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THE CORONATION OF THEIR MAJESTIES KING GEORGE VI & QUEEN ELIZABETH.

The Coronation of their Majesties was celebrated on May 12th with great pomp and rejoicings in England. We on behalf of ourselves and our Journal beg to express our sense of profound loyalty to the person of their Majesties and to the throne of the Empire. The description of this magnificent ceremony that we have read in the papers, especially the article by Mr. Fredrick Grubb on "The Crowning of King George" which appeared in the "Hindu" of May 24 reveals to us in India, the veneration with which the Crown is held by the people of England and the value that is attached by them to the ideas which the Crown symbolises. The sentiment which instinctively arose in the hearts of all Englishmen and which manifested itself on this great occasion is an indication of their innate healthy conservatism which has been not a little responsible for steady and orderly progress in their country and which has kept them proof against the evils of anarchy and revolution which have beset the other countries of Europe. Profound loyalty to the throne and to the Royal House, which the commonsense of the Englishman dictates as a rule of conduct, keeps him away from that mentality which leads the citizen in other countries to accept and submit to militarism and dictatorship.

It has been often remarked—and this is one among the many half-truths current about our country—that loyalty to the person of a King is a peculiarly oriental trait. Confirmation is sought for it in the references that are found in Indian literature to the King being the embodiment of God on earth. Foreign writers about India, even assert that it is almost a rooted religious instinct with the Hindu. But a careful and critical student of ancient Indian literature and history will not fail to observe that loyalty to the King has only been regarded in India as a duty which involves and implies the reciprocal duties of the King towards his subjects. It may be true that veneration for kingship is a dominant characteristic of the Indian mind. But it must be noted that it is based not on mere instinct, but on a

conviction that sovereignty implies good government which maintains the peace and orderliness of society. The Indian mind has always abhorred the idea of *Arājaka*, a word whose English equivalent is anarchy. The *Srimad Bhāgavatā* says that it was due to the absence of *Arājaka* that the great Rājs installed even King Vira on the throne. Loyalty has, therefore, more a political base than otherwise and the reciprocity of the obligations of the King and his subjects is a cardinal element in the Hindu conception of it. Hence, it has been the custom for Kings in Ancient India at the time of their Coronation to exhibit their feelings of love towards their subjects in many ways, for example, by generous gifts, release of prisoners, great benefactions like digging of tanks, construction of public buildings and temples and foundations of charities—a feature which is not prominent on the occasion of Coronation ceremonies of Kings in England and other Western countries. To us, in India, at the present day, the Crown of England under the British Empire symbolises the existence of a strong Central Government, the need for which has always been felt throughout Indian history, for, whenever the Central Government has been weak, India has suffered. Nowadays too, under British rule, the policy of too much provincialization and decentralization has been condemned and far-seeing statesmanship among public men in India has always been on the side of a policy of the maintenance of a strong Central Government which will promote the unity of India and the feeling of solidarity among its people. In ancient days too, the masterminds of India have always longed for the grand conception of a single Emperor of India. Kālidāsa loved to picture it and Śaṅkara bewailed the degeneracy of his days which made a *Sārvabhauma Kṣatriya* unknown in his times, and the Tamil Saint Appar in one of his beautiful devotional songs extolled the sole sovereignty of the whole country as conferring the highest material happiness upon people.

The Imperial throne of England will find an abiding place in the hearts of its numerous Indian subjects by its beneficent influence in securing the attainment of freedom to India. May we therefore hope and trust that the throne of England would continue in greater degree to be the symbol of peace and orderly progress throughout the Empire and of the speedy evolution of India into a self-governing dominion!

"Weal to the people! and good governance, may the Sovereign vouchsafe. To the sacred cow and the saintly custodian of culture, weal for ever! and happiness to all!"

*"Santi prajābhyaḥ paripālāyanām
 ayāyena mārgena mahimā mahiṣāḥ |
 tūbrāhmaṇeभ्यः श्रद्धायाः नित्यम्
 लोकं समस्तं सुखिनो भवन्तु ॥"*



SANSKRIT LEARNING IN THE CŌLA EMPIRE.

BY

K. A. NILAKANTHA SASTRI.

Tamil culture attained its high-water mark under the Cōla emperors of the house of Vijayākṣaya. From the tenth century to the close of the thirteenth they ruled South India with rare distinction and bestowed on the country the benefits of a strong, unified and enlightened administration. In those days the Cōla empire was a power whose cultural influence permeated the most distant lands. Learning and the arts received a great impetus, and the most brilliant epoch in the political annals of Southern India is marked also by splendid achievements in the realms of literature, philosophy and fine arts.

The culture of this great age was a composite culture, the result of the interaction through centuries between southern and northern influences, at once Tamil and Sanskrit in its inspiration, a truly South Indian thing. And there is nothing unique in this. When two cultures, originally independent, come into contact, and this contact is sustained for a period sufficiently long, there always emerges a new culture which draws sustenance from both the original cultures, and yet perceptibly differs from them. Such was the result of the further spread of Hindu influences from South India across the seas to the Malay peninsula, the Archipelago and Indo-China. And there is no reason to suppose that the process and the result differed at an earlier stage of the formation and spread of Hindu culture.

In the consciousness of the people of the Cōla empire, in fact, there was ever present a vivid sense of the debt they owed to the Sanskrit language and culture, and this comes out clearly in the numerous inscriptions of the age and in some striking literary references. Throughout the hundreds of villages which flourished in the empire, numerous endowments were created for all kinds of purposes, and several of these were earmarked for the promotion of the study of one Veda or another, a system of philosophy or ritual, grammar, rhetoric and so on, and for the holding of periodical competitions and the award of prizes for the most proficient among the competitors. The exposition in temples of the Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata and Purāṇas of a sectarian

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character was also provided for. Besides these relatively minor endowments for the study of individual subjects in different centres, there were large-sized residential colleges, each with tens of teachers and scores of pupils pursuing all the different Vedas and Śāstras simultaneously. The most conspicuous examples of such residential colleges in the enjoyment of considerable endowments were those at Eṇṇāyiram, Tribhuvani and Tirumukkūdal. There must have been others, but we have now no definite knowledge of them.

Everyone knows that the age of the Cōlas was the golden age of Tamil literature, and that the courts of these emperors and their vassals were adorned by poets of the first magnitude like Jayanṅkondār, Ottakkūttan, Śekkilār and Kaṇṇaṇ. But it is not as well known that the same age also witnessed much excellent work carried on in the realm of Sanskrit. A great Bhāṣya on the Ṛgveda was composed on the banks of the Kāvērī in the reign of the great king Parāntaka I, (907-53 A. D.) also called Vira Cōla. Mādhava, the son of Veṅkaṭārya and Sundarī, and author of this extensive and important work, states expressly that he lived happily in the Cōla country when he wrote his work:—

“Jagatāmekavīrasya cōleṣu nivasan sukhaṃ |
tiram-āśritya nivasan kāvēryā dakṣiṇam sukhaṃ||”

and so on. The tradition of patronising Sanskrit authors was continued by the successors of Parāntaka through several generations. Thus we see that Rājarāja II (1146-70 A. D.) commissioned a certain Keśavasvāmī, who was already in his service, to undertake a work which the monarch had long had in mind, viz. the compilation, for the benefit of young pupils, of a lexicon in which words would be arranged in their alphabetical order for easy reference, and their different meanings expounded. The result was the production of the *Nānārthārṇavasamkṣepa*, a work that has fortunately come down to us in its entirety and may now be read in an excellent edition by Mahāmahopādhyāya T. Gaṇapati Śāstri in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series. The language in which the king's command is reported shows the personal interest of the monarch in the enterprise and its proper execution, and gives us the same kind of impression as Umāpatiśiva's narration of the circumstances leading to the composition of the *Periya Purāṇam* in the reign of Rājarāja's father, Kulottuṅga II, Anapāya. Surely the Cōla emperors felt like a sage writer of a later time:

இருமொழியு சேனென்று கிதந்தைய லுமேதமே.

LINGUISTIC "PRESERVATIONS" IN MALAYĀLAM.

BY

L. V. RAMASWAMI AİYAR, M.A., LL.

(*Maharaja's College, Ernakulam.*)

Malayālam which in its earliest stages was more allied to what I have denominated Early Middle Tamil than to any other Dravidian speech, has actively preserved, with the modifications induced by lapse of time, in both the literary and the colloquial varieties of modern speech a number of features which, though current in the older stages of Tamil, have disappeared to-day in many colloquial varieties of this East Coast speech.

These "preservations" in Mal. are mostly features mirrored in Early Middle Tamil, though there are a few which may have to be traced to an earlier stage of Tamil and marked off as "archaisms" of the West Coast dialect.

The modern Tamil colloquials with which I have compared these features of modern Mal. are those spoken in the districts of Trichy and Tanjore. I am told that the Jaffna colloquial has several peculiarities of its own; but as I have not yet had the opportunity of studying these peculiarities, I have confined my observations in this essay to the colloquials of Trichy and Tanjore, which might be said to represent (in a very rough way indeed) South Indian colloquial Tamil.

The Mal. "preservations" discussed here are alike literary and colloquial to-day; further, they are everywhere commonly used in Malabar.

I have traced the evolution of these Mal. features elsewhere.

1. *r* is a *valleljuttu* according to the Tamil grammatical tradition [cf. Tol. Et., 19], but in many Tamil-speaking areas it is given the value of a sibilant *ṣ* when it occurs in initial positions. Medially, what is represented with the symbol for short *r* is also evaluated as *ṣ*. The sound of *r* in medial *cc*, *rc*, *jc* [the latter two groups occurring as sandhi resultants] and of *j* in the group *ñj* is

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that of an affricate constituted of an unexploded plosive element and the sibilant.

In Mal., initial *c*, medial *-cc-*, and *j* in *ñjare* are evaluated always as affricates.

That the affricate value for *c*- in initial positions may have been older at least in a number of native instances is indicated by (i) the evidence of *Tolkāppiyam*; (ii) the evaluation of *c*- as an affricate in other Dravidian languages like Telugu; (iii) the existence of the affricate value in regional colloquials of Tamil (e.g., in *Tinnevely*); (iv) the history of the initial *c*- of a number of Tam.—Mal. words corresponding to words with initial *k*- in other Dravidian languages like Kannaḍa (and Brāhūi), in which instances one can postulate the palatalisation of the velar (to a palatal stop) and then the assibilation of this stop to an affricate value.

2. The palatal nasal *ñ* occurs initially in modern Tamil colloquials only in adaptations from Skt. like *ñāyam* [Skt. *jñāna*], *ñāpakam* [Skt. *jñāpaka*] and occasionally *ñāyam* [Skt. *nyāya*]. The initial *ñ*- of old native words like *ñāṇ*, *ñāyiru*, *ñāl*-, etc. is brought out in Tamil colloquials to-day only with the value of an alveolar point-nasal *ṇ*. The process of change appears to have started in the colloquials from at least the Late Middle Tamil period, inasmuch as the inscriptions of this period have instances like the following with the blade-dental *n* in the stead of *ñ* :—

nāyru [with the blade-dental *n* for *ñ*] in SH, II, p. 121.

nāyaru [" "] in SH, III, p. 240.

The blade-dental *n* in initial positions was also gradually replaced by the point-nasal alveolar *ṇ* from about this period (see below). The modern colloquials have thus come to possess the alveolar *ṇ* for *ñ* initially in these words.

Mal., however, has preserved the old initial *ñ* "scrupulously" in words like *ñāṇṇ*, *ñāṇ*, *ñāyāṇṇa* 'Sunday', *muṇ-ñāṇṇu* 'day before yesterday' [*<muṇ-ñāyru*], *ñāl*-, etc. So "popular" has *ñ*- been in Mal. that it shows *ñ*- in *ñāy* 'I' [Tam. *yāṇ*, *nāṇ*] and *ñāṇṇaḷ*, *ñāṇṇaḷ* 'we', the Tamil cognates of which do not have *ñ*- at any stage.—Further, derivative long *ñā* was also evolved in the earliest stages of Mal. from older *ñj* and from Skt. *ñj*.

Tamil literary *ñ*- in initial positions is to be traced to different sources:—

(i) Old native *ñ*-, as in *ñayñu*, *ñay*, etc. Modern Tamil colloquials have replaced it with alveolar *ṇ*, while Mal. preserves it.

(ii) The sandhi meeting of *-ai* or *-y* (of monosyllabics) with the blade-dental *n* following, as in *ai-ñ-ñayñ*. This change is mentioned in Viracōliyam [Candippadalam, 17] and in Nagnūl 124. Modern Mal. *aññayñ* preserves the old *ññ*, while I have heard only *aiy-ṇayñ* or *ayy-ṇayñ* [with the alveolar *ṇṇ* in these two last-mentioned instances] in the Tamil colloquials with which I am acquainted.

(iii) Middle Tamil inscriptions *i-ñ-ñagarattu* [SI, III, p. 269], *i-ñ-ñilam* [*ib.*, III, p. 254] owe their *ñ* (instead of the normal blade-dental *n*) to the same phonetic principle that underlies the change in (i) above.

Neither Tamil nor Mal. preserves this *ñ*.

(iv) Sandhi meeting of *ṇ* and *y*, in *may ṇatta* [Tol. E., 147]. This optional *ñ* is not met with in the present-day speech of Mal. or of Tamil.

(v) Adaptation of Skt. *jñ*-, *ny*-, (or *j*):—

ñāpakam, *ñāyam*, etc. appear in Old Mal.; to-day, however, Skt. *jñ* is "correctly" evaluated by those who know Sanskrit. *ñāyam* for Skt. *nyāya* is, however, quite frequently heard in Mal. speech.

3. The blade-dental *n* has always been distinguished from the point-nasal alveolar *ṇ* in Tamil grammatical tradition. The descriptions of these sounds in Tol. E., 93 and 94 make these points clear. For the dental *n*, Sūtra 93 refers to the slightly spread-out character of the tongue-blade ("*nāṇṇi parandu*") and to the dental position ("*paṇṇuday maruṇṇi*"). For the alveolar *ṇ*, the bare reference to *ṇuṇṇō* 'tongue-tip' shows the "coronal" character of the sound.

This distinction is kept up clearly in Mal. pronunciation, while colloquial Tamil uses the point-nasal alveolar everywhere except in the group *nd*.

The tendency to replace the blade-dental by the alveolar is already reflected in Middle Tamil colloquial instances like the following:—

ṇāl-u/akku [SI, I, p. 113.]

ṇāyayārkkū [*ib.*, I, p. 118.]

Though literary Tamil, as written to-day, correctly uses the symbols for the blade-dental and the alveolar, little difference is made in the actual evaluation of the two sounds.

In Mal, the distinction has never been forgotten or confused. Cf. the following observations of the fourteenth-century grammar *Līlātīlakam* on the subject:—

*sthānabheda'pyasti, nakārasya dantaḥ sthānam.
karaṇam te tadā jihvāyā vistāraḥ. nakārasya mūrdhā. lātra
jihvāgrasyomatiḥ.*

Mal., in its earliest stages, also developed the long dental derivative *m* from older sounds [(i) old *nd* (*n*) old *ṅr* i.e., the group constituted of the alveolar nasal and the alveolar plosive, (ii) Skt. *ṇḍ*].

4. The long alveolar plosive *tt* is evaluated as a pure alveolar in both literary and colloquial Mal.,¹ while in the colloquial Tamil of South India² the tendency to use the long blade-dental plosive value *tt* has been conspicuous from at least the period of the commentary on *Viracōḷiyam* which [*kiryāpadappaḍalam*, 12] refers to the "corrupt" practice of using *-tt-* instead of alveolar *tt* in instances like *āttukkal* and *ēttunūlam*.

In the Tamil colloquials of South India, the blade-dental *tt* (sometimes "palatalised" to *cc* by preceding front vowels) is commonly used for the alveolar *tt* in nouns like *kāttu*, verb-bases like *tt-*, past *deṁs* like *feṭt-*, third person "irrational" finites like *ōḍittu*, *āccu* [*<ō(y)ttu <ōyittu <ōyirru.*] etc.

5. Mal. forms like *veylattu*, *maḷa-y-attu*, *teru-v-attu*, *nīḷ-v-attu*, etc. have a "locative" force with the force of "at", and are governed by verbs. Such forms are quite common and frequent

1. The dental group *-tt-*, instead of the "correct" alveolar group, is heard sometimes in Mal. in *ēlāttilum* and in the mass-colloquial *ittūnaḷ* [*<veṇṇūnaḷ*]. The long alveolar plosive is, however, so deep-rooted in Malayāḷi articulation that after the front vowel *i*, even the long cerebral *tt* is in regional evaluation converted into a long alveolar.

2. I learn that till very recently the long alveolar *tt* [= *rt* in writing] and the alveolar group *nd* [= *ṅr* in writing] were evaluated with "correct" values in the colloquial of Jaffna.

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in literature and in the colloquials. The *-attu* here is the augment *-att-* (appearing in inflexional forms of words with final *-am*; cf. Tol. E.I., 186) transferred by analogy to bases like *vayyil*, *maḷa*, *teru*, etc. with which this augment is normally not associated.

This analogical transference is not a new one in Mal., however. Sūtras 242, 243, 288, 306, 378 and 403 of Tol. E.I. refer to the use of the augment *-att-* in connection with *maḷai*, *paṇi*, *vaḷi*, *vay*, *vayil* and *iru* respectively.

In this connection, I may also mention that both the literary and the colloquial varieties of Mal. use to-day forms *agattu vannu* 'came inside' *puṇattu pōyi* 'went outside', etc. in which the original augment *-att-* is employed without any other "casal" or "post-positional" ending, to denote a locative meaning. Such a usage (though current in literary Tamil) is foreign to the Tam. colloquials that I know of.

6. The representative of *kāi*, one of the post-positions with a seventh case force [Tol. Col., 82; Nappūl, 302] is very active in Mal. to-day (with its vowel shortened at a very early stage) in forms like *paḍikkol* 'at or near the gate', *vāḍil-k-kai*, etc.

Modern Tam. colloquials do not appear to have this post-position.

7. The use of the augment *-in-* in the inflexional forms of nominal bases, particularly in genitives and datives, has been "inherited" (with some modifications) from the "parent" speech of the West Coast, closely allied to Early Middle Tamil.

The modern colloquials of Tamil generally eschew the use of the augment *-in-* in inflexional positions:—*vittukku*, *pū-vukku*, etc.

8. According to Tol. E.I., 209 [cf. also Nappūl, 163], the long demonstratives *ū* and *ī* are to be met with only in poetry even in the Tamil of that period, as in *ū-y-īdai*, *ī-vayināra*. These long demonstratives are not met with in modern Tamil colloquials. Even in the literary dialect, they are rarely employed to-day.

These long demonstratives have been active in Mal. from the earliest known stages. Kannaḍa and Telugu also have these long demonstratives.

9. The inflexional base *nig-* of the second person sing. pronoun *nī*, is certainly a very old archaism in the West Coast speech, since even during the Middle Tamil period *ng-* had begun to exercise dominance in Tamil.

10. The third person "rational" plural pronoun *avar* stands in Mal. for "normal plurality", as well as for "honorific plurality" with reference to women. In colloquial Tamil *avar* has usually only an honorific value, while real plurality is denoted by *avūl* (<*avargaḷ*). Mal. *avargaḷ* is exclusively honorific.

11. The inflexional bases *avayr-*, *iṅayr-*¹ of the non-rational plural *ava* and *iva* are still used in Mal., though restricted in application to cattle and sometimes to "low-caste" people. The modern Tamil colloquials employ only *avugaḷ*, *iḍugaḷ* in these contexts.

12. The causatives with the so-called *-ri-*, *-bi-*, *-ppi-*, which are rare in Śaṅgam Tamil but appear numerous in post-Śaṅgam literature, are not widely represented in the South Indian colloquial Tamil speech of to-day. In the Trichy and Tanjore dialects I have heard only a few like *Kāmi* (<*Kāmbi*), *terivi*, *taruvi*.

In Mal., the causatives of this type with the endings *-vi* or *-i* and *-pp-* are frequent and well-rooted in colloquial speech.

13. The characteristic Mal. present tense ending *-iṅṅ-* [with the blade-dental *ṅṅ*] is derived ultimately from *-iṅṅ-* cognate with Early Middle Tamil present tense ending *-g-iṅṅ-*.

But the Tamil present tense ending used in modern colloquials is *-iṅ-* or *-g-iṅ-*, a variant of *-g-iṅṅ-* [with loss of the nasal?]. This *-g-iṅ-* appears to have gained currency in the late Middle Tamil period; and it is mentioned in Viracōḷiyam [Kiriyaḍapaḍalam, 4].

14. The adverbial future participles of the type of *varuvāṇ*, *kāṇṇṇ* (<*kāṇmāṇ*; Tam. *kāṇbāṇ*), and *edupṇṇ* are indispensable in Mal. to-day both in literary speech and in the colloquial dialects.

1. The symbol *r̥* used in the transliteration of Mal. words in this essay stands for the long alveolar plosive (without any such *r*-sound as is incorporated in the evaluation of literary Tamil).

In Tamil colloquials, I have heard the type used only in contexts like *varuvāṅ ēy ?*

This type with *vāṅ*, *ppāṅ* became active in the Early Middle Tamil period and was evolved from syntactic modifications of original future finites and participial nouns. In Mal., the type has been preserved with different syntactic functions, chief among these being its use as a "purpose"-participle (in which respect it displaced the old infinitive participle with the signification of "purpose"), while in modern colloquial Tamil the use of the type under reference has become limited to *varuvāṅ ēy ?*, etc.

15. Mal. relative participles of the type of *ōḍiya*, *pāḍiya* show -y-, while colloquial Tamil has -u- in *ōḍiya*, *pāḍiya*, etc.

The type of *ōḍiya* was almost exclusive in Śaṅgam Tamil in relative participles; in Early Middle Tamil both this type and that of *ōḍiya* are met with.

16. Mal. colloquials (as well as the literary speech) employ the old optative of the type of *ceyga*, as a polite second personal imperative to-day.

I have not heard this type used as a second personal imperative in the Tamil colloquials with which I am acquainted.

Used in Śaṅgam Tamil for third personal forms, it was associated in Middle Tamil with other persons also. Old Mal. used it for the second and the third persons, while New Mal. has converted it into a polite second personal imperative.

17. The use of the verbal nouns with -ga or -ka (corresponding to those with Tamil *gai* or -*kat*) is varied and frequent in modern Mal. [see my EMM, p. 87].

In Tamil colloquials, I have heard forms like *varugai-y-il*, *ceygai-y-il*, *ūgai-y-iṅ-il-ē*, but not the others which Mal. employs to-day.

18. The Mal. plural imperatives of the type of *ceyyin* (<*ceyyin*), *ceṇṇṇin*, *kāṇṇin*, etc. are used neither in the literary dialect of Tamil nor in its colloquial varieties. The literary dialect of Tamil has -*niṅ* for all forms.

19. The Mal. negative finites of the type of *ceyyunn-illa*, *ceyib-illa* correspond to the Middle Tamil type of *ceygiy-il-ēy*,

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etc. (with the personal endings in Tamil), *ceyd-il-ēn*, etc. This type is not heard in the Tamil colloquials with which I am acquainted.

20. The Mal. type of *ceyga-y-illa* with a future (and in some contexts an "indeterminate") force is not represented in the Tamil colloquials under reference; but Middle Tamil used collocations like *ceygai-y-uṇḍu*, *ūgai-y-am uṇḍu*, *ūgai-y-illai*.



THE NUMBER OF RASAS

BY

V. RAGHAVAN, M.A., PH.D.

(Continued from Vol. X, Pt. iv, p. 353.)

V

The Text of the Abhinavabhāratī on the Śānta Rasa.

In this section, I am presenting the text of the Abhinavabhāratī on the Śānta rasa. It would have been unnecessary to give this text here, if the text available in the Gaekwad Edition had not been so error-ridden. The text presented here by me is as corrected with the help of my Professor, Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar. I give in the foot-notes the incorrect readings found in the MS in the Madras Government Oriental MSS Library with the letter 'M', and in the Gaekwad Edition with the letter 'G'.¹ There are still a few passages of which completely satisfying reconstruction has not been possible. After the MS of this text had been prepared for the Press, Pandit H. Sesha Aiyangar of the Kanarese Department of the Madras University placed at my disposal the readings in two MSS of the Abhinavabhāratī from Māngāy Koil, which belong to H. H. the Jiyar of Melkote. Some of the readings in these two Māngāy MSS supported our reconstructions while many agreed with those found in the Gaek. Edition. Two of the Māngāy readings were definitely helpful and these are given, besides a few others, in secondary foot-notes with the letters 'A', 'B'.

It is well known that Hemacandra, who reproduces whole sections from Abhinava, helps us a good deal in the task of reconstructing the text of the Abhinavabhāratī. The Śānta Rasa section in the Abhinavabhāratī is to be found, with the omission of some parts, on p. 68 (text and com.), pp. 80-87 (com.) and p. 96. (com.) of Hemacandra's Kāvyaṇuśāsana. As pointed out in the secondary foot-notes, Hemacandra supports the two Māngāy readings selected by me, towards the close of the section.

1. *Vide* Nāṭya Śāstra, Gaek. Edn., Vol. I, pp. 333-342.

अभिनवभारत्यां

शान्तरसप्रकरणम्

ये पुनर्नैव रसा इति पठन्ति, तन्मते शान्तस्वरूपमभिधीयते । तत्र केचिदाहुः—शान्तः शमस्यापिभावात्मकः तपस्यायोगिसंपर्कादिभिः विभावै-
रुत्पद्यते । तस्य कामकोपाद्यभावरूपैरनुभावैरभिनयः । व्यभिचारी
भूतिमतिप्रभृतिरिति ॥

एतदपरे न सहन्ते, शमशान्तयोः पर्यायत्वात्, एकाग्रपञ्चाशद्भावा
इति संख्यायागात् । किञ्च विभावा ऋतुमाल्यादयः तत्समनन्तरभाविनि
शृङ्गारादावनुसन्धीयन्त इति युक्तम् । तपोऽभ्ययनादयस्तु न शान्तस्य ^१समन-
न्तरहेतवः । तत्त्वज्ञानस्य ^२अनन्तरहेतव इति चेत् पूर्वोदिततत्त्वज्ञानेऽपि
तर्हि प्रयोज्यतेति तपोऽभ्ययनादीनां विभावता ^३त्यक्ता स्यात् । ^४कामाद्य-
भावोऽपि नानुभावः, शान्ताद्विपश्चादव्यावृत्तेः, अगमकत्वात्, प्रयोगासमवायि-
त्वाच्च ; न हि चेष्टाव्युपरमः प्रयोगयोग्यः । सुप्तमोहादयोऽपि हि निःश्वासो-
च्छ्वासपतनभूषणनादिभिः ^५चेष्टाभिरेवानुभाव्यन्ते^६ । भूतिप्रभृतिरपि प्राप्त-
विषयोपरागः^७ कथं शान्ते स्यात् ? न चाकिञ्चित्करत्वमात्रेण तत्त्वज्ञानोपाये
व्युत्पाद्यन्ते^८ विनेयाः^९ । ^{१०}नैते परदुःखदुःखितमनसो दृश्यन्ते^{११} सम्य-
ग्दर्शन^{१२} समावस्थां प्राप्ताः, अपि तु संसारे । तन्न शान्तो रस इति ॥

1. M. and G. शमनस्य ये हेतवः

2. M. अनन्तहेतवः

3. M. पूर्वोदिततत्त्वज्ञानेऽपि

4. G. युक्ता

5. M. कामाद्यनुभावः

6. M. भूषणादिभिः

7. M. अनुभाव्यते

8. M. and G. प्राप्तविषयोप-

भोगः

9. G. तत्त्वज्ञानोपायः व्युत्पाद्यते

10. G. विनेये

11. G. चैते

12. G.—मानसो दृश्यते

अत्रोच्यते—यथा¹ इह तावत् धर्मादिव्रितयम्, एवं² मोक्षोऽपि पुरुषार्थः शास्त्रेषु स्मृतीतिहासादिषु च प्राधान्येनोपायतो व्युत्पाद्यत इति सुप्रसिद्धम् । यथा च कामादिषु समुचिताश्चित्तवृत्तयो रत्यादिशब्दवाच्याः कविनटव्यापारेण आस्वादयोग्यताप्रापणद्वारेण तथाविधहृदयसंवाद्यतः सामाजिकान् प्रति रसत्वं शृङ्गारादितया नीयन्ते, तथा मोक्षाभिधानपरम-पुरुषार्थोचिता चित्तवृत्तिः किमिति रसत्वं³ नानीयत इति वक्तव्यम् । या चासी तथामूला चित्तवृत्तिः सैवात्र स्थायिभावः । एतत्तु चिन्त्यम्—किञ्चा-मासी ? तत्त्वज्ञानोत्थितो निर्वेद इति केचित् । तथा हि—दारिद्र्यादिप्रभवो यो निर्वेदः ततोऽन्य एव, हेतोस्तत्त्वज्ञानस्य वैलक्षण्यात् । स्थायिसञ्चारि-मध्ये धैतदर्थमेवायं पठितः⁴, अन्यथा साङ्गलिको मुनिः तथा न पठेत् । जुगुप्सां च व्यभिचारित्वेन शृङ्गारे निषेधन्⁵ मुनिर्भावानां सर्वेषामेव स्थायि-त्वसञ्चारित्वचित्ततत्ताजत्व⁶ अनुभावस्थानि⁷ योग्यतोपनिपतितानि शब्दार्थ-बलाकृतानि अनुजानाति । तत्त्वज्ञानजश्च निर्वेदः स्थाय्यन्तरोपमर्दकः⁸ । भाववैचित्र्यसहिष्णुभ्यो रत्यादिभ्यो यः परमः¹⁰ स्थायिशीलः, स एव हि स्थाय्यन्तराणामुपमर्दकः ॥

इदमपि पर्यनुमुञ्चते—तत्त्वज्ञानजो निर्वेदोऽस्य¹¹ स्थायीति वदता तत्त्व-ज्ञानमेवात्र विभावत्वेन उक्तं स्यात् । वैराग्यसंकीर्णादिषु¹² कथं विभावत्वम् ? तदुपायादिति चेत् कारणकारणेऽयं विभावताव्यवहारः, स चातिप्रसङ्गावहः । किञ्च निर्वेदो नाम सर्वत्रानुपादेयताप्रत्ययो वैराग्यलक्षणः, स च तत्त्वज्ञानस्य प्रत्युतापयोगी । विरक्तो हि तथा प्रयतेते, यथास्य तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते ;

1. यथा is omitted in M.
2. M. एव
3. M. रसत्वात्
4. M. परितः
5. M. निषेधम्
6. M. reads चिन्ततात्तापत्वं
and G. चिन्तनात् तावत्. Both mean
little. We must have a word
there to mean सात्त्विकत्व. All
writers from Bharata explain
Sattva as Manas and therefore
चित्ततत्ताज, however much un-
couth the word may be, is sug-
gested as standing here to mean

सात्त्विकभाव. Unfortunately,
Hemacandra's epitome of this
passage (p. 68, com.) does not
have this word.

7. M. and G.—अनुभावस्थानात्
नियोग्यतोपनिपतिता निःशब्दबलाकृता

8. G. वा नानुजाति

M. ननु जानाति.

9. M. उपमर्दकभाव etc.

10. M. and G. परमस्थाविशीलः

11. M. and G. व्यवस्थायीति

12. G. and Hemacandra.

वैराग्यसंकीर्णादिषु

तत्त्वज्ञानाद्धि मोक्षः, न तु तत्त्वं ज्ञात्वा निर्विद्यते, निर्वेदाच्च मोक्ष इति ।
 'वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः' (ई. कृ. साङ्ख्यकारिका-४५) इति हि तत्रभवन्तः ।
 ननु तत्त्वज्ञानिनः सर्वत्र दृढतरं वैराग्यं दृष्टम् । तत्रभवद्विरुद्धम् — 'तत्परं
 पुरुषक्यातेर्गुणवैतृष्यम्' (योगसूत्रम्—१. १३) इति । भव्यवेम् ;
 'तादृशं तु वैराग्यं ज्ञानस्यैव परा काष्ठा' इति मुञ्जकविमुनेव* भगवताभ्यधायि ।
 ततश्च तत्त्वज्ञानानामेवेदं तत्त्वज्ञानमालया परिपोष्यमाणमिति न निर्वेदः
 स्थायी ; किन्तु तत्त्वज्ञानमेव स्थायी भवेत् । यत्तु स्वभिचारिण्याक्यानावसरे
 वक्ष्यते तच्चिरकालविभ्रमविप्रलम्भस्योपादेयत्वनिवृत्तये यत्सम्यग्ज्ञानम्,
 यथा—

बुधा दुग्धोऽनङ्गवान् स्तनभरनता गौरिति परं
 परिप्लवक्तुः पण्डो युवतिरिति लावण्यरहितः ।
 कृता वैदूर्याशा विकचकिरणे काचशकले
 मया मूढेन त्वां कृपणमगुणं प्रणमता ॥

इति तन्निर्वेदस्य खेदरूपस्य विभावत्वेन ; एतच्च तत्रैव वक्ष्यामः ॥

ननु मिथ्याज्ञानमूलो विषयगन्धः तत्त्वज्ञानात् प्रशम्यतीति दुःखजन्म-
 सूत्रेण अक्षपादपादैः भगवद्भिः मिथ्याज्ञानापचयकारणे^१ तत्त्वज्ञानं वैराग्यस्य
 दोषापायलक्षणस्य कारणमुक्तम् । ननु ततः किम् ? ननु वैराग्यं निर्वेदः ?
 क एवमाह ? निर्वेदो हि शोकप्रवाहप्रसररूपाश्चिच्छित्तविशेषः । वैराग्यं तु
 रागादीनां प्रभवंसः । भवतु वा वैराग्यमेव निर्वेदः । तथापि तस्य
 स्वकारणवशात् मध्यभाविनोऽपि न मोक्षे साध्ये सूत्रस्थानीयता^२ प्रत्यपादि
 आचार्येण । किञ्च तत्त्वज्ञानोत्थितो निर्वेद इति क्षमस्यैवेदं निर्वेदनाम कृतं
 स्यात् । क्षमशान्तयोः पर्यायत्वं तु हासहास्याभ्यां व्याख्यातम् ; 'सिद्ध-
 साध्यतया, 'लौकिकालौकिकत्वेन साधारणासाधारणतया च वैलक्षण्यं
 क्षमशान्तयोरपि सुलभमेव । तस्मात्तु निर्वेदः स्थायीति ॥

अन्ये मन्यन्ते रत्यादय एवाष्टौ चित्तवृत्तिविशेषा उक्ताः । त एव
 कथितविभावविश्लिष्टश्रुताद्यलौकिकविभावविशेषसंश्रयाः विचित्रा एव तावन् ।

* Not Patanjali, but Vyāsa
 in this Bhāṣya. (Ānandāśrama
 Edn. p. 20.)

1. M. and G. कारणतत्त्वज्ञान

2. M. त्पादाचारिव

G. त्पादाचारीव

3. M. and G. सिद्धं साध्येते

4. M. and G. यदलौकिकत्वेन

A. This is read as मावत्वेन in one of the two Māngāv Mss.
 Both M. and G. have विभावत्वेन. Hemacandra also reads only
 विभावत्वेन. (p. 81, K. Anu.vyā.)

ततश्च तन्मध्यादेव अन्यतमोऽत्र स्थायी । तत्र अनाहता¹नन्दमयस्वात्म-
विषया रतिरेव मोक्षसाधनमिति, सैव ²ज्ञान्ते स्थायिनीति । यद्योक्तम्—

यश्चात्मरतिरेव स्यात् आत्मतृप्तश्च मानवः ।

आत्मन्येव च सन्तुष्टः तस्य कार्यं न विद्यते ॥ (गीता. ३-१५.)

इति । एवं समस्तविषयं वैकृतं पश्यतः, विधं च शोच्यं विलोकयतः,
सांसारिकं च वृत्तान्तम् अपकारित्वेन पश्यतः, सातिशयमसम्मोहप्रधानं
वीर्यम्³ आश्रितवतः, सर्वस्मात् विषयसार्धाद् ⁴विन्यतः, सर्वलोकस्पृहणीयादपि
प्रमदादेः जुगुप्समानस्य, ⁵अपूर्वस्वात्मातिशयलाभात् विस्मयमानस्य
मोक्षसिद्धिरिति ⁶रतिहासादीनां विस्मयान्नामानाम् अन्यतमस्य स्थायित्वं
निरूपणीयम् । न चैतन्मुनेने सम्मतम् । यावदेव हि विशिष्टान् ⁷भावान्
परिगणयति ⁸रत्यादिशब्देन चक्षुदेन च तत्प्रकारानेव अन्यान् सङ्गृहीते,
तावदेव तद्व्यतिरिक्तालौकिकहेतूपनतानां रत्यादीनामनुजानात्येव अपवर्ग-
विषयत्वम् । एवंवादिनां तु परस्परमेव ⁹विशारक्ताम् एकस्य स्थायित्वं
विशीर्षित एव । तदुपायभेदान् तस्य तस्य स्थायित्वमित्युच्यमानं
प्रत्युक्तमेव¹⁰ । स्थायिभेदेन प्रतिपुरुषं रसस्याप्यानन्त्यापत्तेः¹¹ । मोक्षहेतुत्वाद्
एको रस इति चेत्, ¹²क्षयैककलत्वे वीररौद्रयोरप्येकत्वं स्यात् ॥

अन्ये तु पानकरसवदविभागं प्राप्ताः सर्वे एव रत्यादयोऽत्र स्थायिन
इत्याहुः । चित्तवृत्तीनामनुगपद्भावात्, अन्योन्यं च विरोधाद् एतदपि
न मनोक्षम् ॥

कस्तर्ह्यत्र स्थायी ? उच्यते—इह तत्त्वज्ञानमेव तावन्मोक्षसाधनमिति
तस्यैव मोक्षे स्थायिता युक्ता । तत्त्वज्ञाने च नामात्मज्ञानमेव । आत्मनश्च
व्यतिरिक्तस्य विषयस्यैव¹³ ज्ञानम् ; परोक्षेव¹⁴ मात्मा अनात्मैव स्यात् । विपश्चितं
चैतदस्मद्गुरुभिः । अस्माभिश्चान्यत्र वितन्यत इति इह नातिनिर्बन्धः कृतः ।
तेन आत्मैव ज्ञानानन्दादिविशुद्धभोगयोगी परिकल्पितविषयोपभोगरहितोऽत्र
स्थायी । न चास्य स्थायितया स्थायित्वं वचनीयम् । रत्याद्यो हि तत्तत्कार-

1. M. and G. ज्ञानं

शब्देन च तत्प्रकारानेव

2. M. and G. शान्ते

9. M. and G. विचारयतां

3. M. and G. विनिवृत्तम्

10. M. and G. प्रगुणमेव

4. M. and G. शङ्कतः

11. M. and G. आपत्तौ

5. M. and G. पूर्वस्वात्म

12. M. क्षमैकः

6. रति is omitted in

G. क्षमैकः

M. and G.

13. M. व्यतिरिक्तस्योदयस्यैव ज्ञानम्.

7. M. and G. विभावान्

G. व्यतिरिक्त इन्द्रियस्यैव ज्ञानं

8. M. and G. परिगणयत्यादि-

14. M. and G. आत्मनात्मैव.

णान्तरोदयप्रलयोत्पद्यमान¹ निरुध्यमानवृत्तयः कश्चित् कालम् ²आपेक्षिकतया स्थायिरूपात्मभित्तिसंश्रयाः ³सन्तः स्थायिन इति उच्यन्ते । तत्त्वाज्ञानं तु सकलभावान्तरभित्तिस्यातीत्ये सर्वस्थायिभ्यः स्थायितमं सर्वा रत्यादिकाः ⁴चित्तवृत्तीः⁵ व्यभिचारीभावयन्⁶ निसर्गत एव सिद्धस्थायिभावमिति ⁷तन्न वचनीयम् । अत एव पृथगस्य गणना न युक्ता । न हि खण्डमुण्डयोर्मध्ये तृतीयं गोत्वमिति गण्यते । तेन एकाक्षपञ्चाशद्भावा इत्यव्याहतमेव । अस्यापि कथं न⁸ पृथगणनेति चेत् पृथग् ⁹आस्वादयोगादिति ब्रूमे । न हि रत्यादय इवेतरा¹⁰संपृक्तेन वपुषा तथाविधमात्मरूपं लौकिकप्रतीति-गोचरः¹¹ । स्वगतमपि अविकल्परूपं व्युत्थानावसरेऽनुसन्धीयमानं चित्त-वृत्त्यन्तरकलुषमेवावभाति ॥

भासतां वा लोके तथा । तथापि न संभवन्मात्रस्थायिनां गणनम्, रसेपृक्तेषु अनुपयोगात् ; अपि तु व्यभिचारित्वेन¹² लक्षणीयत्वं विज्ञायते, नेतरथा¹³ । तथा द्वेकाक्षपञ्चाशद्भावा इति एतत्प्रपञ्चोपपत्तिः । न चास्यात्म-स्वभावस्य ¹⁴व्यभिचारित्वम् ; असम्भवात्, अवैचित्र्यावहत्वात्, अनौचित्याच्च । शम आत्मस्वभावः ; न शमशब्देन¹⁵ मुनिना व्यवदिष्टः । यदि तु स एव शमशब्देन व्यवदिश्यते, निर्बेदशब्देन वा तन्न कश्चिद्बाधः¹⁶ । केवलं शमश्चित्त-वृत्त्यन्तरं¹⁷ निर्बेदोऽपि शरिरादिविभावान्तरोत्थितनिर्बेदतुल्यजातीयः स¹⁸ भवति । तज्जातीय एव हेतुभेदेऽपि तद्व्यपदेश्यो रतिभयादिरिव¹⁹ । तदिद-

1. M. विकटमान

2. M. आपेक्षिकतया

3. M. G. and Hema-
candra omit सन्तः

4. M. वृत्ति

5. M. प्रावयन्ति सर्गतः

6. M. and G. तन्वचनेन

7. M. and G. omit न

8. M. and G. आस्वादयोगात्

9. M. असंपृक्तेन

10. G. गोचरम्

11. M. व्यभिचारित्वात्

G. व्यभिचारिलक्षणीयत्वम्

12. G. नेति

13. M. and G. व्यभिचारित्व-
संभवात्14. M. and G. समात्मस्व-
भावस्य शमशब्देन

15. M. and G. भावः

16. M. and G. चित्तवृत्त्यन्तम्

17. M. and G. न

18. M. and G. भयादिभिरेव

मात्मस्वरूपमेव तत्त्वज्ञानं¹ शमः, तथा च यत्कालुष्योत्तरागविशेषा एवात्मनो
रत्यादयः ; तदनुगमेऽपि शुद्धमस्य रूपम् अव्यवधानसमाधिवत्यात्² अधि-
गम्य, द्युत्यनेऽपि प्रशान्तता³ भवति । यथोक्तम् 'प्रशान्तवाहितासंस्कारात्'⁴
(यो० सू० ३. १८) इति । तत्त्वज्ञानलक्षणस्य च स्वायिनः समस्तोऽयं
लौकिकालौकिकचित्तवृत्तिकलापो व्यभिचारितामभ्येति । तदनुभावा एव च
यमनियमाशुपकृता⁵ अनुभावाः 'उपाङ्गाभिनयाद्यध्यायत्रये च ये स्वभावा-
भिनया वक्ष्यन्ते । अत एते एतद्विषया एव । अयमेव हि स्वभावः । विभावा
अपि⁶ परमेश्वरानुषहप्रभृतयः ; 'प्रक्षयोन्मुखाश्च रत्यादयोऽत्रास्वाद्याः । केवलं
यथा विप्रलम्भे अत्युक्तम्, सम्भोगेऽपि वा 'प्रेमासमाप्नोत्सवम्'⁷ इति, यथा
च रौद्रे औप्रथम्, यथा च करुणबीरभयानकादृतेषु निर्वेदवृत्ति⁸वासदृष्याः
व्यभिचारिणोऽपि प्राधान्येन अवभासन्ते, तथा 'ज्ञान्ते जुगुप्साद्याः सर्वथैव
रागप्रतिपक्षत्वात् । तथा हि महाव्रते⁹ नृकपालादिधारणम्, 'अनुभार्योदि-
समुदायादिचिन्तारसंश्लेषातिकर्माकृतिर्हि धर्मः ? जुगुप्साहेतुत्वेनैव निजा-
भ्यञ्जने¹⁰ च देवरात् पुत्रजन्मनि¹¹ उपादिष्टम् । स्वात्मनि च कृतकृत्यस्य
परार्थघटनायामेवोद्यम इति उत्साहोऽस्य परोपकारविषयेच्छाप्रयत्नरूपो
द्यापरपर्यायोऽभ्यभिक्तोऽन्तरङ्गः । अत एव 'एतज्ज्यभिचारिवत्यात् केचिद्
द्याधीर्येन तत्पादंशान्त, अन्ये धर्मेवीर्येन ॥

ननुत्साहोऽहङ्कारप्राणः शान्तस्त्वहङ्कारशैथिल्यात्मकः¹² । व्यभिचारित्वं
हि विरुद्धस्यापि¹³ न नोचितम्, रताविव निर्वेदोऽपि । 'शर्या शादलम्'
(नागा० ४. २) इत्यादौ हि परोपकारकरणे स्वात्माहम्यैव प्रकर्षो लक्ष्यते । न

1. M. and G. शमता न

2. G. विशुद्धम्

3. M. and G. अधिगम्य

4. M. and G. प्रशान्तिता

5. M. and G. भवन्ति

6. G. अनुकृताः

7. M. अनुभावात् उपाङ्गाभि-

नयस्य...प्यायत्रये ; G. उपाङ्गाभि-

नयस्य (आङ्गिका) प्यायत्रये

8. M. and G. कथम् additional

9. M. वृक्षयोश्च रत्यादयः

10. M. निर्वृति

11. M. and G. न जुगुप्साया द्वैविध्यात्मक

12. M. and G. महाव्रतेन

13. This bit both in M. and G. is very corrupt and sensible emendation was very difficult to be found. Unfortunately, Hemacandra's epitome of this portion does not contain this passage. (p. 81.) The reference here is to the Niyoga ceremony.

14. M. निजाभ्यननम्

G. निजाभ्यर्हणम्

15. M. and G. पुत्रजन्माशुप-

दिष्टम्

16. G. तत्केचित्

M. Gap.

17. M. and G. शैथिल्यात्

18. G. and Hem. नानुचितम्

तु¹ उत्साहशून्या काचिदप्यवस्था² ; इच्छाप्रयत्नव्यतिरेकेण पाषाणतापत्तेः । यत एव च³ परिहृष्टपरावरत्वेन⁴ स्वात्मोद्देशेन कर्तव्यान्तरं नावशिष्यते । अत एव शान्तहृदयानां परोपकाराय शरीरसर्वस्वादिदानं न शान्तविरोधि । 'आत्मानं गोपायेत्' इत्यादिना कृतकृत्यविषयं शरीररक्षणमुपदिश्यते, सम्न्यासिनां 'तद्रक्षादितात्पर्याभावात् । तथा हि—

‘धर्माधिकाममोक्षाणां प्राणाः संस्थितिहेतवः ।

तान्निप्रता किं न हतं रक्षता किं न रक्षितम् ॥’ इति

मुपसिद्धचतुर्वर्गसाधकत्वमेव देहरक्षाया निदानं दर्शितम् । कृतकृत्यस्य जलेऽपि भूमे वा पतेदिति सम्न्यासित्वे भवणात् । तद्यथाकथञ्चित् त्याग्यं शरीरम् । यदि परार्थे त्यज्यं तत् किमिव न संपादितं भवति ? जीमूतबाह्वनादीनां न यदित्यमिति चेत्, किं तेन नः ? तत्त्वज्ञानित्वं तावदवश्यमस्ति । अन्यथा देहात्ममात्रिणां देह एव सर्वस्वभूते धर्माद्यनुद्देशेन परार्थे त्यागस्य ‘असम्भाव्यत्वात् । युद्धेऽपि हि न वीरस्य देहत्यागायोगमः⁵, ⁶परावजयोद्देशेनैव प्रवृत्तेः । भृशुपतनादावपि शुभतरदेहान्तरसंपिपादयिषैवाधिकं विजृम्भते । तत् स्वार्थानुद्देशेन परार्थसम्पत्तये यद्यप्येष्टितं देहत्यागपर्यन्तमुपदेशदानादि तत्तदलब्धात्मतत्त्वज्ञानानामसम्भाव्यमेवेति । तेऽपि तत्त्वज्ञानिनः । ⁷ज्ञानिनां सर्वाधमेषु मुक्तिरिति स्मृतिषु श्रुतिषु च । यथोक्तम्—

‘देवार्चनरतस्तत्त्वज्ञाननिष्ठोऽतिविप्रियः ।

भाद्रं⁸ कृत्वा वदद् द्रव्यं गृहस्थोऽपि हि मुच्यते ॥’ इति ।

केवलं ⁹परार्थाभिसन्धिजान् धर्मान् परोपकारात्मकफलत्वेनैव अभिसंहितात् पुनरपि देहस्य तदुचितस्यैव प्रादुर्भावो बोधिसत्त्वादीनां तत्त्वज्ञानिनामपि ॥

1. M. and Hema. तौ

8. M. and G. असम्भवात्

2. M. अल्पवसावी

9. M. युद्धे विहीनशरीरस्य

3. च is omitted in

त्यागीयमः

M. and G.

G. युद्धेऽपि हि न शरीरस्य

4. M. परावरत्वेन

त्यागाद्योगमः

G. and Hema. परम्परत्वेन

10. M. पराजयः

5. M. मृतताम्

G. परपराजयः

G. लक्षणम्

11. G. तत्त्वज्ञानिनाम्

6. M. तदक्षादि

12. M. भट्टी चरेदविव्यावित्

7. M, G. and Hema. नवतत्त्वम्

13. M. परार्थे हि सन्धिजात्

दृष्टः अङ्गेष्वपि¹ विधान्तिलामः, स्वभावौचित्यात्, यथा रामस्य वीराङ्गे² पितुराज्ञां पालयतः । एवं शृङ्गाराद्यङ्गेष्वपि मन्तव्यम् ।³ अत एव शान्तस्य स्थायित्वेऽपि अप्राधान्यम् । जीमूतवाहने त्रिवर्गसम्पत्तेरेव परोपकृतिप्रधानायाः फलत्वात् । अनेनैवाशयेन नाटकलक्षणे वक्ष्यते— 'शुद्धिविलासादिभिर्गुणैः' (19-11) इति । अनेन हि शुद्धिविलासप्रधानमर्थ-कामोत्तरं रावं चरितं सकललोकहृदयसंवादसुन्दरप्रयोजनं नाटके निवेशयितव्यमित्युक्तम् । एतच्च तत्रैव वर्णयिष्यामः । अनेनैव चाशयेन न शान्ते कश्चन मुनिना जात्यङ्गको विनियोरूपते (Vide Ch. 29 Śls. 1-4) । तेन जात्यङ्गविनियोगाभावात् तदसत्त्वमिति प्रत्युक्तम् ॥

अन्ये तु, 'जीमूतवाहनस्ते पुत्रघाता भविष्यति' (नागा० ४-९) इति शरणार्थिनीं वृद्धामेव ज्ञातवान् । शक्तिश्चास्य न काचित् । पराहिता च न काचिदित्येवमाहुः । तच्चानुमतमेव ; न हि बोधिसत्त्वानां पुनः⁷ अभ्युत्थानात्मक-जीवितमभिसन्धानानुप्रविष्टं शक्तिश्चेति । न च काकतालीयवृत्त्या शास्त्रमुपदिशति । तत् सिद्धं दयालक्ष्णो हृत्साहोऽत्र प्रधानम् । अन्ये तु व्यभिचारिणो यथायोगं भवन्तीति । यथोक्तम् 'तच्छिद्रेषु प्रत्ययान्तराणि संस्कारेभ्यः' (यो० सू० ४. २७) इति । अत एव निष्प्रेष्टत्वादनुभावाभाव इति प्रत्युक्तम् । यदा तु पर्यन्तभूमिका⁸ लाभेऽनुभावाभावः, तदास्य अप्रयोज्यत्वम्, रतिशोकादावपि पर्यन्तदशायाम् अप्रयोगस्य युक्तवान् । हृदयसंवादोऽपि तथाविधतत्त्वज्ञानबीजसंस्कारावितानां भवत्येव ; यद्वक्ष्यति "मोक्षे चापि विरगिणः" (अष्टाध्यायः २७—श्लो. ५९) इति । सर्वस्य⁹ न सर्वत्र हृदयसंवादः, मयानके वीरप्रकृतेरभावान् । ननु नाटशि प्रयोगे वीरस्य क आस्वादः । उच्यते—यत्राद्यं¹⁰ निषध्यते, तत्रावश्यं पुरुषार्थोपयोगिनि शृङ्गार-वीराद्यन्यतममस्येव । तन्निष्ठस्तेषामास्वादः । यत्रापि प्रहसनादौ हास्यादेः प्रधानता तत्राध्यनुनिष्पादि¹¹ रसान्तरनिष्ठ एवास्वादः¹² ।¹³ भिन्नभिन्नाधिकार्यास्वादोद्देश एव रूपकभेदचिन्तने निमित्तमिति केचित् ॥

1. दृष्टः अङ्गेष्वपि is not found in M.

2. M. and G. वीराङ्गम्

3. M. एत एव

4. M. विशालादिभिः

5. M. विशाल

6. M. जीमूतवाहनः कस्ते

G. जीमूतवाहनः कस्ते

7. M. and G. पुनरप्युत्थानं

8. M. ला हेतुभावाभावः

G. लाभे तु भावाभावः

9. M. इत्यत्र

G. त्वित्यत्र

10. M. यत्रैव

G. यत्रैव(दं)

11. G. अनुनिष्पादितं

12. M. and G. आस्वादः

13. M. and G. भिन्नभिन्नादि-

कार्यं शिकादेऽप्युद्देशे दैवरूपक-भेदचिन्तने निमित्तमिति केचित् ।

तस्मादस्ति शान्तो रसः । तथा च चिरन्तनपुस्तकेषु 'स्थायिभावान् रसत्वमुपनेष्यामः' इत्यनन्तरं शान्तो नाम शमस्थायिभावात्मक इत्यादि-शान्तलक्षणं पठ्यते । तत्र सर्वरसानां शान्तप्राय एवास्वादः¹, विषयेभ्यो विपरिवृत्त्या । तन्मुख्यतालाभः² केवलं वासनान्तरोपहित इति । अत्र सर्व-प्रकृतिस्वाभिधानाय पूर्वमभिधानम् । लोके च पृथक् पृथक् सामान्यस्य न गणनमिति स्थावयत्यप्युक्तं 'नोक्तः' । सामान्यमपि तु विवेचकेन पृथगेव गणनीयमिति विवेचकाभिमतसामाजिकास्वादलक्षणप्रतीतिविषयतया स पृथग्भूत एव । इतिहासपुराणाभिधानद्योतादी च नव रसाः श्रूयन्ते, श्रीमन्-सिद्धान्तशास्त्रेष्वपि । तथा चोक्तम्—

“अष्टानामिह देवानां शृङ्गारादीन् प्रदर्शयेत् ।

मध्ये च देवदेवस्य शान्तं रूपं प्रदर्शयेत् ॥”

तस्य च वैराग्यसंसारभोरुतादयो विभावाः । स हि तैरुपनिषद्भिर्विज्ञायते । मोक्षशास्त्रचिन्तादयोऽनुवाचाः । निर्वेदमतिस्मृतिधृत्यादयो व्यभिचारिणः । अत एव ईश्वरप्रणिधानविषये भोक्तृभेदे स्मृतिसतिधृत्वासाहानुप्रविष्टेऽन्यथै-वाङ्गमिति न तयोः पृथक्पत्त्येन गणनम् । अत्र सङ्ग्रहकारिका—

मोक्षाध्यात्मनिमित्तस्तत्त्वज्ञानार्थहेतुसंयुक्तः ।

निःश्रेयसधर्मयुतः शान्तरसो नाम विज्ञेयः ॥

विभावस्थाव्यनुभावयोगः क्रमान् विशेषणत्रयेण दर्शितः ।

स्वं स्वं निमित्तमादाय शान्तादुत्पद्यते रसः ।

पुनर्निमित्तापाये तु शान्त एव प्रलीयते ॥

इत्यादिना रसान्तरप्रकृतित्वमुपसंज्ञितम् ॥

यत्तु हिमे ताम्यशृङ्गारपरिहारेण पटुस्त्वं च वक्ष्यते, तत्रायं भावः । 'दीप्ररसकावयोनिः' (xxviii, 63) इति भाविना लक्षणेन रौद्रप्रधाने तावद्धिमे तद्विरुद्धस्य शान्तस्य सम्भावनेव न, किं निषेधेन । शान्ता-सम्भवे तु दीप्ररसकावयोनिरित्येतेन किं व्यवच्छेदं शृङ्गारहास्यवर्जं पहरसमुक्तं इति युक्तं नातिप्रसङ्गः³ । ननु करुणार्थमत्सभयानकप्राधान्य-मनेन पादेन व्यवच्छेद्यते । नैतत्, साच्चत्यारभटीवृत्तिसम्पन्न⁴ इत्यनेनैव तन्निरासात् । शान्ते तु साच्चत्येव वृत्तिरिति न⁵ तद्व्यवच्छेदकमेवैतत् ।

1. There is a न here in

M. and G.

2. M. and G. तामात्

3. M. युक्तं

4. M. उत्साहान्यनुप्रविष्टिभ्यः

G. उत्साहान्यनुप्रविष्टिभ्यः

5. M. and G. तत्र प्रसङ्गः

6. M. and G. सम्पन्नेनैव

7. M. and G. omit न

तेन दिमलक्षणं प्रत्युत शान्तरसस्य सद्भावे लिङ्गम् । शृङ्गारस्तु प्रसभसेव्य-
मानः सम्भाव्य एव । तदङ्गं च हास्य इति तयोरेव प्रतिषेधः कृतः, प्राप्तत्वात् ।
सर्वसाम्याच्च विशेषतो र्णदेशताभिधानमनुचितमप्यस्य तत्कल्पितमिति
ज्ञेयम् । ¹उत्पनिस्तु शान्तस्यापि दर्शितैव । ²सत्त्वभावो हि हास्यस्सः³ ।
विभावत्वेन चास्य वीरवीर्यमत्तौ । अत एवास्य रसस्य यमनियमेश्वर-
प्रणिधानाद्युपदेशः⁴ । अनुपयोगितया महाफलत्वं सर्वप्राधान्यमिति वृत्तव्याप-
कत्वं चोपपन्नमिति अलमतिप्रसङ्गेन ॥

तत्त्वास्वादोऽस्य कीदृशः ? उच्यते—उपरागदायिभिः उत्साहरत्यादिभि-
रुपरक्तं यदात्मस्वरूपं तदेव विरलोन्मिटरज्जान्तरालनिर्भासमानसिततरसुत्र-
वद्⁵ यदाहिततत्त्वरूपं सकलेषु रत्यादिषु उपरञ्जकेषु तथाभावेनापि सकृद्वि-
भातोऽयमात्मैति न्यायेन भासमानं ⁶पराङ्मुखात्मक⁷ सकलदुःखजालहीनं
परमानन्दलाभसंविदेकत्वेन काव्यप्रयोगप्रबन्धाभ्यां साधारणतया निर्भासमानं
अन्तर्मुखावस्थाभेदेन लोकोत्तरानन्दानयनं तथाविधद्वयं विधत्त इति ॥

⁸एते नवैव रसाः, पुमर्थोपयोगित्वेन रञ्जनाधिक्येन वा इयतामेव
उपवेद्यत्वात् । तेन रसान्तरसम्भवे अपि ⁹पार्षदसिद्धत्वा सङ्कल्पानियम
इति यदन्वैरुक्तं तत्प्रत्युक्तम् । भावाभ्याये चैतद्वच्यते । आर्द्रतास्वायिकः
श्लेहो रस इति त्वमन् । श्लेहो ह्यभिपङ्कः । स च सर्पो रस्युत्साहा-
दावेव पर्यवस्यति । तथाहि बालस्य मातापित्रादौ श्लेहः¹⁰ भवे ¹¹विश्रान्तः,
यूनोः¹² मित्रजने रतौ, लक्ष्मणादेः¹³ भ्रातरि श्लेहः धर्मवीर एव । ¹⁴एवं वृद्धस्य
पुत्रादावपि द्रष्टव्यम् । एवैव ¹⁵गन्धस्थाविकस्य लोल्यरसस्य प्रत्याक्याने
सरणिर्मन्तव्या, हास्ये वा रतौ वा अन्यत्र पर्यवसानात् । एवं भक्तावपि
वाच्यमिति ॥ ”

(to be continued)

1. M. and G. उपरतिः

2. G. सञ्चामावः

3. M. and G. सहविभावित्वेन

4. G. उपदेशे

5. M. सूत्रं यदाह तत्त्वरूपम्

G. सूत्रवदाभातस्वरूपम्

6. M. परेन्मुलता

7. M. आत्म

8. M. and G. एवं ते

9. M. पार्षतः

G. पार्षतः]

10. M. and G. श्लेहोदये

विश्रान्तः

11. M. धर्मविरतः

G. धर्मविरमः

12. M. and G. गन्धस्थाविकस्य

A. Both the Māngāy Mss. and Hema. read मये which is better than श्लेहोदये or श्लेहो दया(विश्रान्तः)

B. Both the Māngāy Mss. and Hema. read यूनो मित्र .

C. Both the Māngāy Mss. and Hema. read लक्ष्मणादेः which is better than the M. and G. reading लक्ष्मणादौ

A CURIOUS LITERARY COINCIDENCE*

BY

V. NARAYANA AIYAR, M.A., M.L.,

Asst. Editor, Tamil Lexicon.

A curious piece of parallelism occurs in the Nalopākhyāna Parvan of the Mahābhārata, which constitutes a handsome tribute by Vyāsa to the poetry of Vālmīki, if we date that passage after the Rāmāyaṇa. Of course, the story of Nalā was known to Vālmīki; for, Sītā refers in the Sundara Kāṇḍa, Ch. 24, verse 12-13, to Damayantī:—

नैषधं दमयन्तीव भैमी पतिमनुव्रता ।

तथाहमिहवाकुवरं रामं पतिमनुव्रता ॥

In the description of the appearance of Damayantī in the palace of the princess of Cedi (Nalopākhyāna, Ch. 65) we have the following verse:—

मन्दं प्रख्यापमानेन रूपेणाप्रतिमेन ताम् ।

निबद्धां धूमजालेन प्रभामिव बिम्बवत्सोः ॥ v. 12-13.

The corresponding verse in Sundara Kāṇḍa is—

मन्दं प्रख्यापमानेन रूपेण रुचिरप्रभाम् ।

पिनद्धां धूमजालेन दिश्यामिव बिम्बवत्सोः ॥ Ch. 15, v. 20.

Hanumān guesses that the lady is Sītā:—

तां समीक्ष्य विशालाक्षीमधिकं मलिनां कृशाम् ।

तर्कयामास सीतेति कारणैरुपपादिभिः ॥ Ch. 15, v. 26-27.

and the Brahmin Sudeva who sees Damayantī in the inner apartment of the queen of Cedi concludes likewise:—

तां समीक्ष्य विशालाक्षीमधिकं मलिनां कृशाम् ।

तर्कयामास भैमीति कारणैरुपपादयन् ॥ Ch. 65, v. 14.

Sudeva says to himself on seeing Damayantī:—

पूर्णचन्द्राननां श्यामां चारुवृत्तपयोधराम् ।

कुर्वती प्रभया देवीं सर्वां वितिमिरा दिशः ॥ (v. 16)

*Read on the occasion of the Vālmīki Day Celebrations of the Samskr̥ta Academy, Madras.

just as Hanumān sees Sītā as

पूर्णचन्द्राननां सुभ्रू चारुवृत्तपयोधरान् ।

कुर्वती प्रमया देवी सर्वा वितिमिरा दिशः ॥ Ch. 15, v. 28-29.

The next verse in the Nalopākhyāna is

चारुपद्मविशालाक्षी मन्मथस्य रतीमिव ।

इष्टां समस्तलोकस्य पूर्णचन्द्रप्रभामिव ॥

which corresponds to Sundara Kāṇḍa Ch. 15, v. 30.

सीतां पद्मपलाशाक्षी मन्मथस्य रति यथा ।

इष्टां सर्वस्य जगतः पूर्णचन्द्रप्रभामिव ॥

The phrases मन्मथानुलिताङ्गौ and मण्डनाहोममण्डिता which occur in verses 17 and 22 of the same chapter in the Nalopākhyāna are echoes of मन्मथमण्डनदिग्भाङ्गी मण्डनाहोममण्डितान् of Sundara Kāṇḍa Ch. 19, v. 6; and the line in verse 19

पतिशोकाकुलं दीनां कुशलोतां नदीमिव ।

is an echo of Vālmiki's

पतिशोकातुरां शुष्कां नदीं विखावितामिव । Ch. 19, v. 17.

For

उत्कृष्टपर्णकमलां विश्रसितविहङ्गमान् ।

हस्तिहस्तपरामृष्टामाकुलां पद्मिनीमिव ॥

Sundara. Ch. 19, v. 15-16,

we have

विश्रस्तपर्णकमलां विश्रसितविहङ्गमान् ।

हस्तिहस्तपरिक्रिष्टां व्याकुलामिव पद्मिनीम् ॥ Nalop. Ch. 65, v. 20.

and for

पौर्णमासीमिव निशां राहुग्रस्तन्दुमण्डलाम् । Sundara. Ch. 19, v. 14

we have

पौर्णमासीमिव निशां राहुग्रहस्तनिशाकराम् ॥ Nalop. Ch. 65, v. 19.

Again for

चन्द्रेखां पयोदान्ते शारदाभैरिवावृताम् । Sundara. Ch. 17, v. 22.

we have

चन्द्रलेखामिव नवां व्योम्नि नीलाभसंवृताम् ॥

Nalop. Ch. 65, v. 22.

Hanumān says to himself on seeing Sītā

कामभोगैः परिल्लक्ता हीना बन्धुजनेन च ।

धारयत्स्यामनो देहं तत्समागमलाजसा ॥ Ch. 16, v. 24.

and

मर्ता नाम परं नार्या भूषणं भूषणादपि ।

एषा विरहिता तेन भूषणार्हा न शोभते ॥ Ch. 16, v. 26.

And Sudeva says to himself on seeing Damayanti (Ch. 65 Verses 23 and 24)

कामभोगैः प्रिवेहीनां हीनां बन्धुजनैः च ।

देहं धारयती दीनं भर्तृदर्शनकाङ्क्षया ॥

मर्ता नाम परं नार्या भूषणं भूषणैर्विना ।

एषा हि रक्षिता तेन शोभमाना न शोभते ॥

And the next two verses (25 and 26) in the Nalopākhyāna are

दुष्करं कुरुतेऽत्यन्तं हीनो यदनया नलः ।

धारयत्वात्मनो देहं न शोकेनापि सीदति ॥

इमामसितकेशान्तां शतपत्रायतेक्षणां ।

सुखार्हा दुःखिता इष्ट्वा ममापि व्यथते मनः ॥

which are obvious echoes of the following verses (27 and 28) of the sixteenth chapter of the *Sandara Kāṇḍa*

दुष्करं कुरुते रामो हीनो यदनया प्रभुः ।

धारयत्वात्मनो देहं न दुःखेनावसीदति ॥

इमामसितकेशान्तां शतपत्रनिभेक्षणां ।

सुखार्हा दुःखिता इष्ट्वा ममापि व्यथिते मनः ॥

How ineffective is the echo, as Sudeva knows nothing of Nala yet—whether he is alive or dead. Hanumān, when he saw Rāma disconsolate at the loss of Sītā, thought that Rāma grieved overmuch. But when he saw Sītā, he wondered that, in separation from such a person, Rāma had not died of grief; and even Hanumān's hard Brahmachārī heart melted at the sight of Sītā's grief. How hollow sounds the corresponding passage in the mouth of Sudeva. Similarly ineffective are the echoes

(1) अस्या नूनं पुनर्लभाद्वैषयः प्रीतिमेप्स्यति ।

राजा राज्यपरिभ्रष्टः पुनर्लब्ध्वैव मेदिनीम् ॥ (Nalop, Ch. 65, v. 28)

of the original verse of *Sandara*, Ch. 16, v. 28.

अस्या नूनं पुनर्लभाद्राशयः प्रीतिमेप्स्यति ।

राजा राज्यात् परिभ्रष्टः पुनः प्राप्यैव मेदिनीम् ॥

(2) तुल्यशीलवयोयुक्तां तुल्याभिजनसंवृताम् ।

नैषधोऽर्हति वैदेहीं तं चेयमसितेक्षणा ॥ Nalop. Ch. 65, v. 29,

of the original verse

तुल्यशीलवयोयुक्तां तुल्याभिजनलक्षणां ।

राघवोऽर्हति वैदेहीं तं चेयमसितेक्षणा ॥ Sundara, Ch. 16, v. 5,

(3) युक्तं तस्याप्रमेयस्य वीर्यसत्त्ववतो मया ।

समाश्वासयितुं भार्यौ पतिदर्शनलाब्धसाम् ॥

अहमाश्वासयाम्येनां पूर्णचन्द्रनिभाननाम् ।

अदृष्टदुःखां दुःखातां ध्यानरोदनतत्पराम् ॥

Nalop. Ch. 65, Verses 30 and 31,

of the original verses of the Sundara Kāṇḍa (Ch. 30, Verses 6 and 7).

युक्तं तस्याप्रमेयस्य सर्वसत्त्वदयावतः ।

समाश्वासयितुं भार्यौ पतिदर्शनकाङ्क्षिणीम् ॥

अहमाश्वासयाम्येनां पूर्णचन्द्रनिभाननाम् ।

अदृष्टदुःखां दुःखातां दुःखस्वान्तमगच्छतीम् ॥

Hanumān brings solace to Sītā by giving her news of Rāma; but what comfort does Damayantī get from Sudeva—that her parents, brother and children are happy, but that her husband's whereabouts are unknown. The above extracts afford telling proofs of the influence on the author of Nalopākhyāna of Vālmiki's verses whose charm is able to overpower the lofty sense of poetry of even such as Vyāsa. Other, though less obvious, traces of the influence of Vālmiki occur in other portions of the Nalopākhyāna; and when Damayantī sends a messenger in search of Nala, she echoes clearly the message of Sītā to Rāma and Sītā's soliloquy before Hanumān sees her.

ह्यातः प्राङ्गुः कुलीनश्च सानुक्रोशो भवान् सदा ।

संवृत्तो निरनुक्रोशः शङ्के मद्भाग्यसंश्रयात् ॥

तत् कुरुष्व नरव्याघ्र दयां मयि नरर्षभ ।

आनुशंस्यं परो धर्मस्त्वत्त एव हि मे श्रुतः ॥

Nalop. Ch. 67, Verses 14 and 15.

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ह्यातः प्राज्ञः कृतज्ञश्च सानुकोशश्च राघवः ।

सद्वृत्तो निरनुकोशः शङ्के मद्भाग्यसंक्षयात् ॥ Sundara. Ch. 26, v. 11.

स कुरुष्व महोत्साहः कृपां मयि नरर्षभ । Sundara. Ch. 38, v. 40.

आनृशंस्यं परो धर्मस्त्वत्त एव मया श्रुतः ॥ Sundara. Ch. 38, v. 41.



SARVĀSTIVĀDA IN ŚAṆKARA'S BHĀṢYA

BY

N. AIYASWAMI SASTRI.

Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, the author of the Bhāṣya on the aphorisms of the Vedānta, in order to establish his own Monism, summarises by way of *pūrvapakṣa* the different opinions of the other philosophical systems such as Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika and others and refutes them all as irrational and not in harmony with the Upaniṣadic teachings. In doing so, he also cites the opinions of the Buddhists and demonstrates that they cannot stand to sound logic or reasoning. We gather from his Bhāṣya that the aphorisms II, ii, 18-27 are a direct reply to the Realistic School of Buddhism (Sarvāstivāda), and those of II, ii, 28-32 to the Idealistic School (Vijñānavāda). With regard to the Sūnyavāda of the Mādhyamikas, he says that it is quite contrary to all means of knowledge (सर्वप्रमाणविप्रतिषिद्धम्) and therefore no separate efforts have been made (by Vyāsa) to refute the same. In explaining the aphorisms, Śaṅkarācārya first summarises one of the topics of the Buddhist doctrine, and then introduces one aphorism as a refutation of that particular topic, and in this way he has dealt with and criticised all the important topics of the Buddhist philosophy. In the following pages we shall confine ourselves to that portion of the Bhāṣya bearing upon the Sarvāstivādin School of Buddhism, and see how the tenets of that school so set forth in brief in the *pūrvapakṣa* by the author tally with those actually found in the Buddhist Literature now available to us.

At the outset, Śaṅkara says that there are three different advocates of the system, viz., (1) Sarvāstivādins (2) Vijñānavādins and (3) Sarvasūnyavādins. Buddhist Schools are generally spoken of in the Brahminical Literature as composed of four divisions, (1) Vaibhāṣikas (2) Sautrāntikas, (3) Yogācāras and (4) Mādhyamikas. But here the author of the Bhāṣya represents them to be divided into three only as said above. Bhāmati, a learned commentary on the Bhāṣya, remarks that though the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas differ from each other on some minute points, they do not disagree on the point that

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'Everything exists' (सर्वस्तितायां नास्ति विवादः). From this remark, we have to understand that Śaṅkarācārya meant by 'Sarvāstivādins' both Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas. But we find in the Buddhist Literature the term 'Sarvāstivādin' as a designation only for Vaibhāṣikas, and never for Sautrāntikas.

What is meant by the term 'everything' (Sarva)? Buddha answered that 'Everything' means 12 āyatana. Now the āyatana-division is only one of the many classifications of all the Dharmas, 75 in number, as accepted by Sarvāstivādins, that is, Vaibhāṣikas.¹ The divisions of Dharmas into 5 skandhas, into 12 āyatanas and into 18 dhātus are very often referred to in the Buddhistic Literature. Again the classification into the two categories, i.e., mind and matter (नाम-रूप) is also made by Buddhists. Here mind includes mental elements and some forces called *cittaviprayukta*, and matter includes primary and secondary elements (भूत-भौतिक). If we put the forces (संस्काराः) under a separate category, we will have a three-fold division of the elements (1) nāman, (2) rūpa and (3) saṃskāra. Among these classifications, only the two-fold classification, (nāma-rūpa—division) seems to be understood by Śaṅkara, when he says in the Bhāṣya (भूतं भौतिकं चित्तं चैतत् च). This sentence, taken literally, will give rise to the idea that a four-fold division (which is unknown to the Buddhists) is also made by them.

In explaining *Bhūta* and *Bhautika* Śaṅkarācārya says

भूतं पृथिवीधातवादयः ; भौतिकं रूपादयश्चक्षुरादयश्च ।

This Bhāṣya is quite in keeping with the Buddhist idea of matter. From the statement that *Bhautika* includes also sense-organs, eye, etc., we may be sure that he is referring here to an important tenet of the Vaibhāṣikas. For, they alone maintain that all the sense-organs are mere products of Bhūtas, whereas the Sautrāntikas hold that they are transcendental, but inferable from their consciousness and whose abodes are the eye-balls etc.² Then the Bhāṣya runs:—

पृथिव्यादिपरमाणवः खरस्नेहोष्णेरणस्वभावास्ते पृथिव्यादिभावेन संहन्यन्ते ।

The apparent meaning of this passage would be like this:—The atoms of earth constitute the earth; and so on. But this inter-

1. Th. Scherbatsky, conception of Buddhism, Appendix II.

2. Yaśomitra, *Sphuṭārthā*, pp. 24-25.

pretation will come into direct conflict with the Buddhist theory of matter. All the material objects, according to this theory, are constituted of so many atoms. There are simple atoms and combined atoms. The simple atoms never appear separately. The combined ones include at least 8 atoms; 4 primary atoms of the Universal elements (महाभूत) conventionally termed earth, water, fire and air, and 4 secondary atoms of colour, smell, taste and touch. When a matter resounds, an atom of sound becomes present. Then the number will be nine.

The existence of earth and other elements in water and *vice versa* is demonstrated by Yaśomitra as follows:—

पृथिव्यां संप्रहपकिञ्चिद्बुद्ध्यहर्दशनात् शेषाणां जलतेजोवायूनामस्तित्वमनुमीयते² । etc.

In conformity with this theory, therefore, the passage in the Bhāṣya cited above should be interpreted thus:—The earth-atoms, combined with the water-, fire- and air-atoms in less proportion, constitute the earth and so on.

While speaking of the internal elements of the Buddhists, Śaṅkara enumerates five Skandhas—Rūpa, Vijñāna, Vedanā, Saṃjñā and Saṃskāra—an order which is quite contrary to the Buddhist tradition. The order generally accepted by them is rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra and vijñāna. Vasubandhu has maintained in his Kośa that this order alone is proper and rational.³ We understand from the *pūrvapakṣa* that the author has taken the *bhūta* and *bhāntika* to be external and *citta* and *caitta* to be internal. But this will not tally with the Buddhist conception of external and internal. They hold that *bhūtas* and *bhāntikas* are themselves divided into external and internal. The five sense-organs, eye, etc., which are products of Bhūta (bhūta-vikāra) are called internal and the objects like colour, shape etc., are called external. Similarly the *citta* which acts as mind is internal, and mental elements, feeling, etc., are external.

In replying to this *pūrvapakṣa*, Śaṅkara says that the collocation (*samudāya*) of elements cannot come into being, since the elements are totally unconscious. If some of the Buddhists put forward the reply that it arises on account of some illumination of the mind, he declares that this is not correct

1. Yaśomitra, Sphuṭārthā, p. 35 and The Soul Theory of the Buddhists, p. 953, n. 11.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

because that illumination again depends upon the existence of the collocation of some elements. The Bhāṣya here seems to be based on the saying of Buddha in the Tathāgata Gūhya Sūtra:—

आलम्बनवशितं स्थितिः । अनालम्बनतः शम्यति¹ ।

Again supposing that it is argued in favour of the Buddhists that the *ālāya* serves as the factor bringing about the said collocation, Śaṅkarācārya refutes this argument also on the score that the *ālāya* cannot be described as either identical with or different from the elements and therefore cannot be taken as the cause for effecting the collocation of the elements. What is meant by *ālāya* here? Bhāmatī takes it to be *Ālayavijñāna* and explains thus:—

आशेषेऽस्मिन् कर्मवासना इति ।

This explanation is not relevant to the point at issue, viz., the system of Vaiśbhāṣikas which admits no *Ālayavijñāna*. Ratnā-prabhā, another commentary on the Bhāṣya, is undoubtedly better in explaining the term in the sense of *santāna*:—

आशेषेऽस्मिन् रागादय इत्याशयः सन्तानः ।

But we gather from the accompanying portion of the commentary, that it has taken *santāna* in the restricted sense of *vijñānasantāna*. We need not, however, restrict the term in that narrow sense; since Buddhists always employ it in relation to the stream of elements mental as well as material, and never in the restricted sense *vijñānasantāna*. It would be much better to have here the reading *āsrava*, meaning *anuśāya* (=rāgādi) instead of *ālāya*. For it is held by Buddhists in general and Vaiśbhāṣikas in particular that so long as the *anuśāyas* are exercising their influence upon the stream of elements, the latter is in the state of steady commotion. It comes to a stand still only when *anuśāyas* are removed and an eternal blank is substituted. Therefore the reading *āsrava* will quite fit in with the context. But this is a mere conjecture and no Mss. so far available are reported to have that reading.

In the next Sūtra, Śaṅkarācārya refers to an important item of the Buddhist doctrine, viz., *pratītyasamutpāda*, and enumerates its constituent members, *avidyā* etc. and further says that this doctrine is explained in brief in some texts and elaborately made out in some other texts. The commentator, Vācaspati Miśra has

¹ Madh. Vṛtti, p. 363, l. 10.

beautifully, but without mentioning the source, summed up the whole topic from the Śālistambā-Sūtra¹—a discourse by Buddha where the subject is dealt with in full detail. But there are some misprints in the extant editions of the Bhāmati which ought to be removed. In explaining the third member of causation viz., vijñāna, Bhāmati says:—

वस्तुविषया विज्ञप्तिविज्ञानम् ।

According to the Sūtra it ought to be

वस्तुप्रतिविज्ञप्तिः विज्ञानम् ।

Vasubandhu also has interpreted vijñāna thus:—

विषयं विषये प्रति विज्ञप्तिर्विज्ञानम् ।

Nāmarūpa is explained in the Bhāmati as follows:—

विज्ञानाच्चत्वारो रूपिण उपादानस्कन्धाः तन्नाम, तान्युपादाय रूपमभि-
निर्वर्तते ।

But in the Sūtra we have this explanation:—

विज्ञानसदमुचः चत्वारः स्कन्धा अरूपिणः उपादानादुपास्तन्नामरूपं
चत्वारि महाभूतानि तानि चोपादाय रूपम् । तच्च नाम [तच्च रूपम्]
एकध्वमभिसंक्षिप्य तन्नामरूपम् ।

In the light of this explanation, we have to amend the Bhāmati as follows:—

विज्ञानाच्चत्वार अरूपिणम् उपादानस्कन्धास्तन्नाम, चत्वारि महाभूतानि
रूपम्, तानि चोपादाय रूपमभिनिर्वर्तते ।

Then Śarāyatana is defined:—

नामरूपसंमिश्रितानि इन्द्रियाणि । Read संमिश्रित For संमिश्रित.

Sparśa the sixth member of the causation is defined as—

नामरूपेन्द्रियाणां संनिपातः ।

We have to either read here रूपविज्ञानेन्द्रियाणां or take nāman to mean vijñāna. In explaining *duḥkha*, the commentary has:—

पञ्चविज्ञानकार्यसंयुक्तमसाध्वनुभवम् दुःखम् ।

According to the Sūtra we have to read *kāya* for *kārya* and *asāta* for *asādhva*. Apart from these misprints and some other small variations, the Bhāmatī closely follows the Sūtra in explaining the doctrine of Pratītyasamutpāda.

Then in the Sūtra असति प्रतिशेषरोष etc., Śaṅkarācārya goes on criticising the view of the Buddhists regarding the momentariness of all elements, finds fault with them on the ground that it is a contradiction to the assumed hypothesis (स्वप्रतिशेषरोष) and in that connection he quotes two passages one:— चतुर्विधान् देतृन् प्रतीय, etc., and the other, क्षणिकाः, etc.

The first passage is not known to us in a form as we have it here, but is met with in the Buddhist Literature in a form in which the passage is quoted by him afterwards—

चतुर्भिश्चित्तवैत्ता उत्पद्यन्ते ।

The second passage is well known and cited in the Buddhist works as declared by Buddha.¹ Then Śaṅkara turns to an important topic of Buddhists, viz., two Nirodhas and quotes another passage—

बुद्धिबोध्यं त्रयादन्यत् संस्कृतं क्षणिकं च ।

a passage which I am unable to trace out in the extant Sanskrit Buddhist Literature. Here he reports that there are three *asaṃskṛtas*, which, he says, according to Buddhists are *avastu*, *abhāvomātra* and *nirūpākhyā*. This cannot be taken to be the opinion of the Vaiśbhāṣikas, for, they maintain the *asaṃskṛtas* are uncomposite elements and substantially existing. Certainly it is the view held by the Sautrāntikas who do not admit *asaṃskṛtas* as separate entities, but mere negation of something else. That the *ākāśa*, according to them, is a mere absence for the material objects is seen from Kumārila's *Śloka-vārtika*, *anumāna*, 103, 116. Commencing to criticise the two *nirodhas*, he defines the first one, *pratisaṅkhyānirodha* :—

बुद्धिपूर्वः किल भावानां विनाशः ।

This definition ought have been adopted from the Sautrāntika sources, if it be a quotation, and never from Vaiśbhāṣika works. Vasubandhu in his *Kośa* explains it from the standpoint of the latter:—

प्रतिसंख्याननिरोधो यो विसंयोगः पृथक् पृथक्

which is connected upon by himself in the Bhāṣya:—

1. Bodh. ear. pañjikā, p. 376 and Tattvas, pañjikā, p. 11.
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सत्त्वबाणां धर्माणां यो विसंयोगः स प्रतिसंख्याननिरोधः । दुःखादीना-
मार्यसत्त्वानां प्रतिबोधः प्रतिसंख्या प्रज्ञाविशेषः तेन प्राप्यो निरोधः प्रति-
संख्याननिरोधः¹ ।

But on the other hand, Vācaspati Miśra, a well-informed commentator on Śaṅkara, interprets the term thus:—

भावप्रतीपा बुद्धिः प्रतिसंख्या तथा निरोध इति ।

Then he says:—

बुद्धेर्भावप्रतीपत्वं सत्त्वम् ; इमसन्तं करोमीत्याकारता इति ।

It is not known from what source he draws the above explanation. It ought to be, I suppose, from some Sautrāntika source.

The other *nirōdha*, *apratisaṅkhyānirōdha*, is said by Śaṅkara to be the opposite of the former (तद्विपरीतः). According to Vasubandhu, it is

उत्पादालम्बनविज्ञोऽन्यो निरोधोऽप्रतिसंख्या, i. e. अनास्रवाणां धर्माणाम्
उत्पादालम्बनभूतनिरोधो यो विसंयोगादन्यः सोऽप्रतिसंख्याननिरोधः² ।

The commentator, Yaśomitra explains the particle *na* in *apratisaṅkhyānirōdha* in three ways, (1) it is intended to denote either a *prasajya* *pratiśedha*.

न प्रतिसंख्यया प्रत्य इत्यर्थः । (2) or a *pariyudāsa*, प्रतिसंख्यायाय
अन्यत् प्रत्ययवैकल्यं सा अप्रतिसंख्या तथा प्राप्यो निरोधः ।

(3) or it has the force of mere isolation,

प्रतिसंख्याननिरोधादन्यत्त्वमात्रमेवोच्यते³ ।

Therefore the passage 'तद्विपरीतोऽप्रतिसंख्याननिरोधः' in the Bhāṣya may be interpreted in either way.

The conception of *pratisaṅkhyānirōdha*, a mere negation of the phenomenal elements, is confirmed by the accounts given from the Tibetan authorities by Dr. Obermiller where he mentions two Sautrāntikas⁴ (1) those who hold that 'It is the

1. Abh. Kośa. Tib. I. 7. p. 9, l. 12 and Documents D'Abhidharma, a very useful essay on the subject by Dr. Louis de La Velle Poussin (Extrait du Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient. 1930).

2. Abh. Kośa. Tib. p. 10, l. 11 and Documents.

3. Sphutārthā, p. 18.

4. I.H.Q., Vol. X., p. 237.

negation of the phenomenal life in the sense of mere absence; it is not separate reality in itself (वस्तु), and after that *nirodha* i.e. *Nirvāṇa*, "there remains the subtle consciousness merged in complete quiescence"; and (2) those who opine that it is the complete extinction of material elements and consciousness alike, and mere absence of the phenomenal elements, without any positive counterpart. The latter group of *Sautrāntikas* seems to be meant by Śāṅkara here. This will also be clear from the following considerations.

In the *Sūtra* आकाशे चाविशेषात् Śāṅkarācārya refutes the Buddhist theory of *Ākāśa*, when he presents to us their conception of it as follows:—

आकाशमनावरणमभावमात्रम् ।

As I have pointed out above, this is not the opinion of the *Vaiśvāṣikas*, but of *Sautrāntikas*.¹ *Ākāśa* is defined and explained by *Vaṣubandhu*:—

आकाशमनादृतिः, अनावरणस्वभावम्, यत्र रूपस्य गतिरस्ति² ।

Therefore according to the *Vaiśvāṣikas* it is in reality an uncomposite entity and not mere absence of something else. In order to prove the existence of *Ākāśa*, they quote an āgama:—*पृथिवी भोगोत्तम*³ etc. It is interesting to note that this āgama is cited by Śāṅkara also who points out to the Buddhists an apparent contrary proposition when they maintain *Ākāśa* to be a mere absence of some other material objects. Here it is to be borne in mind that the charge may be directed against the *Sautrāntikas* only and not against *Vaiśvāṣikas* as said above. At the end of the *Bhāṣya* on this *Sūtra*, Śāṅkara concludes as follows:—

निरोधद्वयमाकाशश्च त्रयमेतन्निरुपास्यम्, etc.

In making this charge he draws no distinction whatever between *Vaiśvāṣikas* and *Sautrāntikas*. If we look into the full meaning

1. Cf. Poussin, Documents, p. 35, n. 1, 48.

2. Abh. Kośa, Tib. I. 5, pp. 8-8 and Documents, p. 31, n. 3.

3. *Sphuṭārthā*, p. 16. Quoted by Saṅghabhadra also (Documents, p. 50). It is to be noted here that *Vaiśvāṣikas* accept two kinds of *Ākāśa*, (1) *Ākāśadhātu* (2) *Ākāśa* and maintain that the first is material (*rūpa*), impure (*sāsrava*) and impenetrable (*sapratigha*) while the second is immaterial, pure and non-impenetrable. V. Documents, p. 30. Saṅghabhadra quotes the passage in order to prove the existence of *Ākāśa*.

of the passage, the foundation for the charge will vanish; for, those, *i.e.*, (Vaibhāṣikas) who maintain the *asaṃskṛtadharmas* to be eternal entities, do not say that they are *avastu*¹ and *nirupākhyā*; and those (Sautrāntikas) who hold them to be *avastu* and *nirupākhyā*, do not declare that they are eternal.

Then the author goes on to frame one more charge against the Buddhists in the Sūtra नास्त्यो दृष्टत्वात्. There he says that they hold the theory that things originate from non-existence, and in this connection he quotes also a passage as though of the Buddhists. It runs as follows:—

नानुपमृष्य प्रादुर्भावात् ।

It could not be traced to any Buddhist work. The author evidently cites it from a non-Buddhist source, *viz.*, Nyāyasūtra, IV, 1. The theory of origination from non-existence which is criticised in N. Sūtras, does not seem to be a verbatim dogma of the Buddhists. True, the theory of origination of what did not exist before (अभूताभावात्) is a characteristic of them,² but it does not mean that the origination comes from non-existence. It seems, however, that it has been deduced as such from the fact that according to Buddhists, and especially the Sarvāstivādins, every effect comes into being only when the four *pratyaya* conditions are present of which *sama mantara pratyaya*, the suppression of the material cause (*upādānakāraṇanivṛttiḥ*) is one. The four-fold condition theory is applicable to all effects material and mental alike. The same theory is expressed by the dictum:—

चतुर्भिश्चित्तचैता उत्पद्यन्ते ।

Therefore no contradiction in the Buddhists' view can come in when they accept the dictum; नानुपमृष्य प्रादुर्भावात् and at the same time maintain the four conditions to be the factors of the origination. In fact the dictum *nānupa* etc. is only a part of the theory of origination.

We may gather from the above observations that Śāṅkarācārya confuses in several places Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas and reports the tenets in main of the latter in the name of former, *i.e.*

1. Of course Vaibhāṣikas call 3 *asaṃskṛtas* *avastuka*; but the term is used in the sense of 'ahetuka' and not in the sense of 'abhāva'. V. Sphuṭārthā, p. 22 and Documents, p. 80.

2. Maibh. Vṛtti, p. 263, n. 2.

Sarvāstivādins. And this is, I think, due to the state of things that during Śaṅkara's time the Sautrāntikas had already won the victory in the battle against the Vaibhāṣikas. That Śaṅkara was not a mere shadow-fighter but actually fought with the Buddhist opponents can be inferred from the expression:—

बहो वेनाशिकैः सर्वो लोक आकुलीक्रियते

and others used in the Bhāṣya.¹



1. This subject was, some 20 years ago, treated in 'The System of Buddhist Thought' by Mr. Yamakami Sogen, then of Calcutta University. He criticised Śaṅkara and said that Śaṅkara's refutation of Sarvāstivāda was unfounded. Now this paper will, I suppose, convince that the fact was otherwise and that many of Śaṅkara's criticisms of Sarvāstivāda were based upon some foundations.

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Fig. 1.



Fig. 2.



Fig. 3.



Fig. 4.

RECENT PROGRESS IN THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF SUMATRA, HINDU-BUDDHIST PERIOD.

IV

PROFESSOR K. A. NILAKANTHA SASTRI,
University of Madras.

The archaeological traces of the first centuries of Hindu Sumatran history were till recently somewhat disappointing. Repeated search in and near Palembang, the site of the ancient Sri Vijaya, did not yield anything at all commensurate with the great role of Sri Vijaya in the medieval history of South Eastern Asia; and all that was known of Palembang and other archaeological sites of Sumatra was summed up by Dr. Bosch in Bijlage C of the O. V. for 1930; and a brief account of antiquities including inscriptions from Sumatra also appears from the pen of Heine-Geldern at pp. 323-27 of *SUMATRA, ITS HISTORY AND PEOPLE* by E. N. Loeb (1935). Since then the results of some excavations undertaken by F. M. Schnitger at Palembang and other places with the support of the Archaeological Service of Java have been made available in a series of tentative reports published by him and Dr. Stutterheim who has worked at the inscriptions discovered by Schnitger. Our aim is to draw attention to the chief additions to our knowledge of Sumatran archaeology brought about by Schnitger's work.

In January 1935 Schnitger recovered a number of inscribed stones from Telagabatu of which we shall say more presently. Besides, he recovered a fair number of *makara* fragments in terra cotta, and discovered ruins of several brick structures at present containing a number of Mahomedan graves, but originally unmistakably Hindu in character, either Śaivite or Buddhist. All these brick structures are found in a place called Gedingsura which, according to tradition, takes its name from a nobleman from Demak who came to Palembang after the fall of Madjapahit and there founded a dynasty which held sway till the year 1823. Another important find was a copper Buddha standing on a double lotus *piṣṭha*. The total height of the image is

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16½ cms. The right hand is missing, and the left slightly bent in *vitarāmanudā*. The upper garment covers the left shoulder, leaves the right bare, passes under the right arm and falls stiffly on the sides well below the knees, covering the left arm up to the wrist. A lower garment hangs down a little below the upper, reaching almost to the ankles. The lotus pedestal is hollow and somewhat damaged. The style of this image recalls the prince Śākyamuni of the Leiden Museum reproduced as No. 86 in With's JAVA.

Schmitger had the good fortune to identify the head of the well-known broken Buddha statue of Bukit Seguntang.¹ The fragments of this celebrated image were first signified by Westen-ent in 1920 and part of the image reconstructed in 1928 by Perquin. The head now seen to belong to it was first discovered in 1914 by the Archaeological Service of Java and has been preserved in the Batavia Museum since. This beautiful statue is undoubtedly of the school of Amara-vāli and furnishes sure proof of the antiquity of Buddhism in Palembang (fig. 1.)

In Gedingsura to the east of Palembang was also found, as a result of an excavation undertaken by Laning under the auspices of the Municipality of Palembang, a beautiful fragment, 1.18 metres high, of the image of a divinity of the middle Javanese period, highly ornamented with ear-rings, armlets, a collar for the neck and clothing with loops on both the hips and falling near to the ankles; head, arms and feet missing.

Schmitger also mentions three images in bronze he got from the natives of Seguntang:—

1. a Kubera 7½ cms. high,
2. a Lokeśvara 8½ cms. high, arms and left foot missing,
3. another Lokeśvara, arms and feet missing, 9½ cms. high,

Nos. 2 and 3 showing Cham influence. He also noticed two bronze images recovered from the river Palembang and now in the possession of Mr. A. van Doorninck. One is an image of the Buddha preaching seated in the European mode on a rectangular chair with a tall back and double lotus cushion for his feet (fig. 2.) The back of the chair comprises a rectangular part with a small column on either side, the whole surmounted by a

1. This name seems to have been that of a mythical mountain after which at least three hillocks in Sumatra were named. *Hindoe-Oudheden aan de Batang Hari*, Schmitger, pp. 7-8.

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high triangle supported by *mukara* heads on the sides and ornamented with four stylised flames on each side. The image is very beautiful and doubtless belongs to the middle Javanese period. Height $1\frac{1}{2}$ cms. The other bronze is a Vairocana seated with legs crossed on a double lotus cushion set upon a rectangular *piṭha*. The hands are held in front of the chest, the right hand enclosing the fore-finger of the left. There is a nimbus round the head, and the back piece betrays Cham influence and was surmounted by an umbrella which has disappeared (fig. 3). A stone Amitāya $24\frac{1}{2}$ cms. high, also taken out of the river, is in the possession of the same gentleman.

These numerous finds, though none of them perhaps of great interest individually, are still of considerable importance taken together, as they constitute a tangible proof of the real antiquity of a site which seemed devoid of all archaeological interest.

We may turn now to the inscribed stones mentioned at the outset. They are nine in number, of which only five have been examined by Stutterheim, four still remaining to be photographed and studied. The first inscription in Pallava script is a fragment of four letters, reading

Śikṣa prajña.

It must have formed part of an inscription engraved on a smoothly worked stone tablet. The date of the inscription may be put as the second half of the 7th century A. D. The second inscription in six lines, not yet deciphered, is in Pallava script of the second half of the 8th century A. D. The remaining three inscriptions are on natural stones of varying sizes, picked up from the river; the characters of all of them are Pallava, and of the first half of the 8th century A. D. The most complete of these inscriptions is in two lines and reads:—

(ja) yasiddhayā

tra Sarvasatya.

Stutterheim's remarks on Jayasiddhayātrā are so important that they may be translated in full here. "On the significance of this term there has been difference of opinion. In my view the standpoints of different scholars may be combined in the translation, 'pilgrimage for victory', by which is meant that a magical power necessary for victory is obtained by a pilgrimage, though

possibly people did not realise the magic character of the word *siddha* (for *siddhi*).

"The expression *siddhayātrā* or *siddhiyātrā* signifies, according to the Lexicons, a pilgrimage undertaken to achieve an object which is done usually by supernatural means. I do not believe that, as Coedes thinks, it was exclusively the receipt of magic power. There is a little difference between the getting of *Barakat* (for I would compare this with the Javanese usage) and the acquisition of magic power as it obtains in Bali by t̃āntric means. The prefixing of the word *jaya* (conquest) makes it probable that we must here think of princes who betook themselves to a particular holy place in order that there they may receive the blessing needed for a conquest (or success, for *jaya* need not always imply victory in war). The expression *Śrīvijaya-jayasiddhayātrā* of the inscription of Kelukan Bukit may then signify that the prince mentioned therein had completed a pilgrimage to the place of the charter which was necessary for success against Śrīvijaya. It is self-evident that if this interpretation is correct, there can be no question in this charter of the foundation of the kingdom as has sometimes been thought. Indeed Coedes has expressed doubts on good grounds regarding this matter.

"At the same time I will draw attention to the fact that all the inscriptions in which our expression occurs (with the exception of that of Campā) are written on natural stones or round boulders and not on a so-called charter-stone. This must doubtless have a significance. It seems to me that the character of a votive inscription becomes emphasised thereby, at least that it becomes doubtful whether it is the usual type of a royal inscription." Stutterheim then proceeds to state that in all probability there was a temple in Palembang to which persons resorted in different centuries (7th, 8th, 10th) to receive *Barakat*. He draws attention to the inscription of Talang-Tawo and to the celebrated stone Buddha of Bukit Seguntang as supporting this view. The usually accepted view that Palembang was in fact Śrīvijaya is rejected by Stutterheim, who thinks that according to Chinese sources Śrīvijaya lay on the Equator. This last statement is of considerable interest and scholars will await eagerly Stutterheim's proofs for the new view he has stated.

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Less than a hundred miles to the North of Palembang, on the east coast of Sumatra, we reach the mouth of the stream called Batang Hari (Djambi river). A few miles higher up the river, there are two places of importance to archaeology, Muara Djambi on the northern bank and Djanbi on the southern bank of the river. Two Buddha statues in a north Indian style, apparently related to traditions of Gupta Art, are already known from Djambi. The ruins of Muara Djambi were first noticed by an Englishman, Captain S. C. Crooke, in 1820 and formed the subject of brief notices by T. Adam in the *Outhetd kundig Verslagen* for 1921 and 1922. In March 1936, Schnitger undertook a more systematic survey and carried out some trial excavations. He discovered the remains of no fewer than seven groups of ruined buildings spread along the northern bank of the river, mostly temples built of brick, generally facing east and occasionally south. In the absence of any inscriptions, the style of the structures is the only guide to their age and Schnitger is inclined to place them in the 11th or 12th century A. D. There can be little doubt that these considerable structures, which do not fall behind others found elsewhere in Sumatra in their size or beauty, must have formed part of a large city, perhaps larger than Palembang itself. Schnitger is inclined to identify this site with that of the ancient Malāyu, the Malaiyūr of Rājendra Cōḷa's inscription; he suggests that Muslim sultans of modern Djambi used much material from the old ruins of Muara Djambi in their buildings, and possibly carried some of the Hindu images also from Muara Djambi in the process. He argues that though Hindu images have been found in Djambi so far, no relics of any old Hindu structure have been brought to light. We must necessarily await the results of further exploration before the surmises of Schnitger are accepted as final.

One of the most remarkable finds from the banks of the Batang Hari (from Sungei Langsat on its upper course), was a large Bhairava image in 1906. Schnitger publishes a clearer photograph of the image than has appeared so far of this enormous statue (fig. 4), which he describes in the following terms: "On a pedestal of eight skulls, there is a slab, a double-lotus-cushion (*padmaṣṭha*), bearing a lying figure with legs folded under the body. On this figure stands a short, thick-set figure with a knife and a skull in the hands; snakes surround the

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ankles and wrists, and form arm bands and ear ornaments. The girdle is held by a clasp in the form of the head of a monster and there hangs from its mouth a pearl garland with a bell at its bottom. From the left shoulder where a knot or loop is seen, a broad ribbon falls obliquely on the chest; another ornamental band is also seen in a similar position. Chest and legs are lustrate; there is also the moustache, and at the corners of the mouth are sculptured little projecting horns. *Makaras* with cloven eyes and flowers with hanging seed-garlands serve as ear-ornaments. In the tall coiffure sits the Buddha *Aksobhya*. The statue is 4.41 m. high." Both Schnitger and Stutterheim agree that this Bhairava is a representation of *Ādityavarman*, a ruler of Menangkabau in the 14th century. There is much evidence at hand to show that *Ādityavarman* was a Bhairava worshipper. He records in one inscription in 1347 that he and his wife Mahāgiri, performed a dance, and this performance is referred to in a technical expression of tantric Buddhism in the phrase: '*manidhaya nāṭakatarāṅga*'. Again, an inscription of 1370 at Suroaso records the consecration of *Ādityavarman* as Bhairava, that on this occasion he sat on a pile of corpses, and that by this ceremony he became one with *Kṣetrajña*, a form of Bhairava, according to Monier-Williams.

The third area with which Schnitger has concerned himself, Padang Lawas (the modern district of Tapaneli), lies further north and includes the valley of the upper Kampar river; near the west coast of Central and Northern Sumatra. It was surveyed by Dr. Bosch in 1930 and in his interesting report of the tour, he drew attention to some stone and bronze images marked by unmistakably south Indian artistic influences roughly of the 9th to the 11th centuries A. D. In June and September 1935, and April 1936, Schnitger carried out some excavations in this region, and the results are indeed very interesting. But we cannot go into all the details here, and must confine ourselves to mentioning two of the most significant finds. While clearing the cella of a *barā* (*Vihāra*) at Sangkolon, Schnitger came by a small inscribed gold plate 5×15 cm. On one side of it, in the middle is a rectangle engraved with Vajra-points, and enclosing one syllable; four lines of writing on either side, in all eight, constitute part of a Nāgarī inscription which must have begun on another plate, not forthcoming now, which might have been

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fastened crosswise on the extant one. The inscription, according to Dr. Bosch, seems to have reference to the consecration of an image of Yamāri, with 8 faces, 24 eyes and a Kapāla-mālā; Dipamkara is also mentioned.

Pamutung is the greatest temple centre in Padang Lawas. The chief temple of Pamutung, like that of Sangkilton, says Schmitzer, has two floors (terraces) and a rectangular roof rising by stages to a considerable height. Climbing a flight of steps we enter an enclosed space which contains the *pradakṣiṇa* path. A second flight of steps leads to a second smaller terrace, also with a *pradakṣiṇa* path going round. A third and smaller flight of steps leads to the cella guarded on either side of the entrance by male figures, life-size, standing on a monster-head (roaring lions sometimes take the place of these *draṇapālakas*). The portal is surmounted by a monster-head also. The smaller temples have only one terrace, and the cella is always nearly cubical, varying from two or three metres. At Pamutung was found the upper half of a female statue, well-modelled, 43 cm. high, with hands in *āṅguli*; large knobs in the ears, eyes wide open, and two curved fangs at the corners of the mouth; Schmitzer considers this to be the representation of a queen as a Bhairavi; proof of the bhairava-cult practised in this region also. This only confirms conclusions reached earlier by Dr. Bosch and others regarding the Vajra-Bhairava character of the religious practices of Padang Lawas. This image, like the bronze image of a woman from Barra Lel Bahal, also shows south Indian influence. According to Schmitzer the art of Padang Lawas owes something to South India; it shows also Cham influence in a measure; with the art of Java it seems to have had, however, no direct connection.

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BHARTṬHARI AND THE BHĀGAVṚTTI

BY

O. P. RANGASWAMI, M.A., L.T.,

Asst. Professor of Sanskrit, The Presidency College, Madras.

Students of Sanskrit Grammars have been mystified by the number of references to a grammatical work called the Bhāgavṛtti. Nothing definite about the name of its author, its identity, its relation to any other work, or its subject-matter is known. From the various references to the work¹, it was speculated by scholars that it was a very old work, which was held as important as the Kāśikā itself. This could be well made out by the following extract from Puruṣottamadeva which forms the colophon of his work Bhāṣāvṛtti.

काशिकाभाषवृत्तोद्योते सिद्धान्तं बोधुमस्ति धीः ।

तदा विचिन्वतां भ्रातर्भाषवृत्तिरियं मम ॥²

Ament the various grammarians after Patañjali and before the Kāśikā, there are not sufficient data to determine their age and time. Various are the theories floated and flouted regarding even the eminent author of the Vākyapadīya, which is the earliest extant systematic work dealing with the philosophy of grammar. Bhartṛhari's date which was believed to be the 7th century has been questioned and attempts have been made to push his date a century earlier.³ However that may be, even as regards his works, there is no definite information. Excepting the well-known Vākyapadīya, the Vivaraṇa and the Tripādī, mentioned by Vardhamāna in his Gaṇaratnāmāhodadhī,⁴ are merely names and no definite information about them is available. Some other works are also attributed to Bhartṛhari, among which the Bhāgavṛtti is one.

1. Some of the extracts gathered by me will be published in a subsequent issue of this Journal.

2. Bhāṣāvṛtti, S. C. Chakravarti's Edn. p. 573.

3. Dr. C. K. Raja, S. K. Aiyangar commemoration volume, pp. 293-298.

4. Benares Edn. p. 123.

Puruṣottama's reference¹ to the Bhāṣavyṛtti is enough to show that the work was recognised to be an authoritative work on grammar which could stand next if not equal to the Kāśikā and that it was not as easily manageable a work on grammar as his own. Almost all the writers who had anything to say on Sanskrit grammar do not pass without referring to the Bhāṣavyṛtti. So much did the work gather in importance that it was fully believed by eminent scholars that the work was one of Bhaṭṭhari's grammatical productions.² It will be worthwhile to follow the line of thought by which the authorship of the Bhāṣavyṛtti has been ascribed to Bhaṭṭhari.

The main basis for taking the Bhāṣavyṛttikāra and Bhaṭṭhari as identical rests on tradition and also on the statement found in the Dhughatavyṛtti:

यथात्क्षणमप्रयुक्त इति उपरामः उद्यमः इत्येव भवतीति भर्तृहरिणा
भागवृत्तिकृता चोक्तम् ।³

In the absence of any conclusive evidence to the contrary, it was generally believed that the Bhāṣavyṛtti was a very old work dealing exhaustively with Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī in full, since it was recognised as an important work by eminent grammarians like Puruṣottamadeva, Śaṅkaradeva, Kāśyapa, Bhaṭṭoji, Nāgoji and others, in their references to the work. As the name Bhāṣavyṛtti was not self-explanatory, and as there was no important writer on grammar before the Kāśikā other than Bhaṭṭhari, and since Bhaṭṭhari was known to have written an exhaustive work on grammar,⁴ the Bhāṣavyṛtti came to be ascribed to Bhaṭṭhari.

But as against this there are very clear evidences to prove that the Bhāṣavyṛttikāra and Bhaṭṭhari are entirely different persons. S. C. Chakravarti, in his edition of Bhāṣavyṛtti⁵ has appended a footnote, the source of which has not been referred to. It runs as follows:—

1. Bhāṣavyṛtti, p. 573.

2. S. C. Chakravarti, Introduction to the Kāśikāvivarana-
pañjikā, pp. 14 and 26.

Also, Bhāṣavyṛtti, p. 229, fn.

3. T. S. S. Edn., p. 117.

4. Gaṇaratnamahodadhī. Renares Edn. p.

5. *Ibid.* pp. 193-194 fn.

उपशब्देन केवलं पीडेरव योग इति भागवृत्तौ भर्तृहरिः । प्रत्येकं योग इति जयादित्यजिनेन्द्रबुद्धिहरदत्तमाधवभट्टोविप्रमृतयः । तथा च धातु-वृत्तौ माधवः—‘अत्र णमुल्विधौ उपसर्गग्रहणं पीडेरव विशेषणमिति भागवृत्तौ । भट्टिकारस्त्वतन्त्रं मन्यते, यदाह -- धनुररिभिरसहो मुष्टिपीडं दधान इति । इदं तावत् साहसमात्रम्, यदाचार्यप्रयुक्तस्यातन्त्रत्वस्वीकरणम् । यदपि पीडिनैव संबन्धकथनं तदपि न न्याय्यम्, बह्वचकस्य पूर्वनिपाता-योगात् । अत एव वृत्तिन्यासपदमज्जयादिषु संबन्धोऽङ्गीकृतः’—इति । अत एवाह हरिदीक्षितः—“धनुररिभिरसहो मुष्टिपीडं दधान इति भट्टिप्रयोगे तु न णमुल्वन्तम् । किन्तु चञ्चलम् । क्रियाविशेषणत्वाच्च द्वितीयेति बोध्यम् ।”—इति (शब्दरत्ने) । किञ्च ‘बाहुपपीडमाश्लिष्य जगाहे चां निशाचरः’ इति भट्टौ णमुल्वप्रयोगः । दण्डिनि च “तमेव संहितोरुमुरुपीडं मुजोपपीडबोपगुह्य तल्पेऽभिरमयन्नल्पमिव तां निशामलनैषीत्” इति (दशकुमारचरिते) । यो रणे दुरुपस्थानो हस्तरोधं दधन्नुरिति च भट्टिप्रयोगो भागवृत्तिमतसंवादी । पुरुषोत्तमेन च भर्तृहरिमतमेवानुसृतम् ।¹

The passage is interesting in as much as the words भागवृत्तौ भर्तृहरिः in the opening sentence could only mean that Bhartṛhari is the author of the Bhāgavṛtti. But curiously the passage ends with the words

“यो रणे दुरुपस्थाने हस्तरोधं दधन्नुरिति च भट्टिप्रयोगो भागवृत्तिमतसंवादी । पुरुषोत्तमेन च भर्तृहरिमतमेवानुसृतम् ।”

The above sentence quite conclusively proves that Bhartṛhari and Bhāgavṛttikāra are different, or at any rate, there is difference of opinion between Bhāgavṛttikāra and Bhartṛhari, even if the difference in the authorship of both the works cannot be conclusively proved.

There are several discrepancies in recognising the author of the Bhāgavṛtti and Bhartṛhari as one and the same person. In the first place, if the identity is granted for argument's sake, the date of the Bhāgavṛtti would have to be placed before the time of the Kāśikā. On internal grounds this concession is impossible. It is generally known and accepted that Bhartṛhari should have preceded the Kāśikā, since the latter clearly refers to the Vākyapadīya,¹ by name, which from the context can be none

1. The Kāśikā on Pāṇini, IV-2.

other than the work of Bhāṭṭarhari. But as far as the Bhāṅga-vṛtti is concerned, the following passages clearly bring out that the work is decidedly later than the Kāśikā.

(a) युवति शब्दात् यौवनमिति जयादित्यः । मस्यादे तद्धित (VI-3-75 वा) इति पुंवद्भावे यौवनमिति भागवृत्तिः ।¹

(b) साहाय्यमिति ब्राह्मणादित्वात् इति जयादित्यः । नेति भागवृत्तिः ।²

(c) कथमवच्छिनो वियोगः ? विजायते इत्यननुवृत्तेरिति जयादित्यः । स्त्रीलिङ्गनिर्देशादुपमानस्याप्यसंभवाच्चैतदिति भागवृत्तिः ।³

The above three passages chosen from among others are sufficiently illuminative in proving that the Bhāṅga-vṛtti is engaged in a sort of adverse criticism of the Kāśikā. It cannot be said that the mere name of Jayāditya does not prove that he is the author of the Kāśikā, who is referred to, since Vāmana is also the joint author of the Kāśikā. For it is not only Jayāditya but also Vāmana who is criticised by the Bhāṅga-vṛtti, as could be gathered from the following excerpts:—

(d) इह समानस्येति योगविभागः । तेन सपञ्चधर्मसजातीयाः सिध्यन्तीति वामनवृत्तिः । अनार्योऽयं योगविभागः । तथा ह्यव्ययानामनेकार्थत्वात् सहशार्पस्य सहशन्दस्यैते प्रयोगाः । कथं नाम समानपक्ष इत्यादयोऽपि भवन्तीति भागवृत्तिः ।⁴

(e) दशमहृणादिह पुरुषो नारक इत्यादावप्ययं दीर्घ इति वामनवृत्तिः । अनेनोत्तरपदविधानादप्राप्तिरिति पुरुषादयो दीर्घोपदेश एव संज्ञाशब्दा इति भागवृत्तिः ।⁵

(f) “क्तो वा” (VII-2-28) इत्यस्येदो दीर्घो नेहास्तीति वामनवृत्तिः । अस्तीति भागवृत्तिः ।⁶

These passages are sufficient to make one understand that the Bhāṅga-vṛtti had known fully the Kāśikā, whose joint authors are Jayāditya and Vāmana. Not only is the Bhāṅga-vṛttikāra later than the Kāśikā, but also he is not known to Jinendra-

1. Bhāṅga-vṛtti, C. Chakravarti, Edn. p. 235.

2. Bhāṅga-vṛtti, p. 310.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 314.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 420.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 427.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 482.

buddhi, the earliest commentator of the Kāśikā. His work, Kāśikāvivarāṇapañjikā, known popularly as the Nyāsa or Vṛtti nyāsa, is dated about 750 A.D.² That Bhāgavṛttikāra should have come in later than 750 A.D. will be borne out if a study of the passage marked (f) above is made along with the passage in the Nyāsa :

“वृत्तो वा” इत्यस्य दीर्घत्वं नेच्छन्ति । कथं पुनरिष्यमाणमपि न भवति ?
व्यवस्थितविभाषाविज्ञानात् ।

Even if it is objected that this passage is not conclusive in proving that the Nyāsa is not prior to the Bhāgavṛtti in as much as it does not take into consideration the अस्ति of the Bhāgavṛtti, Jinendrabuddhi, as a conscientious and very earnest commentator on the Kāśikā,³ would never have allowed an unfair and very scurrilous attack on the Kāśikā by the author of the Bhāgavṛtti. The passage in question is found in the Mādhyamika-Dhātuvṛtti.⁴

“मागवृत्तिकारस्तु—उपलब्धेन प्रकाशनेन ; देवदत्ताय शपते ।
किञ्चिद्व्याप्यतर्ह्यर्थः । वाचाशरीरस्पर्शनमित्यदः कस्यचित् काव्यम् ।

Here that the word कस्यचित् refers to Jayāditya is borne out by the reference made in the Daiva and Puruṣakāra⁵. To one who studies with some interest the reference made in the Bhāgavṛtti to Jayāditya, the passage cannot but strike as unhappy and very mischievous. If Jinendrabuddhi, who had a renown of being a meticulous commentator of the Kāśikā, had really the passage of the Bhāgavṛtti before him, when he wrote his commentary on the Kāśikā, he would not have allowed the criticism to stand unanswered but would certainly justify at least the usage of the Kāśikā, because there is no evidence which can be found out by a careful study of a corresponding passage in the commentary on the Kāśikā, to show that Jinendrabuddhi knew the attack of the Bhāgavṛtti. As such the author of the Bhāgavṛtti should have come after the Nyāsa of Jinendrabuddhi.

1. Introduction to the Kāśikāvivarāṇapañjikā, p.

Also Introduction to Bhāgavṛtti, p. 3.

2. Kāśikāvivarāṇapañjikā on Pāṇini, VII.2-75.

3. Cf. Śiṣupālavadha, II, 112 and the commentary of Mallinātha thereon.

4. M. O. L. Edn. p. 655.

5. T. S. S. Edn. p. 94.

Bhāgavṛtti is posterior to Māgha the author of the Śiśupālavadhā. A reference made by Ujjvaladatta to the Bhāgavṛtti clears the point. The passage runs thus—

‘वारुणीमदविशङ्कमयाविश्वभुषोऽभवदसावित्र रागः ।’ इति माघे
व्यवहितप्रयोगः प्रमादज इति भागवृत्तिः ।

This passage unequivocally points out that the Bhāgavṛtti is later than Māgha, in as much as it criticises the *Imesis* in आविरभवत्. It is well known that Māgha in his Śiśupālavadhā refers to the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi and if Bhāgavṛtti refers to Māgha, he must necessarily be considerably later than 750 A. D., the date of Jinendrabuddhi and Māgha.

From these it would be perilous to accept Bhartṛhari to be the author of the Bhāgavṛtti. Bhartṛhari cannot be brought down later than 650, the date of the Kāśikā and on no account can the Bhāgavṛtti also be placed before 750 A. D.



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1. Śiśupālavadhā, X-19.
 2. Upādisūtravṛtti, Madras Edn. on, II-109.
 3. II-112 and the commentary of Mallinātha thereon.

THE ORIGIN OF THE ALPHABET OF CHAMPĀ.

BY

DR. R. C. MUZUMDAR,

Vice-Chancellor, Dacca University.

In Vol. X, Part III, pp. 192-200, of this Journal, Prof. K. A. Nilakantha Sastri of Madras has adversely criticised my article on the origin of the alphabet of Champā, published in B. E. F. E. O., Vol. XXXII. Although I am unable to agree with his views, I none the less appreciate the fact that he has not used such slighting and satirical remarks against me as I found in his book 'The Colas'.

Prof. Sastri's main attack is directed against the view which I expressed about the origin of the alphabet used in Vo-Canh inscription. I disagreed from the generally accepted view that this alphabet belonged to the southern type such as that used in Girnar or Kanheri inscriptions. My first argument is based upon the absence, in Vo-Canh, of two characteristics which are found in Girnar and Kanheri, and in all inscriptions of the southern type. These two characteristics are:—

(1) The re-ascent to the left of the lower end of the verticals of *a*, *d*, *r* and of the medial *u*, and *ū*,

and (2) the bend towards the left of the upper end of the vertical of *l*.

Prof. Sastri tries to meet my first argument by quoting an observation of Prof. Vogel to the effect that 'the Cham inscriptions of Bhadravarman represent an earlier stage of writing than the Kutei inscriptions', and then by making the following observations himself:—"We see, then, that the re-ascent of the lower end of the vertical, as Majumdar calls it, is the result of a gradual development of the Southern alphabets", and only a proof of the high antiquity of the Vo-Canh record, as compared with Girnar and Kanheri."

I must confess that I have not been able to understand the meaning of the above, or of the sentences that follow, unless it be the view of Prof. Sastri that Vo-Canh record is to be derived from an imaginary type of Southern alphabet, which is distinctly earlier than that of Girnar and Kanheri, and which did not

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exhibit the characteristic re-ascent to the left of the lower end of the verticals in certain letters.

This partially supports my contention that the alphabets of Vo-Canh inscription cannot be derived from those of Gihar and Kanheri. But it is difficult to accept any such view. Prof. Sastri has not referred to any single record with the southern type of alphabets lacking this particular characteristic. As a matter of fact, strictly speaking, we can hardly call an alphabet of southern type unless it exhibits these characteristics. For, as Buhler has observed, they were the earliest characteristics which distinguished a new system of alphabet that ultimately came to be called Southern. In other words, we should remember, that, at a period much earlier than that of the Gihar inscription, the points of difference between the alphabets current in different parts of India were not perhaps sufficiently marked to distinguish them as North Indian or South Indian.

As regards the second characteristic, *viz.*, the bend towards the left of the vertical of 'r', Prof. Sastri thinks that this feature is clearly present in two cases. I do not agree with him. In 'ra' of '*Kulamandana*' (1.10), a spot on the estampage, due to erosions of rock, immediately to the left of the top of 'ra', no doubt gives rise to an impression like a bend, and this has also appeared in my plate. There is however no such bend in '*lokasyāsa*' (1.11) as Prof. Sastri supposes. He has probably mistaken the thick stroke of *śrif* for a bend.

So far about the two characteristics which are universally present in South Indian alphabet. I still hold the view that the absence of these characteristics definitely demolishes the theory of the southern origin of Cham alphabets so long at least as the imaginary Southern alphabet of Prof. Sastri is not found in an actual record.

My second argument is based upon certain features of Vo-Canh inscription which are not present in South Indian alphabets, but some of which are present in North Indian alphabets. Prof. Sastri has proved, to his own satisfaction, that these features 'are either not present in the Vo-Canh record or are found in South Indian inscriptions of an age not much later than the Gihar and Kanheri records.'

Thus according to Prof. Sastri the Vo-Canh record is both an 'earlier' and a later 'specimen of the same script'. Comment [Vol. XI, Part I.]

on this is superfluous. As to the detailed treatment of the different alphabets on pp. 196-197 of the review, it is a matter of opinion whether certain features are or are not present, and I can safely leave it to the judgment of any reader who will take the trouble of comparing the facsimiles of inscriptions referred to therein.

As regards the notched 'p a', Prof. Sastri quotes the observation of Vogel that 'it is even found in Kuṣāṇa inscriptions'. This certainly supports my view, and is difficult to be reconciled with the further observation of Vogel that 'the origin of this peculiarity can be traced back to the famous Gīṃar *Prakāśh* of Rudradāman.'

Prof. Sastri has attempted to prove the South Indian origin of the Indian colonists by the absence of analogies between 'specifically North-Indian customs, institutions or legends, and those of Campā and Kāmboja,' and tracing them to South India (pp. 102-3). Leaving aside the Nāga-myth, whose origin is a disputed point and requires separate treatment, the other examples quoted by him are Indian rather than South-Indian. The naming of *liṅgas* and shrines after the donor is referred to in Rājatarāṅgī and North Indian inscriptions (cf. Bharādīdīh Ins. of Kumāragupta, dated 437 A. D.). Varman endings of royal names were not rare in North India. Among the kings defeated by Samudragupta there were three whose names ended in Varman, and of them two belonged to North India and one to South India.

Similarly, Prof. Sastri's reference to distinctions between right-hand and left-hand castes is misleading in the extreme. The only evidence he cites is a passage in a Chinese text referring to 'officials to the right and left of the king' of Fu-Nan. It is hardly logical to conclude from this that Fu-Nan knew the specifically South Indian social customs.

As regards the use of the Śaka era, with *amānta* reckoning, and the architectural style of Indian colonies, the problem is more complicated than Prof. Sastri imagines. I need not discuss them here, as they hardly touch the question of the origin of the colonists. We meet with these features in comparatively later times when the influence of South India is evident from palaeographic study, and I myself stated this fact in my article. Of course, some of the other features referred to above also

might be late, but, in any case, as I have shown above, they are Indian and not South-Indian. I would now leave the readers to judge for themselves how far, as Sastri puts it, 'facts like these raise a presumption in favour of a South Indian origin of the principal culture elements of the Colonies'.

It is somewhat surprising that while discussing the origin of the colonists, Sastri completely ignores the traditions preserved in the different colonies referring to their original home as situated in Northern India. Nor has he referred to two important facts bearing on this question, viz., (1) that a king of Champā abdicated the throne in order to spend his last days on the banks of the Ganges; and (2) that a king of Fu-Nan sent an embassy to Northern India about 240 A.D., i.e., during the earliest period of the existence of colonial kingdoms known to us. These and other facts referred to in my book 'Champā' should have removed Sastri's doubts whether there has been any evidence produced in support of a northern origin for the early Indian colonists.



A NEW GRANT OF THE GĀNGA SĀMANTAVARMAN

BY

M. SOMASIKHARA SARMA.

These plates were discovered, sometime back, while some people were digging in a high field nearly a furlong west of Cidivalasa—a place not far from Narasannapēṭa. They were in an earthen pot in a well-preserved condition. The discovery came to be known to Śrī Śrī Phalahārīmahant Rājārām bāvājī, the pontiff of Balagamatha and the proprietor of the village of Cidivalasa,—a very learned man, much interested in history—who acquired these plates and preserved them carefully. Sometime later, my friend Bhyri Appalaswami Naidugaru, who takes special interest in the history of the Kaṭiṅga country, came to know of this and while the Mahant was camping in his village, Tāḷavalasa, he paid a visit to the learned Mahant and was successful in getting a loan of these plates, which he kindly sent to me for publication.

It appears that there is a local tradition that the high field, wherein these plates were discovered, once formed part of a flourishing village. The Cidivalasa plates¹ of Devendravarman are also stated to have been discovered in the same place. Siviḍi, which is said to be the village granted, according to Devendravarman's plates, has been identified with the modern Cidivalasa. Mr. Appalaswami Naidu writes to me that the Mahant informs him that Cidivalasa was known in his old records as 'Sivudi grāma' (the village of Śiva).

The grant consists of three plates, each measuring 6' by 2.2'. The ring, to which these plates were originally fastened together, was lost along with the seal attached to it before the plates came into my hands.

The alphabet is of the Vēṅgi type which was current in the Kaṭiṅga country in the early 5th and 6th centuries of the Christian era. This type is found in the grants of the Kaṭiṅgādhipatis, (who do not mention in their grants the name of the dynasty to which they belong) and in the grants of the Eastern Gāṅgas of Kaṭiṅga till the time of Devendravarman, son of

1. Jour. Andh. Hist. Res. Soc., Vol. II, p. 146 ff.

Gupārnava of the 183rd year of the Gāṅga era. The change, in the script used in the Kaṭiṅga grants is noticeable from the time of Devendravarman onwards. While the characters in the charters of the Kaṭiṅgādhipatis and the early Gāṅgas are circular in form, those in the charters of the latter Gāṅgas are rectangular. Letters in rectangular form are found distinctly in the charters of the Gāṅgas, from the time of Indravarmān Rājasiṃha, of the 87th and 91st years of the Gāṅga era till the time of Devendravarman, in whose grants also we find the same rectangular form. The period of Devendravarman's rule forms a land-mark in the development of the alphabet used in the Kaṭiṅga grants.

The form of letters used in the grant under review is circular as in the Dharmapala plates² of Śāmanavarman, the only difference being that while the letters in the former are big in size and boldly and deeply engraved, those in the latter are small and inscribed faintly and lightly. Considering all these points, these plates may be safely stated to belong to the period of the grants of Indravarmān of the 150th year of the Gāṅga era,³ of Devendravarman of the 183rd year of the same era⁴ and of Śāmanavarman of the Dharmapala plates.

The first side of the first plate is left blank. Only one line indicating the date of the grant was inscribed on the second side of the third plate.

The only form that is not found in the regular Vēṅgi script is that of *ṇ*. This form is peculiar to the Kaṭiṅga grants and is found in them from the time of Indravarmān and Devendravarman. As usual in the grants of this age *ka*, *ga*, *ba*, *ṭa*, *ṇa*, *ya* and *ṛa* are doubled after *ṛ*. *Na* is distinguished from *ṇa* by a loop as in the early inscriptions in the Vēṅgi script. Final *ta* is shown by a slanting stroke below (*ṭ*, 22). Anusvara for final *m* is used in the imprecatory verses. In some places *ra* is used for *ba*.

The language is Sanskrit. The whole inscription with the exception of the last five imprecatory verses, is in prose. The Sandhi is wrong in "Sariṁ-meghāvati" (*ll.* 14-15), which ought to be "Sariṁ-meghāvati." It is interesting to note that a compound

2. Ep. Ind., Vol. XV, p. 275 ff.

3. Ep. Ind., Vol. XVIII, p. 307 ff.

4. Ep. Ind., Vol. III, p. 130 ff.

word "Kōdrava-khalī", which means the threshing floor of "Kōdrava"—a kind of grain—, is mentioned as one of the boundaries of the village granted. So far as I am aware, no inscriptions are found which mention a threshing floor also as a boundary. Since it was cited as one of the boundaries, it was perhaps a fixed plot of land belonging to the village community, used for the above-said purpose. Since it seems to be a permanent threshing floor, the kind of tenure, which was prevalent in the village granted, appears to be different from that of the ryotwari one, under which, it is evident that each ryot has his own threshing floor prepared in one of his own fields during the grain-threshing season. It was perhaps a joint tenure and the threshing floor—a permanent one—, was the common property of the village, each villager having a right to use it during the grain-threshing season⁵.

The grant under review is of great importance to the history of Kāṇṇṇa. It belongs to Mahārāja Sāmantavarman of the Eastern Gāṇṇa dynasty, who issued it from the victorious city ('Adhiṣṭhāna') of Śeṭṭaka. The first six lines of the grant contain the praśasti of the Gāṇṇa kings and describe their glory. The next six lines describe the grant proper. The object of the inscription is to record the grant, made by the Mahārāja Sāmantavarman of the Eastern Gāṇṇa dynasty to four brahmins Kīrtiśarman and his sons Devaśarman, Kaviśarman and Divākaraśarman of the Bhāradvāja gōtra and of the Vājasaneyā (caraṇa). The village granted was Phēraya, along with Aśvatthaccheda, attached to (the territorial division) Lohasrṅgaraviṣaya and was

5. There is evidence to show that even as late as in the nineteenth century, there was a sort of collective farming in vogue in the villages in the Jeypore tract, which once formed part of the ancient Kāṇṇa country. John Shortt writes in "the Hill ranges of Southern India" (Part III) thus:

"Land is granted by the Dewān on cowl from three to five years. The cowls are issued in the name of the headman or some one or two of the principal residents of the village, who are answerable for the kist of the entire village. The villagers are now assembled and an arrangement entered into with the headman as to how much each ryot will pay, according to the extent of land he may cultivate, and the extent of land each may bring under cultivation is also then settled. The ryots are sincere in their promises and keep strictly to their word, by paying the Kist in kind at the regular instalments."

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declared free from all kinds of taxes and constituted into an *agrahāra* to endure as long as the Sun and the Moon last. The boundaries of the village granted are described in the next three lines. The occasion on which this grant was made is not stated; but the date of the grant is given as 'Samvat 100 [+*] 85 Kārttikadina 30.'

According to the general practice usually observed in epigraphy, 'Samvat' denotes the years in the 'Vikrama era'. Thus, if Samvat 185 is reckoned as 'Vikrama Samvat' 185, the grant has to be assigned to A.D. 243, the period previous to the invasion of the Southern kingdoms by Samudragupta, and what is more, to the pre-Gupta period. This is against all the facts known so far about the history of the Eastern Gāṅgas. In fact another grant—the *Bṛhatprōṣa* grant⁶ of the Kaṇḍūgūdhīpati Umavarman also gives the date in Samvat. 'Samvat' has therefore simply to be taken as an equivalent to *Samvatsara* or an year. The starting point of this reckoning is still unknown and sufficient details are not given in the date portion of the grant. Hence, to calculate the exact date in the Christian era is not possible.

Ścētaka, Lōhaśṛṅgāra-viṣaya, Phērava and Meghāvatī are the four geographical terms that occur in this grant. The last of the above four terms is the name of a river that forms the Western boundary of Phērava, the village granted. Lōhaśṛṅgāra is the name of a territorial division (*viṣaya*) in the Kalinga country. The term Ścētaka can be explained philologically to be the same as the modern Cikaṭi in the Sōmpēṭa taluk of the Ganjam district, the intervening forms being, Ścēkata (through metathesis), Cēkata, Cēkaṭa and finally Cikaṭi in popular parlance. It is not possible to identify Lōhaśṛṅgāra-viṣaya, which occurs for the first time in this inscription. But we may not be far from the right in assuming that this was the region around Ścētaka, the modern Cikaṭi Zamindāri in the Ganjam district. Phērava is no doubt the modern Barua in the Sōmpēṭa taluk and the river Meghāvatī is no other than the Mahendratanaya that rises in the Mahendragiri mountains and falls into the sea near Barua.

Local accounts assert that the modern village of Barua was known in ancient times as Bhavaharapura, as it was founded by

6. Ep. Ind., Vol. XII, p. 4 ff.

the Pāṇḍavas, to atone for the sin of killing a cow (mistaking it for a deer) from the Mahenragiri mountain. They are also stated to have established the god Janārdana at that place and made a gift of the village to some Brahmins. The present grant mentions the name of the village not as Bhayāhara-pura but as Phērava, which is a more likely origin of the modern name Barua; and consequently it is obvious that the local tradition is of late origin.⁷

Three grants⁸ have already been published in the *Epigraphia Indica* which were issued by the Gāṅga kings from Ścētakādhiṣṭhāna. The name of the city from which those grants were issued was wrongly read as Śvētaka⁹, which is really Ścētaka. It

7. I am indebted to my friend Mr. Bhyri Appalaswami Naiduguru for supplying me with this information.

8. *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XV, p. 275 ff.
Ep. Ind., Vol. XIX, p. 114 ff.
Ep. Ind., Vol. IV, p. 196 ff.

9. When I found the form of "Ścētaka" in this inscription I was confronted with a doubt whether the previous readings of "Śvētaka" were correct. Then, I consulted the originals of the Dhanantara plates of Sāmantavarman and the Ganjam plates of Prthivivarman, housed in the Government Museum, Madras, with the kind permission of the Archaeological assistant, Mr. C. Sivaramamurti, M.A., to whom my thanks are due.

Prthivivarman's inscription is written in the Nāgarī script. In this grant also the name of the adhiṣṭhāna is "Ścētaka" but not "Śvētaka". The second letter of the conjunct consonant 'scē' is very clear and resembles 'ca' occurring in other places in this inscription. The Dhanantara plates are in the Vēṅgī script, in which there is much difference between 'ca' and 'va'. 'Scē' in "Ścētakādhiṣṭhāna" is very clear. The correctness of the reading becomes evident even if the facsimile impressions of these plates, published in the *Epigraphia Indica* are consulted. In the Viṣaṁgiri plates of Indravarman there are two kinds of "śa"—one is of the Nāgarī script and the other of the Vēṅgī (—Kaṭiṅga) script. The conjunct letters "śca" and "śva" can be distinguished by the letter "śa" which, in the former, is invariably in the Nāgarī script and in the latter, invariably in the Vēṅgī script. Since "śa" used in the name of the city from which the grant was issued is in the Nāgarī script, it is evident that the name of the city is "Ścētaka" but not "Śvētaka".

has not yet been settled if the kings mentioned in these grants, who also call themselves Gāṅgas, belonged to the same branch of the Gāṅga dynasty that was ruling from Kaṭiṅga-nagara. These grants bear no dates and hence it has been difficult to get any clear idea as to their chronology. Nor was it possible to identify, so far, the region over which they ruled, since the places mentioned in these grants have remained unidentified. The present grant helps us to locate these rulers in the region of the modern Cikat, Zamindāri and is helpful to us also, in providing a date—the year 185 to this grant—although it is not clear as to which era was followed. Assuming that it was Gāṅga era, it follows that Śāmantavarman the donor of the present grant, was ruling practically at the same time as Devendrarvarman, son of Guṇarjaya of Kaṭiṅganagara, whose grants of the years 183 and 192 of the Gāṅga era are available, and was, therefore, his contemporary. The evidence of the alphabet supports but does not go against such a contention. If the above assumption is correct, then it is possible to argue that Devendrarvarman and Śāmantavarman belonged to the same family of the Gāṅgas and ruled in the same Kaṭiṅga country. Śāmantavarman was probably a member of another branch of the same Gāṅga family and ruled from Ścētakādhisthāna. Such a view is not improbable, especially, in the light of the statement in the records¹⁰ of Vajrahasta III that there were originally five different kings ruling different parts of Kaṭiṅga and that Vajrahasta I, an ancestor of Vajrahasta III unified them all under his rule. It is possible that these five kings were really of the same family—that is, the Gāṅga family—and that the Ścētaka line was one of its branches. It might be added that the records issued from Danta-pura might refer to a third branch of the same family but it is not yet possible to assert anything definite regarding this in the present state of our knowledge. It will be interesting to note in this connection that some of the records¹¹ of Anantavarman Cōḷagāṅga state that his remote ancestor Kāmārjaya, son of Virasimha, conquering Śaharāditya and taking possession of Kaṭiṅga ruled from Dantapura. Decorating his younger brother Dānārjaya with the necklace (of royalty)—

10. Ep. Ind., Vol. IX, p. 94, v. 1.

11. Ind. Ant., Vol. XVIII, p. 165.

"Kaṇṭhikābandhurakaṇṭham vidhāya"—perhaps as a token that he should succeed him to the throne, Kāmārṇava, at the end of his reign, gave Ambivāḍi viṣaya to Guṇārṇava, Sēdāmaṇḍala¹² to Mārasinḥa and Kaṇṭakavartani to Vajrahasta. The kingdoms referred to in the records of Vajrahasta III, as united into one by Vajrahasta I, were probably the territories ruled over by the descendants of these five brothers. Even then, only four but not five kingdoms are recognisable, if at all they belonged to these brothers, since Dānārṇava became the ruler of the principality of his brother Kāmārṇava.¹³ Whatever this may be, it seems that 'Sēdāmaṇḍala' is a corrupt form of 'Ścētaka' or 'Ścēta maṇḍala', 'Ścētaka' or 'Ścēta' having been changed into 'Cēta' and then into 'Sēda'.

Among the three grants of the kings of 'Ścētaka', published so far, the earliest is the Dhamantara plates of Sāmantavarman. Although there are two slight differences in the phraseology of the praśasti found in the Dhamantara plates and the plates under review, I believe that the donor Sāmantavarman, of both the grants is one and the same person. The question then arises as to why this Sāmantavarman who was described as "स्वमुखवत्तराकम्मान्तसकल-श्रेतकाधिराज्यः" came to be praised as "स्वमुखवत्तराकम्मान्तकलिङ्गाधिराज्यः". Another noticeable point is that Sāmantavarman, in these plates, has the titles "महाराज" and "सकलकलिङ्गाधिराजि" which

12. Those who had edited the inscriptions of Anantavarman Cōḍagaṅga read this as "Sūdāmaṇḍala". When consulting the originals of Cōḍagaṅga's plates, housed in the Government Museum, I found the correct reading to be "Sēdāmaṇḍala".

13. Sri Satyanarayana raja guru of Parlakimedi, while publishing in the Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society (Vol. III, p. 30ff) the Phulsara plates of Kīrti-rājadeva, gives the pedigrees of his own creation for each of the five branches of the Gāṅga family, in a tabular form. He states that the country ruled over by Dānārṇava was "Kaṇḍika handhura". In fact "Kaṇḍi(ṭhi)kābandhura" is not the name of a country. The passage in question is given here for the benefit of the readers:

"असौ दानार्णवमुज्जं कंदि (ठि) काव्धुरकंठं विधाय गुणार्णवायव-
दिविषयं मारसिंहाय सेंदामण्डलं वज्रहस्ताय कंटकवर्तनीमदात् .

are absent in the Dhanantara plates. The assumption of these titles by Śāmantavarman in the present grant and the change in the passage in the *prāśasti* therein indicate that probably Śāmantavarman was originally a petty local chief of no importance during the period when he issued the Dhanantara plates, and in course of time he assumed those titles after making some fresh conquests and acquiring some more territory. Thus, the present grant is proof positive that he gained dignity and status sometime after he issued the Dhanantara plates.

Now the question arises as to whom he conquered and what became of Devendravarman, son of Guṇārdhava, his contemporary, who was described in his grants as “निजनिविशभारेणजितसकलकलिङ्गाधिपत्यः”¹⁴. How is it that both happened to have titles “सकलकलिङ्गाधिपतिः”¹⁵ and “सकलकलिङ्गाधिपत्यः”¹⁶ having more or less the same meaning? As a matter of fact, the Gāṅga rulers of Kāṇḍināgarā from Hastivarman onwards till Devendravarman, with the exception of Indravarmān of the 138th year of the Gāṅga era, are described as “स्वनिविशभारेणजितसकलकलिङ्गाधिपत्यः”¹⁷. This passage, it is to be noted, is found in all the grants¹⁸ dated in the years 204, 221, 254, 351, 397 and 520 of the Gāṅga era, issued from Kāṇḍināgarā from after the time of Devendravarman, son of Guṇārdhava, with the exception of those that are dated in the years 304, 310, 31 (2), 500 and 526 of the same era¹⁹ and the undated grants²⁰ of the Gāṅga kings, Arjunavarman's son Devendravarman, Rājendravarman's son Devendravarman,

14. Jour. Andh. Hist. Res. Soc., Vol. II, p. 272 ff.

Bhārati. Vol. V. p. 111.

Ind. Ant., Vol. XVIII, p. 143 ff.

Ind. Ant., Vol. XIV, p. 10 ff.

Jour. Andh. Hist. Res. Soc., Vol. II, p. 146 ff.

Jour. Andh. Hist. Res. Soc., Vol. II, p. 171 ff.

15. Ep. Ind., Vol. III, p. 17 ff.

Ep. Ind., Vol. XVIII, p. 311 ff.

Ind. Ant., Vol. XIII, p. 273 ff.

Jour. Andh. Hist. Res. Soc., Vol. VIII, p. 168 ff.

16. Jour. Andh. Hist. Res. Soc., Vol. VIII, p. 192.

Ep. Carn., Vol. IX, Bn, p. 140.

Jour. Andh. Hist. Res. Soc., Vol. VIII, p. 193.

Ep. Ind., Vol. III, p. 220 ff.

Devendravarman's son Anantavarman and Mahārājādhirāja Vajrahastadeva.

This passage, which had found mention in the praśasti of the Gāṅgas of Kañjanagara, probably from the time of the first Gāṅga king as a result of his conquest of Kañjiga, was formally adopted by his successors. It is to be presumed by his titles mentioned in the present grant, that Sāmantavarman invaded the dominion of the Gāṅgas of Kañjanagara and defeated them. Then annexing a portion, if not the whole of their territory, he assumed the titles mahārāja and kañjigādhipati, as a mark of his superiority over them, besides incorporating in his praśasti in the present grant, the passage "स्वमुखवल्पाकमाकान्त-कलिङ्गाधिराजः", which the Gāṅgas of Kañjanagara were proud of repeating in their grants. It appears that the Ścētaka rulers that succeeded Sāmantavarman merely inherited the titles from him and the passage alluded to above bears no special significance in their grants. The assumption that the grant under review is dated in the Gāṅga era leads us to think that the defeated king was no other than Devendravarman, son of Guṇarāja. If Sāmantavarman defeated Devendravarman, he could have done it only after 184th year (between the years 184 and 185) of the Gāṅga era, since we find an inscription¹⁷ of that date, of the latter king, issued from Kañjanagara. But we are led to conclude by the last inscription¹⁸ so far discovered of Devendravarman, dated in the year 192, the praśasti of which, except for the words 'vāsaka' and 'tyāgādiguṇa' is just a copy of that of his inscription dated in the year 184, that he regained what he might have lost, if at all he lost, before that date (192).

17. Jour. Andh. Hist. Res. Soc., Vol. II, p. 275 ff.

18. Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. XI, p. 300 ff.

Text¹

First plate.

1. ओ [१] स्वस्ति विजयश्चेतकाधिष्ठानाद्भगवतश्चराचरगुरोरसक
2. लशशाङ्कशेखरधरस्य स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयहेतोर्महेन्द्राच
3. लशि[स्त्र]निवासिनः श्रीगोकर्णेश्वरस्वामिनश्चरणकमलारा
4. धनादवातपुष्पानेचयो गङ्गामलकुलाम्बरदुः[२]स्वभुजव(व)
5. ३लपराक्रमाकान्तकलिङ्गाधिराम्यःशक्तिप्रवप्रकर्षानुरक्षिताशे
6. पसामन्तः परममोहचरो मातावितृपादानुप्यातस्स

Second plate first side.

7. कलकलिङ्गाधिपतिर्महाराजश्रीसामन्तवर्मा कुशली[॥॥]लोहभृ
8. ङ्गारविषयसम्बन्ध केरवप्रामे यथानिवासिजनपदं समाज्ञा
9. पयनि विदितमस्तु भवतां यथायं प्रामोक्षत्वल्लेदसहि
10. तस्तर्षकरभरानपद्धनय⁴ भारद्वाजसंगोत्र वाजसनेय कीर्त्तेश
11. शर्मणे तत्पुत्रदेवशर्मरविशर्मदिवाकरशर्मभ्यश्च चतुर्भ्यो मा(मा)द्वणे
12. १भ्यस्तल्लभ्यारपूर्वमाचन्द्रार्ककालप्रतिष्ठमप्रहारं कृत्यामि

Second plate. Second side.

13. १तापित्रोरामनश्च पुष्पभिर्बुद्धये सम्प्र[द॥]तोस्य च प्रामस्य
सीमालिङ्गा
14. नि भवन्ति[॥] पूर्वेण शुष्कनदी[॥] दक्षिणेन सम्येच[॥]
पश्चिमेन सरित्ते(म्मे)षाव

1. From the original plates with me the facsimiles of which will be published in the next issue.

2. Read 'कुलाम्बरदुः[२]'.

3. Read 'स्वभुजव'.

4. Read 'नपद्वाय'.

5. There is an indistinct letter inscribed before 'भ्य', which seems to be unnecessary and superfluous. Read 'माद्वणेभ्यः'.

6. Read 'माता'.

15. ती[॥●]उत्तरेण कोद्रवखर्दः [॥●] दक्षिणेन गत्वा (ती) पूर्वोत्तरेण
यावत्पर्वतः[॥●]
16. विदित्वैवं न केनचिस्वप्याप्यावा(वा)धा कार्या[॥●]नविध्यतश्च
राज्ञः[●]प्रति
17. वे(वे)धयति⁷[॥●]धर्मक्रमविक्रमेण नावाप्य⁸ महीमनुशासद्विरयं
18. दानधर्मोनुपालनीयः [●]व्यासगौताश्चात्र श्लोका भवन्ति[॥●]
बहुभिर्व

The first plate, first side.

19. सुधा दत्ता राजभिस्सग्रादिभिः [॥●] यस्य यस्य यदा भूमिस्तस्य
तस्य
20. तदा फले [॥●]स्वदत्तां परदत्ताम्वा यत्नाद्वक्ष्य युधिष्ठिर[॥●]मही⁹
महीमतां श्रेष्ठ
21. दानाच्छ्रेयोनुपादनं [॥●]पृष्टि¹⁰सद्विद्यानि स्वर्गे मोदति भूमिदः
[॥●] आश्रे
22. सा चानुमन्ता च तान्येव नरके वसेत् [॥●]माभूदफलशङ्कावःप
23. रदत्तेति पार्थिवाः[॥●]स्वदानात्फलमानन्व¹¹ परदानानुपालनं ॥
[॥●]
24. यशोनिस्तो¹²ऽस्थिराभोगा¹³जीवितक्षणभङ्गुरं[॥●] इति सेविन्व
नृपते कुरुधर्मानुपालनरम् ॥[●]

Third plate, Second side.

25. सम्बत् 185 कार्तिकदिन ३(१)[॥●]

7. Read 'प्रतिबोधयति'.

8. Read 'धर्मक्रमविक्रमेणावाप्य'

9. Read 'महीम्'.

10. Read 'पृष्टिर्वर्ष'.

11. Read 'मानन्वयम्'.

12. Wrong gender.

13. Read 'जीवितम्'

LITERARY NOTE.

यं सर्वदौलाः पत्तिकल्प्य कर्म मेरौ स्थिते दोग्धरि दोहदक्षे ।

मास्रन्ति रत्नानि महीवधीश्च पृथूपदिष्टां दूददुर्धसिन्धुम् ॥

This second verse in Canto one of Kālidāsa's *Kumārasambhava* contains certain beautiful *Dhyanis* or suggestions which the discerning critic will not fail to detect. It is a verse of deep artistic significance and poetic beauty. By a praise in poetic language of the glory of the Himalayas, the poet stresses the geographical importance of this great mountain of India and desires to convey to the reader the fact that the Himalayas is the repository of precious gems and minerals, medicinal herbs and useful plants, and that the geological formation of this mighty range is not a little responsible for the fertility and richness of the great Gangetic and Indus valleys. In fact, it is as much a maker of the History of India as any of the great personalities of her past. At the same time, the poet by clever turns of expression and the nuances of the words gives to the reader a clue to the main theme of the poem, the union of Siva and Pārvatī, whose fulfilment was the birth of the hero to protect the kingdom of heaven and bless the world. Hence the imagination of the poet has seized upon the story, which is contained in the *Natsya-purāṇa* and the *Śrīmad-Bhāgavata*, about how in days of yore, the great King, Prithu forced with the aid of his extraordinary prowess, Mother Earth to yield all the plenty he desired for the prosperity of his people. He induced her to take the form of a cow and made her yield all her treasures and essences in the form of milk. The various classes of beings of the universe formed themselves into groups and each division selected the most precious among its members and improvised that individual or unit as a calf and with its aid milked the cow. The story goes that the mountain ranges of the world selected the Himalayas which is the highest and best among them as a calf for Mother Earth and made her yield the most valuable minerals. मिरयो हिमवदला नानाधातुं स्वसानपु. In Kālidāsa's picture in this verse however, we find a modification of the story. Instead

1. The *Natsya-purāṇa*, Ch. X. The *Bhāgavata*, IV—18.

of the minerals the poet mentions shining precious gems and great herbs,—*नैस्त्वन्ति रत्नानि महीपरीक्ष*—and in the figurative representation of the milking of the cow, he specifically refers to mountain Meru as an expert milkman. The poetic significance of these two emendations has to be assessed and appreciated. It will be a legitimate inference to draw that the reason for the mention of Ratna and Oṣadhi instead of the Nānādhātus is that the poet desired to indicate in what the greatness and glory of the Himalayas consisted. According to Puranic tradition, the two most noteworthy claims to glory of the Himalayas are the birth of Pārvatī or Umā and the existence of the great Soma plant, among its Fauna and Flora. As the word Ratna in Sanskrit phraseology is *Śreṣṭhavyākaraṇa* i.e., indicates the best of a particular group or category, it aptly denotes also the Kanyāratna, Umā or Pārvatī and the phrase Mahāoṣadhi would naturally include the greatest of them all, so vital for vedic sacrifices, the Soma plant. In his commentary on the third verse of the Kumārasambhava the Commentator, Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita, in annotating the word Ratna, states that it includes Kanyāratna also i.e., Umā. In verse 17, again, the poet refers expressly to the greatness of the Himalayas as consisting in its being the producer of the Soma plant which is denoted by the expression 'Yajñānga'. Hence it is clear that the poet had in mind to bring home to the reader the idea above mentioned viz., that the glory of the Himalayas was, in Puranic tradition, due to the birth of Umā as the daughter and the production of the Soma Plant. Herein lies therefore the explanation for the mention of Ratna and Oṣadhi instead of Nānādhātus as in the story of the Śrimad Bhāgavata. In order to emphasise the intimate natural link between the great mountain and the earth which is in the nature of a great geological process and not the outcome of any artificial agency, the poet emphasises, in the figurative representation of the earth as a cow yielding milk, that, even without the aid of any artificial agency of a milkman, the cow yielded milk which naturally flowed from her udder on account of the intense motherly affection for her calf. Hence by the specific reference to the mountain Meru standing by and by the description of Meru as Dohadākṣa (an expert milkman) the poet suggests that the cow was milked with the aid of her calf alone and without the aid of a milkman. To appreciate the full

force of this, we may read as a contrast the figurative representation of the Upaniṣads as cows and Pārthasārathi as the milkman in the śloka frequently recited about the Gītā : सर्वोपनिषदो मावः दोग्धा गोपालनन्दनः । तस्यै वक्तुः सुधीर्मोक्षा. There, the conscious and necessary agency of the great teacher who will give for the benefit of mankind the true message of the Upaniṣads as its essence is well indicated by the express statement that Gopālanandana was the milkman. Hence it is that the great Alāṅkārika, Abhinava Gupta in his classical work, the Dhavanyāloka, in commenting on the verse—

सरस्वती स्वादु तदर्थवस्तु निष्पन्दमाना महतां जनीनाम् ।

अलोकमान्यमभिव्यनक्ति परिस्पृन्तं प्रतिमाविशेषम् ॥

illustrates the force of the word Nisṣandamānā (naturally flowing) by quoting this 2nd verse of the Kumārasambhava.

The great religious truth embodied in the Ardhanārīśvara form of the union of Śiva and Pārvatī, viz., the association of the creative principle or Mālaprakṛti with the transcendental Brahman is aptly and beautifully indicated in this verse by the suggestion of Umā as the Kanyāśratna destined to become the bride of Śiva, born to the Himalayas as the essence of Mother Earth. As we all know, the fulfilment of this union in the birth of the hero is the theme of this great poem. The reader will fully appreciate how the poet by his beautiful turns of expression and suggestive phrases gives the clue to the central theme and the message of his work in this verse.

K. BALASUBRAHMANYA AYYAR.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

SIVA TATTVA PRAKĀŚIKĀ.

BY

SRESHTHULUR KRISHNĀSWAMI AIYAR, RETIRED
PLEADER, CHITTOOR.

(*Victoria Jubilee Press, Chittoor, Price Rs. 1-0-0*).

This is a brochure in English having for its purpose the refutation of the theory which is held by certain sections of the devotees of Śiva and Viṣṇu that the one or the other is the supreme deity superior to all other deities. The book tries to point out that the saguṇa forms of Śiva and Keśava are only the manifestations of one supreme being. As is well put by the Skandopaniṣad those who salute Mahāviṣṇu are considered to have saluted Maheśvara also. Those who worship Mahāviṣṇu with piety are considered to have done likewise to Maheśvara. Those who hate Maheśvara are considered to have hated Mahāviṣṇu also. Moreover, those who are not able to perceive Maheśvara will not be able to perceive Mahāviṣṇu as well. (I have adopted the translation of the author.) The book seems to have been the outcome of a controversy which has arisen on account of a certain action of the Tirupati Devasthanam Committee. We in this journal have nothing to do with the merits of the action of the committee and we do not propose to say anything in the matter. The controversy about the superiority of these two deities was much more acute in the period covering the 14th, 15th and 16th centuries and much literature has been produced on this matter. But, we regret to say that this controversy is absolutely barren and has been solely responsible for the degeneracy of the true religious spirit in our country. An impartial reading of our religious literature will convince us that the real spirit of the ancient authorities is towards henotheism. Our ancients while following the practice of worshipping many deities have been liberal enough to tolerate all differences in the matter of worship and to adopt the principle that whatever manifestation of God a devotee worships he is sure to attain the blessing of the one Supreme Being that governs the universe.

We have great pleasure in commending this book to all those who are interested in a topic of this kind.

[Vol. XI, Part I.]

THE CHILD IN ANCIENT INDIA.

MRS. KANALAKSHI DESHPANDE, B.A., PH. D.

(*Everywhere, book-sellers, Page 4, Price Rs. 2.*)

This very interesting work deals with an important aspect of the religious life of the Hindus, their Saṁskāras. The author has limited the scope of her research to the nine Saṁskāras ending with Upanayana, which cover the period of ancient Aryan Childhood. Incidentally, also she has dealt with the history of the growth of the custom of child marriages in India. She has culled her information chiefly from that portion of Hindu religious literature called the Grhyasūtras or books of the rules for the domestic rites, though the Saṁskāras are also dealt with in a general way in the Dharmasūtras and Smṛiti. The work was presented by the talented lady as a thesis to the German University in Prague in the year 1931, when she had the privilege and benefit of being trained under the great oriental scholar, Dr. Winternitz, whose recent death all those interested in Indology greatly deplore. The subject chosen is also of great practical interest to all pious Hindus. A scientific study of the Saṁskāras in the fourteen Grhya ūtras has been a desideratum for a long time. The attention of both the reformers and the orthodox people has needs to be focussed on this topic and a thorough knowledge of the history and significance of these Saṁskāras will greatly help all in the right understanding and proper solution of the many problems which have been agitating the public mind at the present day in regard to the social life of the Hindus, especially of the Brahmin community. An intelligent appreciation of the meaning behind the religious rites enjoined in the performance of the various Saṁskāras and the critical estimate of their true value are both necessary for the English-educated Hindu to cultivate the right attitude towards the Saṁskāras and to decide the part they have to play in his practical domestic life, under changed modern conditions. A blind literal observance of all unmeaning formalities or outworn habits has to be disapproved and, at the same time, an unthinking denunciation of all Hindu religious rites inspired by the delusion

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and snare of the material glory of Western civilisation has to be severely condemned. Hence the effort of the distinguished author of this thesis is to be commended.

Mrs. Kamalabai Deshpande, the worthy daughter of a distinguished son of India, Mr. N. C. Kekar, has brought to bear upon her task large powers of critical acumen, accurate research and meticulous industry. It is only in one direction that I venture to make a criticism not in any carping spirit, but in the interests of true oriental research. Western Scholars in probing into the history and growth of the social and religious institutions of India are apt to trace their development on the assumption that the progress through the centuries was from the rudimentary stage of primitive peoples and to discover the origin of custom from a comparative study of the existing records of the customs of the primitive peoples of the world, the ancient Hindus being reckoned as among them. Hence they imagine they find even in the developed ideas of later Hindu civilisation the impress of the primitive customs which are found fairly prevalent among all primitive peoples. It is, indeed, a question whether this attitude is historically correct. So far as the records of ancient India go, it is difficult to maintain that the ancient Hindus are shown to be akin to the other primitive peoples of the world. Mrs. Deshpande in this matter has fallen in line with the Western Scholars possibly largely owing to the influence of Western savants in the course of her training. At page 17 of her book in tracing the origin of the Saṃskāra of Garbhādhāna, she states: "From the accounts of the primitive stages of all the peoples, we find that the menstruation period of a woman is not looked upon as a natural occurrence but as due to the influence of some evil power". The authority for this statement is given as the *Ency. of Religion and Ethics*. But it is difficult to find from the ancient Hindu religious literature or medical books any explicit statement to that effect. On the other hand, it is possible to substantiate that the ancient Hindus had a fairly scientific idea of this natural phenomenon among women. At page 75 again in discussing the history of the Saṃskāra of Jātakarma she states that "the secret name goes back to a belief which is found among primitive people all over the world". At page 21 she observes "among many of the primitive tribes which exist to this day we find similar customs and ideas to be present and so it is quite likely that the primitive Indo-European

society had them also; when they migrated eastwards those customs either accompanied them or they copied them from the native Indian people who were 'already there'. These are controversial assumptions, to say the least. At page 133 she remarks about *Cacla* as follows: "Similar customs are found among the Slavic people of South Europe and other branches of the Indo-germanic people. It has been seen that among the primitive people hair and nails are looked upon as having some significance. Evil spirits are supposed to invade a person whose nails or hair they could get hold of. "In discussing the question of *Upanayana* she again observes: "It may be safely suggested, if not asserted, that in the primitive stage of the so-called Indo-European period when the tribes which migrated towards the East and the West were not separated some such custom of admitting a boy to the community..." At page 163 she even suggests that some of the rites in *Upanayana* may reach back to the Stone Ages. On the other hand, the impartial student of Hindu religious literature is struck with the highly advanced ideas that were current even in pre-historic ages in India and the unbroken continuity and unique vitality of the characteristics of Hindu civilisation throughout history. At any rate, it is up to us Indian research Scholars, especially Indian women, who have all along in the course of centuries been the custodians of Hindu Dharma, not to fall into the natural error of Western Scholars to assume the primitive nature of the ancient Hindus. For, it was *Āpastamba* who declared, at the end of his *Dharmasūtra*, that from women should be learnt the rest of the Dharmas.

It is indeed, a great pleasure to us to commend to the public this very remarkable venture on the part of an accomplished Indian lady to explore the hitherto unfamiliar region of the critical survey of the *Gṛhyasūtras* dealing with the *Samskāras*.

K. BALASUBRAHMANYA IYER.

OBITUARY NOTICES.

THE LATE PROFESSOR MORITZ WINTERNITZ.
(1863—1937)

I

In the demise of Dr. Moritz Winternitz of the University of Prag, in January 1937, Indology has suffered a great and irretrievable loss. His eminent scholarship and his meritorious services to the cause of Sanskrit learning and research in general, and to the Mahābhārata studies in particular, are known well to all the Indologists. Every serious student of Sanskrit is familiar with his great work on the History of Sanskrit literature, which may, without exaggeration, be described as a monument of his vast scholarship and industry.

Professor Winternitz came to India in 1922 and spent some time in the *Śāntiniketan*. During his stay in India, he visited Madras and was kind enough to see Mahamahopādhyāya Professor S. Kuppaswami Sastriyar, at his residence in Mylapore, on the Dipāvali Amāvāsyā afternoon, of the year 1922. Dressed in the simple style of the old-world Brāhmaṇa, he quietly walked into Professor Sastriyar's library room and had a long and interesting conversation with him on several topics connected with Sanskrit literature. Professor Sastriyar was profoundly impressed with his sweet reasonableness and discriminating scholarship. The acquaintance, which began in this way, between Professor Sastriyar and Professor Winternitz ripened into a lasting friendship; and it is a matter of painful regret that, just at a time when Professor Sastriyar was looking forward to the active and valuable co-operation of Professor Winternitz in the preparation of a complete and up-to-date *Catalogus Catalogorum* of Sanskrit manuscripts, under the auspices of the Madras University, God chose to remove Professor Winternitz from this world.

May the soul of Professor Winternitz rest in peace and may he re-incarnate himself in the Bhārata-varṣa, to continue his

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valuable work in the sphere of Oriental Research—is the fervent prayer of *The Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.*

II

THE LATE DR. K. P. JAYASWAL.

On behalf of this Journal, we have to place on record our sense of profound sorrow at the untimely demise of the famous Indian scholar—Dr. Kasi Prasad Jayaswal and at the great loss which historical research in this country has thereby sustained. Among the non-professional Orientalists of this country, who, by sheer industry and intrinsic worth, rose to the rank of first-rate Indologists, Dr. K. P. Jayaswal's name stands out prominently. The attention of our readers is invited to the following note about Dr. Jayaswal, which our good friend Rao Bahadur R. Krishna Rao Bhonsle, I.S.O., Madras, has sent to us for publication.

NOTE

BY RAO BAHADUR R. KRISHNA RAO BHONSLE.

Dr. Kashi Prasad Jayaswal, a famous Oriental scholar, Patna, is no more! India is poorer by his death, which is a loss, an irreparable loss, to those interested in Oriental research work.

A man of great learning and varied knowledge, he had no pride of learning. The first sentence in his address as President of the Seventh All-India Oriental Conference held at Baroda in 1933, showed his humility. It was this: "In obedience to your call, I stand before you as a servant. A servant has no option but to carry out the wishes he has taken to serve. In this right alone, I take this chair". His address, in the words of H. H. The Maharajah of Baroda, was very learned, thoughtful and worthy of deep study. The Maharajah added: "The profession of research scholar is one of the hardest, yet noblest callings of modern times. . . . There are only a few men available, who are intellectually so advanced as to appreciate, admire and devote themselves to this kind of work."

Dr. Jayaswal's profession was Law, but his real "profession" was one of research in the field of orientalism. How fittingly the remarks quoted above applied to him. The history of the systems of government in Ancient and Mediaeval India has been enriched by Dr. Jayaswal by his researches, and its usefulness at [Vol. XI, Part ii.]

the present juncture could not be denied—thus rightly remarked Sir V. T. Krishnamachari, Dewan of Baroda.

Dr. Jayaswal had always a warm corner in his heart for the Madras research workers. In his Baroda address, he said: "On philosophic literature, our wealth is rapidly increasing. The *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Miśra, contemporary of Śaṅkara, is under publication by Mahāmahopādhyāya Kuppaswami Sastri and in the meantime Maṇḍana's *Vibhrama Viveka* has been brought out by Mr. T. V. Ramachandra Dikshitar, under the guidance of that learned Mahāmahopādhyāya Within the last few years, the attention of Indian historians has been drawn towards composing text-books on individual provinces or dynasties. Several such manuals are already in the fore. . . .

When I submitted to the Baroda Conference copies of my contributions to the "Madras Mail" under the caption, (i) "Ophir Newly Identified" and (ii) "The Art of Tattooing in India", I furnished at the same time copies of them to Dr. Jayaswal. I received from him a very encouraging appreciation of them which I shall ever treasure.

Some of the delegates including myself who attended the thirteenth Session of the Indian Historical Records Commission held at Patna in 1930, had some difficulty in inspecting certain rare articles found out in the excavations of Pāṭaliputra (the ancient name of Patna, described by Magasthenes as Palibothra) kept in the safe of the Patna Museum. When we expressed our earnest desire to him to see them, he not only made special arrangements for our inspection, but also followed us and gave us a detailed description of each of the articles including a rare seal. May his soul rest in peace!



Second Mate—first mate.



[A highly degraded, low-contrast scan of a document page, likely from a historical manuscript. The text is extremely faint and illegible due to poor image quality. A large circular artifact is visible near the bottom center.]

Third Place—First side

[illegible]

First Plate-second add.

မိမိတို့အား နှစ်နှစ်နှင့်

PAININGS FROM THE KAILĀSANĀTHA TEMPLE*

BY

C. SIVARAMAMURTI, M.A.,

Archaeological Assistant, Government Museum, Madras.

The painters of the court at Kājasimha have been at work at the temple of Kailāsanātha. Their brush has glided softly over the surface of the walls in the tiny little shrines that surround the central vimāna. The panels have not been large and the space for the play of the painter's art has not been over much. Every individual sculpture must have been painted but panels devoted mainly to line and colour have not been many. Master sculptors have been at work in that temple; and most of the space has tasted the magic transformation of shape the chisel has produced, though only just a little of it had sucked colour and brilliance from the dainty tip of the brush of the Pallava painter.

But who knew that these lovely dreams of a Citrakāra were hidden beneath the ugly coatings of white in those utterly neglected cells. Centuries of sleep within the curtains of coats of white was disturbed when Dr. Jouveau Dubreuil tapped the coatings on 12th January 1931, and these sleeping beauties peeped through the interstices whence flakes had fallen off. The world soon came to know of this and there was a general scramble to rush to these wonderful paintings to have a glimpse of their beauty. But this was only a fleeting interest and an utterly dilettantish appreciation.

The place is to-day as deserted as it was when the great French savant made the epoch-making discovery. The other day when I was there I had to get a small jungle of briars cleared ere I could stand before the paintings. Little did I know that spiders could appreciate excellence in art, for, what met my eyes except great webs of those octo-peds spun about the cells as fortifications and on the paintings in fond embrace of the essence of beauty.

As one enters the gopura and walks along the court-yard around the main vimāna peeping into the little cells and peering at the walls, daubs of paint and traces of line meet the eye of the

* Blocks lent by the author.

inquisitive and proclaim in dumb eloquence what pageants of colours they once were. Most of the walls present a dull white. One of the first four cells, as we proceed clock-wise, has on its walls a dim remnant of the feet of what once should have been a figure in yogic posture. The *yoga-paṭṭa* is an obvious factor here.

We cover the length of the court-yard that direction and turn; peeps into cells this side are not rewarded; but at the



Fig. 1.

further end as we turn again there is an elegant figure of a *mahāpuruṣa* [Fig. 1], almost smothered by a fecund growth of a strange species of weeds, crude lines of a later-day novice, yet not so completely lost as to be missed by one whose heart yearns after the beautiful and sublime. The *kirita* is a precursor of the ornate but delightful headgear characteristic of Cola art; and as the eye rests on that calm and serene face, the mind of the spectator is transferred to Ajanta, where another head equally lovely and index of an unruffled mind proves how the ideals of art being the same everywhere master minds thought alike and created reflections, images. Compare this with the head of the *mahāpuruṣa* painted at Sittappavāśal

and the similitude is striking. Art finds its level after soaring its heights.

Six or seven cells further up, we may crane our necks and would be amply rewarded for the trouble. Here, on the wall of the tiny cell is the most magnificent *Somāskanda* [Fig. 2] that the hand of man ever drew. The outline is fragmentary but what there is is enough to suffuse the spectator with pure joy. There is little of paint here. Perhaps it was just left a picture in lines. But the vermilion aureole around the child's head suggests the intention of the painter—use of colour. The outline is in Indian red.

It is curious that this entire composition should have been missed by those who have described parts of it. Some have talked of heads, others of the child, torso and heads. The torso is of Śiva. The child is Skanda; and beside him is his mother. On either side, below, are Gaṇas of Śiva. The picture has not been copied in its entirety and parts of it have been taken out of [Vol. XI, Part ii.]



Fig. 2

the composition, named and described in a strange setting. No wonder the descriptions have nothing to do with the composition.

The Pallava monuments are famous for many peculiar iconographic forms carved on them. The most popular was the *Somāskanda* group. This is an invariable feature in every Pallava temple and is a vital factor behind the *Śivaliṅga* in the inner sanctuary. It is a lovely theme of the fond parent and frolicsome child, of the ideal mates and the object of their love, philosophy of affection spent on the offspring but increasing ever more.

Alas ! that this excellent theme worked so magnificently by a master painter should be so fragmentary ! But thank God ! even thus we have it ! There is yet in these lines enough to see the *Somāskanda* group. Śiva is seated, right leg lowered down

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and the left bent on the seat. The *pañamakuta* has vanished. The curve of the face and the ear lobes suggest what a precious gem we have lost. The torso is a perfection of, or if it may so be put, an improvement on Nature's contour moulded by the hand of the Divine Creator. The upper hands are more suggestive than complete; but the lovely palm of the lower left nestling on the lap makes up for all that is lost of the lower right of which the fingers alone remain. The *yajñopavita* flowing in a curve and hanging in tassels is matched only by the elaborate girdle and pleasing folds of the silken garment. *Keyūras*, wristlets and *ularabandha* complete a most pleasing arrangement of jewellery. The baby beside him, *Skanda*, is a noble representation of the age of innocence. The tiny coronet is a dainty little ornament of which the child may well be proud. From his mother's lap he looks at his father with a meaning in his look that a child alone can enjoy. It may be remembered that his father is "*Svayambhū*". The mother of this pretty little child is a painter's dream, a marvel of brush-work, a delicate subject treated softly, sweetly. She is seated on a couch with her right leg on the seat and the left hanging down perhaps to rest on a cushioned footstool which has completely disappeared from the picture. The face of *Umā* is completely obliterated. Imagination may complete a striking picture of the beauty of her face as it must have been, the gem-decked crown or flower-filled braid. Her right hand caresses the child, the left rests on the seat. The full breasts, the attenuated waist and the broad hips supply a contour to the form that idealises feminine grace. There is a charm in the figure that is more easily enjoyed than explained. The pendant, which is all that is left of a necklet, is in a place where beauty of form beautifies beauty of ornament. There are armlets and various types of bracelets. The elaborate girdle with its manifold tassels flowing down the sides of the couch like tiny silvery streamlets descending in little cascades is a piece of work of which any master should be proud. The silken garment worn by the goddess has a pleasing pattern worked on it. On either side at their feet is a *gaṇa*. It could be only the genius of a "master" that could work the *gaṇas* in such a way as to get the *uddhata* i.e., "the forceful" type nearer *Śiva*, and the *lalita* i.e., the "soft" type nearer *Umā*. There is a strange mixture of action, intelligence and calm in the face of the *gaṇa* near *Śiva*; a beatific look adorns the sweet little face of the one near the Lord's consort.

THE NUMBER OF RASAS.

BY

V. RAGHAVAN, M.A., PH.D.

(Continued from Vol. XI, Pt. I, p. 21.)

VI

OTHER RASAS.

Synopsis.

[A. 1. Preyas, Vātsalya and Bhakti; their Sthāyins; controversy over these Rasas.

2. Sneha, Śraddhā, Lauhya, Mrgayā, Akṣa and other Rasas.

3. Lollaṭa's view that Rasas are innumerable, as cited in the Abhinavabhāratī. Rasatva for all Vyabhicārins and even Sāttvikas,—the view of Rudraṭa and Namiśādhu. Pratīharendurāja's acceptance of this view. The restriction of Rasatva to eight or nine is 'conventional' almost. The mention of the possibility of additional Rasas,—Lauhya, Sneha, Vyasana, Duḥkha and Sukha, in the Nāṭyadarpaṇa. Vyābhicāritva and Sthāyitva names of stages, rather than of a set of fixed Bhāvas.

4. Bhoja's view of Rasa in S. K. Ā. and Śr. Pra. His Udāṭta and Uddhata Rasas; his acceptance of Śānta and Preyas. These four Rasas are accepted for the four types of hero, Udāṭta, Uddhata, Lalita and Śānta. His acceptance of Rudraṭa's position; not only Vyabhicārins and Sāttvikas, but many other states like Svātantrya and Pāravaśya are considered as Rasas by Bhoja. The largest number of Rasas to be seen in Bhoja. The accommodation of this view in his main theory of one Ahāṅkāra Rasa. Bhoja's critique of the old view that only a few, Rati etc., are Sthāyins. A state of chaos in the world of Rasa, recorded by Abhinava in his Locana.

5. Criticism of the above view; clear statement of the theory of Sthāyibhāva and Rasa, according to Bharata and Abhinava. Jagannātha Paṇḍita proposing to stick to Bharata to avoid a complete overhauling of the system.

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6. Bhakti and Madhura Rasa; the Vaiṣṇava Ālaṅkārikas of Bengal; Madhusūdana Sarasvatī on Bhakti Rasa.

7. The Māyā Rasa,—Bhāmodatta and Cirañjīvibhaṭṭācārya; the Kāraṇya Rasa.

8. The Vṛṇāṅka Rasa in the Anuyogadvāra Sūtra and its commentary by Maladhāri Hemacandra.

B. The varieties of the same Rasa.

1. King Haripāṅk's three different Rasas, Śṛṅgāra, Sambhoga and Vipralambha; the question of Rasābhāsa and the question whether all Rasas are pleasurable; Vidyādhara *versus* Śṛṅgabhūpālā on Rasābhāsa; the Rasakalikā holding some Rasas to be painful.

2. The varieties of Hāsyā, Karuṇā, Bhayānaka, Bībhatsa, and Adbhuta.

3. The varieties of Vīra,—Dāna-, Dharma-, and Yuddha-Vīras; Dayā Vīra; Jagannātha on the possibility of numerous other Vīras. The Anuyogadvāra on Vīra and its varieties.

4. Māṭṛgupta on the three forms of all Rasas, Vācika, Nephathya and Svābhāvika.

5. Dharma Śṛṅgāra, Artha Śṛṅgāra and Kāma Śṛṅgāra, in Bharata; Mokṣa Śṛṅgāra also in Bhoja.

C. Are all Rasas pleasurable or are there some which are painful? The Nāṭyadarpaṇa and the Rasakalikā hold that some are painful. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's consideration of the question of bliss in Rasa from the viewpoints of the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta. All Rasas are pleasurable.]

A

The incoming of the Śānta rasa seems to have set the writers thinking on the sanctity or otherwise of the number eight or nine pertaining to the Rasas.¹ Close on the footsteps of Śānta,

1. Mr. Śivaprasāda Bhaṭṭācārya, in his Skt. gloss (in his Edn.) of the Ālaṅkāra Kaustubha of Kavikarṇapūra Gosvāmin in the Varendra Research Society Series, says that some Ālaṅkārikas, following the Pāka śāstra and the Vaidya śāstra, hold Rasas to be six in number.

“षट् रसा इति रसज्ञा विषयः, तदनुसारिणः केचिदलङ्कारमार्गगा अपि ।”

The basis of this statement is not given; nor have I been able to find the Ālaṅkārikas who held Rasas to be six.

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an aspect of Love called Preyas or Vātsalya, covering cases of non-sexual love like that between parents and children, elders and youngsters, became a Rasa. The first work we now know mentioning it as the tenth Rasa is the K. A. of Rudraṭa (Ch. XII. ŚL 3). Preyas is found in Udbhaṭa as an Alaṅkāra by the side of Rasavat, both of which belong to a separate class of emotion-figures. Udbhaṭa considers Preyas as the poetry of Bhāva, Bhāva kāvya, and distinguishes it from the poetry of Rasa called Rasavat. In Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, Preyas was a kind of sweet compliment born of devotion or love. प्रेयः प्रियतरस्यानन् . In this sense, Preyas as Cāṭu lives in later literature also. But Udbhaṭa's view is peculiar. As Pratihārendurāja observes, any Bhāva is Preyas for Udbhaṭa—

“एवं भावकाव्यस्य प्रेयस्त्वदिति उद्भट्टेनैव व्यपदेशः ।”

This view found no follower, since Udbhaṭa's view of Bhāva kāvya and Rasa kāvya and his view of Bhāva or Rasa being indicated by their own names met with criticism. The older Preyas of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin as speech expressive of non-sexual love developed into a new Rasa. Daṇḍin says that this Preyas is very closely related to Śṛṅgāra but is distinct, since Pṛiti is the sthāyin in the former whereas Rati is the Sthāyin of Śṛṅgāra.

प्राक् प्रीतिर्दर्शिता सेवं रतिः शृङ्गारता गता ।

Daṇḍin, II, 289.

Friendship or Affection of parents—Sneha and Vātsalya—feature in some of the noblest poetry and there was felt a necessity to recognise a Rasa for such situations. Rudraṭa who introduces Preyān at first, mentions Sneha as its Sthāyin—स्नेहप्रकृतिः प्रेयान् । That Rudraṭa thought mainly of Friendship is shown not only by the Sthāyin but also by the following explication—

अन्योन्यं प्रति सुहृदोर्व्यवहारोऽयं मतस्तत्र । XVI, 18.

We now get three categories of non-sexual attachment or affection,—(i) the Preyas of Rudraṭa with Sneha as its Sthāyin which comes to friendship; (ii) Vātsalya or the affection of parents and elders for children and youngsters¹ and (iii) Pṛiti,

1. Viśvanātha calls this Vatsala, describes it as paternal affection and gives it in his S. D. after giving the 8 old Rasas and

the other kinds of attachment like that between a leader and a follower, a king and his officer or court-poet. To these is to be added the fourth, *Bhakti*,² reverence to elders and devotion to God.

All these aspects, to begin with, were called only *Preyas* which then was understood as all types of non-sexual love.

प्रीतिरप्येवमेव स्वान्न तस्यां सांप्रयोगिकी । Bhoja., S. K. Ā., V.

Daṇḍin's *Preyas*, as his two illustrations show, refer only to the fourth aspect called *bhakti*. He actually calls it by the name *Bhakti* and uses as its synonym, *Pṛiti*. Commenting on Vidura's words spoken on Kṛṣṇa's arrival at his house, Daṇḍin says:—

इत्याह युक्तं विदुरो नान्यतस्तादृशी धृतिः ।

भक्तिभावसमारोप्यः सुप्रीतश्च ततो हरिः ॥ K. A., II, 277.

the Śānta, the 9th.

“अथ मुनीन्द्रसंमतो वत्सलः—

‘रुष्टं वत्सकारितया वत्सलं च स्वे विदुः ।

स्थायी वत्सलता स्नेहः पुत्रादात्मन्येन मतम् ॥

उद्दीपनानि तेष्वेव विद्याशौर्वदादयः ।

आलिङ्गनाङ्गसंस्पर्शादिरस्तुम्बनमीक्षणम् ॥

पुलकानन्दवाष्पाया अनुभावाः प्रक्षीर्तिताः ।

सञ्चारिणोऽनिशङ्कादहंमर्वादयो मताः ॥

पद्मार्मच्छविर्बर्णो दैवतं लोकमातरः ॥’

The illustration given is Raghva's childhood and Dilipa's Vātsalya (R. V. III). The *Mandāramarandacampō* curiously enough considers *Karuṇā* or *Kāruṇya*—Compassion—as the *Sthāyin* of Vātsalya:—

अन्ये तु करुणास्थायां वत्सल्यं दयमोऽपि च । K. M., edn., p. 100.

Kavikarṇapūra Gosvāmī, who illustrates Vātsalya with Yaśodā's love for baby-Kṛṣṇa, gives *Mamakāra* as its *Sthāyin*—

‘अथ ममकारः स्थायी ।’ p. 148.

2. *Kavikarṇapūra* classifies Love into sexual love—*Sāmpṛa-yogikī Pṛiti*, *Maitrī*, *Sauhārda* and *Bhāva*. The last is the *Sthāyin* of *Bhakti*. “तत्र रतिर्पण—

“रतिश्चेतोरञ्जकता सुखभोगानुकूलकृत् ।

सा प्रीतिर्यैत्री-सौहार्द-भावसंज्ञाश्च गच्छति ॥”

A. K., Ch. V, Varendra Edn., p. 124.

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The other instance is the manifestation of a king's devotion to Śiva, uttered in the form of a Stotra on seeing Him:-

इति साक्षात्कृते देवे राज्ञो यदाजवर्मणः ।

प्रीतिप्रकाशनं तच्च प्रेय इत्यवगम्यताम् ॥ II, 272.

It is quite natural that in our literature, Bhakti should have come in as a dominant motif and that scholars should have accepted it as a distinct Rasa. Though Rūdraṭa mentions only the Preyaś of Sneha, we find the Abhinavabhāratī saying that others propose not only Bhakti but Śraddhā, Faith, also as a new Rasa. Abhinava however does not consider them as distinct Rasas but includes them in Sānta of which the two are important accessories.

“अत एव ईश्वरप्रणिधानविषये भक्तिश्रद्धे स्मृतिमतिधृत्युसाहानुप्रविष्टे अन्यथैव अङ्गम् (शान्तस्य) इति न तयोः पृथक्सत्त्वेन गणनम् ॥”

Abhi. Bhā., I, Ch. VI, p. 340.

Of Bhakti, more will be said in the section on Madhura Rasa. The Daśarūpaka mentions Prīti and Bhakti separately as *Bhāvas* and includes them in Haṛṣa, Utsāha or some other similar Bhāva, (IV, 84.)

प्रीतिभक्त्यादयो भावाः • • • ।

हर्षोत्साहादिवु स्पष्टमन्तर्भावाश्च कीर्तिताः ॥

Prīti here means types of love other than Rati and Bhakti. To be clear about accepting friendship as Rasa, some seem to have called Sneha itself as a Rasa. Rūdraṭa used the name Sneha for the Sthāyin and called the Rasa, Preyaś; but these proposed Sneha as the Rasa and Ārdratā as the Sthāyin. Rūdraṭa himself mentioned this Ārdratā while describing his Sneha Sthāyin:—

आर्द्रान्तःकरणतया ज्ञेहपदे भवति सर्वत्र । XVI, 19.

The Abhi. Bhā. thus introduces and criticises this Sneharasa with Ārdratā as its Sthāyin:—

1. Hemaçandra reproduces this discussion on the additional Rasas from the Abhi. Bhā. See K. A., p. 68, Text and Com. Śivaraṃa's Rasaratnahāra seems to be another work which speaks of the Śraddhā Rasa and includes it in one of the nine accepted Rasas.

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“अर्द्रतास्वायिकः स्नेहो रस इति त्वसत् । स्नेहो ह्यभिपङ्क्तः । स च रत्युत्साहादेव पर्यवस्यति । तथा हि—वाल्स्य मातापित्रादौ स्नेहो भये विश्रान्तः, यूना मित्रवने स्तौ, लक्ष्मणादौ भ्रातरे परमवीर एव । एवं वृद्धस्य पुत्रादावपि दृष्टव्यम् ।” *Abhi. Bhā.*, I, p. 342.

This dismisses *Prīti*, *Socha*, *Vātsalya* and similar Rasas based on attachment. This is not a commendable attitude. To have less distinctions is no great aim. If it is said that friendship is only a variety of *Rati*, can we call the Rasa in the association of Rāma and Sugrīva, *Śrīgāra*? If brotherly attachment again is brought under *Rati*, is the Rasa in the association of Rāma and Bhīshma or Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa, *Śrīgāra*? If Dharmavīra can be called forth to deny *Rasatva* to Lakṣmaṇa's attachment to Rāma, why should not opponents of *Sānta* call forth another kind of *Vīra* to deny *Rasatva* to *Sānta*? Do Abhinava and Hemacandra mean that Friendship, Brotherly attachment, Parental affection and the like are only *Bhāvas* that cannot be nourished into a state of *Rasa* with attendant accessories? Literature is only too full of these types of attachment. The instance of Daśaratha's death due to separation from Rāma is ample proof for the existence of *Vātsalya*¹ as a major mood, fit to be developed and fit to be refreshed.

1. Hemacandra, *K. A. Vyā.*, p. 68.

“स्नेहो भक्तिर्वात्सल्यमिति हि रतेरेव विशेषाः । तुल्ययोः वा परस्परं रतिः स स्नेहः । अनुत्तमस्य उत्तमे रतिः प्रसक्तिः, सैव भक्तिपदवाच्या । उत्तमस्य अनुत्तमे रतिः वात्सल्यम् । एवमादौ च विषये भावस्यैव आस्वाद्यत्वम् ॥

Sārngadeva, Saṅgitaratnākara, p. 839.

भक्ति स्नेहं तथा लील्यं केचित् षोडशमन्वते रसान् ।

अर्द्राद्रतामितापांश्च स्थायिनस्तेषु ते विदुः ॥

तदसत् ; रतिभेदो हि भक्तिस्नेहौ नृगोचरो ।

अभिचारिणमनयोः ; नृनार्योः स्थायिनौ तु तौ ॥

2. Strangely, we find *Vātsalya* introduced (as a *Rasa*, of course) in the midst of other Rasas in the text of Bharata itself. In Ch. 17, second section, dealing with *Pāthyaganas*, we find with [Vol. XI, Part ii]

Laulya Rasa.

In the same section, the Abhū. Bhā. mentions and criticises another Rasa called Laulya, of which the Sāhāya is given as Gardha. Abhinava suggests that it can be included in Hāsa, Rati or elsewhere.

एवैव गर्भस्थायिकस्य लौल्यरसस्य प्रत्याख्यानं सरणिर्मन्तव्या, हासे वा, रती वा, अन्यत्र पर्यवसानात् । Abhū. Bhā., p. 342.

Laulya seems to have been proposed to label the Rasa of an anti-hero like Rāvaṇa whose vile passion for Sītā is enormous. This thirst of heart, Abhinava says, is inappropriate; it is not Rasa in him, but only Rasābhāsa; and this Anaucitya of his desire causes Hāsa Rasa. Śārngadeva summarises Abhinava thus:—

अनुकविषया नृप्या लौल्यं तदास्यकारणम् ।

Mrgayā and Akṣa Rasas.

Even as Abhinava does, Dhanañjaya also refers to other Rasas proposed by writers. Prīti and Bhakti, two additional Bhāvas, and their inclusion by Dhanañjaya in one or the other of the Bhāvas, were referred to previously. In the same verse, Dhanañjaya refers to two additional Rasas, Mrgayā and Akṣa, Hunt and Gambling.

प्रीतिभक्त्यादयो भावा मृगयाक्षादयो रसाः ।

हर्षोत्साहादिषु स्पष्टमन्तर्भावान्न कीर्तिताः ॥ D. R., IV, १३.

Rasa refers no longer to a mental state only; these writers generalise it very much to mean any motif or any idea.

If we can infer anything from the mention of these additional Rasas by Abhinava after a reference to Lollāṭa's view that Rasas are innumerable, we may say that it was Lollāṭa who proposed these additional Rasas. Though Lollāṭa's commentary on the N. Ś. is not available, we have, about that time, the K. A.

reference to Varṇas and Rasas:—

“तत्र हास्यशृङ्गारयोः स्वरितोदात्तैः, वीर्यद्राद्भुतेषु उदात्तकम्पितैः कण्ठ-वात्सल्यभयानकैषु अनुदात्तस्वरितकम्पितैर्वर्णैः पात्र्यमुत्पादयति ।”

K. M. Edn., p. 187.

A similar strange passage occurs in Ch. 22, in Śl. 3, same edn. where Rasas are mentioned as nine:—

अव्यक्तरूपं सर्वं हि ज्ञेयं नवरसाभयम् ॥

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of Rudraṭa, which holds the same view on the number of Rasas as Lollāṭa is said by Abhinava to hold. These writers re-examined Bharata's text to find out what exactly constituted Rasatva and Bhāvatva. Bharata considered as Rasas those emotions which were "masters"—*Svāmibhūtas*, and were consequently attended upon by many minor ones, (*Balivāśrayāḥ*) which are called *Bhāvas*. The forty-nine *Bhāvas* described by him include the eight *Sthāyins* also and these eight are once again described as *Bhāva* among *Bhāvas*. This shows that the eight *Sthāyins* had a *Sthāyin*-stage and a *Bhāva*-stage. When reinforced by *Vyabhicārins*, *Rati* etc. became *Sthāyins*. Similarly, thought some writers, other *Bhāvas* also can be reinforced by other attendant *Bhāvas* and made *Sthāyins*. According to this view, the *Vyabhicārins* themselves would have other *Vyabhicārins*; *Nirveda* is attended by *Cintā*; *Śrama* by *Nirveda* and so on. Says Abhinava:—

“—व्यभिचारिणामपि च व्यभिचारिणो भवन्ति, यथा निर्वेदस्य चिन्ता, धर्मस्य निर्वेद इत्यादि निरूपयन्ति । तथासद्व । Ch. VII, p. 346.

Abhinava did not accept this view.¹ But Lollāṭa's and Rudraṭa's position would make its acceptance necessary for them. Bharata says while explaining what *Rasa* is:—

अत्र रस इति का पदार्थः ! उच्यते ; आस्थावापाद ।

1. If he accepted this view, he might give a handle to those who considered all the thirty-three *Vyabhicārins* also as capable of becoming Rasas. So, he says, wherever there seem to occur in one *Vyabhicārīn* many others, as for instance *Vitarka* etc. in *Unmāda* in *Purītavas*, it cannot be said that one *Vyabhicārīn* is nourished by others, but it must be said that all these are separately *Vyabhicārins* nourishing the main *Sthāyin*, *Vipralambha Rati*.

But Bharata does not seem to support this contention of Abhinava. He seems to allow *Vyabhicārins* in *Vyabhicārins*. Defining *Dainya*, the *Āryā* in the N. S. says: चिन्ता-औत्सुक्य-समुत्था. Ch. VII, 74, p. 362. *Asāyā*, a *Vyabhicārīn* is given as an *Anubhava* of another *Vyabhicārīn* *Garva* (p. 369). In *Autukya*, *Cintā* and *Nidrā* are given; and many other *Vyabhicārins* also occur here as well as in *Viśāda* (p. 370).

On p. 66 of his *Locana*, Abhinava cites *काकावै* etc. and calls it a case of *Bhāvaśabalatā*. He says that this verse portrays four pairs of *Vyabhicārins* appearing one after another: *Vitarka*—

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Rudraṭa perhaps based himself on this text when he said that any Bhāva can be Rāsa, because Āsvādyatva or relishability is present in it:—

इति मन्तव्या रसाः सर्वे ॥ XII, 3.

रसनाद्रसत्वमेवां मधुरादीनामिषोक्तमाचार्यैः ।

निर्वेदादिष्वपि तन्निकाममस्तीति तेऽपि रसाः ॥

Only a poet must develop the Vyabhicārīn also to a state of relishability. Namiśādhu explains Rudraṭa clearly and observes that there is no mental state which cannot be called Rāsa, if only it is developed.

“अयमाशयो ग्रन्थकारस्य—यदुत नास्ति सा कापि चित्तवृत्तिः या परिपोषं गता न रसीभवति । भरतेन सहृदयवर्जकत्वप्राप्तुर्वात् संज्ञां चाश्रित्य अष्टौ वा नव वा रसा उक्ता इति ।”

Rudraṭa was perhaps contemporaneous with Śaṅkuka C. 850 A.D. and thus followed Lollaṭa, C. 825 A.D., on this question of Rasas being as many as Bhāvas. If Bharata spoke only of eight or nine Bhāvas as Rasas, it is because of their greater vogue among poets and critics. According to Abhinava, Lollaṭa said the same thing:—

“एतावन्त एव च रसा इत्युक्तं पूर्वम् । तेन ‘आनन्देऽपि पार्षद-प्रसिद्धया एतावतां प्रयोग्यत्वम् इति यत् भट्टलोल्लटेन निरूपितं तदवलम्बना-परामृश्य(?)इत्यलम् ।” Abhin. Bhāṭ., I, p. 299.

“तेन रसान्तरसम्भवेऽपि पार्षदप्रसिद्धया संख्यानियम इति यदन्यैः (लोल्लटादिमिरिष्यैः) उक्तम्, तदप्रयुक्तम् । भावस्यैव चैतद्वक्ष्यते ।”

(*ibid.*, p. 341.)

It is perhaps Lollaṭa who, while commenting on the text enumerating the Sthāyīns, Vyabhicārīns etc. at the beginning of Ch. VI, says regarding Sthāyīns that Bharata did not give any fixed number for the Sthāyīns; for, Abhinava says in his commentary in this place:—

“स्थायिषु च सदृश्या नोक्त्यपरे ।” (*ibid.*, p. 271.)

Autsukya; Mati-Smarana; Saṅkā-Dainya; and lastly Dhṛti-Cintā. He concludes however that finally Cintā is the Vyabhicārīn which we relish. This seems to mean that the one Vyabhicārīn of Cintā has other Vyabhicārīns, Vitarka etc. ‘पर्यन्ते तु चिन्ताया एव प्रधानतां ददती परमास्वादस्थानम् ।’

Unfortunately, the Bhāvyādhyāya of the Abhinavabhāratī, is for the most part, lost and Abhinava's detailed statement and refutation of Lollāṭa's view are lost to us.

Pratīhārendurāja who comes after Aranda notices this view of Rudrāṭa that Nirveda and the other Bhāyas are also Rasas. His explanation for many considering only eight or nine as Rasas is not very different from Lollāṭa's Pārṣadaprasiddhi. Pratīhārendurāja takes his stand on Caturvarga as contrasted with those objects which are to be avoided by the wise—the Parihārya. Pratīhārendu says that only nine are called Rasas because of their reference to the four Puruṣārthas and the name Rasa as restricted to these nine is 'Tāndrika', technical and traditional for this Śāstra. This is a clumsy explanation; virtually this writer accepts the position of Rudrāṭa. The 'Tāndrika' or 'Pāribhāṣika' nomenclature begs the question and one looks to see how any Bhāva, Nirveda or another, is irrelevant to a Puruṣārtha. Says Pratīhārendurāja:—

“एते च शृङ्गारादयो न च यद्येवं चतुर्वर्गप्राप्त्युपायतया तदितर-
परिहारनिबन्धनतया च रसादीनां स्थायिनां नवानां भावानां यः परिपोषः
तदात्मकाः । अतः तथाविधेन रूपेण आस्वाद्यत्वात् आस्वादभेदनिबन्धनेन
तान्त्रिकेण रसशब्देन अभिधीयन्ते । निर्वेदादी तु तथाविधस्य आस्वाद्यस्य
(स्यस्य) अभावात् प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदनिबन्धनस्य तान्त्रिकस्य रसशब्दस्य
अप्रवृत्तिः । अस्वाद्यमात्रविवक्षया तु तत्रापि मधुराम्लादिवत् रसशब्द-
प्रवृत्तिरविरुद्धा । युदुक्तं शृङ्गारादीन् रसानुपक्रम्य—

‘रसनाद्रसत्वमेषां + अस्तीति तेऽपि रसाः ॥’ (Rudrāṭa; see above).

इति । तदाहुः—

‘चतुर्वर्गेतरी प्राप्पपरिहारी क्रमाद्यतः ।

चैतन्यभेदादास्वाद्यात् स रसस्तादृशो मतः ॥’ इति ।

स इति चैतन्यभेद इत्यर्थः । तादृश इत्यनेन आस्वादविशेषनिबन्धनत्वं
शृङ्गारादिषु तान्त्रिकस्य रसशब्दस्य उक्तम् ॥” K.A. S.S. Vyāsa p. 49.

To some extent, the final observation of Abhinava himself at the end of the sixth chapter is weak and justifies the restriction of Rasatva to eight or nine on grounds neither stronger than nor different from Lollāṭa's Pārṣada-prasiddhi or Pratīhāra's caturvargapraptyupāya.

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“एते नवैव रसाः, पुमर्थोपयोगित्वेन, रञ्जनाधिक्येन वा
इयतामेव उपदेश्यत्वात् । तेन रसान्तरसम्भवेऽपि पार्षदप्रसिद्धा etc. ।

Abhi, Bhā., II, p. 341.

Vyasanā, Duhkha and Sukha Rasas.

The Nāṭyadarpaṇa of Kāmacandra and Guṇacandra follows Abhinava, reproducing these very words of the Abhinavabhāratī but adds that though, usefulness in Paruṣārtha and Rāṣṭranā restrict Rasas to nine, more Rasas are possible: Lauhya with Gardha as its Sthāyin; Sneha with Ārdratā as its Sthāyin; Vyasana Rasi with Āsakti as its Sthāyin; Duhkha Rasi with Arati as its Sthāyin and Sukha Rasi with Santosa as its Sthāyin.

सम्भवन्ति त्वरेऽपि—यथा गर्वस्थायी लौह्यः, आर्द्रतास्थायी स्नेहः,
आसक्तिस्थापि व्यसनम्, अरतिस्थापि दुःखम्, सन्तोषस्थापि सुखमित्यादि ।

G. O. S., p. 163.

According to the view that accepts the Vyābhicārins also as Rasas, the names Sthāyin and Vyābhicārīn are not fixed names of two sets, but rather names of stages. A Sthāyin may be a Vyābhicārīn and a Vyābhicārīn may become a Sthāyin. Abhinava himself draws our attention to Bharata prohibiting the Vyābhicārīn Jugupsā in Śrīgāra. (p. 334, Abhi, Bhā.) This Jugupsā is a Sthāyin. The author of the gloss on the Vyaktiviveka says:—

स्थायिनामपि व्यभिचारित्वं भवति । यथा स्तेर्देवादिविषयायाः, हासस्य
शृङ्गारादौ, शोकस्य विप्रलम्भशृङ्गारादौ, क्रोधस्य प्रणयकोपादौ, विस्मयस्य
वीरादौ, उत्साहस्य शृङ्गारादौ, भयस्य अभिसारिकादौ, जुगुप्सायाः संसार-
निन्दादौ, शमस्य कोपामिहतस्य प्रसादोद्गमादौ ॥ T.S.S. Edn., pp. 11-12.

Śārṅgadeva, Saṅgitaratnākara:—

रत्यादयः स्थायिभावाः स्फुर्भूयिष्ठविभावजाः ।

स्तोकेर्विभावैरुपजास्त एव व्यभिचारिणः ॥

रसान्तरेष्वपि तदा यथायोगं भवन्ति ते ।

यथा हि हासः शृङ्गारे रतिः शान्ते च दृश्यते ॥

वीरे क्रोधो भयं शोके जुगुप्सा च भयानके ।

उत्साहविस्मयी सर्वरसेषु व्यभिचारिणी ॥

Bhāradatta, Rasatarāṅgi, v:

स्थायिनोऽपि व्यभिचरन्ति । हासः शृङ्गारे । रतिः शान्तकरुण-
हास्येषु । मयशोकौ करुणशृङ्गारयोः । क्रोधो वीरे । जुगुप्सा मयानके ।
उत्साहविस्मयो सर्वरसेषु व्यभिचारिणौ ॥

Further, we find among the Vyabhicārins, Anurāga which is only Krodha, the Sthāyin of Raudra, but to a lesser degree; Trāsa which is Bhaya, the Sthāyin of Bhayānaka; Viṣāda which is only Śoka, the Sthāyin of Karuṇa Rasa.

Bhoja is a writer who held the same view as Lollaṭa and Rudrata on the number of Rasas. Bhoja's theory of Rasa is a very complex problem and it has been expounded at length by the present writer in the Rasa section of his Ph. D. thesis on Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa. Bhoja is a monist and a pluralist combined regarding this question of the number of Rasas. Fundamentally, Rasa is only one to him, and that is, Ahaṅkāra or Śṛṅgāra or Abhimāna. Compared to this, Rati-Śṛṅgāra, Hāsyā, Vira, and the other old Rasas even are unfit to be called Rasas, but are only Bhāvas; much more so the Vyabhicārins. But this is a Pāramārthika state of affairs and there is a Vyāvahārika state also in which, by Upacāra, the name Rasa, by virtue of the immanence of Ahaṅkāra in all of them, applies to all the forty-nine Bhāvas.

If we turn to Bhoja's S. K. Ā., Ch. V, we find him first mentioning only the old eight Rasas:—

रतिर्हासश्च * * * * ।

* * विस्मयश्चाष्टौ स्थायिमात्राः प्रकीर्तिताः ॥ V, 14.

Then, he adds, that these Rasas have 'Viśeṣas', which, as a matter of fact, means, additional Rasas:

शृङ्गारवीरकरुणरीडाद्भुतमयानकाः ।

वीमत्सहास्यप्रेयांसः शान्तोदात्तोद्धता रसाः ॥

The additional Rasas mentioned here are the old Śānta, the Preyas which we have already heard of and two absolutely new Rasas, Udātta and Uddhata. Dr. Abhayakumar Goṭha, writing on the Rasa cult in the Caitanya Caritāmṛta, in the Asutosh Silver Jubilee Volumes III, says on p. 375. "Another rhetorician, Bhojarāja, adds one more, e.g., Preman (love). Thus according to Bhojarāja, eleven Rasas in all." That is, he says, to the [Vol. XI, Part II.]

well-known nine, some add Vātsalya and Bhoja, Preman, making eleven. This information is wrong. Dr. S. K. De says in Vol. II of his *Poetics*: "and although he (Bhoja) mentions as many as ten Rasas in his encyclopaedic S. K. Ā., including the Śānta and Preyas..." This also is incorrect. As shown above, Bhoja accepts twelve Rasas in all in his S. K. Ā. There is no peculiarity about Śānta and Preyas¹ in Bhoja, both of which are Rasas from earlier times. The two new Rasas of Bhoja are Udāta and Uddhata Rasas. They are both explained and illustrated on p. 515 of the S. K. Ā. Māti is held as the Sthāyin of the Udāta Rasa and Garva as the Sthāyin of the Uddhata Rasa. Bhoja says that the Udāta is also called Ōrjasvin.

It is clear that Bhoja proposed these two new Rasas as a result of his realisation that each type of Hero shall be distin-

1. (a) Bhoja gives Preyas as Vātsalyaprakṛti, i.e., having Vātsalya as its Sthāyin, S. K. Ā., p. 514. Bhoja's illustration is however not friendship but only love for woman which will not prove Preyas as different from Śṛṅgāra. As a matter of fact, Preyas is considered by Bhoja as the Rasa lying at the back of Śṛṅgāra and all other types of love. Preyas is called Ahetupakṣāpāta—

“रतिप्रीत्योरपि नावमेव मूलप्रकृतिरिष्यते । यदित्यमाहुः—

‘अहेतुः पक्षपातो वस्तस्य नास्ति प्रतिक्रिया ।

स हि खेदात्मकस्तनुरन्तर्भूतानि शीघ्रमिति ॥” (U. R. Carita, V. 17.)

S. K. Ā., p. 515.

The verse from the U. R. Carita quoted by Bhoja occurs in the drama to explain the inexplicable love that two persons, of whatever descriptions they may be, evince mutually on seeing each other,—called Tārāmaitraka and Cakṣurāga. This is a purer and more basic love and rides high in the synthetic tides of Bhoja's imaginative mind. Bhoja, as can be seen in the last section of this paper, synthesises all Rasas and Bhāvas in this Preyas or Preman. Hāsyā is love for Hāsa; Vīra is love for Vīrāḥa and so on. In his *Śṛṅgāra Prabhāsa*, Ch. XI, Bhoja says at the very outset:—

रसास्त्विह प्रेमानमेव आसन्नन्ति ।

(b) Dr. De and Dr. Guha evidently owe their view of the number of Rasas accepted by Bhoja to Kavikarṇapūra Gosvāmin's *Alaṅkāra Kausubha*:—

मेजस्तु वस्तुप्रेमान्याम् एकादश रसानां च । p. 123.

Bhoja's synthesis of all Rasas in Preman is to be found in this writer also; of this more later. (See A. Kaus., pp. 147-8.)

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guished by a Rasa which dominates his character and constitutes his individuality. Thus Sânta is the Rasa of the Dhīraśānta hero; Preyas of the Dhīralīlita; Uddāta or Ūrjasvin of the Dhīroddāta and Uddhāta of Dhīroddhāta. He says expressly in his *Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa*:—

न च अष्टावेति नियमः, यतः शान्तं प्रेयांसम् उद्धतम् ऊर्जस्विनं च
केचिद्रसमाचक्षते । तन्मूल्यश्च किल नायकानां धीरशान्त-धीरललित-धीरोद्धत-
धीरोदात्तव्यपदेशः । *Mañ. Mā., Vol. II, pp. 337-8.*

Among old Sanskrit writers also, as among modern research scholars, few had a correct knowledge of what the king of Dhīrāśānta actually. *Siribhāṣṭhīpāṭa* is the only writer who caught sight of Bhoja's Uddāta and Uddhāta Rasas and criticised them in his *R. A. Śa.* pp. 168-172, *T. S. S.* I have dealt with this at length elsewhere.

In addition to these two new Rasas, Bhoja, like Rudraṭa, recognised all the Bhāvas as being capable of becoming Rasas. In the *Vyavahāra*-stage, Bhoja held all the forty-nine Bhāvas as Rasas:—

एतेन रुद्धाहङ्कारता रसस्य पूर्वा कोटिः । रत्यादीनामेकोनपञ्चाशतोऽपि
विभावानुभाक्व्यभिचारिसंयोगात् परप्रकर्षाभिगमे रसव्यपदेशार्हता रसस्यैव
मध्यमावस्था । *Sr. Pra. Vol. II, p. p. 301.*

रत्यादयो यदि रसास्सुरतिप्रकर्षे

हर्षादिभिः किमपराद्धमतद्विभिन्नेः ।

अस्थायिनस्त इति चेद् मयहासशोक-

कोपादयो वद किपञ्चिरमुल्लसन्ति ॥

स्थापित्वमत्र विषयातिशयान्मतं चेत्

चिन्तादयः कुतः ; उत प्रकृतेर्वशेन ?

तुल्यैव सात्मनि भवेद् ; अथ वासनायाः

सन्दीपनात् ? तदुभयमत्र समानमेव ॥

Sr. Pra., Intro., verses 11 and 12.

“यद्युक्तं परप्रकर्षगामी रत्यादिभावो रस इति, तदप्यसारम् ।
रत्यादिष्वपि तदुपपत्तेः । गल्यादयोऽपि हि श्रमादिभिः परं प्रकर्षमारोप्यन्ते ।
न ते स्थायिन इति चेत् स्थापित्वमेवाम् उत्पन्नतीव्रसंस्कारत्वम् । तीव्रसंस्कारो-
त्पत्तिश्च विषयातिशयात्, नायकप्रकृतेश्च । प्रकृतिश्च त्रिधा—सात्त्विकी,

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राजसी, तामसी च । तद्वशाच्च तथाविधानुभवभावनोपपत्तिः । ततश्चैषां स्थायित्वव्यपदेश इति ।”

“हर्षादिष्वपि विभावानुभावक्यभिचारिसंयोगस्य विद्यमानत्वात् ।”

ibid., Vol. II, p. 355.

“अन्ये त्वाहुः (वाहुः)—सर्व एव सत्यादयो विभावानुभावक्यभिचारिसंयोगाद्बुध्यमानाः भूमानमापन्ना रसीभवन्ति । तथा हि—

रसनादस्त्वमेषां मधुरादीनामिवोक्तमाचार्यैः ।

निर्वेदादिष्वपि तन्निकाममस्तीति तेऽपि रसाः ॥ (Rudraṭa).

सर्वेषां च तुल्ये रसत्वे सत्यादीनामेव परप्रकर्षगमिनां शृङ्गारवीर-
व्यपदेश इति न घटते ।” *ibid.*

Bhoja restates Rudraṭa's position with some arguments. He asks: If Rati and the other seven become Rasas, why not Harṣa and the rest? If it is said that Rati etc. alone become Rasas by virtue of their being Sthāyins, why are not Harṣa and others Sthāyins? It cannot be said that all these eight and those eight only are 'permanent' and Harṣa etc. are 'fleeting'. Among these eight also, there are Bhaya, Hāsa, Śoka, Krodha etc. which are not 'permanent'. Permanence or Evascence is not inherent in any Bhāva invariably but is born as a result of character and circumstance. Universality and the quality of being a major mood do not pertain to these eight only. Umtā is as much a major mood, in a character and in a set of conditions, as Rati. Therefore, even as Rati, Glānī (Fatigue), or Harṣa (Delight), have their own Vyabhicārins, Anubhāvas and Vibhāvas,¹ Provided the poet develops these Harṣa etc. also with their attendant emotional conditions, they also attain to Sthāyitva and Rasatva. Thus, in a later section devoted to illustration, Bhoja speaks of Ānanda Rasa with Harṣa as its Sthāyin.² (S. K. Ā., p. 636 and

1. Accordingly, in Chs. XIII-XIV, (Vol. III, Mad. M.S.), Bhoja gives the Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas and Vyabhicārins of all the forty-nine Bhāvas. According to Abhinava only the eight or nine Sthāyins can have Vyabhicārins. Vibhāvas and Anubhāvas are granted to all.

2. The *Nāṭya darpaṇa*, as pointed out above, points out Sukha as a Rasa with Santoṣa as its Sthāyin. Contentment, Santoṣa, is Ānanda's Tṛṣṇākṣaya and the N. D.'s Sukha is really Śānta Rasa.

Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa, Vol. II, p. 394.) On pp. 394-5 of his *Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa* (Vol. II) and p. 627 of his S. K. Ā., he speaks, along with the Vira and Ubbhata Rasas, of the new Rasas Svāntarya, Ānanda, Prāsaṅga, and Pāravaśya. (On pp. 399 of the *Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa* Vol. II) and p. 629 of his S. K. Ā., he speaks of Sādhvāsa, Vilāsa, Amrāga and Saṅgama Rasas. This beats Rudraṭa who mentioned Nirveda only, i.e., all the Cātavṛttis and primarily the Vyahicārnas, as Rasas. But Bhoja extends Rasatva to Sāttvikas also, which are physical manifestations. And in this respect, he is one with Nānvaśālin who says while commenting on the list of Rudraṭa—‘इति मन्तव्या रसास्त्वै’ :—

इतिशब्दः एवंप्रकारार्थः । एवंप्रकारा अन्येऽपि नात्र रतिनिर्वेदस्तम्मा-
दयः सर्वेऽपि रसा बोद्धव्याः ।

Though called Bhāvas, the Sāttvikas are physical manifestations. शरीरेस्तु सात्त्विकभावादिः says Bhānandata in his *Rasatarāṅgī*. But even these are Rasas, as much as any Cātavṛtti, to Bhoja. Fortunately the intimate Udilghara Vibhāvas like the Malayamārula and Moonlight and the Ālambana Vibhāvas which are characters themselves are not made Rasa. To these Bhoja would be content to give the name ‘Rasānyayavibhūti’. But there seem to have been persons, before Bhoja also, who would take, as the *Dakṛṣṇaka* points out, such subjects as Mṛgayā and Akṣa as Rasas.

From a passage in the *Locana* of Abhinava we understand that a period of chaos prevailed in the world of Rasas. Abhinava says that some hold the pure Vibhāva only as Rasa; some Sthāyin only; some the Vyahicārnas only; some the interplay of of all these; some the story enacted itself and some all this put together.

अन्ये तु शुद्धं विभावं, अपरे शुद्धमनुभावं, केचित्तु स्थायिमात्रं, इतरे
व्यभिचारिणं, अन्ये तत्संपोषिणं, एके अनुकार्यं, केचन सकलमेव समुदायं
रसमाहुरित्यलं बहुना ।” *Locana*, p. 69.

It is perhaps on the authority of this passage in the *Locana* that Jagannātha Paṇḍita says in his R. G., p. 28.

“विभावद्वयः त्रयः समुदिता रसः” इति कतिपये । ‘त्रिषु य एव
चमत्कारी स एव रसोऽप्यथा तु त्रयोऽपि न’ इति बहवः । ‘भाव्यमानो विभाव
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एव रसः' इति अन्ये । 'अनुभावस्तथा तथा' इतीतरे । 'व्यभिचार्येव तथा तथा परिणमति' इति केचित् ।"

Such a view of the concept of Rasi has been criticised by Abhinavagupta. Surely the very substratum of the Bhāvas, namely the characters, the *Ālambanavibhāvas*, cannot be called Rasi. Things like Moonlight and Southern Breeze also, which are Jala and are conditions of Nature kindling the sentiment, *Uddīpanas*, cannot possibly be mental states, *Cittavrttis* and are thus not to be called Rasi. Similarly the *Sāttvika*. What Bhāva is tear which is a drop of water and *Romāñca* which is hair standing on end? While defining, explaining and illustrating the eight *Sāttvikas* which are also Rasas to him, Bhoja says in his *S. K. Ā.* (pp. 498-500) that though they become Rasas, they, being *Sāttvikas*, are not attended by accessory *Sañcārins*—

"अयं च स्तम्भः पुष्टोऽपि सात्त्विकत्वात् सदैव अन्यानुयायीति नानुभावादिभिरनुवर्ष्यते ।"

"अस्यापि (रोमाञ्चस्य) सात्त्विकत्वात् अन्यानुवर्षादयो न जायन्ते ।"

S. K. Ā., p. 498.

What does Bhoja mean by such qualified Rasas? How can an unattended thing be considered *Pūsta* or developed? If it is still looking up to something to render itself understood (*अन्यमुखप्रेषि*), how is it leading? A mere description of *Stambha* cannot make an instance of *Stambha Rasi*. The concept of Rasi means 1. an emotional state and 2. an emotional state which is '*Pradhāna*'. This '*Pradhānatva*' is not a mere question of a poet nourishing a Bhāva. It means that the Bhāva is, by nature, a major mood, within which occur a number of secondary emotional states. Only such a major state of mind can be reinforced by attendant conditions. Bhoja says *Glāni* can be reinforced by *Śrama* etc. This is not possible. When it is said that one is *Glāni*, fatigued, the question is at once asked, and the mind does not rest without asking this question, why is he fatigued? That is, there cannot be *Viśrānti* in a minor or fleeting feeling; such a minor mood is common to more than one state of mind. One may be fatigued because of *Vipralambha*, because of fight in *Vira*, because of yogic practice in *Sānta*. But when it is said that Rāma loves Sītā, there is no more question. A *Sthāyin* explains a world of feelings; it is like a master with many

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servants; it is independent, Svatantra and Ananyamukha prekṣī, Atanyānāvāyī and Svaviśānta. This is the significance of the simple but effective simile of King and the followers. Abhinava clearly explains the position thus—

“अप्रधाने च वस्तुनि कस्य संविद् विश्राम्यति, तस्यैव प्रत्ययस्य प्रधानान्तरे प्रत्यनुधावतः स्वात्मनि अविश्रान्तत्वात् । अतो अप्रधानावे जडे विभावानुभाववर्गे, व्यभिचारिनिचये च संविदात्मकेऽपि नियमेन अन्यमुख-प्रेक्षिणि संभवतीति तदतिरिक्तः स्वाय्येव चर्चणापात्रम् ।”

Abhi. līhā., I, p. 283.

“ये त्वेते ऋतुमास्यादयो विभावाः बाह्याश्च बाह्यप्रभृतयो अनुभावाः ते न भावशब्देन व्यपदेश्याः ।”

“भावशब्देन तावत् चित्तवृत्तिविशेष एव विवक्षिताः ।”

ibid., Ch. VII, p. 343.

As regards the criticism that some among the accepted Sthāyins of old, are less permanent, Abhinava accepts that there does exist a graded Prādhānya among them. He accepts also that sometimes, the Sthāyins become Vyabhicārins but Vyabhicārins do not become Rasa. Vyabhicārins are always Paratantra.¹ It cannot be contended that all Bhāvas are equally relevant to the Puruṣārthas. The point in the argument of Caturvargopayoga is this: There are any number of things that man aspires for and works to get; but all these fall under the four heads of Dharma, Artha, Kāma and Mokṣa. Similarly, though any feeling of man, as such, cannot but be related to his activity towards Caturvargaprāpti, there is a classification and grouping possible

1. To Abhinava, the Vyabhicārins are always Paratantra; to Bhoja, they are Svatantra and Paratantra according as they are Rasa or Bhāva. There is a writer, later than Vidyānātha, named Veṅkatanārāyaṇa-dikṣita, of the Āndhradeśa, who seems to follow the view of writers like Bhoja. For he says that Vyabhicārins are of two kinds, Svatantra and Paratantra; when they go to heighten another, they are the latter; they are the former when they do not have to heighten another.

परतन्त्राः स्वतन्त्राश्च द्विविधा व्यभिचारिणः ।

परप्रेषकतां प्राप्ताः परतन्त्रा इतीरिताः ।

तदभावे स्वतन्त्राः स्युः भावा इति च ते स्मृताः ॥ Mad. Ms., pp. 112-3.

He however does not explain his position further.

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among them, according to which we arrive at a few dominant heads, under which the rest can be brought. The argument of 'Ratnjanādhikya' means this: Though there is *Asvādyatva* in everything in poetry and drama, it is only some mental conditions that can be handled as leading themes; how can *Glāni* be worked at as the *Rasa* of a drama and who will relish it?

Jagannātha paṇḍita adopts a peculiar attitude towards this question. He raises the problem by pointing out *Bhakti* as an additional *Rasa*. As love for God, an *Anurāga*, it cannot be brought under *Sānta*, since *Sānta* implies absence of any *Rāga*. He replies that all *Rati* except the *Rati* between man and woman is only a *Bhāva* and can never become a *Rasa*. If it is argued that *Bhagavad Rati* can be taken as the *Sthāyi-Rati* and the *Strī-pūmrati* be relegated to the *Bhāva*-class, another will propose *Rati* for children as a *Sthāyin* and a third will ask why *Jugupsā* and *Śoka* cannot be put down as *Vyabhicārin* instead of being called *Sthāyins*. The whole system of *Bharata* will then have to be overhauled and this is far from desirable! *Bharata* alone is the guide and authority to decide which *Bhāva* is *Sthāyin* and which *Vyabhicārin*.

“न चासी शान्तरसेऽन्तर्भावमर्हति । अनुरागस्य वैराग्यविरुद्धत्वात् ।
उच्यते—मतेः देवादिविपरित्यजेन भावान्तर्गततया रसत्वानुपपत्तेः ।
* * * भरतादिमुनिवचनानामेव रसभावत्वादित्यवस्थापकत्वेन,
स्वातन्त्र्यायोगात् । अन्यथा पुत्रादिविषयाया अपि रतेः स्थायिभावत्वं कुतो
न स्यात् ? न स्याद्वा कुतः शुद्धभावत्वं जुगुप्साशोकादीनाम्, इत्यखिलदर्शन-
व्याकुली स्यात् । रसानां नक्वगणना च मुनिवचननियन्त्रिता भव्येत, इति
यथाशास्त्रमेव व्यायः ।” R. G.

Bhakti and Madhura Rasa.

It was pointed out previously how Daṇḍin illustrated *Preyas* by two instances of devotion to God, *Bhakti*. It is natural that, in this land, this sentiment of devotion should have been soon accepted as a *Rasa*. But *Abhinava* and others proposed to bring it under *Sānta*. *Sānta* is the *Rasa* relating to the final *Puruṣārtha*, *Mokṣa*; and many are the paths leading to *Mokṣa*. The three paths of *Bhakti*, *Karma* and *Jñāna* are well-known. It may be that *Bhakti* is in some cases an *Aṅga* of the *Sānta* developed on lines of *Jñāna* but the advocates of *Bhakti* held it to be supreme by itself. They made *Jñāna* and *Karma* its aids; the release, *Mokṣa*,

from everything which the Jñānin wanted, the Bhakta did not favour. He wanted that he should permanently be loving God.

Just as the Vira Rāsa has the four varieties, Dāma etc., this Bhakti also has the varieties of Mādhura or Śrīgāra or Ujjvala, i.e. love as in the case of the Gopis towards Kṛṣṇa, Sakhya as in the case of Arjuna, Vātsalya as in the case of Devakī, Yaśodā, Vasudeva and Nanda, Dāsya, or servitude as in the cases of other devotees. The elaboration of Bhakti Rāsa on these lines is the special contribution of the rhetoricians of Bengal who followed the school of Caitanya. Rūpa Gosvāmin's two works, the *Bhakti-rasāmṛtābhāṣā* and the *Ujjvalānandamāñi* deal with this Bhakti Rāsa at very great length. Dr. Abhayakumar Cuha has dealt with this subject in an article on the Rāsa cult in the Caitanya-centenary by the Asutosh Mukerjee Silver Jubilee Volumes (III) and Dr. S. K. De's complete account of 'the Bhakti-Rāsa Śāstra of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism' in the *IHQ* (Vol. VIII) for 1932, removes the need for any further contribution on this subject.

These Vaiṣṇava Ālankārikas accept the eight Rasas of Bharata; accept the Sānta; accept the Vātsalya; accept the 'Sneha-prakṛtiḥ Preyān' or the 'Ādratā-sāhāyikāḥ Snehaḥ' as Sakhya and add only one absolutely new Rāsa-concept, namely Dāsya. Thus they speak of twelve Rasas but they give a new orientation to the whole scheme, wherein lies the speciality of their school. The old Śrīgāra becomes the chief Rāsa; it is Rati for their God; it is also called Mādhura and Ujjvala. Along with this Mādhura, there are four others which are primary; they are Sānta, Dāsya, Sakhya and Vātsalya. These five are called the five Mukhya Bhakti Rasas. The rest, the seven (Hāsyā, Adbhuta, Vira, Karuṇā, Bibhatsa, Bhayānaka and Raudra), are secondary, the Gaṇa Bhakti Rasas. The primary Bhakti Rasas numbering five are the five forms of Bhakti; the seven secondary Rasas are more or less Vyabhicāras for the five primary Rasas for they are Rasas only when they involve Kṛṣṇa-rati.

शान्त दास्य (सख्य) मधुर रस नाम

कृष्ण भक्ति रस मध्ये ए पञ्च प्रधान ।

श्रीचि. म. प. १६.

दास्याद्भुतवीरकरुणबीभत्सैभयरौद्र

पञ्च विभ भक्ते गौण सप्त रस ह्य ।

पञ्च रसस्वार्थो व्यापी ह्ये भक्तनते

सप्त गौण आगन्तुकं वा इये कारणे ॥

(Quoted by Dr. A. K. Guha in the article ref. to above.)

According to the table given by Dr. De in his article (p. 666), *Dāsya* is called *Prīta* (rendered as Faithfulness) and *Sakhya* is called *Preyas* (rendered as Friendship).

Kavīkartapūra's *Ālaṅkāra Kaustubha* is a regular *Ālaṅkāra* treatise but it introduces some ideas of these *Vaiṣṇava Ālaṅkārikas* also. *Kavīkartapūra* does not give us the classification into *Mukhya* and *Gauṇa* *Rasa*, and we miss also *Dāsya* in his work. He accepts the eight *Rasas* of *Bhārata*, the *Śānta* and the *Vātsalya*. To these ten he adds two more, *Preman* and *Bhakti*. *Preman* is the name he gives to the *Madhura Rasa*, the divine *Śṛṅgāra* between *Kṛṣṇa* and the *Gopis*. He considers *Cittadrava* as its *Sihāyin*. According to him, this love is not *Śṛṅgāra*. He also records the view of some who hold *Śṛṅgāra* as the *Rasa* between *Rādhā* and *Kṛṣṇa* and says that, in that case, *Preman* will be the *Aṅga* of that *Śṛṅgāra*. But, according to himself, *Preman* is the *Aṅga*; *Śṛṅgāra* its *Aṅga*. This *Preman*, *Kavīkartapūra* considers as Love Supreme within which every other *Rasa* comes.

“अथ प्रेमासः * * * अत्र चित्तद्रवः स्थायी । प्रेमासे सर्वे रसा अन्तर्भवन्तीत्यत्र मदीयानेव प्रपञ्चः । अन्यगौरवभयारिहमात्रमुक्तम् । केषाञ्चिन्मते श्रीराधाकृष्णयोः शृङ्गार एव रसः । तन्मतेऽप्येतदुदाहरणं नास्त्यतम् । शृङ्गारोऽङ्गी प्रेम अङ्गम्, अङ्गस्यापि कचिदुद्रिक्ता । वयं तु प्रेमाङ्गी, शृङ्गारोऽङ्गमिति विशेषः । तथा च—

उन्मज्जन्ति निमज्जन्ति प्रेम्ण्यखण्डरसत्त्वतः ।

सर्वे रसाश्च भावाश्च तरङ्गा इव वारिधौ ॥ A. Kau., p. 148.

This view of *Preman* will make it the basic Love, which *Bhoja* also says, lies at the root, as *Mūlaprakṛti*, of *Rati* and *Prīti*.

The *Vāghela* King *Viśvanātha śiṁha*, a great devotee of *Rāma* and the author of a number of works on *Rāma*, (A.D. 1853-4) treats of *Bhagavad Bhakti* as a *Rasa* at the end of his treatise *Sarvasiddhānta*. *Vide* *Rajendralal Mitra*, *Notices of MSS.*, Vol. VII, p. 100. No. 2329. It would be interesting to compare his elaboration of this subject with that of the *Bengal Vaiṣṇava Ālaṅkārikas*.

[Vol. XI, Part II.]

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī on Bhakti Rāsa.

It is a well-known fact that Madhusūdana-sarasvatī, the great Advaitic writer, was a great devotee of the personal God in the form of Kṛṣṇa. In this role, he has left to us a Stotra, and a treatise on devotion called Bhāgavadbhaktirasāyana,¹ a work, in which the subject is approached from the point of view of the Ālankārika. It expounds the Bhakti Rāsa. Though this Rāsa is old and has been dealt with by others, as can be seen from the foregoing survey, the treatment by Madhusūdana-sarasvatī has its own peculiarities.

Generally, the Puruṣārthas are said to be four, Dharma, Artha, Kāma and Mokṣa. M.S. says that Puruṣārtha is really one which is bliss untainted by misery, दुःखासंस्पृष्टदुःख, and that, if one speaks of four Puruṣārthas, one calls the means the end, adopting the common Upacāra. (p. 5.) Since devotion to God, Bhāgavad-bhakti, is one of the ways of attaining such unimpured bliss, Bhakti also is a Puruṣārtha.

अतो भगवद्भक्तियोगस्यापि दुःखासंभिन्नसुखत्वेनैव परमपुरुषार्थत्वमि-
त्याह—'निरुपमसुखसंविद्रूपमनृशदुःखम्' इति । p. 5.

M.S. separates Jñāna and Bhakti and consequently does not include Bhakti in the fourth Puruṣārtha, Mokṣa. He bases himself on the difference in character in aspirants to spiritual salvation, which explains why some take to the path of knowledge, Jñāna, and some to the path of devotion, Bhakti. Firm minds seek the former through cultivated Narveda, while softer minds tending to be emotional seek the latter.

ततश्च अदुतचित्तस्य निर्येदपूर्वकं तत्त्वज्ञानम् । द्रुतचित्तस्य तु
भगवत्कथाश्रवणादिभागवतधर्मश्रद्धापूर्विका भक्तिरिति अवधित्वेन द्वयमप्यु-
पात्तम् । p. 2.

On the basis of certain texts in the Bhāgavata, he even says that Jñāna also becomes a means and not an end, a means to the attainment of Cittaprasāda, which is necessary for Bhakti. This makes Jñāna a Sañcārīn of Bhakti.

1. Benares Edn., 1927.

“अत्र ‘मनो यावत् प्रसीदति’ (भा. XI. 20.) इति भक्तियोग एव ज्ञानावधिकत्वेन उक्तः ।” p. 3.

M.S. accepts two kinds of Bhakti, the means and the end, Sādhana and Phala. Even as Jñāna can be means to Bhakti, Bhakti itself can be. The Bhāgavata-Dharmas like Śravaṇa and Kīrtana, which produce Citāprasāda and Satvaśuddhi, form Sādhana-Bhakti (p. 8). Bhakti itself can serve to intensify Bhakti.

The word Bhakti itself is explained by M.S. in a very original manner. All writers explain Bhakti as Rati for God. M.S. does not say this at first. According to him, Bhakti is the Citta taking the form of the Lord. The Citta or Antahkaraṇa takes the form of the object it comes into contact with; भगवदाकारता is Bhakti.

“भजनम् अन्तःकरणस्य भगवदाकारतारूपं भक्तिः ।

द्रुतस्य भगवद्धर्मादारावाहिकतां गता ।

सर्वेशो मनसो वृत्तिर्भक्तिरित्यभिधीयते ॥ L. 3.

* * * या सर्वेशविषया वृत्तिः भगवदाकारत्वेत्यर्थः ; तदाकारत्वेव हि सर्वत्र वृत्तिशब्दोऽस्माकं दर्शने ; अतस्मा भक्तिरित्यभिधीयते शास्त्रविद्विः ।” p. 13.

By Karṇa Vyūṭpatti, Bhakti means the Sādhana also.

“भज्यते सेव्यते भगवदाकारम् अन्तःकरणं क्षिपते अनया” इति वरण-व्युत्पत्त्या भक्तिशब्देन श्रवणकर्मनादि साधनमभिधीयते ।” p. 8.

Thus the word Bhakti would apply to the Uddīpanas and the Anubhāvas also.

M.S. explains all details, Vibhāvas etc. according to his view. The Ālambana-Vibhāva is of course the Lord (p. 6); Tulasī,

1. On p. 11 M.S. points out the difference between Bhakti and Brahma-vidyā or Jñāna. The two are there for two different kinds of Adhikārins. The common man or anybody as such is a candidate for Bhakti; whereas, only he who has acquired the four Sādhana is eligible for Brahma-vidyā. In form also, the two differ; Bhakti is a Savikalpaka-cittavṛtti and Brahma-vidyā is a Nirvikalpaka-cittavṛtti. In the former, the mind takes the form of God.

On p. 6, he points out to the critics who would not give Bhakti such a supreme and independent status of Puruṣārtha, that they should accept Bhakti as a Puruṣārtha, at least as forming part of the first or the fourth, Dharma or Mokṣa.

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Caribana etc. are the Uddīpana-Vibhāvas; Anulāḥavas are tears of joy or closing of eyes and the like. Regarding the Sthāyin, the older writers give Rati but Madhusūdana holds the Citta being of the form of the Lord, Bhāgavadākāraṇī as the Sthāyin. This Cittaṭṭi develops into the Rasa of ineffable bliss.

“—मकलविषयविमुखमनसः महानगस्य कस्यचित् भगवद्गुण-
गरिमग्रन्थनरूपग्रन्थश्रवणव्रतितद्रुतिरूपायां मनोवृत्तौ सर्वसाधनफलभूतायां
गृहीतभगवदाकारायां विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसंयोगेन स्वरूपतया ‘विभावानु-
भावव्यभिचारिसंयोगाद्रसनिवृत्तिः’ इति ।

“विभावो द्विविधः—आलम्बनविभावः उदीपनविभावश्च । तत्र
आलम्बनविभावो भगवान्, उदीपनविभावः तुलसीचन्दनादिः, अनुभावो
नेत्रविक्रियादिः । व्यभिचारिणो भावाः निर्वेदादयः ; व्यक्तीभवद्वयवदाकारता-
रूपरसाख्यः स्थायिभावः परमानन्दसाम्राज्यकारामकः प्रादुर्भवति ; स एव
मक्तियोग इति ; तं परमं निरतिशयं पुरुषार्थं वदन्ति रसज्ञाः ।” p. 4.

It must be noted here that, though M.S. distinguishes Śānta and Bhakti as essentially different, he still gives Nirveda or मकलविषयविमुखमनस्कता (Vairāgya) as a condition precedent even to the Uddīpana-Vibhāva. This would however make Śānta an Aṅga. Though M.S. gives his Sthāyin for Bhakti as Bhāgavadākāraṇī (Cittaṭṭi) there does not seem to be any great difference between this and Bhāgavad-Rāī. For he holds that the result of this Cittaṭṭi, its Phala, is intense love for God. भगवद्विषय-
प्रेमप्रकटी मक्तियोगम् । p. 11. On p. 10, he says that this molten state of the mind is called Prapāya, Anurōga, Snehā etc., all names of Rati.

इयमेव द्वावस्या प्रणवानुरागस्नेहादिशब्दैः अपि सङ्कीर्त्यते । p. 16.

According to M.S., the Ālambana of Bhakti is God; the Rasa realised, Paramānanda, is God; and the Sthāyin, the mind which has taken God's form, is also God. How is this explained? M.S. says that God (the Ālambana) is independent and is the Bimba of which the Sthāyin in us is the Pratibimba. The form of God is ineffable bliss.

भगवान् परमानन्दस्वरूपः स्वयमेव हि ।

मनोगतस्तदाकारसतामेति पुष्कलम् ॥ 1. 10. p. 18.

विम्बमेव ह्युपाधिनिष्ठत्वेन प्रतीयमानं प्रतिविम्बमित्युच्यते । परमानन्दश्च मगवान् मनसि प्रतिविम्बितः स्वाविभावनामासाद्य रसतामापादयतीति भक्ति-रसस्य परमानन्दरूपत्वं निर्विवादम् । नाप्यालम्बनविभावस्थाविभावपरैक्यम्, विम्बप्रतिविम्बभावत्वेन भेदस्य व्यवहारसिद्धत्वाद्, ईशजीवयोरिव ।' p. 18.

M.S. then recognises that the following Bhāvas can become Sthāyins and Rasas. (1) Kāma becoming Saṁbhoga and Vipra-lambha; 2. Krodha becoming Dveṣa as in Śrīpāta and Kāṁsa; 3. Bhāva; 4. Śneha (Dāsyā, Sakhya, Vātsalya, and Preyas); 5. Haṁsa becoming love for Kṛṣṇa; 6. Hāsa; 7. Viṣṇaya; 8. Utsāha (Dayā, Dāna and Dharma); 9. Soka; 10. Jugupsā; and 11. Sama (II, 25-26). Of these, Dharmavīra, Dayāvīra, Bibhaṭsa and Sama are not part of Bhakti Rasa (II, 27-28). Similarly Dveṣa born of Irṣyā and Bhāva are not part of Bhakti (II, 29). So also Raudra and Bhayānka are never Aṅgas of Bhakti (II, 30). The rest form part of Bhakti (II, 31-33). As pointed out already, M.S. is of opinion that Śānta Rasa and Moksā Puruṣārtha are for 'Adrutacitta' and that both differ from Bhakti which is a separate Puruṣārtha. Hence, he excludes Śānta from Bhakti. But as can be seen in the earlier section, the Bhakti Rasa scheme of Rūpa and others admit Śānta in Bhakti. This, the author of the gloss on M.S. also points out. M.S. rules out of the scope of Bhakti, Dharma-Vīra and Dayā-Vīra because their Ālambanas differ; Raudra and Bhaya are against love and Dveṣa cannot produce any Druti.

Those who did not accept Bhakti as a separate Rasa considered it as a Bhāva, a variety of Rati, the object of which was God देवादिविषया रतिः. To these writers, M.S. replies that this Bhāva-rati described as 'Devādiviṣayā' refers to Rati for the Gods like Indra and others. Rati for the one supreme God is a Rasa.

रतिर्देवादिविषया व्यभिचारी तथोर्जितः ।

भावः प्रोक्तो रसो नेति यदुक्तं रसकोविदैः ॥

देवान्तरेषु जीवत्वाद् परानन्दाप्रकाशनात् ।

तथोच्यम् ; परमानन्दरूपे न परमात्मनि ॥ II, 75-76.

Bhakti Rasa is the real Rasa; since here it is that one has the ineffable bliss that is not tainted by even a grain of sorrow. Śṛṅgāra and other Rasas cannot mean this bliss and are inferior; they are like glow-worms; Bhakti is the very Sun.

कान्तादिविषया वा ये रसावास्तत्र नेदशम् ।

रसत्वं पुण्यते पूर्णमुखात्सार्धान्वकारणात् ॥

परिपूर्णरसा क्षुद्ररसेभ्यो भगवदतिः ।

खद्योतेभ्य इवादित्यप्रभेव बलवत्तरा ॥ II. 77-78.

The Māyā Rasa.

The advent of *Sānta* latterly gave rise to another controversial *Rasa* called *Māyā*. Just as there is the possibility of depicting the *Sānta* *Rasa* with the psychological, religious and metaphysical concepts like *Jñāna*, *Bhakti*, *Sama*, *Dama*, *Santoṣa* etc., there is also the possibility of depicting the *Māyā* *Rasa* by showing the *Jivānma* rolling in *Samsāra* as a result of *Mithyā-jñāna* or *Avidyā*, with characters *Kāma*, *Krodha*, *Lobha* and the like. Even as *Sānta* is the *Rasa* of the state called *Nivṛtti*, *Māyā* is the *Rasa* of the state called *Pravṛtti*. In a philosophical drama, the *Rasa* from which the hero escapes into the *Sānta*, will be *Māyā*. The *Rasatarāṅgī* of Bhānudatta puts it forward thus:—

चित्तवृत्तिः द्विधा—प्रवृत्तिर्निवृत्तिश्च । निवृत्तौ यथा शान्तरसः,
तथा प्रवृत्तौ मायारस इति प्रतिभाति । Ch. VII.

He points out there how this *Māyā* cannot be identical with or included in *Rati* etc., all of which come within its fold. *Rati* and the seven other *Sthāyins* become the *Vyabhicārins* of this *Rasa*.

किन्तु विदुः इव रतिहासशोकक्रोधोत्साहभवजुगुप्साविस्मयास्तत्र
उत्पद्यन्ते विलीयन्ते च । तेन तत्र व्यभिचारिभावा इति ।

The *Sthāyin* of this *Rasa* is *Mithyājñāna*.

लक्षणे च प्रबुद्धमिष्याज्ञानवासना माया रसः । मिष्याज्ञानमस्य स्थायि-
भावः । विभावाः सांसारिकभोगार्जकभर्मोर्धर्माः । अनुभावाः पुत्रकलत्रविजय-
साम्राज्यादयः ।

The *Mandāramaranda-campū* follows the *Rasatarāṅgī* and describes the *Māyā*-*Rasa* of *Pravṛtti* as well as the *Sānta* *Rasa* of *Nivṛtti*. K. M. 35, p. 106.

Cirañjīvaibhaṭṭācārya cites the *Rasatarāṅgī* on *Māyā* *Rasa* and criticises it:—

[Vol. XI, Part ii.]

अत्रेदं चिन्त्यं — मायाया अनादित्वेन अजन्यत्वात् रसत्वासंभवः । रसास्तु सर्वे जन्या एव । कथं वा कथ्येत् मिथ्याज्ञानादिः मायायाः कारणमिति, शास्त्रविरुद्धत्वात् । वस्तुतस्तु आलङ्कारिकाणां मते रसो नित्यः आनन्दरूपः । अतोऽस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वेन मायाया रसत्वासंभवः । माया हि तुच्छा विनाश-शालिनी ब्रह्मभिन्नेवेति दिक् । अत एव प्राचीनसंप्रदायिकैरपि नवैव रसाः कथिताः । ”

Kāvya-vilāsi, Sarasvatī Bhavan studies, XVI, p. 10.

This scholastic criticism, going into some of the features of the concept of *Māyā* as accepted in Metaphysics, does not meet the question properly. If it is argued that *Rasa* is 'Nitya', 'Ānandarūpa' and hence of the form of the Brahman, and consequently *Māyā* which is different from Brahman cannot be a *Rasa*, how does the author propose to explain *Śṛṅgāra* etc. as *Rasas*? They all come under *Māyā*. If a portrayal of *Bībhatsa*, *Bhayanaka* and *Raudra* can be *Rasa*, why not *Māyā*? One objection that can be considered is however not mentioned by the critic of the *Māyā-Rasa* and it is this: As an opposite of the *Sānta Rasa*, a *Māyā-Rasa* is no doubt present, but it is not a unitary *Rasa*. It is made up of *Śṛṅgāra* and the seven other *Rasas*. Any given specimen presenting a mundane activity can be called by one of the eight names, *Śṛṅgāra* etc. It is not necessary to have a separate *Rasa* as *Māyā* which is only the common name of all the eight mundane *Rasas* of *Pravṛtti*. Suppose, in a metaphysical play, *Pravṛtti* and *Nivṛtti* are portrayed; under the former *Kāma*, *Krodha* etc. will be portrayed as developing into *Śṛṅgāra*, *Raudra* and other *Rasas*. To us who see it with unenlightened minds, the several parts will appeal as *Śṛṅgāra*, *Raudra* and so on; we will never realise them as *Māyā*; if we realise, we shall be sitting along with the chosen few, the *Jñānins* who alone see *Māyā* in all those *Rasas*; and to them, this *Māyā* will not produce *Cittasainvāda* or *Rasāsvāda*; only the opposite *Sānta* will produce that in them. Therefore, practically speaking, there is no necessity for a *Māyā-Rasa*.

The Kārpaṇya Rasa.

Along with the *Laulya*, which *Abhinava* had already mentioned, *Bhānudatta* examines if *Kārpaṇya* can be a *Rasa*. He mentions *Spṛhā* as its *Sthāyin*. The argument for rejecting this is the same as that used by *Abhinava* for rejecting *Laulya*. Even

as a development of *Lasya* can only become *Hāsyā*, development of *Kārpāyā* also will become *Hāsyā*.

The Vṛīḍānaka Rāsa.

The *Ānuyōgadvāra Sūtra* of the Jains, which I mentioned previously in the section on the *Sānta Rāsa*, gives nine *Kāvya-rāsa*s, in which 1st, *Bhayaṇaka*, is omitted and in its place is found a new *Rāsa* called *Vṛīḍānaka*, which can be rendered as 'Modesty'. (*Āgamaśāstra Samiti Series* Edit. with *Maladhārī Hemacandra's* Skt. gloss, pp. 134.)

पयकञ्च रस पण्यता, तं जहा—

वीरो सिगरो अणुओ अ रोरो अ होइ बोदव्यो ।

वेलयओ बीभण्णे हासो कट्टणो पसंतो अ ॥

The commentary of *Maladhārī Hemacandra*¹ explains that *Vṛīḍānaka* is the *Rāsa* of Bashfulness, that some give in its place *Bhayaṇaka* as a *Rāsa* and that the *Bhayaṇaka* is included in *Raudra* and hence not mentioned separately.

“वीडयति लज्जामुत्पादयति लज्जनैवस्तुदर्शनादिप्रभवो मनोव्यटीक-
तादिस्वरूपो वीडनकः । अस्य स्थाने भयजनकसङ्ग्रहमादिवस्तुदर्शनादिप्रभवः
भयानको रसः पठ्यतेऽन्यत्र । स चेद् रौद्ररसान्तर्भावविवक्षणात् पृथक् नोक्तः ।”

In defining, however, the text gives a verse in which we see *Bhayaṇaka* instead of *Raudra*, to explain which the commentator says that the text describes not *Raudra* as such, but describes it through its effect, *Bhaya*. The *Lakṣaṇaśloka* is—

भयजननरूपशब्दान्धकारचिन्ताकपासमुत्पन्नः ।

संमोहसंभ्रमविषादमरणलङ्घो रसो रौद्रः ॥ (छाया)

The illustration is however for *Raudra* proper:—

जुकुटीविडम्बितमुखः सन्दष्टोऽथ आर्काणैरुधिर ।

इंसि पशुं असुरनिभं भीमसितं अतिरौद्रं रौद्रोऽसि ॥

The commentator explains that though the *Lakṣaṇaśloka* means only the *Bhayaṇaka Rāsa*, it has to be taken as referring to the cause of *Bhayaṇaka*, *Raudra* also.

1. The commentator's date is the end of the 11th cent. and early part of the 12th. He wrote his *Jīvasamāsa* in 1107 A. D. and *Bhāvabhāvanā* in 1113 A. D. (Winternitz, *Hist. Ind. Lit. Eng. Tran.* II, p. 589.) He is different from the author of the *Kāvya-nuśāsa*.

“ननु भयजनकरूपादिभ्यः समुत्पन्नः संमोहादिलिङ्गश्च भयानक एव भवति, कथमस्य रौद्रत्वम् ; किन्तु पिशाचादिरौद्रवस्तुभ्यो जातत्वात् रौद्रत्वमस्य विवक्षितमित्यदोषः । * * * रौद्रो रसः, सोऽप्युपलक्षणत्वादत्रैव द्रष्टव्यः, अन्यथा च निरास्पद एव स्यात् । अत एव रौद्रपरिणामवत् पुरुषचेष्टाप्रतिपादकमेव उदाहरणं दर्शयिष्यति । नीतचेष्टाप्रतिपादकं तु तत् स्वत एव अन्यूहाभिवलं प्रसङ्गेन ।”

If the number of Rasas is to be reduced by omitting the Rasas which are produced by other Rasas or the Rasas which are the causes of other Rasas, we shall arrive at four Rasas, proceeding on the basis of Bharata's indication of the Kāraṇa-kārya-bhāva existing among the eight Rasas, शृङ्गारादि भवेद्भास्वः etc. Such a process of reducing the number is illogical. There is no reason why the causal Rasa should be retained and the effected Rasa dismissed and why it should not be *vice versa*.

Coming to the Vṛīḍanaka Rasa, the definition and illustration are as follows—

विनयोपचारगुहागुरुदारमर्यादाव्यतिक्रमोत्पन्नः ।

वीरनको नाम रसो लज्जाशङ्काकरणलिङ्गः ॥

यथा—

किं लौकिककरणीयात् लज्जनीयतरमिति लज्जितास्मि ।

विवाहे गुरुजनो परिवन्दते बधूनिवसनम् ॥

(छाया)

According to the gloss, this is a verse addressed by a would-be bride to her maid. The reference in it is to a provincial marriage custom according to which, elderly women and men, including the father-in-law and the mother-in-law, pay their respects to the Sārī and the person of the bride after the nuptial night. The bride is taken round and elders revere her for her chastity. The thought of the elders revering her produces shame in the bride's heart.

This however is a mere Vyabhicārin and hardly a Rasa. Vṛīḍā of the same description is given by Bharata as one of the thirty-three Vyabhicārin.

[Vol. XI, Part ii.]

B.

The Varieties of the Same Rasa.

The first Rasa Śṛṅgāra has two phases, Sambhoga and Vipralambha, the two Adhiṣṭhānas, as Bharata says, of Śṛṅgāra. There is a peculiar view in this connection propounded by king Haripāladeva, whom I have already mentioned in the section on the Śānta Rasa, as holding two Rasas called the Śānta and the Brāhma. Haripāla accepts thirteen Rasas: the eight of Bharata, Śānta and Vātsalya and three new Rasas, Sambhoga, Vipralambha and Brāhma. The peculiarity of the Brāhma-Rasa and its difference from the Śānta have already been explained. (J.O.R., Vol. X, pp. 249-250; 327-329.)

शृङ्गारो हास्यनामा च बीभत्सः करुणस्तथा ।

वीरो मयानकाङ्क्षानो रौद्रास्त्रयोऽद्भुतसंज्ञकः ॥

शान्तो ब्राह्मभिधः पश्चाद् वास्तव्यास्त्रयमतः परम् ।

संभोगो विप्रलम्भः स्याद् रसास्त्रयेते त्रयोदश ॥ p. 16.

Haripāla has three different Rasas, Śṛṅgāra, Sambhoga and Vipralambha. He considers them separate, since, according to him, their characters differ essentially. He thus argues his case against the ancients:—

संभोगो विप्रलम्भश्च ब्राह्मश्चेति त्रयो रसाः ।

अतिरिक्ता उदीर्यन्ते हरिपालमहीभुजा ॥

तत्रेयं वासना (!) पूर्वेः संभोगो विप्रलम्भकः ।

शृङ्गारस्यैव भेदी द्वौ कथितौ—तदसाम्प्रतम् ॥

अनित्यस्तत्र शृङ्गारः क(का)चित्को दृश्यते यतः ।

पशुपक्षिमृगाद्येषु यतश्च न विडोक्नते ॥

सर्वजन्तुषु दृश्यत्वाद् संभोगस्यास्ति नित्यता ।

अतोऽप्यथापि संभोगो रसः शृङ्गारकः(तः) पृथक् ॥

उज्ज्वलः शुचिरित्युक्तः शृङ्गारो हर्षवर्धनः ।

मलिनो दुःखकारी च विप्रलम्भोऽप्रियावहः ॥

अतः शृङ्गारतो भिन्नो विप्रलम्भ उदाहृतः ।

मयानकस्य वीरस्य जन्यस्य जनकस्य च ।

यो भेदो विप्रलम्भस्य संभोगस्य च स स्मृतः ॥ p. 8.

Śṛṅgāra has always been considered as Ujjvala and Śuci, a Rasa of men of cultivated taste and of sophisticated persons, the Uttamaprakṛtis. Therefore, in course of time, Śuci and Ujjvala became synonyms of Śṛṅgāra. In an unsophisticated rustic, there is Śṛṅgāra but only in a way. The ancients also consider that love in birds and beasts is not Rasa, but only its semblance, Rasāhhāsa. Therefore, love as understood by the word Śṛṅgāra is Anitya and Kvācitka, being present only in high class individuals. But love of a kind which is the joy a pair derives mutually is present in all living beings, rustics, birds and beasts. This love need not be called Śṛṅgārāhhāsa, it may be separated into a distinct Rasa and called Sambhoga.

More striking is Haripāla's view regarding Vipralambha. Since both Śṛṅgāra and Sambhoga are of a pleasurable nature, and Vipralambha is essentially of a painful nature, the latter is a separate Rasa. If Śṛṅgāra is Śuci and Ujjvala, Vipralambha is 'Malina'. Vipralambha may be due to Śṛṅgāra or Sambhoga. This cause-effect relationship between Śṛṅgāra and Vipralambha is not proof of their essential identity. The two differ as much as Vira and Bhayānaka, of which the former produces the latter.

If love among higher classes is different from rustic love and love among birds and animals, equally do the separations, Vipralambhas, in the two cases differ. Strictly speaking, Haripāla should have two Rasas for Love in separation.

Haripāla gives Āhlāda as the Sthāyin of Śṛṅgāra, Rati of Sambhoga and Arati of Vipralambha.

आह्लादः प्रथमं * * *

* * * * *

* * * प्रीत्यरती तथा ।

प्रत्येकं स्थायिनो भावाः क्मात् प्रत्येकमौरिताः ॥ p. 17.

The ancients were not unaware of the painfulness of Vipralambha, but they did not consider it, on this score, as a separate Rasa. Autsukya or longing is at the root of Vipralambha. This longing is only a kind of Rati. Arati can only be an intermediate state in the ten Avasthās of love and it is not the basic state of mind that persists throughout Vipralambha. The slender line of Rati runs through the state of Vipralambha; and if this Rati is not accepted in Vipralambha, as its sthāyin, there can be

no difference between Vipralambha and Karuṇa. The Rasakalikā of Rūdrabhāṭṭa also opines that Rati is not of the form of happiness, since Vipralambha is far from being pleasurable.

आनन्दात्मकत्वे रतेः कैश्चिदुक्तम्, तच्चिन्त्यम् । विप्रयोगदेः आनन्दात्मकत्वस्य अयोगात् । Mad. M., p. 2.

The Rasakalikā however does not separate Vipralambha as a distinct Rasa, but takes it, as all do, as a phase of Śṛṅgāra only. It agrees with Haripāla in finding Vipralambha as standing in the way of accepting Rati to be of the nature of pleasure. Rati will thus be, according to the Rasakalikā, a state of pleasure as well as pain. Viprayoga, though apparently and immediately painful, is ultimately a state of pleasure. The very life of Rati is a certain longing; and this exists in Sambhoga as well as in Vipralambha. That it constitutes the life of Rati is seen from what Kālidāsa and Māyurāja say:—*सविनुषप्रार्थना कुरुते* (Śāloṭaka) and *प्रेमासक्तोत्सवम्* (Tāpasavatsarāja). Therefore, Vipralambha is an aspect of Śṛṅgāra only, and of Vipralambha also, Rati is the Sthāyin.

“विप्रलम्भे रतिरेव स्यात् । • • • विप्रकर्षेऽपि रतेः स्वतः सिद्धत्वात् ।”

A. Kau, Kavikarṇapūra.

To match its opinion that Rati is not unmixed pleasure, the Rasakalikā says that Rasa itself is of the nature of both pleasure and pain; but of this more in a further section.

To return to Haripāla's Sambhoga Rasa, he postulated this for the Love of those who are not *Uttamaprakṛtis*. The love of birds and beasts described so largely in the Kāvya which was being known by the term *Rasa-ābhāsa*, comes under Haripāla's Sambhoga Rasa. Vidyādhara, the author of the *Ekāvali*, refuses to recognise that the love of birds and beasts is *Rasā-ābhāsa*. He says that their love also is Rasa. If it is said that the birds and beasts do not consciously enjoy or enjoy in such a manner as cultivated men and women do, such knowledge and cultivated taste, Vidyādhara says, is irrelevant. Why should the subject know what it is enjoying or how it enjoys, provided it enjoys? Kumārasvāmin cites this view of Vidyādhara in his commentary on the *Pratāparudrīya*:—

[Vol. XI, Part ii.]

“अत्र तिरश्चोः पारावतयोः कलकौशलभावेन तदीयशृङ्गारस्य विभावादिपरिपूर्वभावात् आभासत्वं द्रष्टव्यम्¹ । रस एवायं नाभास इति केचित् । तदुक्तं विद्याधरेण—‘विभावादिसंभवो हि रसं प्रति प्रयोजकः, न विभावादि-ज्ञानम् । ततश्च तिरश्चामस्यैव रसः ।’ p. 21, Bāṇamanoramā Edn.

Earlier than Kumārasvāmin, Śiṅgabdhūpāla noticed this view of Vidyādhara, and as a staunch follower of the accepted tradition, criticised it. The discussion in his R. A. S. is too long to be quoted in full. (T. S. S. Edn., pp. 206-7.) Vidyādhara's view is thus stated:—

‘अग्रे तु रसाभासं तिर्यक्षु प्रचक्षते । तद् न परीक्षाक्षमम् । तेष्वपि भावादिसंभवात् । विभावादिज्ञानशून्यास्तिर्यक्षः न भावने भवितुमर्हन्ति रसस्येति चेत् न । मनुष्येष्वपि केषुचित् तयामूलेषु रसविषयाभासप्रसङ्गात् । अत्र विभावादिसंभवोऽपि रसं प्रति प्रयोजकः । न विभावादिज्ञानम् । ततश्च तिरश्चामस्यैव रसः ।’

The criticism of Śiṅgabdhūpāla is that Śṛṅgāra is essentially a Rasa of subjects, Ālambanas, who are Śuci and Ujjvala; it is not enough if, according to their own conditions, birds and beasts do have a consciousness of their love and its art; it is a question of Aucitya. How can a human being who alone is Sāmājika for poetry and drama, have Cittasamvāda in such cases? The terms Vibhāva etc. do not apply in the case of the love among birds and beasts; the emotional conditions there are called only Kāraṇa, Kārya etc. Says Śiṅgabdhūpāla:—

“अथ स्वजातियोग्यधर्मैः करिणां करिणीं प्रति विभावत्वं इति चेत् न । तस्यां कक्षयां करिणां करिणीं प्रति कारणत्वम्, न पुनः विभावत्वम् ।”

“किञ्च जातियोग्यधर्मैः वस्तुनो न विभावत्वम्, अपि तु भावकचित्तो-
ल्लासहेतुमी रतिविशिष्टैरेव ।

“किञ्च विभावज्ञानं नाम औचित्यविवेकः, तेन शून्याः तिर्यक्षो न विभावतां यान्ति । * * विवेकरहितजनोपलक्षणम्लेच्छातस्य रसस्य आभासत्वे स्पष्टावाप्तेः ॥” R. A. S., p. 206-7.

1. That love among birds and beasts has less of art and is less poetic, may not be accepted at all by the biologists.

Consistent with this argument, Śiṅgabdhūpāla says that Anaucitya is the only cause of a Rasa becoming its Ābhāsa; that this Anaucitya is of two kinds, Asatyatva and Ayogyatva; and that in trees and other aspects of nature which are described in love-images, the Rasa is Ābhāsa by reason of 'Asatyatva' and in rustics, low people, and birds and beasts, the Rasa is Ābhāsa by reason of 'Ayogyatva.'

अभासता मनेदेषामनीचिलप्रवर्तिनान् ।

असत्यत्वादयोग्यत्वात् अनीचित्वं द्विधा भवेत् ॥

असत्यत्वकृतं तत् स्याद् अचेतनगतं तु यत् ।

अयोग्यत्वकृतं प्रोक्तं नीचतिर्षङ्गनाश्रयम् ॥

Kumārāśvāmin does not refute Vidyādihara and Rājacūḍāmaṇi dikṣita fully agrees with Vidyādihara. After reproducing the Ekāvālī, Rājacūḍāmaṇi says that if the Kāvya-prakāśa is not wrong in illustrating Bhāṣānaka Rasa with the verse श्रीवाभङ्गाभिरामम् etc. describing fear in a deer, it is Rasa in birds and animals, and not Rasābhāsa.

अत एव काव्यप्रकाशिकायां 'श्रीवाभङ्गाभिरामं मुहुरनुपतति स्पन्दने बद्धदृष्टिः—' इति श्लोकेन भयानकरसः तिर्यग्निषयगततया उदाहृत इत्याहुः ।

Kāvyaadarpaṇa, Ch. IV, pp. 211-2.

Vāṇivilās Edn.

Possibly, Śiṅgabdhūpāla would reply to Rājacūḍāmaṇi that the Rasa in question is only Śṛṅgāra, and Anaucitya-veka was spoken of only regarding this Rasa and its Ābhāsa. But would he accept that other Rasas in birds and beasts are not Ābhāsa and should a distinction be made among the Rasas?

Haripāla's contribution to this controversy is the creation of a Sambhoga Rasa for rustics, aborigines, birds, beasts etc.

Of Hāsyā Rasa, Bharata has given six varieties, ranging from smile to roar, according to the nature of men who are gentle, boisterous and so on. Kāvīkartapūra diminished this number to three. (A. Kau. p. 143.) Bharata himself speaks of a broad three-fold classification of laughter according as men are Uttama, Madhyama or Adhama, refined, moderately refined or unrefined. (N. Ś. Ch., VI. pp. 315-7; Gaek. Edn. I.) Further, Bharata has recognised that Laughter has two varieties, Laughing with and Laughing at, Svagata and Paragata or Ātmasitha. (N. Ś., [Vol. XI, Part ii.]

Ch. VI, p. 314.) Of these, I have spoken in a paper on the Comic Element in Skr. Literature, awaiting publication.

Karūṇa varies according as its cause is curse, death and so on. (pp. 310 and 332.) On p. 332, Karūṇa is considered to be of three kinds, Karūṇa born of peril to Dharma, Karūṇa due to peril to Artha and Karūṇa born of Śoka in general, i. e., Śoka at the loss of relations and the like. The Uttamas are chiefly sorry on issues of Dharma; the Madhyamas, on loss of wealth and other possessions (Artha), and perhaps, only Adhamas are supposed to sorrow too much over the loss of those whom they love (Kāma). This however does not rule out Karūṇa on the loss of the beloved in an Uttamaprakṛti. It appears that only the third variety is Śoka and Karūṇa proper, and that the first two varieties of Śoka in Dharma and Artha, seem to be only Vyabhi-cāriṇs. Three kinds of Bhayānaka are given, Vyāḥat (feigned), Aparādhāt (at having done a mistake) and Vitrāṣitaka, born of being timid by nature. The varieties of Bibhatsa,—Kṣobhaṇa and Udvegin, or Kṣobhaṇa, Udvegin and Śuddha—have been spoken of while considering the possibility of a kind of Jugupsā being the Sthāyin of the Śānta. (J. O. R., Vol. X, pp. 344-5.) Adbhuta is Divya and Ānandaja, wonder born of heavenly miracles and that produced by the joy one has when things are achieved. Such classifications of Rasas do not have any scientific basis or method in them.

Of the varieties of Rasas, the varieties of Vira have attracted greatest notice, because an early school of opponents of the Śānta explained away Śānta as provided for by one of the varieties of the Vira mentioned by Bharata. Bharata mentions three kinds of heroism:—munificence, Dānavira, as in Karna; sticking to right at all costs, Dharmavira, as in Yudhiṣṭhira; and martial heroism, Yuddhavira.

दानवीरं धर्मवीरं युद्धवीरं तथैव च ।

रसं वीरमपि प्राह ब्रह्मा त्रिविधमेव हि ॥ N. S., VI, 99.¹

Here again, the first two Vīras do not seem to be Rasas, they can only be Bhāvas. If they are developed as main themes,

1. Cf. Bharata's description of Utsāha:—

तस्य (उत्साहस्य) त्वैर्यं वैर्यं त्यागं वैराग्यादिभिरनुभावैरभिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः ।

N. S., VII, p. 354.

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they will become *Āṅgas* of *Śānta*. Otherwise, they will form the *Guṇas* of the *Nāyaka*, as *Andārya* and *Dhārmikatva*.

A *Dayāvira* was then proposed and this *Dayāvira* sought to throw out *Śānta* for some time. *Jagannātha Paṇḍita* has pointed out other varieties of *Vira* and the *Mahābhārata* gives a long list of *Viras*. All this has been set forth already in the section on *Śānta Rasa*. (J. O. R., Vol. X, pp. 340-344.)

Bhānudatta has taken trouble in his *Rasatarāṅgī* (Ch. II) to prove that *Dayāvira* cannot be included in *Karuṇa Rasa*; there is a confusion here between *Karuṇā* and *Karuṇa*.

The *Anuyogadvārasūtra* cited previously breaks the usual order in enumerating the *Rasas* and instead of opening with *Śṛṅgāra*, opens with *Vira*. The gloss says here that *Vira* is mentioned first, because it is the noblest and foremost of *Rasas*, the *Vira* meant here is that associated with *Dāna* and *Tapas*. Towards the end of this section, the text and the commentary divide the *Rasas* into two classes, those vitiated by what are called *Sūtra-dōṣas* such as Falsehood and Injury to others, and those which do not involve these sins. Here *Yuddhāvira* is considered vitiated by the sin or flaw of injury to another, *Paropaghāta*. Similarly *Adbhūta* involves exaggeration which is a species of Falsehood. But such *Vira* as *Tapāvira* and *Dānavira* is, like the *Prasānta Rasa*, free from such *Sūtra-dōṣas*.

“अत्र तु त्यागतपोगुणो वीरस्ये वर्तते । त्यागतमसी च ‘त्यागो गुणो गुणशतादधिको मतो मे’, ‘परं लोकातिगं धाम तपः श्रुतमिति इयम्’ इत्यादि-
वचनात् समस्तगुणप्रधान इत्यनया विवक्षया वीरसस्य आदावुपन्यासः ।”

“तथा कश्चिद्रसः उपघातलक्षणेन सूत्रदोषेण निर्वर्त्यते, यथा—

‘स एव प्राणिति प्राणी प्रीतेन कुपितेन च ।

वित्तैर्विपक्षरक्तैश्च प्रीणिता येन मर्म(र्ग)याः ॥’

इत्यादिप्रकारं सूत्रं परोपघातलक्षणदोषदुष्टम्, वीरसश्चायम् । ततोऽनेन उपघातलक्षणेन सूत्रदोषेण वीरसोऽत्र निर्वृत्तः । * * *
तपोदानविषयस्य वीरसस्य प्रशान्तादिरसानां कचिदवृत्तादिदोषान्तरेणापि निष्पत्तेरिति ।

In VI. 97, *Bharata* says that *Śṛṅgāra* is of three forms, caused by speech (*Vāk*), dress (*Nepathya*), and physical action (*Kriyā*), [Vol. XI, Part ii.]

and Hāsyā and Kaudrā also have these three forms. But why should he restrict these three forms to Śṛṅgārā, Hāsyā and Kaudrā only? These three, speech, dress and action, form the three Abhinayas, Vācika, Ālārya and Āṅgika. The Sāttvika comes under the last. All Rasas are roused by these three Abhinayas. See Māṭṛgopā says:—

रसस्तु त्रिविधा वाचिक-नेपथ्य-स्वभावज्ञाः ।

रसानुरूपैरात्मैः श्रेयैर्विद्वद्भिः पदैस्तथा ।

नानालंकारसंयुक्तैः वाचिको रस इष्यते ॥

कर्मरूपवशोनातिदेशकालानुवर्तिभिः ।

माल्यभूषणवस्त्राद्यैः नेपथ्यरस इष्यते ॥

रूपवीदनलवप्यस्वैर्यथैवादिभिर्गुणैः ।

रसः स्वाभाविको ज्ञेयः स च नात्ये प्रशस्यते ॥

Quoted by Rāghavabhaṭṭa in his Śāk. Vyā.

In another connection, *ibid.* while describing the Samavakāra type of drama, Bharata speaks of three other kinds of Śṛṅgārā, Dharma Śr., Artha Śr. and Kāma Śr.

त्रिविधाकृतिः शृङ्गारः ज्ञेयो धर्मार्थकामकृतः । N. S., XX.

Kāśī. Edn. Śls. 76-79; See also the Nāṭyadarpaṇa, p. 125.

Bhoja postulates a Śṛṅgārā for each Puruṣārtha and relates the resulting four Śṛṅgārās with the four types of heroes, Dhīrodatta, Dhīroddhata, Dhīralabha and Dhīraśānta. Of this, I have spoken fully in the chapter on Rasa in my Ph. D. thesis on Bhoja's Śṛṅgārakāśa.

C

Are all Rasas pleasurable or are there some which are painful?

This is a very important question into which it is not possible to go completely in this paper. It relates to the very theory of the concept of Rasa which is, strictly speaking, out of the scope of this paper. While dealing with Haripāla's new and separate Rasa of Vipralambha, it was pointed out that the Rasakalikā of Rudrabhaṭṭa also considers Vipralambha as standing in the way of accepting Rati as a purely pleasurable state and that as a matter of fact, Rasa is both, some being pleasurable and some painful.

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“कठणामयानामप्युपादेयत्वं सामानिकानाम्, रसस्य सुखदुःखात्मकतय ।
तदुभयलक्षणत्वेन उपपद्यते । अत एव तदुभयजनकत्वम् ।

Rasakalika, Mad. Ms., pp. 51-52.

This question takes us straight into the greater one, why do we see and how do we enjoy a tragedy ? What is the relish in Karuṇa ? This problem, which is still to be solved even in Western literary criticism, cannot be undertaken for discussion here. True, Rhoja also says:—

रसा हि सुखदुःखावधारूपाः ।

Vol. II, Mad. Ms., Sp. Pra., p. 369.

But he evidently means here the Laukika bhāva, to which the term Rasa is applied by extension. The Nāṭyadarpapā also says in Ś. 109 (p. 158): सुखदुःखात्मको रसः and proceeds to elaborate prove in the Vṛtti that some Rasas are certainly painful and that our seeing them and enjoying them is really due to the excellence of the art of either the dramatist or of the art of the actors. (p. 159.)

The majority of the writers do not accept this view at all which misses the distinction between Laukika bhāva and the Rasa. All the Rasas are, considered uniformly and to an equal extent, pleasurable. But it is noteworthy that a writer like Madhusūdanasarasvatī should hold the view that among Rasas, there is a difference of bliss. — He adopts the Sāṅkhyan scheme of three guṇas, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas: Only Sattva can make a Sthāyīn and Rasa. In Krodha which is Rājasa and Śoka which is Tāmasa, only a shred of Sattva exists, only so much as to make them Sthāyīns and give them the blissfulness of Rasa, but this blissfulness or enjoyability is naturally meagre in Krodha and Śoka. Therefore all Rasas cannot be relished in the same measure. He says in his Bhaktirasāyana:—

“—द्रवीभावस्य सत्त्वधर्मत्वात्, तं विना च स्थायिभावासंभवात्,
सत्त्वगुणस्य च सुखरूपत्वात्, सर्वेषां भावानां सुखमयत्वेऽपि रजस्तमोऽशमिश्र-
णात् तारतम्यमवगन्तव्यम् । अतो न सर्वेषु रसेषु तुल्यसुखानुभवः ।” p. 22.

“ कोपशोकमवादीनां साक्षात्सुखविरोधिनान् ।

रसत्वमप्युपगतं तथानुभवमावृतः ॥ ” II-79.

After saying this on the basis of the Sāṅkhya, Madhusūdanasarasvatī discusses the question from the Vedāntic standpoint [Vol. XI, Part II.]

also. All bliss is of the form of Brahmananda, for bliss is the form of the Brahman. This however does not militate against mundane things also being blissful, for it is said in the Upaniṣad:—
एतस्यैव आनन्दस्य अन्य आनन्दा मावाप्तुर्वाच्यन्ति.

Though literary enjoyment is superior to mundane enjoyment, it still is not on a par with Brahmasvāda. (I, 10-14.) Compared to Brahmasvāda, Kāvya-rasāsvāda is Laukika. A similar view is propounded by Śāradātanaya also. See Bhāvaprakāśa, Intro. pp. 39-40; pp. 52-3 G.O.S. Edn. But among literary Rasas also, the Śānta and Bhakti are on a par with Brahmasvāda, for there it is the Paramātmā and Bhagavān themselves that are involved in them as Sthāyin and Ālambana. The Advaitic approach is seen in full in Ch. III, where Madhusūdanasarasvatī discards his previous Sāṅkhyan conclusion that Rasa is varying in degree in its bliss and says expressly that though, in the world, the Bhāvas are of the forms of Sukha, Duhkha and Moha, their counterparts in the Kāvya and in the hearts of the spectator, are all of the form of bliss only.

बोध्यनिष्ठा वशास्वे ते सुखदुःखादिहेतवः ।

बोद्धुनिष्ठास्तु सर्वेऽपि सुखमात्रैकहेतवः ॥ 5.

Sattva begins to spread and dominate as the sole Vṛtti of the Antahkarana and Rasa is then manifested.

समूहालम्बनात्मेका जायते सात्त्विकी मतिः ॥

सान्तरक्षणेऽवश्यं व्यनक्ति सुखमुत्तमम् । III, 12-13.

(To be Continued.)

MAÑIMEKHALAI'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDIAN LOGIC

BY

PANDIT N. AIYASWAMI SASTRI.

Thanks to the painstaking efforts of Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. V. Swaminatha Aiyar Avl., a veteran Tamil scholar of wide reputation, a Tamil classic called Mañimekhalai was unearthed and put in print critically and scientifically. And we are indebted to the same doctor for his learned annotations added to every page of the poem without which (annotations) the whole poem becomes hardly intelligible to us. Chap. XXIX of it is mainly concerned with the pure logical theories of the Buddhists. The learned editor after calling for information on the subject from some Sanskrit and Pāli scholars and not obtaining sufficient data for the similar annotations left the logical portions of the Chapter unannotated. It was then Dr. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar who made a first attempt to render it into English, advanced and still now holds, a theory that the logical doctrine of the Mañimekhalai was of the pre-Dīnāga period from which Dīnāga derived inspiration for his logic. But on the other hand Profs. H. Jacobi and Mahāmahopādhyāya S. Kuppaswami Sastriḡal, both of them independently, pointed out that the logical theories of the poem were based upon the Nyāyapraveśa and therefore belonged to the post-Dīnāga period. And especially MM. Prof. S. Kuppaswami Sastriḡal in his learned paper published in the J. O. R. M., Vol. I, part III has shown in parallel columns the remarkable coincidences between Mañimekhalai (=MMK.) and Nyāyapraveśa (=NP.) and strengthened his point. Again, of late, Mr. Tiru Narayana Aiyangar, editor of the *Sen Tamil*, Madras, has made detailed studies in Tamil and compared MMK. and NP. An impartial and comparative study of the two texts will lead us to conclude that they not only agree in the main principles but do so verbatim, in the major portion as well. We may in this connection, read with advantage, the learned paper of MM. Prof. S. K. Sastriḡal above referred to. We cannot, therefore, resist the natural conclusion that MMK.

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was written in a period posterior to NP, so far as the logical portions of the Chap. XXIX are concerned.

But Dr. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar has strongly objected to place MMK. in the post-NP. period on two historical grounds as follows: "The first is that the author of MMK. is demonstrably a contemporary of *acchuttayan* Chēraṅ, and of his younger brother *Ilango*, the author of the *Śāhappadikāram*. That is a fact of history which it would be difficult to call in question. The second is that at the time to which the work refers which is undoubtedly the time of the author, Kāñcī was not under the Pallavas, nor under the *Tondaimān* chieftain, *Ilan Tiraiyan*, but under the princely viceroys of the Chola family." (See Prof. S. K. Aiyangar's MMK., p. 10.) "No princely viceroy of the Cola was possible in Kāñcī after A. D. 300, from which period we have a continuous succession of Pallava rulers holding sway in the region" (Introduction XXVII). Therefore, says Prof. Aiyangar, "no conclusion can be accepted which does not satisfy this condition primarily" (pp. 106-7). Relying upon these data, he draws the conclusion that MMK.'s treatment of the subject marks a stage of transition and it belongs to the pre-Diñnāga period. In favour of this view he sets forth the following three points:

(1) MMK. accepts only two *pramāṇas*, viz. *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, others being capable of inclusion in the second, and 'others' here refers to four *pramāṇas* out of six mentioned in Chap. XXVII as current at the time and applicable to the six systems, 'whereas Diñnāga seems to have no such qualms and actually deals with the four *pramāṇas* of the Naiyāyikas, retains the first two and rejects the other two, after examination, positively'. (2) With regard to the members of the syllogism also MMK. marks a stage of transition. It mentions five members and accepts the first three and considers the other two as being capable of inclusion in the third; while in the case of Diñnāga there is nothing like the rejection of the last two. (3) And again Diñnāga treats of *svārtha* and *parārtha* forms of *anumāna* and after a serious discussion concludes that the latter is included in the former. MMK. on the other hand does not consider it necessary to discuss the latter at all.

Now we shall see whether the points above summarised will really support his view. With regard to the first point Dr.

S. K. Aiyangar is wrong in the statement that Dīnāga retains the first two *pramāṇas* and rejects the other two positively. When he rejects a *pramāṇa* as such, it ought to be taken as included in one or other *pramāṇa* accepted as valid even if it is not so mentioned in a particular place. For, the method of rejection would be incomplete without the method of inclusion, though the latter method may vary with the different authors and different schools. Dīnāga also, therefore, has expressly stated in his *Nyāya-mukha* (Tucci's translation, p. 50) that the *pramāṇas* are only two, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, and others, *śabda*, *upamāna* etc. are included in these two. Keśava Miśra, a logician of the 10th century A.D., has also stated in his manual,¹ *Tarkabhāṣā* to this effect that there are only four *pramāṇas* and the other two *pramāṇas* are included in one or other of the former four, that is to say *arthāpatti* in the *vyatireka-anumāna* and *anupalabdhi* in the *abhāvapratyakṣa*. Similar statements may be found in all the *Nyāya* works of the still later period (See e.g. *Kārikāvallī*, 144 with *Muktāvallī* and *Tarkasamgrahadīpikā*, *Śabdapariচ্ছেদা*, *ad finem*). Therefore neither the method of rejection nor that of inclusion nor both combined could be said to be peculiar features of a particular author or period. It is to be pointed out here that Dr. Aiyangar's interpretation of the passage Chap. XXVII, ll. 78-85 is not admissible. According to his interpretation all the six *pramāṇas* enumerated in the lines 83-85 are applicable to the six systems mentioned in the lines 78-80. We, therefore, take it for granted that he meant thereby a Buddhist system which admitted of six *pramāṇas*. There have been amongst the Buddhists some authors who have advocated the first four *pramāṇas*, (See e.g. *Vigrahasyāvarṇani* and *Upāyahrdaya*) and some others, viz. a sect of *Yogācāras* represented by *Maitreya Asaṅga*, *Sthiramati* and others, who have held the three i.e. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*. But no author is known to us in the history of Buddhism, who held six *pramāṇas*. Therefore the passage in question should be interpreted in a way which will not go against the current opinion thus: the *Lokāyatikas* are advocates of one *pramāṇa*, *pratyakṣa*, the Buddhists of *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and so on—an interpretation which has been pointed out by the editor himself. One wonders how the learned professor found his way to interpret that passage in a manner

1. *Nirṇayasagar* edn., 1894, pp. 29-30.

above noted in the presence of the express statement of the Chap. XXIX, ll. 47-8 to the effect that there are only two *pramāṇas* according to Ādiśaṃdra. Moreover the professor seems to have laid special emphasis on the line 'only these *pramāṇas* are accepted at the present time', (Chap. XXVII, 85) which led him to interpret the word 'others' in Chap. XXIX, l. 55 as referring to the four out of the six *pramāṇas* mentioned previously and to draw a sharp distinction between the position of MMK. and that of Dinnāga in respect of the treatment of the 'other' *pramāṇas*, *viz.* according to the former other *pramāṇas* are four and capable of inclusion in the *anumāna*; while in the case of the latter 'others' are two and rejected positively. That Dinnāga rejected other two *pramāṇas* positively, *i. e.* without making any effort to account for them in his own system is a sheer misconception of the fact. True, Dinnāga dealt with the four *pramāṇas* of the Naiyāyikas, accepting the first two and including the other two in one or other of the accepted ones; still it does not follow that at the time of Dinnāga only four *pramāṇas* were current and not six as Prof. Aiyangar, I suppose, seems to have assumed. Dinnāga treated of the four *pramāṇas* only and not apparently the last two also, *viz.* *śabda* and *āpamāna*; because he did not probably think it necessary to repeat the same arguments raised by the Naiyāyikas to disprove their value, and not because these two *pramāṇas* were not in vogue amongst the philosophical disputants of the time. The advocates of six *pramāṇas* are Mimāṃsakas, particularly Bhāṭṭas, and there is no reason to doubt that the Mimāṃsā school of thought had, from the time of its rise down to a very recent date, earned for itself a considerable number of able advocates in succession and without any interruption, who maintained six *pramāṇas*. Prof. Aiyangar himself has pleaded for the view that Jaimini, the author of *Mimāṃsā Sūtras*, accepted six *pramāṇas*. We have, therefore, to take the word 'others' to mean what *pramāṇas* Dinnāga meant and that *pramāṇas* might be four or more than that, if Dinnāga meant so.

As regards the second point I have to make the following observations. It is well-known that the Naiyāyikas have admitted the five-membered syllogism. Some old Buddhist authors also are known to have adopted the five-membered type of syllogism; *e. g.* Nāgārjuna, Maitreya, Asaṅga and Śhīramati, etc. But Dinnāga and his successors are generally believed to have adopted the three-membered syllogism. The Mimāṃsakas have

also adopted the same type. The reason why the three-membered syllogism was adopted is that the last two members, *upanaya* and *nyāyama*, can be included in one or other of the first three, viz. *upanaya* in the second, *hetu* and *nyāyama* in the first; *pratijñā* is vice versa. The three-membered syllogism, therefore, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, consists of *pratijñā*, *hetu* and *vilāharāga* or *vilāharama*, *upanaya* and *nyāyama*. When they hold the former alternative, the last two members should be taken to be merely an extension of the third member, *vilāharāga* and therefore not separate members of the syllogism. Exactly the same view is, I think, intended in the passage of MMK.: தீபம் எரிவது காரணம் நெருக்கித் தீட்டல் ஊதலே காரணமாதலும், which I take to mean the *upanaya* and *nyāyama*, [since] they are extensions [of *vilāharāga*] are connected with it and [therefore] included [in it]. Closely examining further, we find that Dinnāga has reduced the syllogism to two members, major premise, *vilāharāga* and minor premise, *upanaya*, the conclusion, *nyāyama* which is the same as thesis, *pakṣa* being implied in the latter. The full form of his syllogism may be represented as follows:—

(1) Major premise. Wheresoever there is smoke there is also fire, e. g. in the kitchen where both are present, or in the tank (*iraḍa*) where there is no smoke, because there is no fire.

(2) Minor premise and conclusion combined. There is here such smoke indicating the presence of fire.

(Th. Stcherbatsky, *Bod. Log.*, Vol. II, p. 110, n. 3.)

The thesis or conclusion, therefore, according to Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti is not and need not be expressed as a separate member of syllogism. (*Nyāyabindu* II, 36-38 with *Tikā*.) Still there is nothing incongruous for them, says Dharmottara, to define what they hold a sound thesis in order to remove the misconception held by the opponent about it. (NB. *Tikā* ad II, 40.) This is the reason why we find the three-membered syllogism mentioned in the works like NP. Kumāralabhāṭṭa on the other hand insists on the necessity of formulating the thesis as a separate member of the syllogism (*Ślokaṅgā*, *Anumāna*, 54). MMK. seems to have favoured the three-membered syllogism like Mīmāṃsakas and this is a point of difference between MMK. and NP. a point which we shall have occasion to speak of. Therefore Dr. Aiyangar has not well understood the real position of Dinnāga in making the statement in regard to the second point.

As to the validity of the third point, it is not known where Diñnāga considers *parārthānumāna* to be included in *svārthānumāna*. True, the *parārthānumāna* is not a separate *pramāṇa*; still it is not at all considered to be brought under *svārthānumāna* as Dr. Aiyangar has contended. And it is obviously incorrect to say that MMK. does not discuss *parārthānumāna* at all. For, though it does not divide *numāna* into two and say what is *svārthānumāna* and what is *parārthānumāna* in express terms, yet they are no doubt spoken of. The former is implied when MMK. speaks of *numāna* and divides it into three, *kāraṇa*, *kārya* and *sādhūya*, and the latter is meant when *pakṣahetudrṣṭāntas* with various types of fallacies are described. Thus the points which are raised by Prof. S. K. Aiyangar to substantiate his contention are unsustainable.

Since there are close correspondences, verbal and otherwise, between NP. and MMK. as remarked above, we are naturally led to the conclusion that the logical portions of MMK. were written in the post-Diñnāga period and based upon NP. Moreover what seems more objectionable to place MMK. in the pre-Diñnāga period is that MMK. has, like NP., adopted nine types of fallacy of thesis (*pakṣa*) of which the four, according to Chinese authorities, were added by Śaṅkarasvāmin, a direct disciple of Diñnāga. Nor have we any decisive evidence to discard this Chinese tradition. That NP. is the work of Śaṅkarasvāmin and not of Diñnāga is established on reasonable grounds by Prof. Tucci—a conclusion which it is difficult to call in question. As Diñnāga is believed to be a younger contemporary of Vasubandhu whose date is taken to be proved as 350 A. D., the date of Śaṅkarasvāmin and his work NP. may be fixed as 400 A.D. and therefore MMK. cannot be pushed back beyond A. D. 450, so far as its logical portion is concerned. But this date of MMK. will come into direct conflict with the two historical grounds of Prof. S. K. Aiyangar above mentioned, relying upon which he seems to have dated the poem from 200 A. D. The events contained in the poem may be as old as 200 A. D. It is, however, doubtful, as Prof. A. B. Dhruva puts it,¹ whether the time to which the poem refers was actually the time of the author. It may be useful to bear in mind here that the mythological evidences of the poem too go against such an antiquity

1. Nyāyapraveśa, Introduction, p. 15 (?)

of it as Prof. Aiyangar has assumed. (See K. V. Ramachandran, Age of MMK., J. O. R. M., Vol. II, p. 220, ff.)

Though the author of MMK. has, as I believe, taken NP, as a source for his logical theories, yet it is not to be understood that he composed these logical portions on the strict model of NP, and followed it blindly. But on the other hand he has presented them in his own way that may be intelligible to his readers. Therefore there are differences of some importance between the two texts and these differences may be noted here in order.

MMK. begins with the consideration of the two *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, like the Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti; while NP, commences with *sādhyanavākya*, syllogism, i.e. *parārthānumāna*, like the Nyāyamukha of Dinnāga.

The inference, i.e. *svārthānumāna*, is divided in MMK. into three, *kāraṇa*, *kārya* and *sāmānya*, whereas no such discussion is found in NP.

Then follows in MMK. a long discussion regarding the five members of the syllogism with illustrations and their validity. It is maintained in MMK. that a complete syllogism has only three members, and that the last two members, *upanaya*, *niṣamāna* are not separate members but only an extension of the third member, *udāharana*, following, I think, the Mīmāṃsikas here. The last line of the discussion should be interpreted in a manner already pointed out. This long discussion has no parallel in NP.

The full text of the above discussion is as follows:—

There¹ are [five members of syllogism] called *pakṣa*, *hetu*, *dṛṣṭānta*, *upanaya* and *niṣamāna*. Of these the *pakṣa* is: this mountain has fire. *Hetu*: because it has smoke. *Dṛṣṭānta*: like a well-equipped kitchen. *Upanaya*: mountain also has smoke. *Niṣamāna*: because it has smoke, it has fire. Whatever has no fire has no smoke, like a tank. This is a *vaidharmya dṛṣṭānta*, since it expresses the exclusion [of fire and smoke] from an appropriate negative example (*vipakṣa*). In the case of a pure *kārya* having the nature of a reason, the *pakṣa* is: sound is non-eternal; *pakṣadharmavacana*: because it is the product [of

1. In translating this and the following extracts of MMK, I have consulted Prof. S. K. Aiyangar's translations but not adopted them for the present purpose.

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an effort]; *sapaksādyānta*: whatever is a product is non-eternal, like a pot; *vipaksādyānta*: whatever is not non-eternal is not a product, like ether. A negative concomitance, by itself, becomes proof (*pramāṇa*) when a positive one is not possible; for instance, there is no pot in this open place; [this is *pakṣa*], because the *pakṣa* (i.e. the pot) is not perceived, this is *pakṣādūratavastava*. A horn of the hare is an apt affirmative example (*sapakṣa*) when the non-existence is [to be proved]. Were it existent, it would have been perceived like myrrabolam in [our] hand. This is an appropriate model of negative example (*vipakṣa*). The reason of this type would prove the thing [to be proved]. But what does the smoke, *kārya* [*luṭu*] prove? One may answer that the smoke establishes the fire by means of a positive concomitance, viz. there is fire where there is smoke, and also by means of a negative concomitance, viz. there is no smoke where there is no fire. If [we accept that] a positive concomitance [alone] establishes [the *prabandam*]; e.g. since the smoke, with darkness that is proceeding straight from it and going upwards spirally is the effect of fire; one seeing something dark and smoky in the sky, necessarily establishes fire; then a person once meets an ass and hetera as co-existing (*anṛaya*) in a place and afterwards when he comes across the ass, he should at once infer the hetera. This will never be possible. If, however, one argues [merely] on the basis of a negative concomitance i.e.—there is no smoke where there is no fire; then one, not seeing in the mane of an ass the tail of dog, also does not see the tail of fox and thereby he is to infer the tail of the dog [by seeing] the tail of fox in another place;—an inference which is absurd. This argument is also not possible. *Upanaya* and *nigamaṇa*, [since they] are extensions [of *adāharoma*], are connected with it and [therefore] they are included [in it] (ll. 57—110).

The definition of thesis (*pakṣa*) in MMK. does not agree with that of NP. It runs in MMK. thus:—It is a valid proposition which comprises a *dharmin* well-known [to both parties] and a well-known *sādhyadharmā*, endowed with the concomitance of negation (செஞ்சு செறுபட்டினை) and which rests upon a law [of concomitance] that could exhibit [invariably the existence of] the *prabandam*, *sādhyadharmā* in itself, [i.e. *dharmin*]; e.g. to prove one of the two alternatives, viz. sound is non-eternal or it is eternal, is the same, [i.e. a valid proposition]. Here sound is *dharmin*. Eternal or non-eternal is *sādhyadharmā* (ll. 113-121).

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NP. पक्षः प्रसिद्धो धर्मी प्रसिद्धविशेषणविशिष्टतया स्वयं साध्य-
त्वेनेप्सितः ।

Note. Here MMK. seems to have taken the term *pakṣa* in the sense of a proposition or a thesis and not in the sense of a *dharman* combined with a *dharma* as defined in Dīnāga's works and NP.

MMK. describes *hetu*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* in a manner similar to that of NP. but does not define *vipakṣa*.

The two kinds of example, positive and negative, are explained in MMK. thus:—The faultless example is of two types, *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya*. What is *sādharmya* is to mention in the form of a positive concomitance, a non-eternal pot, etc. The *vaidharmya* example is [to say] that there is no *probans* where the *probandum* is not (II. 136-141).

MMK. has nothing corresponding to the following passages of NP. :—

(१) यत्र हेतोः सपक्ष एवास्तित्वं कुर्याप्यते । (२) तच्चया यन्नित्यं तदकृतकं दृष्टे यथाकाशम् । (३) नित्यशब्देनात्र अनित्यत्वस्याभाव उच्यते । अकृतकशब्देनापि कृतकत्वस्याभावः यथा भावामावोऽभाव इति ।

Note. Of these three passages, the third indicates that the author of NP. was undoubtedly a Sautrāntika, because it is Sautrāntikas who maintain the three *asapakṣatadharmanas*, *ākāśa* and two *nirodhas* to be mere negations of something else and not separate entities as Vaiśbhāṣikas hold. Therefore according to Sautrāntikas there is no such thing as could be called *akṛtaka* and *nitya*. Since that important passage of NP. has no counterpart in MMK. the author of the latter appears to have not shared the opinion held by NP. in regard to *nitya* and *akṛtaka*.

NP. has a small paragraph (p. 2 ll. 7-12):—

एषां वचनानि एतान्येव त्रयोऽवयवा इत्युच्यन्ते ।

which MMK. seems to have summarised in one line:—These [items, *pakṣa*, *hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta*] as above described are associated with a good syllogism (I. 1+2).

With regard to the description of the nine varieties of *pakṣa-bhāsa* MMK. and NP. agree with each other except for some differences in the following points.

MMK. The erroneous proposition, erroneous reason and erroneous example are called respectively *pakṣābhāsa*, *hetvābhāsa* and *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* (ll. 143-146).

NP. साधयितुमिष्टोऽपि प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धः पक्षमासः ।

MMK. *Lokavirodha* is what is reverse of the opinion of the people at large; e.g. *madi* (= *śaśi*) is not moon (*na candraḥ*) [ll. 162-3].

NP. यथा शुचिनरशिरःकपाले प्राण्यन्नत्वाद् शङ्खशुक्तिवद् इति ।

Note. It is to be pointed out here that according to MMK, *lokavirodha* is the equivalent of *sarvalokaprasiddhavirodha* of Kumārila and of *prasiddhavirodha* of Dīnaṅga, who gives the same example. शशी न चन्द्रः सत्त्वाद् । (See *Nyāyamukha*, p. 7.)

NP. seems to have understood the term *lokavirodha* in the sense of *sarvāgamavirodha*, just like Bhāmaha who explains it clearly to that effect and gives a similar example:—

सर्वशास्त्रविरुद्धत्वाद् सर्वानामविरोधिनी । यथा शुचिस्तनुः etc.

MMK. *Āgamavirodha*—To speak of what is non-eternal as eternal is contrary to the scripture on the part of the Vaiśeṣikas who advocate the non-eternity [of all things] (ll. 164-6).

NP. वैशेषिकस्य नित्यः शब्द इति ।

MMK. *Aprasiddhasāmbandha* is to prove a fact recognised by one's own opponent; e.g. [suppose] one seeks to prove to a Buddhist that sound is non-eternal; and as the latter holds the same opinion, it is unnecessary [for the former] to prove it again (ll. 186-190).

NP. प्रसिद्धसंक्थो यथा आवणः शब्द इति ।

Note. The reading in MMK. is *aprasiddha* instead of *prasiddha* of NP. *Prasiddha* is explained in the *Vṛtti*:—

वादिप्रतिवादिनोरविप्रतिपत्त्या स्थितः ।

Aprasiddha is interpreted in MMK. 'edirikku iśainda', i.e. 'recognised by one's own opponent'. So *prasiddha* of NP. and *aprasiddha* of MMK. appear to mean the same thing. To read in MMK. *prasiddha* for *aprasiddha* is said to be open to the objection that the metre would be affected. How could *aprasiddha* mean *prasiddha*? *Abhāva* does not at all mean *bhāva*. It seems to me that *aprasiddha* of MMK. is not a pure Sanskrit word but a Tamil-Sanskrit one i.e. 'a' a Tamil particle meaning

'*avay*'—*ediri*—opponent, plus *prasiddha*—*iśāinda*—recognised. Such a Tamil-Sanskrit compound word is not rare in the Tamil literature. A similar instance may be cited here, viz. the word '*āputra*' which is found in MMK. itself and explained 'son (*putra*) of a cow'. But why the author should introduce such a compound word here is difficult to explain satisfactorily. It seems to me, however, that the author did so in harmony with the names of the three preceding fallacies of *pakṣa*, which begin with '*aprasiddha*' and for the sake of pun in words. Mr. Tiru Narayana Aiyangar suggests the reading '*aprasiddhāsambandha*' for '*aprasiddha*'. The suggestion, though ingenious, will come into conflict with the explanation of the text '*edirikkū iśāinda*'.

Then MMK. speaks of 14 varieties of the fallacy of reason at length and agrees generally with NP. Yet some points of difference may be cited here also.

MMK. *anyāta asiddha* is to deny (*aggrāye[ida]*) a reason put forward by one's opponent; e.g. sound is non-eternal, because product of effort (*Seyalagan*). If one argues like this, it will not be an established fact (*asiddha*) for a Sāṅkhya who holds that sound is eternal but stands unmanifested, and denies its being a product of effort (ll. 198-202).

NP. तत्र शब्दानिवृत्ते साध्ये कृतकत्वमिति शब्दाभिव्यक्तिवादिनं प्रत्यन्वतरासिद्धः ।

Note. It is to be observed that MMK. reads *anyāta asiddha* for *anyatardasiddha* of NP.—a reading which ought to be corrected in accordance with NP. and that MMK. is clearer than NP. in the explanation of the point.

MMK. *Siddhāsiddha* is to establish [the *prebāudam*] through a doubtful reason; e.g. it is the case when one, seeing something [in the sky] which cannot be determined whether vapour or mist, assumes it to be a real smoke and ventures to prove the fire through that assumption of the smoke (ll. 203-206).

NP. वाष्पादिभावेन सन्दिग्धमानो भूतसङ्घातोऽग्निसिद्धानुपदिश्यमानः सन्दिग्धासिद्धः ।

Note. MMK. has *siddhāsiddha* for *sandigdghāsiddha* of NP., but both the terms mean the same thing.

Similarly the 5th fallacy of the inconclusive reason in MMK. bears the name *ubhayaikaadeśavṛtti* for *ubhaya-pakṣaikaadeśavṛtti* in NP.

MMK. *Viruddha* [a] *vyabhicārin* is a reason that can never function rightly as *praband* and always admits of a contradictory *praband*; e.g. sound is non-eternal [because] it is produced by effort (*prayatnānūbhūtyā*). In this case the pot and others (*ghaṭādi*) [serve] as *ūpākṣā* [example] to [a] *pakṣa* having the character of a product of an effort. That being so, one argues against [it] that the sound is eternal, because it is heard [by us] like *śabdātva*. By virtue of these two contradictory reasons, the *praband* becomes doubtful and undetermined (*naikānta*) (ll. 267-274.)

NP. विरुद्धान्वयमिचारी यथा अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वात् घटवत् । नित्यः शब्दः प्रावणत्वात् शब्दत्ववत् इति । उभयोः संशयहेतुत्वात् द्वावप्येतावेकोऽनैकान्तिकः समुद्दितायेव ।

Note. It is interesting to compare MMK's interpretation of the term '*viruddha* [a] *vyabhicārin*' with the one adopted by Nyāyabinduṭṭikā and NP. Vṛtti. NBT. explains it thus:—

हेत्वन्तरसाधितस्य विरुद्धं [साध्यं] यत् तत्र व्यभिचरति स विरुद्धान्वयमिचारी । यदि वा विरुद्धसाधो साधनान्तरसिद्धस्य धर्मस्य विरुद्धसाधनात् अव्यभिचारी च स्वसाध्यव्यभिचारात् विरुद्धान्वयमिचारी (P. 80).

Without accepting the second alternative, NPV. gives the following explanation:—

अधिकृतहेत्वनुमेयविरुद्धासिद्धको विरुद्धः । विरुद्धं न व्यभिचरतीति विरुद्धान्वयमिचारी । MMK. appears to agree with the second interpretation of NBT.

MMK. *Dharmavācīparipartasūlhanā* is a reason set forth [by the opponent] to prove a certain *Sādhyā*, but it is vitiated by proving too much (*keṇu*); e.g. the organs like the eye and others, if examined, are found to be *parārtha*, for the use of others, because they are constituted by different parts like the bed and seat. If one argues like this, the reason 'being constituted by different parts' here employed, will prove the organs like the eye and others to be *parārtha* like the bed and seat. But the same reason places the *ātman* on a par with the body the possessor of the bed and seat, and could prove also that the *ātman*, like the body, possesses constituent parts. What is sought to be established is that the organs like the eye, etc. are intended to be used by the *ātman*, which in the opinion of the opponents, has no parts. (ll. 288-302).

NP. धर्मविशेषविपरीतसाधनो यथा परार्थश्चक्षुरादयः सङ्घातत्वात् शयनासनाद्यङ्गविशेषवत् इति । अयं हेतुः यथा परार्थं चक्षुरादीनां साधयति तथा सङ्घातत्वमपि परस्याग्रनः साधयति । उभयत्राव्यभिचारात् ।

Note. Here we see that MMK. is more easily intelligible and clearer in its explanation of the point than NP. and that this fallacy of reason is called *pratighāṭake* by Dharmakīrti. (See Nyāya-mukha, p. 36, n. 65.)

MMK. *Dharmavirūpaviparītasādhana* is a reason which leads to the *dharma* (*pakṣa*) itself being shown to be different in its nature from what it is maintained to be, e.g. being (*bhūva* = *sattā*) is neither *dravya*, nor *karma*, nor *guṇa*, because of the difference in respect of the distinctive feature (*vyaparīti* = *lakṣaṇa*) of a *dravya* or a *guṇa* or a *karma* like a particular generality (*sāmānyavīśeṣavat*). If one argues like that, the *hetu* relied upon cannot prove the *sādhya*—a generality common to *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma*, because there is no *dyṣṭānta* other than the particular generality (*sāmānyavīśeṣa*). Thus, the *prabāsa* reduces the *dharma*, being (*bhūva*) to non-being¹ (*abhāva*) (ll. 303-318).

NP. धर्मिस्वरूपविपरीतसाधनो यथा । न द्रव्यं न कर्म न गुणो भावः एकद्वयवत्त्वात् गुणकर्मसु च भावात् सामान्यविशेषवदिति । अयं हि हेतुः यथा द्रव्यादिप्रतिषेधं भावस्य साधयति । तथा भावस्याभावत्वमपि साधयति । उभयत्राव्यभिचारात् ।

Note. In this section MMK. and NP. agree in substance, though the details are specifically given only in NP.

MMK. *Dharmavirūpaviparītasādhana*, a reason which proves to be non-existent a particular feature of the *dharma*, e.g. the reason above adduced, in so far as it proves just the opposite of what is sought to be proved;—i.e. it proves the opposite of causing the idea of being, viz. causing the idea of non-being (ll. 319-324).

NP. धर्मविशेषविपरीतसाधनो यथा अयमेव हेतुरस्मिन्नेव पूर्वपक्षेऽस्यैव धर्मिणो यो विशेषः सप्रत्ययकृत्वं नाम तद्विपरीतमसप्रत्ययकृत्त्वमपि साधयति । उभयत्राव्यभिचारात् ।

1. I owe to my revered ācārya MM. Prof. S. Kuppaswami Sastrigal Avl. the correct interpretation of this difficult passage.

SOME LAWS OF DRAVIDIAN ETYMOLOGY

BY

REV. S. GNANA PRAKASAR, O.M.I.

Elsewhere I dealt with some aspects of the primary words or roots of what are known as Dravidian languages, chiefly in regard to Tamil, as their best representative¹. These are the simplest elements of speech expressing the most elementary notions the mind can conceive. And what are these notions? They consist in the perception of Form, that is to say, in distinguishing mentally the dimensions of a material thing in itself, or its being near to, far from, beneath or above other things. Elementary words correspond to this distinction which may be called that of Spatial Relation. Once we grant that all knowledge begins by distinguishing things, it follows that this distinguishing of objects one from another, or according to their qualities in themselves, resolves itself into the act of noting whether a thing is far or near, above or beneath another thing; or, again, whether a thing is long or short, straight or crooked, high or low, hard or soft—etc.—etc. This is Spatial Relation. Spiritual and metaphysical distinctions themselves follow the analogy of material and sensible things. Now, early man could have easily signified to his fellows the distinction of one object from another or its relative dimensions by gesticulations, just as we see people doing in a pantomime. We know that gesticulations are demonstrative or pointing-out signs made by various movements of the limbs, the face &c. But, by his superior intelligence, man was able to devise a more perfect medium for pointing out the distinctions in things, than his limbs would have furnished him with. This was articulate voice. He adapted his voice to the marking off of the different aspects of things, and this resulted in the use of the four deictics or demonstrative vowels *a*, *u*, *i* and *e*, for representing Proximity, Remoteness, Depth and Height and other correlated ideas, respectively. The deictics,

1. The *Anthropos*, Vol. XXX, pp. 135 & seq.

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however, were too vague by themselves; and, therefore, other sounds, more emphatic because of their various degrees of obstruction in the organs of speech, were dexterously harnessed. These were the consonants which served to render those vague vowel sounds more definite, thus forming the first words of language. This, in brief, is the theory of Dravidian primary roots.

It will be useful to give here at once a tentative list of all the Dravidian primary roots. Their actual number may not be many more.

1. *a*=idea of Proximity

ak, to get near, to contract

ad, to be near

an, to be close together

at, to approach, to belong to

ap, to adhere

am, to press down, to immerse

ay, to be in the neighbourhood

ar, to approach, to flow down

al, to knit together

av, to get near, reach for

al, to press, to burn

al, to be close

ar, to fasten, to diminish

ag, to touch, to approach

2. *u*=idea of Remoteness or
being Hidden from
view

uk, to start away, exert

ud, to get inside

un, to draw in, call

ut, to give a push, to be at a
distance

up, to expand, rise high

um, to emit, to discharge

uy, to escape, to drive away

ur, increase, to shout out

ul, to turn round, to be spent

uv, to expand, to soar high

ul, to turn inwards, to plunge in

ul, to get inside, to be within, to
exist, to be hidden

ur, to fit into a hole, to be per-
manent

ug, to propel, enter into oneself

3. *i*=idea of being Beneath

ik, to go down

id, to lay down, to place

ir, to bring down, fall in with

im, to diminish

iy, to go down, to move

ir, to lower, to be, to flow down

il, to slip away, not to be

il, to go down, to pull down,
to insert

il, to abate

ir, to drop down, lay aside,
descend

ig, to be brought low

4. *e*=idea of being Above

ek, to go up, throw up

ed, to raise, take up

en, to pick out, count

<i>ei</i> , to rise up	<i>ei</i> , to arise
<i>ey</i> , to raise up, to shoot	<i>ey</i> , to throw up
<i>er</i> , to send up as flames	<i>ey</i> , to raise the voice, speak

It will be seen that the four ideas of Proximity, Remoteness, being Beneath and being Above form the respective themes of the four groups. These ideas, vaguely indicated by the deictics *a*, *u*, *i* and *e*, are made distinct and differentiated by the formatives attached to them.

Once in possession of the elementary words giving names to a number of the most ordinary objects and actions, it was in the nature of human ways not to trouble about creating entirely new words as occasions arose for naming other analogous things, but to modify the already existing forms so as to meet the new needs. This was, doubtless, a slow process following the physiological trend of the people among whom it took place—hence the regularity to be observed in the evolution of derivatives from primitive forms. The principles deduced from such uniform evolution within the Dravidian family of language may be called the Laws of Dravidian etymology. A study of these Laws will put us in possession of the necessary clues to the disentangling and laying bare of the primitive forms, that is to say, the roots of almost the entire vocabulary of Tamil and its sister dialects. This study will also throw abundant light on the true etymology of the Indo-European languages which will be shown in a subsequent paper to be radically related to an ancient phase of the Dravidian speech.

I shall now proceed to enumerate and explain the principal Laws of Dravidian etymology.

LAW 1:—*Sense-differentiating Enunciatives or
Verbal Determinatives.*

Enunciatives are vowels suffixed to consonants for the facility of pronunciation. The Dravidian is quite fond of them. "The chief peculiarity of primitive Dravidian syllabation" says Caldwell, "is its extreme simplicity and dislike of compound or concurrent consonants; and this peculiarity characterises Tamil, the most early cultivated member of the family, in a more mark-

ed degree than any other Dravidian language. In Telugu, Canarese and Malayalam the great majority of Dravidian words, i.e., words which have not been derived from Sanskrit or altered through Sanskrit influences, and in Tamil all words without exception, including even Sanskrit derivatives, are divided into syllables on the following plan. Double or treble consonants at the beginning of syllables, like 'str' in 'strength' are altogether inadmissible. At the beginning not only of the first syllable of every word, but also of every succeeding syllable, only one consonant is allowed. If, in the middle of a word of several syllables, one syllable ends with a consonant and the succeeding one commences with another consonant, the concurrent consonants must be euphonicallly assimilated or else a vowel must be inserted between them. At the conclusion of a word, double and treble consonants, like 'gth' in 'strength', are just as inadmissible as at the beginning; and every word must terminate in Telugu and Canarese in a vowel; in Tamil either in a vowel or in a single semi-vowel, as 'l', or 'r', or in a single nasal as 'n' or 'm'. Malayalam resembles Tamil in this, but evinces a more decided preference for vowel terminations".¹

The insertion of a vowel between the combination of consonants difficult to pronounce is a phenomenon to be found in the ancient forms of other languages too. Thus, the Greek *hebdomos* stands for *hebdomos*, 'a week'. In some hymns of the R̥gveda we find *Indara* for *Indra*, *larasata* for *tarasata*, etc. It is this tendency which is exemplified in the modern Chinese *Ki-li-ase-lu* for our Christ! That something similar to the syllabation we have in Dravidian was the rule with many original word-forms seems to be a fact capable of being established by a considerable array of examples. At a later stage, intervening vowels began to be suppressed probably in the hurry of finishing off words till a strong consonantal harshness was attained as in Sanskrit, German &c. Again, in accordance with the physiological peculiarities of different races, consonants brought together at one time were once more separated by even a different intervening vowel. Thus from the original secondary root *mar*, 'to disappear', Sanskrit produced a form *mṛ* which becomes *mṛti* as well as *marāṇa*. The same word is found in Latin as *mors*,

1. Comp. Gr. of Drav. lang., pp. 182-4.

'death'. This fact should be constantly borne in mind when examining the pre-ethnic relation between the Dravidian and Indo-European families of languages.

But this is a digression. We have spoken of enunciatives in general as vowels originally used for the facility of pronunciation. They may be called euphonic enunciatives. But there is a special class of enunciatives suffixed to verbal roots. These play an important part in differentiating the meaning of words. Dravidian primary words are essentially monosyllabic and are composed, as already pointed out, of a deictic indicating spatial relation in a vague way, and a consonant or formative fixing the sense in particular. Now, formatives which are hard to pronounce without the aid of a vowel have various enunciatives suffixed to them, with the result that different shades of the original sense are brought out. To these we may give the name of Sense-differentiating enunciatives or, better, Verbal Determinatives; for they are always found with verbs. Thus, the primary root *il*, composed of the deictic *i*, 'beneath', and the formative *l*, gives *il-u*, 'to drag down' by suffixing the verbal determinative *u*. The same root with the determinative *i* as *il-i* yields the sense of 'going down'. So, with the determinative *a* we have *il-a*, 'to let slip or lose'. With *ai*, there is again the verb *il-ai*, 'to inset, plant'. All these forms preserve the root *il* intact, whilst, by a change of the suffixed determinative, they present slightly different ideas, but always cognate with the original one.

It is not in one or two isolated cases that we have this sense-differentiation in early verbal forms by the change of determinatives. Almost every root which needs a final enunciative undergoes this change of suffix, in order to yield slightly different senses. To give two more examples taken at random:—

Root	Verbal determinative	Resultant form
<i>ul</i> , to get into, turn inwards	<i>n</i>	= <i>ul-n</i> , to turn round, dig up
	<i>i</i>	= <i>ul-i</i> , to wander about
	<i>a</i>	= <i>ul-a</i> , to experience sor- row
	<i>ai</i>	= <i>ul-ai</i> , to wander about
<i>ad</i> , to get near	<i>u</i>	= <i>ad-u</i> , to approach, join

<i>i</i>	= <i>ad-i</i> , to bring into contact, strike
<i>a</i>	= <i>ad-ar</i> , to be close together
<i>ai</i>	= <i>ad-ai</i> , to close up, reach, press round

Ad-ar, in the latter example, has a second formative *r* added to the verbal determinative. This will be explained under the third Law. It may be permitted here to observe that the final enunciatives of verbal roots seem to have become determinatives through their very deictic character. The deictics *u*, *i*, *a* and *ai* probably a modification of *e*, shewing Remoteness, being Beneath, being Near and being Above respectively, came to denote also motion Away or Within (i.e. hidden from view), motion Downwards, motion Near at hand and motion Upwards. The differentiation of verbal senses seems to have been in accordance with this scheme, originally, at any rate, although it is now difficult to see it clearly in every case. Thus, *ad-u*, with the deictic of motion Away, seems to denote going forward to reach an object; *ad-i* with that of motion Downwards, possibly refers to bringing down an object to meet another; *ad-ar*, with the deictic of motion Near at hand, seems to signify pressing near an object, while *ad-ai* indicates the idea of closing up.

Verbal determinatives are also employed in forming verbs out of nouns. Thus *lēḡ-i* 'to be sweet' is from *lēḡ*, 'honey', *Muṇ-val-i* 'to smile' from *muṇ-val* 'a smile'.

Cases of a similar sort of sense-differentiation, through change of the final enunciative, can also be detected in the Āryan family of languages. In Sanskrit, for instance, the root *mā*, to measure, is turned into *mī*, which signifies 'to diminish in quantity', and *mē*, 'to barter', 'exchange'. So *dhā*, 'to fix the mind upon', which becomes *dhi*, 'to think' and *dhyāi*, 'to imagine', 'contemplate'. The working of this Law is not always easily discerned in the Āryan languages, owing to the fact that in many cases, even the radical vowels of roots have dropped out in the mouths of peoples with a characteristic tendency to expedite pronunciation.

Law II: Variation of the Formative.

This is a very important Law in Dravidian word-building. It was seen that Dravidian roots consist of a deictic showing [Vol. XI, Part II.]

spatial relation in a vague way, and a formative fixing the sense of the root more definitively. By a change of this original formative into other interchangeable consonants, the sense of a primary word is differentiated, and a cognate secondary word is produced. This we term the Law of Variation of the Formative. A detailed account of these permutations is reserved for a separate paper on Dravidian Phonology. Now, to give an example of the Law of Variation of the Formative, we may make use of a word already cited. *l-l-u*, 'to drag down', becomes *lq̣-u* by the change of *l* into *q̣* and means 'to set down'; the same becomes *ir-u*, by introducing the new formative *r* and means 'to sit down'; so again *ir-u*, by the change of *r* into *r̥*, means 'to set before', to pay. In the same manner, *ul-u*, 'to turn round', becomes *ul-ai*, 'to turn inwards, whirl'; *ur̥-a*, 'to insert, tear up', *uq̣-u*, 'to surround' etc.

This Law is not without application to the Indo-European languages, as pointed out long ago by Max Muller. "In the secondary roots," he says, "we can frequently observe that one of the consonants in the Aryan languages, generally the final, is liable to modification. The root retains its general meaning, which is slightly modified and determined by the changes of final consonants. Thus, besides *tud* (*tudati*), we have in Sanskrit *tup* (*topati*, *tupati*, and *tumpati*) meaning to strike; Greek *τυπ-τω*. We meet likewise with *tubh* (*tubhnāti*, *tubhyati*, *lobhate*), to strike; and, according to Sanskrit grammarians, with *tuph* (*tophati*, *tuphati*, *tumphati*). Then there is a root *tuj* (*tuñjati*, *tojati*) to strike, to excite; another root, *tur* (*tutorti*) to which the same meaning is ascribed; another, *tur* (*turyate*) to hurt. Then there is the further derivative *turv* (*tūrvaṭi*) to strike, to conquer; there is *tuh* (*tohati*) to pain, to vex; and there is *tus* (*toṣate*) to which Sanskrit grammarians attribute the sense of striking". (Science of Language I, 304-5 Ed. of 1890).

Reverting to the subject of Variation of the Formative, it may be well to point out that words formed in accordance with this Law are further differentiated by the operation of the previous Law *i.e.*, that of Sense-differentiating Enunciatives, or Verbal Determinative. Thus;—

iq̣-u becomes *iq̣-i*, to crush
iq̣-a, to be broken
iq̣-ai, to submit, fall back

and so with the rest.

Law III: Second Formatives.

Words are still further differentiated by an additional formative with or without an euphonic nasal. These new derivatives are trisyllabic, through their combination with changeable enunciatives, as the previous ones are dissyllabic. This further development may be illustrated by some of the words already cited. We have seen that the word *i/-n* means 'to drag down'. This becomes *i/-n-ku* by the addition of the second formative *k* plus the enunciative *n*, and means 'to lag behind'. So *i/-n*, 'to put down', becomes *i/-n-ñk*, 'to fall in, contract'. Here the new formative is accompanied by the euphonic nasal *ñ*. It is to be noted that all the new senses of the above trisyllabic derivatives are specializations of the secondary ideas of 'going down' and 'setting down' which, in their turn, are specializations of the primitive idea of being Beneath, indicated by the deictic *i*.

A few derivatives which are composed of a deictic and a formative alone (without an enunciative) as their first member, and the new formative as second member, and which are, therefore, dissyllabic in construction, also belong to this class: e. g., *u/-ku*, 'to fall inside, draw in, be afraid'. This is from the root *u/-*, 'to get inside', and properly represents a contraction of *u/-u-ku* which became *u/-ku* by syncope and then, by a well known grammatical rule, *u/-ku*. Many Āryan verbal roots, some dissyllabic and others monosyllabic, are to be explained in the same way. Let us, for instance, take the "artificial" root *bhleg* or *bhleg* (or *berk* or *blek*) given by Skeat as the type of words such as Skt. *bhraj* 'to shine', Gk. *phleg-ein*, 'to burn', Lat. *fulgere*, 'to shine', *flagr-are*, 'to burn', Goth. *baikh-is*, 'bright' etc. Of course no Āryan language has a word like *bhleg*. This is but a hypothetical "root". But compare the Dravidian *vilakkam*, 'shining', with its associated forms *velic-am*, 'light', *vel[-ai]*, 'white', *vilā-ñku*, 'to shine', *piṭa-ñku*, 'to glisten', *u/-uñku* 'to boil' &c. Here we have a cluster of words which contain the actual root of the Indo-European forms above mentioned. The Dravidian *vilakk-am* &c. are from the secondary root *vel* 'to be brilliant' which becomes *vilā* by Law VI, to be explained in its place. *Vilā-ñku*, *vilakk-am* and *velic-am* (or *velikk-am*) are words made up with the second formative *k*. The Indo-European *bhraj* &c. are but parallel forms of our Dravidian derivatives.

An explanation of the newly added formative *ku* or *ñku* may be attempted here. The formative particle *ku* of Tamil is identical with the Telugu *ku*, and *vu* is optionally used in the latter speech for *ku*. It appears from this that *ku* or *cu* was once represented by *vu* and that *v* itself was introduced for the prevention of hiatus between the final vowel of a word and the *u* which came to be added for differentiating that word into a new one. On the other hand, we have, besides *ku*, also other second formatives of this class. They are *cu* or *ñcu*, *qu* or *ñqu*, *tu* or *ñtu*, *pu* or *ñpu*, *mu*, *lu*, *ru* (often shortened into *r*), and *vu*. It appears that aside from the natural permutation of *k* into *c*, and the latter into *t*, *q* on the one hand, and the change of *v* into *m* and *p*, as seen in other instances, on the other hand, the change of *k* (original *v*) into the other consonants mentioned is, in some cases, for the still further differentiation of word-forms. Thus *ira-ñku*, 'to go down' becomes *ira-ñcu*, 'to bow down, worship', by modifying *ñku* into *ñcu*. So again *turn-ru* 'to turn round', becomes *tiru-ku*, 'to twist'; *tiru-mu*, *tir-umpu*, 'to turn back'; *tiru-nlu*, 'to come round, to improve'.

Thus far we have considered *u* as the chief element in the second formatives brought into requisition for the building up of new verbs. This *u* should be distinguished from that which functions as a suffix in certain nouns, and which will be discussed in another place. The *u*, which is the chief component in second formatives already noticed, is rather a "verbal determinative" implying the idea of exerting force, an idea probably connected, (as already remarked under Law I) with the deictic *u*, i.e. being Remote. Compare with this the Gothic and Teutonic verbal suffixes *o*, *ja*, and *ai*, e.g. Goth. *fisk-o-n*, old Eng. *fisc-ia-n*, to fish, from Goth. *fisk-s*, fish. These suffixes *o*, *ja* and *ai* are supposed to be derived from *i* to go.¹ This *i* would represent the Tamil verbal determinative *i*. But it may also be a weakened form of an original *u*.

Law IV: Reduplication and Nasalisation.

A basic principle in word-building is that new words are made from more primitive ones by introducing greater stress. This is done in the various ways already described and those to follow. Words, with a verbal meaning and having a neuter

1. Morris: Historical Outlines of English Accidence, p. 120.

sense, are made causative by stressing the first or second formative as the case may be, that is, by doubling it. It will be noticed that the idea of causation or activity implies the putting forth of energy. This is the office of reduplication. Thus *ā-ku* is 'to become', while *āk-ku* means 'to make'; *īā-ku*, 'to become loose', *īāk-ku*, 'to loosen'. On the other hand, the causative verbs thus formed are given a neuter form by nasalising the first of the double consonants. Thus *aḍ-u*, 'to put near', becomes *aṇḍ-u*, 'to go near' *īrak-ku*, 'to lower, put down', is turned into *īraṇ-ku*, 'to get down'.

Reduplication also serves the purpose of forming derivative nouns from verbal themes. Thus, from *ā-ku*, 'to become', we have *ākk-am* 'becoming'. *Ēṭu-ta*, 'to paint, write', yields *ēṭṭ-u*, 'painting, writing'. So too, by nasalisation, the noun *paṇk-u* 'a portion', is formed from *pak-u*, 'to divide'. Again, reduplication and nasalisation have also been used for replacing an original accentuation in a certain class of words. Thus, the word already cited, *aḍ-u*, with accent on the first syllable, 'to go near', and *a-ḍu*, with accent on the second syllable 'to put near'. Now, to obviate the use of these accents, the first has become *aṇḍ-u* by nasalisation, and the second *aḍḍ-u* (or also *aḍu-kku*) by reduplication. In some cases the change of accentuation brings on a change of meaning other than that of causality. Thus *par-i* (*parital*) is 'to break off'; but *par-i* (*parittal*) means 'to hear'. So *ēr-i* (*erital*) is 'to throw', while *ēr-i* (*erital*) is 'to shoot forth rays'. There are a few scores of words which show original accentuation in Tamil.¹

In old Dravidian the same device of reduplication was used for indicating past tense in some verbs. Thus: *pukk-ōṭ* 'he went', from *puk-u*, 'to go'; *paḍḍ-ōṇ* 'he suffered', from *paḍu*, 'to suffer'. As Caldwell remarks, the same principle is seen in the formation of past tense in Indo-European verbs, although, in them, it is the deictic element of the root which is doubled, as *pa-pāṭha* 'he learnt', from *paṭh-ati*, 'he learns'; while in Dravidian the formative element undergoes the reduplication.

Under this Law we may also include the softening or palatalization of *k* into *c*, with or without an intervening nasal. Thus:

1. See *Tolkāppiyam* I, 76, 141, 142.

uk, 'to start away', becomes *ur*, 'to pitch at a mark'; *akk* 'to contract' becomes *añē*, 'to step back, to fear', in Sanskrit, 'to bend'.

Caldwell has noted a parallel to the instance of nasalisation in the Indo-European languages as follows: "In the seventh class of Sanskrit verbal roots a nasal is inserted in the special tenses, so as to coalesce with a final dental; e.g., *nid*, 'to revile' becomes *nindati*, 'he reviles'. Compare also the root *ud*, 'water', with its derivative root *und*, 'to be wet'. A similar nasalisation is found both in Latin and Greek. In Latin we find the unaltered root in the preterite, and a nasalised form in the present; e.g., compare *vidi* with *scindo*, *edui* with *edim*, *teligi* with *laugo*, *fregi* with *frango*. Compare also the Latin *centum* with the Greek *hecaton*. In Greek, compare the roots *math* and *lab* with the nasalised forms of these roots found in the present tense; e.g., *math-anō*, 'to learn', and *lab-anō* 'to take'. The principle of euphonic nasalisation contained in these Sanskrit, Greek and Latin examples, though not perfectly identical with the Dravidian usage, corresponds to it in a remarkable degree. The difference consists in this, that in the Indo-European languages the insertion of a nasal appears to be purely euphonic, whereas in Tamil it generally contributes to grammatical expression".¹

Law V: Initial Intensive Consonants.

We have seen that it is the consonant which forms the word—an element, without which, a deictic alone would, in the early stage of language, be a very vague thing. Again, the use of consonants is seen in the doubling of a formative, in order to make a new word with a sense analogous to its original one. Further, another consonant of the same class may take the place of the old formative, and thus form a new word (Law II). Or again, a new formative may be added, in order to build up another word (Law III). Reduplication is another factor in the formation of new words (Law IV).

We now come to a further use of the consonants. Having exhausted, as necessity arose, all the devices for making more and more new words with the aid of formatives as *finals*, the makers of our language seem to have turned to another way of laying consonants under contribution. This was by *prefixing* them to roots. When the vowel at the beginning of a word was strengthened by the addition of an initial consonant, a great stress was

1. *Comp. Gr. of Drav. Languages*, pp. 172-3.

introduced, and this helped to differentiate the original sense of that word. (The role intensive consonants play in connexion with suffixes will be seen under Law VIII.) We shall once more take the word *uḷ* as an illustration. *Uḷ-u* (another form of the word *uḷḷ-u*, 'to get inside') which means 'to dig', 'to plough', becomes *paḷ*, *paḷḷ-u* or *poḷ*, *poḷḷ-u*, *ṣaḷ*, 'to make a whole', 'to burst open'. Again, another derivative of *uḷ* in the form of *uḷ-al* 'to be turning inwards' i.e. 'to go round', becomes *kuḷ-al*, *cuḷ-al*, etc. with the differentiated sense of 'curling', 'whirling' and so forth.

It will be interesting to give here an example to illustrate all the five Laws we have so far studied, i.e. to present a word which goes through the changes indicated by these Laws, and, in so doing, gives birth to other words with analogous senses. The word I have chosen as example is one derived from the already well-known root *uḷ*, inside. This root is modified into *uḷ-a* 'to get inside', 'to be caught in', 'to be in trouble', and undergoes the following further changes in accordance with the above five Laws:—

By the Law of Verbal Determinatives:

<i>uḷ-a</i>	to get inside, to be in trouble
<i>uḷ-u</i>	„ to dig, to plough
<i>uḷ-ai</i> , <i>uḷ-ai</i>	„ to wander, to take trouble.

The basic idea in all the three derivatives is the same, i.e. 'getting inside'; but their secondary meaning differs slightly in accordance with the changing enunciatives *a*, *u*, and *ai*. This illustrates the first Law.

By the Law of Variation of the Formative:—

<i>uḷ-a</i>
<i>uḷ-ai</i> , to turn inwards, to whirl
<i>uṛ-a</i> , to insert, to tear up
<i>uḍ-u</i> , to turn inwards, to surround
<i>uṇ-ar</i> , to take in, to understand.

All the above are modifications of the same word *uḷ-a* by the change of the formative into *l*, *ṛ*, *ḍ*, and *ṇ* respectively.

By the Law of Second Formatives:—

<i>uḷ-a</i>	becomes <i>uḷ-a-ru</i> , to turn inwards, to roam about
<i>uḷ-u</i>	„ <i>uḷ-ku</i> , to draw in, to fall into decay
<i>uṇ-ar</i>	„ <i>uṇ-a-ṅku</i> , to draw in, to contract.

By the Law of Reduplication:—

u[a-ru becomes *u[a-rro*, to make to turn inwards, to
cause to go round

u[-ku „ *u[-n-ku*, to draw in, to sprain

un-ar „ *un-ar-ttu*, to put inside, to instruct.

We have thus far seen how the word *u[-a* has yielded various new forms by the operation of the first four Laws. Now, by the fifth Law, the same word in its form of *u[-ai*, 'to turn inwards', yields other words, when various consonants are prefixed to it. Thus:—

By the Law of Initial Intensive Consonants:—

k + u[-ai = *ku[-ai*, to turn in, to bend

c + u[-a = *cu[-ai*, to turn inwards, to go round

t + u[-ai = *tu[-ai*, to bore a hole

n + u[-ai = *nu[-ai*, to get into a hole

p + u[-u = *pu[-u*, to burst open

m + u[-u = *mu[-u*, to get under water.

I omit here words to which *v* is prefixed. This semi-vowel often functions as consonant, and, in most cases, these words have got the *v* sound at the beginning, merely as an alternative for an original *u* and not as an intensive. Of this, however, later. To return to the Law of Initial Intensives, this has played an important part in the building up of the great mass of derivatives. Many words once formed in accordance with this Law, are again multiplied by the operation of the first four Laws, so that the process looks very much like geometrical progression. Thus, to take only the first of the above examples, the word *ku[-ai*, we have the following series of new words derived from it, under the four Laws, in due order. Note that only some of its verbal derivatives are here mentioned.

1. *Ku[-ai*, to bend, becomes by Law 1:

ku[-i, to be hollowed out

Other forms will be found under No. 3 below

2. The same *ku[-ai* becomes, by Law 11:

ku[-ai, to scoop out, to churn

ku[-u, to turn back, to become short

ku[-ai, to disperse

ku[-i, to be hollowed out

ku[-i, to bow, to bend

3. The same *ku/-ai* becomes, by Law III:
 - ku/-ar-u*, to be crooked
 - ku/-ak-u*, to become bent
 - ku/-al-u*, to curl
 - ku/-ar-u*, to go about, mix
4. The same *ku/-ai* becomes, by Law IV,
 - ku/-akk-u*, to bend
 - ku/-akk-u*, to become bent, to droop
 - ku/-akk-u*, to be crooked or bent
 - ku/-app-u*, to stir, to disturb
 - ku/-app-u*, to be agitated, to become mixed
 - ku/-and-u*, to be crooked.

Here, only one example out of those given to illustrate the 5th Law was taken. All the other examples too follow the same process more or less. The derivatives of the word *ku/-ai* alone, which we have considered under the four Laws, number nearly three hundred, as can be seen in the appendix to my Tamil work entitled: *Studies in Tamil Etymology*. It must be noted, of course, that all verbal roots do not go through the whole gamut of the four Laws with equally abundant derivatives.

It was remarked that the semi-vowel *r*, prefixed to several words in Tamil, does not always represent an initial intensive. This *r*, indeed, is in most cases an original *u* changed first into *w* and then into *r*. In pronouncing the vowel *u*, the lips are rounded and the tongue is drawn down, while the breath is emitted as in blowing out a candle. If the same sound is produced with a final *u* or the opening of the mouth, we have then the English *w*, corresponding to the original Tamil *u*. There is no doubt that the present Tamil *r* was pronounced in ancient times like the English *w* as it is to the present day in Sinhalese.¹ It would seem that Sinhalese in the East and English in the West, have alone preserved the true pronunciation of what is now written as *r*. An example will illustrate this fact. The Tamil word *vu/-u*, 'to fall', is derived from *u/-u*, 'to drop inside', and must have therefore stood as *wu/-u* before it became *vu/-u*. So too *vu/-ai*, 'to bend', which is another form of *u/-ai*, *u/-ai*, 'to turn inwards', must have stood at first as *wu/-ai* before becoming *vu/-ai*, 'to bend, to surround'. To give an example from European languages, the Latin *vall-nm* 'a rampart', from *vall-o*. 'I

1. Cf. Skeat: *The Science of Etymology*, p. 174.

surround', and akin to the Tamil *rai-mi*, was once actually pronounced *wall-mi* as is evidenced by the old English forms *weall*, *wealle*, and the modern *wall*. Even the Romance languages, directly derived from Latin, have lost the *w* sound which English has kept. So too our neighbour, Sinhalese, has kept what we have lost. No other Indian language beside Sinhalese possesses the *w* sound. This is, by the way, one of those many arguments for my belief that Sinhalese represents, in its Dravidian elements, an early stage of the development of Tamil.¹ A considerable number of the many Dravidian words, embodied in the vocabulary of the former, belong to a more ancient phase of Tamil than is to be met with in the written literature of the latter.

In a few words such as, for instance, *vi-aiik-u* 'to be bright' from *ib-aiik-u*, 'to be radiant' (root *ei*, 'light'), the *v* prefixed to the derivatives has an intensive sense. There are also cases where the initial *v* is a modification of other labials as in *vēy* 'to put over', 'to cover', which stands for *mēy*, for *mēl*, 'over', (root *ei* 'to rise'). Or, again, *vāk-u*, 'to classify', for *pāk-u*, 'to divide', from *ak-a-l*, 'to recede'. As will be seen by these examples, the introduction of initial *v*, in lieu of other consonants of the same class, also serves to modify the sense of words to a slight degree.

This leads us to examine the distinction of sense signified by the different consonants prefixed to original roots. It may be laid down as a general rule, at once, that what are, in Tamil, called "hard" consonants express greater exertion, harshness, etc. when functioning as initial intensives, and, on the contrary, the so-called "soft" consonants express the contrary ideas. The hard consonants capable of standing at the beginning of words are *k*, *c*, *t* and *p* and the soft ones are *ṅ* (*ā*) and *m*. Two other consonants, which can begin words, belong to what are called the middle class. Of these, *v* has been already noticed and *y* (another semi-vowel like *v*) has obtained a place in the beginning of words almost in the same way as *v*, for, *y* is no more than a modification of *z*. For example, the early *ēzag*, 'who?' has become *yāzag*. We have therefore to do here only with the four hard and two soft consonants. Of these, *c* is not original, it being a palatalised *k*. It was by degrees that the sound of *k* became softened into that of *c* as we see by the example of ancient words in *k* which began to be

1. See the *Anthropos*, XXXII, pp. 155-70.

pronounced with *c* sound later. For instance, the word *kai* (or *kei*) is found in early literature as well as in Kanarese, a Dravidian dialect, to mean, as a verb, 'to do', and as a noun, 'the hand'. To the present day the sense of hand is represented by *kai*, but to signify doing, the same word has been corrupted, in Tamil into *cey* by palatalising the initial *k*. This is but one instance among many. Note also the evolution of the Latin *c* from an original *k*. Having thus disposed of *c* as coinciding with *k*, we have only the three initial hard consonants *k*, *t* and *p* to consider, together with the soft ones *n* and *m*. This will be done best by examining the examples already cited. The primary root *n*, it was seen, gave a derivative *nll-n*, 'to get inside' etc. It was also seen that this *nll-n*, through some of its modified forms, yields the following secondary formations when combined with the five Initial Intensive Consonants in question:—

ku/-ai, to turn towards, to bend
tu/-ai, to get inside, to bore a hole
pu/-ai, *pu/-u*, to burst open
nu/-ai, to get into a hole
mu/-uk-n, to get under water,

This group of derivatives, I think, fairly represents the gradation of sense obtained by the use of the various initial intensives. The emphasis rises from *k* to *p* and lowers from *n* to *m*. Whereas *nll-n*, the original word, meant 'to get inside' or 'turn inwards', *ku/-ai* points to the minimum exertion required for bending any pliable thing. *Tu/-ai* expresses the greater exertion involved in boring a hole through a solid body, while *pu/-ai* or *pu/-u* signifies the maximum exertion which results in bursting through a hard surface. On the other hand, *nu/-ai* represents entering a hole—easy action as compared with *tu/-ai*; and *mu/-uk-n* stands for the opposite of *pu/-ai*, that of plunging into a liquid mass. This sort of fine distinctions may sound too clever to have been made by archaic man, but the fact that is borne in upon one with increasing force, as one dives more and more into an ancient language, is, that he had much greater wits than we are prepared to credit him with. Language, if anything, was formed on a strictly rational basis. Is not language an indispensable medium of thought itself? There seems to be no doubt as to the various initial intensives having been originally employed with a fixed nuance of sense. This is clear in scores of word-groups.

But there are also scores of groups where the distinction is not quite so easy to grasp. And it is small wonder that this should be so. In the course of ages, there have been so many transformations in language, that we find some words that have not kept a single letter—either vowel or consonant,—of the originals they represent. It is by tracing them back, step by step, through their long history, alone, that their identity can be established. Fortunately for us, Tamil is a remarkably conservative language. There are few words in it which are corrupted beyond recognition. Patient study may, therefore, reveal one day that the clue I have given to the understanding of the exact sense associated with the different initial intensive points in the right direction.

I must now answer an objection, raised in some quarters, against my theory of Initial Intensive Consonants, as forming the basis of secondary roots built upon primary ones. "It is not a well known fact", queries the objector, "that initial consonants are gradually dropped rather than newly prefixed to words? All men are bent on economising labour, and it is on this account that we are all led to follow the line of least resistance in every thing. We are inclined to drop consonants rather than to supply them. The word *ku-ai*, for instance, would have tended to become *u-ai*, by leaving out the initial consonant, in course of time, and not the other way about. Is it natural to suppose that early mankind would have introduced those consonants requiring so much exertion to pronounce, when everybody's tendency was to drop such hard sounds altogether? And do we not find in Tamil itself words which have lost their initial consonants, such as *uk-am* for *yuk-am*, *amay-am* for *samay-am*, *ey-patu* for *toy-patu*, etc. etc.?"—Such is the objection. It is no doubt true that there is a natural tendency to eliminate difficult sounds, especially at the beginning of words. And the fact cannot be denied that initial consonants have actually dropped out in many instances. But this is the result of the process of corruption inherent to all man-made things. On the other hand, we have to consider the process of building up a language. For this purpose, sounds difficult to pronounce, that is to say, consonants, *had* to be used first as formatives in order to differentiate one word from another; and when all the resources furnished by the formatives,—first interchanging, then doubling and lastly repeating them—were exhausted, one *had* to turn to the new device of

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using the same difficult sounds as initials. (Note also the further exploitation of other root-words as suffixes and prefixes to supply the ever-growing demand for new words. This will be explained under Law VIII.) The Law of Initial Intensive Consonants, then, deals with the building-up-stage of language, when initial consonants were indispensable factors for making new words. When these words had become common currency and hardened, so to say, into concrete entities, phonetic corruption could have indeed deprived them of their initials, in certain cases, without destroying their identity.

Apart from this, there is the test of sense-development or semantics which clinches the question whether, in a given case, a word beginning with a vowel or one with a consonant is the original. It is evident that a word conveying a simple idea is earlier than one which conveys a complex idea. Root-words are those which signify the most elementary ideas. Complex ideas are represented by secondary roots or the derivatives of both primary and secondary roots. In tracing the etymology of words, we have to take into account the laws of the change of sounds (phonetics) as well as those of the change of meaning (semantics). Now, when we apply the semantic test to what I have designated primary and secondary roots, it becomes abundantly clear that the former are earlier than the latter. It is, doubtless, true that certain words which once began with consonants are now found without them. But this does not contradict the fact that, at the word-building stage of language, these words had consonants prefixed to them, in order to convey secondary ideas.

It may be asked whether there is any parallel to the Tamil use of the properly-so-called initial intensive consonants, in the Indo-European family of languages. There cannot be any doubt that the majority of words in these languages also is formed on the same basis. They present many words, indeed, which have elided the initial vowels and actually begin with consonants. Thus the Tamil *la-ku*, 'to be lightsome', (from *el*, 'light'), has the form of *laghu* in Sanskrit, *levis* in Latin, but *elachus*, *elassōn*, in Greek. The original *e* has been elided in Skt. and L. in which the word begins with a consonant. Such consonants are not to be confounded with the initial intensives. They rather belong to the formative element in the original words. Apart from these, almost all Indo-European words beginning with conso-

nants are demonstrably constructed with initial intensives. This fact will be made clear when we come to consider inter-dialectal transformations in a separate paper.

Law VI: Lengthening and 'Deflection' of Radical Vowels.

This process has perhaps its counterpart in the *guṇa* and *vṛddhi* phenomena of Sanskrit. European philologists include this, together with Samprasāraṇa, under what they call *ablaut* or alternance. In Tamil, the lengthening of radical vowels takes place in some cases euphonicly; e.g. *āḷ*, from *ak-al*, (root *ak-al*) 'to dig', 'to be broad or deep', 'to recede'. Nor are we concerned here with the poetical lengthening of the radical vowel in adjective forms, e. g. *cīṟ(u) aḍi* 'small feet', becoming *cīṟ-aḍi*. The lengthening we here speak of, is, in the generality of cases, intended as an aid for grammatical expression. It introduces the necessary emphasis for sense-differentiation. Thus: *uṟ-u*, 'to be permanent', becomes *ū(g)ṟ-u*, 'to plant firmly'; *ir-i* 'to fall', becomes *ir* 'to drag down'. Nouns are formed, in a large number of cases, from verbs by the same process, e. g. *iḍ-u* 'to set down', *iḍ-u*, 'what is set down, a pledge'; *miḡ*, 'to emit light', *miḡ*, 'what shines: star', fish'. Sanskrit has a similar law in the formation of nouns from verbs. Thus *vac*, 'to say', becomes *vac*, 'word'; *pat*, 'to fall', becomes *pāti*, 'a fall'.

In a few cases, a long radical vowel is also shortened in Tamil. Thus *āḷ*, 'to immerse', become *a(u-ni-u)*, 'to become pressed'. *Tāḷ*, 'to bend low', becomes *taḷu-u*, 'to embrace'. So, too, in the case of some nouns as *nār*, 'string', becomes *nara-mb-u* 'nerve'; *nāṟṟ-am*, 'odour', becomes *naṟa-u-am*, *naṟa-u-u*, 'fragrance'.

To return to verbs, some of the forms lengthened are again deflected for constructing yet other forms. This, again, is a way of bringing in more emphasis. In the lengthening process, *a* becomes *ā*, *u* becomes *ū* or *o*, *ō*, *i* becomes *ī* or *e*, *ē* becomes *ā* etc. In deflecting, *a* is changed into *aya*, (*ava*, *aka*, *ala* or *ara*); *u* or *o* into *uva*, *uka*; *i* or *e* into *iya*, *eya*, *ika*, *ila*, (*ivo*), *eva*. To cite a few examples: We saw the word *āḷ*, the euphonic equivalent or *ak-al*. This *āḷ* becomes, by the Law of Initial Intensive Consonants, *tāḷ*, 'to dig', 'to be deep', 'to bend', 'to lay oneself low'. Here we have the lengthening process. But by deflecting, *tāḷ* becomes *tava-l*, 'to creep', *taḷa-r*, 'to droop', *taḷa-mṇu*, 'to

totter, etc. So also *pi-i*, 'to separate', (secondary root form *ir-i* 'to tear'), becomes *pér*, 'to pluck out'; and this, again, *pey-ar*, 'to transplant', 'separate' &c. As a noun *pey-ar* means 'a separate person', 'a name'. Once more: from *el-u*, 'to rise', we have *er-u*, 'to mount up'; under the deflecting process, this gives *ira-u*, *ira*, 'to rule'.

There is a larger class of words which undergo the lengthening than those undergoing the deflecting process. Dr. Caldwell, who seems to have observed only the former phenomenon, says: "I can scarcely think it likely that it is from Sanskrit that the Dravidian languages have derived a usage which prevails among them to so great an extent, and which has every appearance of being an original feature of their own. If it is not to be regarded as an independently developed peculiarity, arising out of the same mental and lingual habits as those out of which the corresponding Sanskrit usage was developed, it is probably to be regarded as a relic of those pre-Sanskrit influences of which many traces seem to be discoverable in these languages".¹ A large number of Sanskrit words have been, in all probability, derived from ancient Tamil roots by the process of *vrddhi* which we have called 'deflection'. According to Whitney: "the *vrddhi* element is specifically Indian and its occurrence is less frequent and regular".² But there is no doubt that it occurs in other Indo-European speeches as well. Take for instance the Dravidian root *uk* 'to push forward' from an original *uk* which becomes in Skt. *ukt*, (*uktati*) 'to grow strong'. Also *ukt* 'to grow' *ugrah* 'strong'. In Latin, however, this becomes *aug-ere* and in Greek *auxo*, *auxano*. For other Indo-European parallels see Walde-Holmann Lat. Eym. Wörterb. under *augere*.

Law VII: Variation of Radical Vowels.

The modifying of radical vowels in the lengthening and deflecting phenomena follows a regular transition of one vowel into a correlated one, as *u* is changed into *o*, or *i* into *e*. But there is also an irregular transformation of one vowel into another, not correlated with it, for the express purpose of forming new words with cognate ideas. This has a greater resemblance to the ablaut phenomenon of Indo-European languages. Thus,

1. Comp. Gram., p. 213.

2. Skt. Gr., p. 82.

the *e* in *el*, 'the sun', is changed into *a* to form the words *ol-i*, 'to whiten', and *ol-i*, 'brilliance, light'. The regular change of *e* into *ē* in the word *el-a*, 'early', falls under the previous law. So if *el*, again, becomes *ila-k-a*, *da-ūb-a*, 'to shine', this can also be considered as a regular process. But we have a secondary word *tal-aūb-a*, 'to be brilliant', from the same *el*, where the radical *e* has changed into *u*. So too *col-i* 'to be brilliant' and *enē-u* 'to burn' from the same root. The same *el*, through *vel*, yields another form *val alā vāl*, 'white, brilliant'. The transformation of *e* or *ē* into *u*, *o* or *ō* in the mouths of the illiterate of the present day might furnish a side-light on this phenomenon. For *cer-u-k-a*, 'to insert', they would say *cor-u-k-a*; for *mēl-am*, 'a drum', they would say *mōl-am*. In the early interrogative pronoun *ēvay* and *ēta* which have now become *yāvay*, and *yātu*, there is a purposeful interchange of vowels, quite apart from the dialectal corruption which has to account for the change of radical vowels in the same words, found in other languages.

Here it may be well to meet a possible objection. The irregular modifications now in question affect an essential element in words, that is, the deictic. According to our principles of etymology, all names are predicates. They indicate some stand-out quality of the object in terms of spatial relation, and this relation is indicated by one of the four deictics, in each case. Hence the original sense of words is entirely dependent on the deictics. How then are we to account for the fact that these deictics themselves are interchanging, while the words composed with their aid retain their connection with the original sense? The reply to this question is similar to the one given under Law V. The deictics were, indeed, an essential element for word-building in the early state of language, and their identity had to be jealously guarded, so long as names were to be conferred on objects in accordance with the four word-types springing from Spatial Relation. But, when the first words were once built up and had become common currency, there was no more occasion for troubling about their constituent elements. In consequence, they went their way of transformation according to the increased needs of the people who used them. The development of ideas and the consequent need for new words necessitated development in language as well. Existing words were given a twist and a turn, or they were coupled with other words, for meeting the need. The twisting and turning sometimes affected the radical

vowel and sometimes the formative, but never both in the same stage of development of a word, so that the identity of the original was not lost. Thus when *el* was already a recognised name for the sun and its light, it was differentiated not only into *ila-ku* to designate 'shining', but also into *ol-i* and further into *ol-i* for conveying the slightly modified ideas of 'whitening' and 'brilliance'.

This Law is of paramount importance in comparing Tamil roots with Indo-European derivatives. Thus, *heli-os*, *sol*, *sun-n-e*, and *sūr-ya*, names of the sun in Greek, Latin, Old English and Sanskrit respectively, can be compared with the Tamil *el* only in the light of the Law under consideration, by which the latter becomes *ol-i* and *ol-i*, 'to be effulgent', on the one hand, and *ol-ar* and *ol-ar*, 'to burn', on the other.

Law VIII: Combining with other early words.

We are not concerned here with accidence or the inflexion and conjugation of words, whose terminations and particles are admittedly modifications of other words. Nor do we refer to compound words which are clearly seen to be such. Apart from these, there are hundreds of derivatives in Tamil which exhibit internal combinations of primary or secondary words with other early words. The latter are not so hopelessly obscured in Dravidian as Burgmann confesses to be the case with Indo-European suffixes.¹ The Dravidian internal or stem-suffixes may be classified as follows:—

(a) *At-u* 'what belongs to, what is near'. This is a primary word composed of the deictic of nearness *a* and the formative *t* with *u* as enunciative. Later on, this began to function as a demonstrative pronoun, and gradually acquired the sense of 'remoteness'. The definite article now found in some Indo-European languages is also identical with a demonstrative pronoun. Thus the Greek *to*, the English *the*, German *der*, and French *le* are all original demonstratives. In Tamil, however, *at-u* is never found alone as a syntactical instrument, but compounded with original words as a suffix. This practice is the opposite of Arabic wherein the definite article is combined with words as a prefix. *At-u* is often transformed into *aḍu*, *aru*, *al*, *am*, *an*, *ar*, *al*, *al* and contracted into *a* which is again weakened into *ai*.

1. Cf. *Abrege de Grammaire Comparee*, p. 300-1.

Thus: *kuḍ-al-u*, 'the West', from *kuḍ* 'bending downwards'; *kuṟ-aṇu*, 'a block of wood' from *kuṟ* 'to be short'; *kiṇ-aru*, 'a well', from *kiṇḍ* 'to dig', *kuḷ-al*, 'a tube', from *kuḷ*, 'to turn inwards'; *āl-am* 'depth', from *āl*, 'to be deep'; *kaḍ-ay*, 'a duty' from *kaḍḍ*, 'to bind'; *cuḍ-ar*, 'a flame' from *cuḍ*, 'to burn'; *uṟ-al*, 'interstice' from *uṟ*, 'to be present'; *kaṟ-al*, 'rust', from *kaṟ* 'to be black'. The ending *al* (= *atu*) is often strengthened with initial intensive consonants sometimes accompanied with a nasal. Thus: *kal*: *naḍa-kkal* 'walking'; *cal*: *eri-ccal*, 'jealousy'; *tul*: *varu-tal*, 'coming'; *pal*: *tirumpal*, 'returning'; *mal*: *ceyy-ā-mal*, 'not doing'; *val*: *ira-val*, 'begging'. Tamil grammarians call these forms verbal nouns.

Indo-European parallels to the suffixes derived from the Dravidian *al-u* are certainly numerous. It is easiest to identify them in Sanskrit which conforms to the Dravidian morphology on many points. Cf. the ending *as* (= *at*) in *jiv-as*, *jan-as* &c., with the Dravidian *al-u* or *al*. The Greek equivalent of *as* is *os*, the Latin *us*. The neuter termination *am*, as in *jal-am*, may be compared with the Dravidian *am*.

The ending *a*, contracted from *al-u* is frequent in the other dialects, but in Tamil it is almost always weakened into *ai*. Thus *il-a*, 'what hangs down, a leaf (root: *il* 'to go down')', is the form extant in Malayalam; this has become *il-ai* in Tamil. Compare this contracted suffix *a* with the endings *a*, *ia* and *ya* in some Indo-European nouns. e. g. Skt. *drāv-a*, Gk. *thur-a*, 'a door', Lat. *in-eil-ia*, 'hunger', Gk. *pen-ia*, 'poverty', Skt. *vid-yā* 'knowledge'.

Again *a*, in the form of *ai* is also found strengthened with the several initial intensive consonants with or without a nasal. Thus: *kai*: *kari-kai*, 'an umbrella'; *cai*: *kuḍi-cai*, 'a hut'; *lai*: *irun-lai*, 'charcoal'; *fai*: *kudam-fai* 'a nest'; *mai*: *aḍi-mai* 'a slave'; *vai*: *aru-vai*, 'cloth'; *rai*: *piṇ-rai*, 'morrow', &c.

The suffix *al* and its other forms, also sometimes add to themselves their own or other contracted forms of suffixes. Thus: *cuḍ-al-ai*, 'burning ground'. Here *ai*, the further form of *al* is added to *cuḍ-al*; *Al-ar-i*, 'oleander.' Here the contraction of *il* (See below) is added to the *ar* in *al-ar*. In *toḍ-ai(y)al* 'a garland', from *toḍ* 'to string together', the suffix *ai* (= *al*) had already formed the word *toḍ-ai*, 'stringing', while *al* is again added to make a new word. In *nil-a-(y)u* 'what shines dimly:

the moon' *u*, the contracted form of *uḥ* (see below), is added to the suffix *a*. So in *am-a-(r)u* 'what is put in: food'. And, sometimes, such forms have again the first suffix lengthened to compensate for the second one which they drop. Thus *niḥ-a-(v)u* becomes *niḥ-ā*; *ny-a-(r)u* becomes *ny-ā*. In other cases *am* (= *at-u*) is added to the form thus obtained. E. g. *nar-ā*, 'odour', becomes *nar-ā-(v)u*, and then, *nar-a-(v)am*; *ar-ā*, 'snake' becomes *ar-ā-(r)u* and afterwards *ar-a-(r)am*.

It is also noteworthy that the noun forms made by the addition of the suffixes *al* &c. become verbs by the accent being transferred to the second syllable. Thus *āl-ar*, a noun meaning 'a blossoming thing, flower' becomes *al-ār*, a verb meaning 'to blossom'. A verbal determinative is also sometimes added to this form as *al-ār-u*, this being but the natural effect of the accent falling on *ar*. Here we have perhaps the origin of the second formatives mentioned under Law III.

(b) *Uḥ*, meaning 'what is', 'what has' is another primary word composed of the deictic *u*, 'hidden from view', and the formative *ḥ*. This is widely used as an internal or stem-suffix as in *iy-a-(v)-uḥ* 'leader: God', from *iy-a-(h)u* 'to move' (root *ḥ* 'to go down'). *Uḥ* is also compounded with other suffixes like *i* to be described below, as in *ṣall-ḥ-i* 'possessing strength: a bear'.

The suffix is often changed into *ni*, *āḥ*, *urn* and *ārū*. Thus, *alk-ni*, 'the hip', from *alk* (= *alkk*) 'to get near: to decrease'; *enr-āḥ*, 'summer', from *enrū* (*āl-u* 'the sun'); *ḥōy-urn* (for *nāḥ-urn*) 'what possesses the day: the sun' *id-ā-y-ārū*, 'what is set between: a hindrance', from *id-ai*, 'something placed between' (root *id* 'to place').

Uḥ as contracted into *u* is more often employed as suffix denoting possession &c. Thus, *muyy-u* 'what has effulgence: lightning' from *mūy* 'to shine' (from *al* 'brightness': root *cl-u* 'to rise' said of the sun). This suffix is pretty frequent in Indo-European: e. g. Lat. *gen-u*, Gr. *gon-u* 'the knee'. Compare also the English ending *ise* which represents the Old English *u*: e. g. *call-ow* for O. E. *cal-u*; *yell-ow*, for *geol-u*.

The contracted form *u* also takes initial intensive consonants with or without a nasal. Note that some of these suffixes are added not directly to roots but to words already formed with another suffix. Thus *ku*: *pōk-ku* 'going' from *pō* 'to go'; *cu*:

mulai-ñ-cu 'a hole', from *mul-au* = *puñ-au* 'hole'; *ḍu: kava-ḍu* 'a forked thing; branch' from *kav* 'to bend'; *tu: koḷuṅ-tu*, 'a tender thing; shoot' from *kuḷ* 'young'; *pu: ceta-pu*, 'what is reddish; copper' from *cē* 'red'; *vu: vāḷ-ru* 'living long; prosperity', from *āl* 'continue to be'; *ṛu: koḍi-ṛu*, 'what is crooked; pincers' from *kuḍ* 'to bend'.

(c) A third suffix in general use is the primary word *il* meaning 'what is beneath, what is, what has'. It is composed of the deictic *i* 'beneath' and the formative *l*. Thus: *vey-il*, 'having heat: the heat of day' from *av* 'to burn'. This ending with the meaning of 'place' is also the Tamil sign of the locative case, and is already found as such in the Indus Valley seals as read by Father H. Heras, S. J. The Indo-European locative (as well as genitive) terminations in *i* and *e* may be compared with the contracted form of *il*, namely *i*.

The suffix *il* is also changed into *iḷ*, *ir* and contracted into *i*. So: *kum-iḷ* 'what is convex; a knob', from *kuv* 'to become round', *tal-ir* 'what sprouts; a tender leaf', from *talḷ* 'to push forward', *avar-i* 'possessing salt; the sea', from *av-ar* 'salt' (which word already has the suffix *ar*), root *av* 'to swell'.

In Sanskrit a large body of derivatives of all genders are formed with the suffix *i*.¹ Thus *ruç-i* 'brightness' *kṛṣ-i* 'ploughing'.

Like the other suffixes explained under (a) and (b) the *i* also takes initial intensive consonants with or without a nasal. Thus *ki: koḷu-kki* 'a hook' from *koḷ*, 'to grasp', *ṛi: āḍ-ci* 'reign' from *āl*, 'to rule'; *ṇi: kuṇu-ṇi* 'a small grain' from *kuṇu*, 'small'; *ṭi: uru-ṭi* 'firmness', from *uru*, 'to be established'; *pi: kuḍuu-pi* 'tuft of hair', from *kuḍu*, 'to be round'; *vi: kēḷ-vi* 'hearing', from *kēḷ*, 'to hear'; *ṛi: teṇ-ṛi* 'the South', from *teṇ*, 'southward'.

(d) Apart from the above ancient stem-suffixes there are others of later origin, and in less frequent use, which are mainly secondary words or compounds of primary words in a corrupted form. Many of these are common to Dravidian and Indo-European—notably to Sanskrit—in a more or less disguised form. A few examples are given below.—

1. Whitney: Sanskrit Grammar, p. 430.

<i>Suffix</i>	<i>Original form</i>	<i>Example</i>
<i>akkam</i>	<i>ākē-am</i> 'being made', from <i>āk-er</i> ; root: <i>akē</i>	<i>tiyy-akkam</i> 'hardihood' from <i>tiy</i> 'hard'
<i>akam</i>	Do.	<i>keyy-akam</i> , 'folds of cloth', from <i>key</i> , 'to gather together'
<i>agat</i>	<i>agat</i> 'to join'; root: <i>ag</i> 'to bring near'	<i>kadd-agat</i> 'ramming down', from <i>kadd</i> , 'to fasten'
<i>agaru</i>	Do.	<i>tiyy-agaru</i> 'hardihood', as above
<i>iyam</i>	<i>iyal</i> 'course, nature'; root: <i>il</i> 'to stream down'	<i>al-iyam</i> , 'service', from <i>al</i> , 'to labour'
<i>ikkai</i>	Do.	<i>alal-ikkai</i> 'burning', from <i>alal</i> , 'fire'; root: <i>al</i> 'to burn'
<i>ilam</i>	<i>iyal</i> 'course, nature'; root: <i>il</i> 'to stream down'	<i>lapp-ilam</i> , 'fault', from <i>lappu</i> , 'to fail'
<i>uravu</i>	<i>ur-aru</i> 'being possessed of'; root: <i>ur</i> 'to be established'	<i>tupp-uravu</i> 'cleanliness', from <i>tuppu</i> 'purity'; root <i>tuy</i> , 'to wash'
<i>iram</i>	Do.	<i>kad-iram</i> 'hardness', from <i>kad</i> 'hard'
<i>kan</i>	<i>kan</i> 'place or situa- tion'; root: <i>an</i> 'to be near'	<i>iduk-kan</i> 'distress' from <i>idu</i> 'narrow'; root <i>id</i> , 'place'
<i>māyam</i>	<i>āyatū</i> 'what became', from <i>ātu</i> , 'to be'; root: <i>akē</i> .	<i>cēr-māyam</i> 'accompani- ment', from <i>cēr</i> 'to join', root: <i>cēr</i> , 'to go up to'

ON R̥GVEDA 4, 30 19.

BY

A. VENKATASUBBIAH.

Hymn 4, 30 of the *R̥k-saṁhitā* is addressed to Indra and mentions many of the exploits performed by him. One such is the healing of a blind man and a lame man of their blindness and lameness. This is referred to in stanza 19 of this hymn which reads as follows:—

अनु॒द्रा ज॒हिता न॑योऽन्धं श्रो॒णं च॒ वृ॒त्र॒हन् ।

न त॑र्ते सु॒प्तं म॑ष्ट॒वे ॥

The meaning of the stanza is: "Thou, O destroyer of Vṛtra, didst lead the blind man and the lame man, both of whom had been abandoned: this thy benefaction cannot be reached". The meaning of pāda 1 is, 'the limit or extent of thy benefaction is not to be measured by any one'. Compare 8, 3, 10:

येन॑ सु॒मु॒द्र म॑सृ॒जो म॒ही र॑प॒ स्तदि॒न्द्र वृ॒ष्णि ते॒ श॒वेः । स॒पः सो॒
अ॒स्य म॒हि॒मा न॒ स॒न्न॒शे ॥

"Great is that might of thine, O Indra, with which thou didst impel the great Waters to the ocean, this greatness of his is not soon to be reached" and 1, 54, 1:

म॒घ॒वन् न॒ हि ते॒ अन्तः॑ श॒र्व॒सः प॑री॒ण॒शे ।

"The end (limit) of thy might, O Indra, is not to be reached". Compare also Sāyaṇa's explanation—

हे इन्द्र ते ल॒या द॑त्तं तत् सु॒प्तं सु॒प्तं ब॑ष्ट॒वे व्या॑प्तुं कोऽपि न ।
प्र॒भव॑तीति शेषः ।

Geldner however interprets the pāda as, 'This thy favour is not to be reached (by words)' in his *R̥V.—Übersetzung*.

The "leading" mentioned in the first half-verse signifies the healing of the blindness and the lameness. Compare Sāyaṇa's explanation—

अनुनयः अन्धावपङ्क्तवपरिहारेण अनुनीतवानसि

and also Geldner's note on this verse in *op. cit.*

The healing of the blind man and the lame man is referred to in the following verses also of the RV.

1, 11, 8: याभिः शचीभिः कृपणाः परावृजं

प्रान्वं श्रोणं चक्षुसं एतवे कृपः ॥

8, 79, 2: अभ्यूषोति यज्ञं भिपकिं विश्वं यत्तुम्

प्रेमन्धः कृपनिः श्रोणो भूत ॥

10, 25, 11: अयं सप्तम्य आ वरं वि वो मदे

प्रान्वं श्रोणं च तारिष दिवक्षसे ॥

2, 15, 7: प्रति श्रोणः स्याद्वष्ट्रं नर्गच्छ

सोमस्य ता मद् इन्द्रं अकार ॥

2, 13, 12: भीचा सन्तमुर्दनयः परावृजं

प्रान्वं श्रोणं श्रवन् सास्युर्कृपः ॥

The first of these verses attributes the healing to the Aśvins, the next two to Soma, and the last two, to Indra. This difference however does not signify anything; for, the RV. poets, not infrequently, ascribe the same exploit, now to one god, and now to another (see in this connection the observations made on p. 65 of Vol. 58 of the *Indian Antiquary*), and there is no doubt that it is the same story or incident which is referred to in all these five verses and also in verse 4, 30, 19. Compare the observations of Windisch in *Festgrays an Bochlilingk*, p. 115, and also Oldenberg, *RV.—Nuten*, I, 283, and Geldner's *RV. Kommentar*, p. 69. See also Geldner's note on 2, 13, 13 in his *RV. Ueber*.

It is also the opinion of the above-named scholars that the same story is referred to in pādas c, d of RV. 4, 10, 9 also:

व्यृथो अह्य दहिमाददानो निर्भूदुखञ्चित् समस्त पर्व ।

Now in connection with this pāda c, it was pointed out long ago by Pischel (*Vedische Studien*, I, 183, n. 1) that the story [Vol. XI, Part ii.]

referred to in it was, in all probability, one that was similar to the story of *The Blind Man, Crooked Man, and Three-breasted Princess* (*andhakah, kubjakah¹, tristanī rājakanyakā ca*) that is found in the Fifth Book of the *Textus simplicior* of the Pañcatantra (V, 12 p. 66 ff. of Buehler-kielhorn's edition in the Bombay Sanskrit Series). This opinion has been endorsed by Hillebrandt (*Lieder des R̥V.*, p. 47, n. 1); and, in an article published in the *Indian Antiquary* (58, 163), I have sought to show that not only pāda c, but pāda d too, refers to the same story, that the words *sam aranta parva* ('the bones set themselves together') refer to the *kubjaka* being healed of his crookedness, and the words *utrbhūḍ ukhacchit* ('the *ukhacchit*² disappeared') to the disappearance of the third breast of the princess.

According to this interpretation,³ there is no reference in R̥V. 4, 19, 9 to a cripple. Likewise, there is no mention in R̥V. 1, 112, 8; 8, 79, 2; 10, 25, 11; 2, 15, 7 and 2, 13, 12 to the circumstance of the blind man and the lame man having been 'abandoned'.⁴ If then, as opined by the above-named scholars, all these verses refer to the same story, it would follow that the story referred to in R̥V. 4, 30, 19 and other verses must be one that is not quite identical with the story referred to in R̥V. 4, 19, 9, but yet resembles it in many details. That is to say, the story referred to in R̥V. 4, 30, 19 must be a variant of the above-men-

1. According to Hertel, Kale and other translators, *kubjaka* denotes 'hunchback'. I am inclined to think however that it denotes 'crooked man' in this story. See *Indian Antiquary*, 58, 163, n. 55.

2. *Ukhacchid*=glandular swelling or enlargement resembling a woman's breast.

3. Even apart from this interpretation, the fact that 4, 19, 9 mentions that 'the blind man was taking a serpent (*ahim ādāṇah*)' while 4, 30, 19 says that he had been 'abandoned' would seem to indicate that the stories referred to by the two verses are not quite identical.

4. The word *paratrjāṃ* 'abandoned', it is true, does occur in R̥V. 1, 112, 8 and 2, 13, 13; but it has been construed as an independent word, that is, as a word standing by itself and not an attribute of *andham* or *śronam* by all interpreters. Even if one construes it as an attribute of *andham*, the verses would still be silent about the lame man having been 'abandoned'.

tailed story of *The Blind Man and the Princess with Three Breasts*.

Now, the *Pañcatantra* version described by me on p. 62 ff. of Vol. 10 of the *Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik* does contain a variant of the above-mentioned story. Not only does this version of the story mention a *paṇḍu* (cripple) instead of the *kuṇḍaka*, but it also states that the blind man and the lame man had been abandoned by their parents. A résumé of this story (in English) has been given on p. 81 f. *loc. cit.* and I shall therefore reproduce here the original text¹ itself.

[f., 39a.] अन्यथा चिन्तितं कार्यं देवेन कृतमन्यथा ।

अन्यः पङ्कुर्यथास्थानं त्रिस्तनी चाभवत्तदा ॥

पुरा केरुकामपुरे चित्ररथो नाम वणिक् अस्ति । तस्य दुर्दृष्टत्वात् द्वौ पुत्रौ अन्यः पङ्कुरजायतान् । स चित्ररथस्तौ कुमारौ दृष्ट्वा अतीव विचाराक्रान्तो भवति । एवं समये तस्य नृसिंहमहो पुरोहितोऽप्यागत्य तं वणिजमाश्वास्य एवमाह—

अपूपेन हस्ताश्चोरा हतः खड्गेन केसरी ।

दुष्टाश्चेन हतो राजा फले भाग्यानुसारिणी ॥

चित्ररथः । कथमेतदिति । नृसिंहमहोऽब्रवीत् । [Here follows the story] इत्युक्त्वा नृसिंहमहः चित्ररथमाश्वास्य इतः परं स्वदार्जितपुण्येन रूपवन्तौ भविष्यत इति गतः । ततः चित्ररथः मार्यया उक्तः । इमौ पुत्रौ अस्माकं मास्तिवति । उक्तमात्र एव चित्ररथः तौ कुमारौ अन्यत्र वने कालिका-लये विसृज्य गतः । ततः वने देवान्धस्य स्कन्धं पङ्कुरधिरुद्ध यथेष्टं शाखाफलादिकं गृहीत्वा भक्षितवन्तौ कालिकालये स्थितौ । ततः कुमुदनगरे निगमगिरिरिति वणिक् । तस्य सुता तृस्तनीति सर्वे बान्धवाः नोद्वाहयोग्येति तां नेच्छन्ति स्म । ततः इमां कन्यां अत्र गृहे वस्तुं न योग्येति वने विसृज्य गतः । ततः तृस्तनी वने सञ्चरित्वा राज्ञी महल्लन्धकारे कालिकालये गता । अन्यः पङ्कुरश्च तां त्वं केति अपृच्छताम् । तृस्तनी स्ववृत्तान्तं सर्वं अकथयत् । ततः श्रेष्ठः पङ्कुरः तामुद्वाह्य तत्रैव स्थिताः । एकदा आहारालाभात् अन्यः

L. Regarding the blunders committed by the copyist when writing out the MS., see the observations on p. 63 of the above-mentioned article in ZII, Vol. 10.

जानुगतिना सुदूरं गतः । ततः अन्धश्चित्त्वात् सिङ्घं पङ्क्तुं पातइत्वा पतितः ।
ततः कोपात् शिखां गृहीत्वा तस्योत्तमाङ्गं मुष्टिना मर्दने कृतः । स चान्धः
कोपात् कृतमुष्टिपातनात् विपमदृष्टिः समदृष्टिरासीत् । ततः अन्धश्च कोपात्
पङ्क्तोश्चरणं गृहीत्वा आकर्षता तस्य च दैववशात् पङ्क्तुत्वमोचनमकारि ।
उभयोः कलहसमये तृस्तनी भर्तृप्रहारं दृष्ट्वा पतिभक्त्या स्ववक्षस्पताडयत् ।
ताडनं तेन तस्या वक्षोमध्यस्थितः स्तन एकोन्तरितोभूत् ॥

तस्मादैववशं न स्तरतीति । अतोहं ब्रवीमि । अन्यथा चिन्तितमिति ॥

This story is, patently, a variant of story V, 12 of the *Textus Simplicior* and not only does it make mention of the blind man and the cripple, but it is also explicitly related in it that they were both abandoned by their parents and that they recovered, respectively, their sight and the use of their legs. It is very probable therefore that the story referred to in RV. 4, 30, 19 was extremely similar to this, in the same way as the story referred to in RV. 4, 19, 9 was similar to V, 12 of the *Textus Simplicior*.

It is true that, in this story, the blind man and the lame man recover respectively, their sight and the use of their legs through Providence (*daiva*), and that nothing is said about the grace of Indra. This feature is however common to story V, 12 of the *Textus Simplicior*, in which too no mention is made of Indra; see in this connection the observations made on p. 165 of the above-mentioned article in the *Indian Antiquary*.

THE NEED OF THE HOUR—A DICTIONARY OF THE
VEDIC LANGUAGE FROM A HISTORICAL OR
LINGUISTIC STANDPOINT.

A NOTE.

BY

C. R. SANKARAN, M.A.,

Diploma in German and French.

In the history of Indo-European linguistics, the Vedic language had received, more than the classical Sanskrit, the early attention of savants of the West, being far more useful for the reconstruction of the Primitive Indo-European speech and the distinctive formulation of Phonetic laws in Indo-European linguistics.

The first translation of the R̥g-Veda (by H. H. Wilson) appeared in the year 1850 and the earliest translation of the Sāma-Veda (by H. Bentley) in 1848, and Vedic interpretation had advanced so far as to render noticeable two schools of interpretation in the West.

Among the extant dictionaries the most valuable are the Wörterbuch zum R̥g-Veda by H. Grassman (Leipzig, 1873), Bohtlingk and Roth's Sanskrit and German dictionaries in seven volumes (St. Petersburg 1852-75), the smaller St. Petersburg Dictionary by Bohtlingk (Leipzig 1879-89) and supplemental volume to it by Schmidt (Leipzig 1928) and Macdonell's Sanskrit-English dictionary for selected hymns (London, 1893), not to mention Macdonell and Keith's Vedic Index of names and subjects (1912) and Hamsa Raja's Vedic Kośa (Vol. 1, and 2, L. Dwarka Dass Memorial Volume, 1925).

But both Grassman and Roth ignored to a large extent, if not wholly, the Indian commentators of the Veda as unreliable, and endeavoured to read into the Veda what appeared to them the more probable interpretation. (On the defective rendering of the Vedic figures of speech into German by these scholars, see the English Translation of Abel Bergaigne's original article in French. "Some observations on the figure of speech in the [Vol. XI, Part ii.]

R̥g-Veda" in Vol. XVII, Part I, 1935-36 of the *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Poona).

Under these circumstances a critical study of the Vedas and especially the oldest of them—the R̥g-Veda—would necessitate for the modern Indian student an interpretation that would best reflect the sense of the texts as intended by the Vedic seers. This would be possible only if he could understand what the Indian commentators have said (now that such highly useful books as Skandavāman's *Bhāṣya* and Veṅkaṭa Mādhava's *Bhāṣya* for a portion of the R̥g-Veda have seen the light of day) and wherein modern translators have differed from them and for what reasons.

Maurice Bloomfield's concordance is of no use in the interpretation (although the same thing cannot be said, at least without any modification, of the three volumes of Vedic variants by M. Bloomfield, Edgerton and Murray Barnson Emeneau in 1930, 1932 and 1934, published by the Linguistic Society of America), while Grassmann's *Wörterbuch*, being only restricted to the R̥g-Veda, cannot serve our purpose, apart from the reason of the defective nature in his translation of the Vedic hymns as stated above.

For these reasons, I would suggest that a dictionary of words in the Ved iclanguage, in the R̥g-Veda, Yajur-Veda and the Atharva-Veda, in the *Saṁhitās*, *Brāhmaṇas* and *Upaniṣads*, giving their interpretations as indicated by the Indian commentators from the earliest to the last known, the interpretations suggested by Western translators, the history of the words and the changes undergone in sound and sense during the three clearly distinguishable strata of the Vedic language, with passages in illustration of all decisive statements, will be a valuable contribution to the study of Vedic Philology. (To some extent, an attempt in the direction herein indicated has been made by Franklin Edgerton in his article, "The meaning of Sāṅkhya and Yoga" published in the *American Journal of Philology*, Vol. 45, 1924, pp. 1-41, and by P. M. Modi in his book *Akṣara—A forgotten chapter in the history of Indian Philosophy*, Baroda 1932.) A strict and instructive comparison of the Vedic words with the cognate ones in other Indo-European languages like the Avesta and the Greek, and a historical treatment of sound and semantic changes in the course of the progressive

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development of the Vedic language from the dim pre-historic past up to the dawn of the classical language are likely to furnish interesting details to the students of Indo-European linguistics in general and to the students of the Vedic philology in particular. A definite conclusion as to the original meanings of the Vedic words might render necessary a distinct determination of the historical relation and the relative chronology of the various parts of the Vedic lore. The determination of the original sense of the Vedic expressions and the determination of the historical relation of the parts of the Veda may be said to be independent. In addition to these, a history of each of the words, and detailed discussion of extant opinions on the same in brief, would highly facilitate the progress of the critical students of the Veda. (This desideratum will appear all the more apparent when one peruses a book like "Matter, Myth and Spirit of Keltic and Hindu Links" by Dorothea Chaplain, London, 1935, where the author's work would undoubtedly have been considerably facilitated if the want had already been supplied.)

In this connection, I may draw attention to Macdonell's views on this subject. "The modern critical Vedic scholar has at his disposal for the purposes of interpretation partially all the traditional material accessible to Sāyana in the 14th century. But over and above this common material the scientific scholar possesses a number of valuable resources which were unknown to the commentators. These are the evidence of the Avesta, of Comparative Philology, of comparative mythology, of the anthropology of the ancient peoples besides the application of the historical method to traditional evidence as well as to classical Sanskrit as throwing light on the Veda. The Avesta is capable of elucidating questions of language, metre, mythology and cult in the R̥g-Veda. Comparative philology throws direct light on the origin and meaning of many Vedic words, but negatively supplies a check on wild and impossible etymologies."

"A very valuable foundation for Vedic interpretation was laid by Prof. Roth, who followed the comparative method, in the large St. Petersburg Dictionary. It is of course impossible that a single scholar, investigating the whole vocabulary of the R̥g-Veda in this way, should have arrived at certainty in all cases. But a great deal still remains to be done in the critical re-examination of results already arrived at. Complete success, especially

in a field in which the workers are so few, can only be attained by the efforts of several generations of scholars" (A. A. Macdonell: The principles to be followed in translating the R̥g-Veda, Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, 1917, pages 10-11).

The feasibility of a work of this kind is, certainly, beyond question. At the same time it can neither be the work of a single individual, nor is it a task that can be accomplished in a few weeks or months. It would require the intellect and energy of a band of competent scholars trained in the proper way and full of enthusiasm who can devote a large number of years in this pursuit.

To those who undertake this task, a thorough study of the Vedas and Vedaṅgas according to the indigenous system of interpretation, and a sound knowledge of the basic principles adopted by the native commentators as laid down in the Mīmāṃsā, in the Nirukta and the Prātiśākhya, a complete mastery of the fundamental principles in Indo-European linguistics, a useful acquaintance with the Avestan, Greek and Latin languages and their grammar—in so far as they may be useful to compare forms—and a good knowledge of German and French, to realise and extract what has been said on and in the interpretation of the Veda, will be among the indispensable qualifications. It may take years of hard and silent study before one could be ready to undertake such a task as this, but it is bound to repay.

I may add here that a work of this nature will not be possible for European students of Indian literature who have not had sufficient training in the native methods of study, and they are likely, as they have already done, to ignore the immense value of the original Indian commentaries of the Veda and the grammatical treatises that now and then furnish much useful and suggestive information regarding the various changes in sound and sense which the words have undergone in the course of the development of the Vedic language. This is a question well worth to be thought upon whether it will not be a real service to the course of Vedic philology in this country, if well equipped scholars here enter such an enterprise. It will indeed be a monumental work, if successfully carried to the very end, combining in itself lexicon, history and linguistics; and it could be best achieved only if taken up as a labour of love. (A plea similar to the one put forward here, I understand from a *compte*

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veda, has come forth from Professor Dr. Manilal Patel, Ph. D. (Marburg) Visvabharat Śāstriniketan, in his paper (read at the Vedic Section) "Principles of the Translation and Interpretation of the R̥g-Veda" (at the VIIIth All India Oriental Conference held at Mysore, December 1935).

[Since writing the above, I have learnt that the Vishveshvaranand Vedic Research Institute, Lahore, organised with the help of and at the instance of the late Svami Vishveshvaranandji of Shant Kuti, Simla, in 1923, has been engaged on the huge and important work of compiling material for preparing and publishing a complete Vedic Word-Concordance and a Vedic Dictionary of an encyclopaedic nature. I further understand that the Editor may be able to achieve this objective if a stable provision of Rs. 40,000 per annum could be guaranteed to him for 15 years and I only pray that he may be given necessary encouragement to carry out this stupendous task.]



A NOTE ON THE MĀYALŪR PLATES OF VINAYĀDITYA SATYĀŚRAYA.

BY

MR. R. S. PANCHAMURTHI, M.A.,

Madras.

The Māyalūr plates which form a welcome addition to the published charters of the Cālukya king Vinayāditya Satyāśraya are published with plate and a historical introduction in the *Journal of Oriental Research*¹ by Mr. M. S. Sarma of the Telugu Encyclopedia Office, Madras. He discusses at some length the date of accession of Vinayāditya, the calculation of the astronomical details given in the Dayyandinne plates and the interpretation of the terms अवनिपतिवित्त and वैराज्य occurring in the grants of Vikramāditya and Vinayāditya respectively. His conclusions differ widely from the ones arrived at by me on the subject in my paper on the Dayyandinne plates published in the *Ep. Indica*.² Further, his interpretation of the grant portion does not follow the text of the inscription under notice. It is therefore the object of this note to examine his arguments and to offer incidentally a probable meaning of the rare expression *māruṇḍa-maṭumanna* occurring in the grant portion of this and other records of this period.

"The inscription records", according to Mr. Sarma, "the grant of 108 *niṣartana*s of land by the royal measure as '*māruṇḍa-maṭumanna*' in the village of Ālikunde in Perlekul-*viṣaya* to Trivikramaśarma". This is not correct. The relevant portion of the text reads as follows:—

त्रिविक्रमशर्म[णे] . . . पेडेकुल्लिये आलिकुन्दे ग्रामे मारुण्डमहमन्नी
तस्मिन्नेव ग्रामे राजमानेनाष्टोत्तरशत निवर्तनं क्षेत्रं दत्तम् [॥०]

which may be translated as, "(by us) were granted to Trivikrama-

1. Vol X, pp. 27 ff.

2. Vol. XXII, pp. 24 ff.

śarman, मारुञ्जमरुमञ्जौ¹ in the village of Ālikūṇḍa included in Peḍekulviṣaya (and) 108 *nivartana*s of land by the royal measure in the same village." From this it is clear that *māruṇḍa-maru-maṇḍa* is different from and has no connection with the 108 *nivartana*s of land mentioned in line 27, and so it cannot mean a kind of land tenure as stated by the author. Similar expressions are found in the following passages of the records of Ādityavarman and Vinayachōṭya:—

1. मुण्डकलुग्रामस्य शालीरग्रामस्य च उञ्जमन्नपन्नासवृत्तिः राजमानेन दत्ता [I*]²

2. पेडे कुन्विषये तोगचेहुग्रामे आदित्युञ्जमरुमञ्जौ गुञ्जवेलेन्दोरुग्रामे मारुञ्जमरुमञ्जौ(ञ्जौ) एरेयूर्पमे मारुञ्जमरुमञ्जौ वेदेयूर्पमे मारुञ्जमरुमञ्जौ एते सभागो(मोगा) दत्तः (ताः) [II*]³

उञ्जमन्नपन्नासवृत्ति has been translated by Mr. Sarma⁴ as land measuring पन्ना (fifty probably) *pannāṣas* (was given) as *Uñcha-manna-ṛtti*—perhaps the name of a certain kind of land tenure". This does not appear to be correct. To yield this sense, we should expect the text as

मुण्डकलुग्रामे....ग्रामे च पन्नास निवर्तनानि उञ्जमन्नवृत्त्या (or उञ्जमन्नवृत्तिपन्नास निवर्तनानि) दत्तानि [I*]

Inasmuch as the villages are mentioned in the genitive case and the word पन्नास if it meant 'fifty' does not qualify a noun such as *nivartana*, it may be presumed that the holding (वृत्ति) of *pannaṣa* and the उञ्ज lands of the two villages was granted according to the royal *māna* (measure). It may be noted that the word *pannaṣa* or *pannaṣa* is found used as a kind of estate under some particular conditions in the stone and copper plate inscriptions⁵

1. The elongated bend in the right arm of—*n* appears to indicate the an sign. Compare the expression मारुञ्जमरुमञ्जौ in the Togarchēdu grant (J. B. R. A., Vol. XVI, p. 244). Further the word is मञ्ज ending in *a*, if उञ्जमञ्ज.

2. *Ind. Ant.*, Vol. XI, p. 66.

3. *J. B. R. A.*, Vol. XVI, pp. 235 ff.

4. *J. O. R.*, Vol. X, p. 28.

5. See for example *M. E. R.* Nos. 338 of 1922, 310 and 330 of 1935-36; *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. V, p. 141, ll. 27-28; Vol. XV, pp. 334-336 and note 3; *S. I. I.*, Vol. IV, Nos. 1101, 1364 and 1384; *Ind.* [Vol. XI, Part ii.]

of this early period. If, however, *वृत्ति* is taken in the collective sense of *निवर्तनानि*, the expression would then mean "fifty *nivartanas* of Uñcha land of the two villages were granted by the royal measure." In this case the genitive termination used for the two villages cannot be accounted for, unless it is taken to qualify the first member i.e. *उच्छमन्न* of the compound word *उच्छमन्नपञ्चासवृत्ति* on the analogy of *देवदत्तस्य सुस्कुलम्*. But we know that *pannasa* or *panūsa* is a kind of land, and so this interpretation cannot be accepted. Similarly *उच्छमन्न*, as the name suggests, denotes a kind of land and not a kind of tenure. With this as our guide, we may suggest an explanation of the remaining expressions, viz. *आदित्युच्छमन्नमञ्जरी* and *मरुच्छमन्नमञ्जरी*. The word *मञ्जरी* which appears to be a corrupt variant of the Telugu-Kannada word *मञ्जु-मण्डप* (=earth) appears to have been dualised in the two compound words which may be split up as follows:—

मरुच्छमन्न+मरुमन्न=मरुच्छमरुमञ्जरी ।

आदित्युच्छमन्न+मरुमन्न=आदित्युच्छमरुमञ्जरी ॥

Since they form the object of grant in the Togarchikū and Māyalūr plates, they must be considered to denote a particular kind of land and not land-tenure as supposed by Mr. Sarma. *मरुच्छमन्न*, accordingly, may mean 'alienable *nācha* land' where *मरु* means to sell or alienate and *मरुमन्न* the waste or dry land, in which case *मरु* is probably a vernacular rendering of the Sanskrit word *मरु*. *आदित्युच्छमन्न* may be understood as *उच्छमन्न* belonging to the temple of Āditya or named after Ādityavarman the elder, brother of Vikramāditya I. It appears that in ancient times a

Ant. Vol. VI, p. 77; X, p. 167 and XIII, p. 250, l. 30. A Paṭṭadkal inscription of Vikramāditya II (A. D. 733—746) contains the passage '*Narayangalla pannāsugaḥ—itta samayam—ommattarge irkkula jōlam kuṭṭuvudu[*]*' in which *pannāsa* is a kind of estate of which, for one *matte* of land, two *kuṭṭas* of *jōla* should be given. *Samaya* means here *vyavasthā* or arrangement or understanding and not 'at the time of' as translated by Fleet (*Ind. Ant.*, Vol. X, p. 167). It may be noted that Narayangal is known in inscriptions as a sub-division consisting of twelve villages only and the plural in *pannāsugaḥ* is superfluous if it meant 'fifty'.

1. It cannot be connected with the word *mānya* since the letter becomes *mannaya* in its *tadbhava* form. In early Kannaḍa inscriptions *mannu* is used to denote land or field.

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village had some पञ्च, उच्छ and ५६ lands set apart for public use, which belonged to the state, and in the instances quoted above, they were granted by the king to the respective donees.

Mr. Sarma calculates the date of the Dayyandinne plates, viz., 12th regnal year, Śaka 614 (expired), Āṣāḍha, Paurṇimā, Dakṣiṇāyana-kāla, to fall on 22nd June, A. D. 693. This is wrong. For Śaka 614, if expired, would commence on A. D. 692 (23rd February, Caitra Śa.) and, if current, in A. D. 691 (6th March) and never in A. D. 693, for which year he says that he calculated the details. The Śaka year quoted being an expired one, the details will have to be calculated for A. D. 692 only and their English equivalent would be, as shown in my paper, 4th July, A. D. 692. Further, it may be noted that Dakṣiṇāyana-sāṅkramaṇa and Āṣāḍha Śa. Paurṇimā did not occur as stated by Mr. Sarma on the same day in A. D. 693: the former took place on 22nd June at 17 h. 58 m. $7\frac{1}{2}$ s. or on 21st June at 19 h. 40 m. $8\frac{1}{2}$ s. according to the First Ārya Siddhānta-Mean system or the Brahma Siddhānta-Mean system, which were in vogue between A. D. 628 and 1000; while the latter fell on 27th June, A. D. 693. Excepting the Togarchōju grant and the Jejūri plates whose dates have to be separately dealt with, all the other records of Vinayāditya including the Māyālūr plates dated Śaka 614: 11th regnal year and the paṭṭāḍi grant dated Śaka 617: 14th regnal year, yield the initial date for the commencement of the king's reign between 22nd June and 4th July A. D. 681¹. It may be stated here that the date portion in the Lakṣmīśvar inscription² which was examined *in situ* by me recently reads clearly $\text{अष्टोत्तरपदछन्दोऽयं शकवर्षेऽष्टमितीति प्रवर्तमानविजयराज्यवर्चससम्बल्ले}$, which equates Śaka 608 with the 5th regnal year of the king. Fleet's doubt whether the regnal year was 5 or 7 is therefore not justifiable and Mr. Sarma's assumption of the figure to be 7 is accordingly incorrect.³

From the tabular statement of the dated charters given by Mr. Sarma, it would appear that four dates, namely A. D. 679, 680, 681 and 682, are suggested for the initial year of the king's

1. Sewell's *Siddhāntas and Indian Calendar*, preface X and 1.

2. This is engraved in characters of the 11th century A.D. and appears to be a copy of an old charter.

3. *Journal of Ori. Res.* Vol. X, p. 27 fn. 2.

reign. The reading of the date in the Lakṣmeśvar inscription would add further complication by giving the fifth date, namely A. D. 685. These results are at variance with each other and cannot be accepted as conclusive. It must be borne in mind that the initial date of the king should be worked out not from each record separately, but in collaboration with the details given in the other dated charters of the king known so far. If both the 11th and 12th regnal years fell in Śaka 614 (expired) i. e., A. D. 692-93 as cited in the Sorab and Dayyandinne records respectively, it is evident that the 12th year could not have commenced in A. D. 693-94 which corresponded to Śaka 615 (expired). Hence the initial year of the king fell as shown in my paper, in June-July of A. D. 681, which result finds confirmation from other epigraphs of the period.¹

In order to understand the true import of the terms अवनिपतिव्रित्तय and वैराज्य, it is necessary to study closely the texts of the inscriptions where they are used. In all the grants issued by Vikramāditya I up to his 10th year he is described in the following words—

चित्रकण्ठाक्षप्रवरतुरङ्गमेकैकेनैव प्रतीतानेकसमरमुत्थेषु . . . निशित-
निक्षिप्तधारया च . . . निजनुजविजितविजिगीषुः . . . सगुरोदिश्रयमवनिपति-
व्रित्तयान्तरितामात्मसात्कृत्वा कृतैकाधिष्ठिताशोपराज्यमरस्तस्मिन् राज्यत्रये विनष्टानि
देवस्वब्रह्मदेयानि . . . स्वमुखेन स्थापितवान् [I*]

The spurious Kurtakōṭe grant of his 10th year and the Gadval grant of his 20th year add to this the conquest of the Pallava kings in the following verses:—

अपि च मृदितनरसिंहयशसा विहितमहेन्द्रप्रतापविलयेन ।

नयनविजितेश्वरेण प्रभुणा श्रीवल्लभेन जितम् [II*]

कृतफल्लवावर्द्धं दक्षिणदिग्युचतिमातकाश्रीकः [I*]

यो मृशमभिरमयन्नपि सुतरां श्रीवल्लभत्वमितः [II*] etc.

Let us see what the records of his son Vinayāditya say about the exploits of Vikramāditya. They contain the following passage:—

1. M. E. R. 1920, No. 364 and Bharata Itihāsa Saṁśodhaka-maṇḍal Quarterly, (Śaka 1834) p. 169.

मतिसहायसाहसमात्रसमधिगतनिजवंशसमुचितचितराज्यविभवस्य ,
 हिमकरकरविमलकुलपरिमवविद्ययहेतुपल्लवपतिपराजयानन्तरपरिगृहीतकाञ्चीपुरस्य
 प्रभावकुलिशदलितचोळमाण्ड्यकेरळधरणीधरत्रयमानमानभृङ्गस्य अनन्यसमवनत-
 काञ्चीपतिमणिमकुटकुटकिरणसलिलामिदिकचरणवमलस्य त्रिसमुद्रमण्यवर्तिमुवन-
 मण्डलार्थीधरस्य—

Thus the defeat of the Pallavas and the capture of Kāñcī-
 pura being common in both the accounts, अवनिपतिवित्त्य mentioned
 in Vikramāditya's records must evidently refer to चोळमाण्ड्य-
 केरळधरणीधर of his son's grants. This is hinted in the passage
 तुरङ्गमेषीपार्जितस्वस्यवित्त्यचेरचोळमाण्ड्यप्रमागतस्यवयः occurring in con-
 nection with Vikramāditya I in the Nirpani Plates of Tribhuvan-
 nārāya Nāgavardhana¹ which, as Fleet has opined, belong to
 the period of Vikramāditya after the restoration of his kingdom.

There is no basis in the inscriptions so far available to postulate that Vikramāditya I wrested his kingdom from the
 Pallava in A. D. 655, though it is a fact that the Pallava
 Narasimhavarmā had occupied Bādāmi in his 13th regnal year
 (i.e. A. D. 643). The political condition in his period of 12
 years between A. D. 643 and 655 cannot however be determined
 in the absence of a definite evidence. The only alternative
 explanations that can be offered are that the three kings Pāṇḍya,
 Coja and Keraḷa formed a coalition and after defeating the
 Pallavas occupied portions of the Cāḷukya kingdom. To sup-
 pose that these three kings could not unite together as they were
 fighting with each other is against possibilities, inasmuch as
 political relations vary according to circumstances especially
 when the Pallava was the source of common danger as can be
 gathered from the Ashoka record of Pulikeśin II, to be rid of
 whom they could have provisionally joined together. The other
 alternative is that अवनिपतिवित्त्य can be understood as one (i. e.,
 the Pallava) who was the over-lord of the three kings viz.
 Pāṇḍya, Coja and Keraḷa. But this interpretation is not permis-
 sible according to the rules of grammar. Further we are not

1. *Ind. Ant.* Vol. IX, p. 124.

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certain that the three powers were held in subjection by Pallava since varying statements are found in the records of the respective families for this period. Whatever be the exact political conditions of this period in the Deccan, the अवनिपतिवित्तप which overran and occupied the Cālukyan territory must, until more definite evidence is forthcoming, be taken to refer to the Pāṇḍya, Coḷa and Kēraḷas warranted by the text of the inscriptions mentioned above.

If, as contended by Mr. Sarna, अवनिपतिवित्तप and वैरह्य refer to the Pallava Kingdom having three component parts or the Pallava confederacy of three kingdoms,¹ it would appear that the three Pallava branches held their territory in the Nellore, Guntur and the Ceded districts in about A. D. 643 when अवनिपतिवित्तप must have subverted the Cālukya kingdom, and also in A. D. 678 when Vinayāditya uprooted the army of Trairājya-Pallava. This is against all historical facts. For from the records cited by me to prove the Cālukyan sway in Guntur, Nellore and the Ceded districts from the time of Pulikeśin II to about A. D. 620 and even later, it may be concluded that the territory said to have been governed by the two branches of the Pallava dynasty was actually under the Cālukyas in the first half of the 7th century A. D. This was no doubt occupied in the intervening period between 643 and 655 by the अवनिपतिवित्तप by ousting whom Vikramāditya got back his kingdom. It may be noted that these provinces were not newly conquered by Vikramāditya I or his son Vinayāditya as the former's inscriptions definitely affirm that he only recovered the ancestral territory of his father, showing thereby that Pulikeśin's dominions comprised the districts mentioned above.² And we know that Pulikeśin's power did not suffer any loss till at least A. D. 643 when Hsien Tsiang is supposed to have visited his court. The

1. J. O. R., Vol. X, pp. 34 and 40. See also *The Madras Christian College Magazine*, 1929, p. 7B.

2. His kingdom was bounded on three sides by the ocean (तस्यान्ध्रविषयनिवारितशासनस्य)

—Aihole Inscription.

It may be noted that Vikramāditya is described in the records of Vinayāditya as त्रिसमुद्रमध्यवर्तिभुवनमण्डलधीश्वर.

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kings of the Eastern Cālukya dynasty too are not at this period known to have acquired any new territory in the east coast nor any conflict with the Pallavas or their subordinates is mentioned in their inscriptions. The epigraphs cited by Dr. Ramanayya to prove the existence of some Pallava rulers such as Gaṅgūla in the Ceded districts are all later and belong to the period of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa sovereignty. Mr. Sarma cites a record from Kāṇṭhagiri in Nellore district which he thinks belongs to Pallava monarch Parameśvara I. In the first place, the record is engraved in characters of the 10th century A. D. and the king mentioned therein could not have been the imperial Pallava monarch Parameśvaravarman of the 7th century A. D. Secondly, the king mentioned therein appears to be only a subordinate chief Pallavāditya [Bōdi] rājā who is called 'the devout worshipper of the feet of the venerable Arhat. Hence the existence of the Pallava branches in the 7th century A. D. cannot be historically established.

In addition to what has been already written by me on अवनिपतिवित्त and वैराज्य the following evidence may be adduced to prove that they referred to Pāṇḍya, Cōḷa and Kēraḷa only.

(1) If अवनिपतिवित्त denoted Pallava, the Gadvāl grant would not have used the two words separately. This shows that अवनिपतिवित्त is different from Pallava.

(2) The Ūsamblāla grant of the Gujeral Cālukya king Dhārāśraya Jayasīṃha similarly uses the two terms पञ्च and वैराज्य separately in the passage काञ्चीपुरीशपत्नवान्वयप्रनाथीपरिग्रहीत-वैराज्यराज्यः¹. If the composer wanted to convey the sense that Vikramāditya seized the Pallava dominions after subduing them,

1. परिग्रहीतवैराज्यः has to be explained as: त्रयाणां राज्यानां (kingdoms) समाहतः वैराज्यम्, तस्य राज्यम्, (sovereignty), परिग्रहीतं वैराज्यराज्यं येनेति. The idea of Bahuvrīhi i.e., Pallava having three kingdoms under him, cannot be derived from the *Samahara-dvandva* compound as shown above. Mr. Sarma understands the expression as 'who had taken the kingdom of one (i.e. Pallava) who had three kingdoms under him'. This is hardly justifiable, for there is nothing to suggest that *Trairājya-rājya* was the Pallava kingdom since the meaning of the term *Trairājya* itself is not yet determined.

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we should only expect परिग्रहीतव्यायः. Here वैराज्य must mean a different power. This is hinted in the Nijān grant in the passage विजितचेरनेल्लपाण्ड्यकमागतवय्यवयः.

(3) Mūvar, mūvarāṣar, mūvarāyar and mūvēndar which are Tamil renderings of the Sanskrit word त्रैराज्य are applied to denote these three South Indian kings.¹ Mūvar is used in this sense in *Tolkāppiyam* (*van paṭal mūvar laṇṇol raiyippin*)² and mūvēndar in *Tēvāram* (*mudiyai-nalagāṇḍa mūvēndar unṇē*).³ Compare also the Kannaḍa epithet *Mūnṛūyana-gaṇḍa* in which the first member is generally taken to refer to Pāṇḍya, Cōḷa and Kēraḷa.

In the Melepāḍu plates⁴ of Puṇyakumāra, Mahēndra-vikramavarman of the Karikāla family is stated to have been the lord of Pāṇḍya, Cōḷa and Kēraḷa. Himself a Cōḷa-Mahārāja, he is credited with the lordship over the three kingdoms which in the context undoubtedly explain the term वैराज्य occurring in the same grant in connection with Karikāla. *Tairājya* in वैराज्यमुपिजनपदान् of the Viṣṇupurāṇa must refer to the Pāṇḍya, Cōḷa and Kēraḷa and not to the triple Mūṣaka kingdom as suggested by Mr. Sarma.⁵ The existence of three component parts in the small Mūṣaka territory is not warranted by history. The only sources of information about the Mūṣakas are the *Mūṣaka-vaṇṇa* which is partly published in the *Travancore Archaeological Series*⁶ with the summary of the whole *kāya* and a few stone records of the 11th century A. D.⁷ The *Mūṣaka-vaṇṇa* which gives a detailed account of the Mūṣaka kings and their kingdom does not refer to the triple division, nor do the stone inscriptions hint at it. The epithet *Irāṇaguḍamūvar* applied to the Mūṣaka chiefs Udayavarman and Kaṇḍaṇ Kāri-varman of the 11th-12th century A. D. is equated by Mr. Sarma with Rāmagaḥaṭṭa-tritaya or Mūṣaka-tritaya or Tairājya Mūṣaka

1. *Tamīl Lexicon*, pp. 3331 and 3332.

2. *Po.* 391.

3. *Tēvāram*, 880, 11.

4. *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XI, pp. 337 ff. Krishna Sastri has shown that वैराज्य here must refer to Pāṇḍya, Cōḷa and Kēraḷa only.

5. *Jour. Orient. Res.*, Vol. X, p. 39 f.

6. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 87 ff.

7. *M. E. R.*, No. 476 of 1926 and No. 523 of 1930.

by which a triple Mūsaka kingdom is hypothesized¹ in the period when Viṣṇupurāṇa was composed. This, however, is not convincing. As stated above, we do not know of the three divisions in the Mūsaka territory. In the absence of any definite evidence, the term may be interpreted as 'Rāmagaṇa-mūtlavar' meaning Rāmagaṇa-vrddhas just as the early Western Gāṇga kings who were called the Koṅgaivṛddha-Mahārājas or Koṅga-Muttarāja were subsequently styled as Gāṇga-Perumāḷigal, mūtar, vrddha, mullarāja or Perumāḷigal being only a term of respect.²



1. *Jour. Orient. Res.*, Vol. X, p. 39.

2. Mr. K. V. Subrahmanya Aiyar says that the rulers of the Mūsaka kingdom of which Kolam was the capital are styled *Kolattirirājas* in *Keralōtpatti* (*Jour. Roy. As. Society*, 1922, pp. 161 ff). The suffix *ttiri* in *Kolattiri* has been taken by Mr. Aiyar as a Tamil form of *siri*. But Mr. Sarma takes it to be a vernacular variant of the Sanskrit word *tri* equivalent to "mūvar". The word *Kolattirirāja* may after all be a Tamil adaptation of the Sanskrit word *Kolādrirāja* since *drī* must necessarily be written in Tamil as *ttiri*.

THE ORIGIN OF THE ALPHABET OF CAMPĀ

By

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI

I have read and considered carefully the reply (pages 51-4 above) of Prof. R. C. Majumdar to my criticism of his view of the origin of the alphabet of Campā; I do not think that the case for a North Indian origin has improved by his discussion, and I want to indicate briefly why I think so.

Before doing so, I must say a personal word. Prof. Majumdar says: "Although I am unable to agree with his views I none the less appreciate the fact that he has not used such slighting and satirical remarks against me as I found in his book *THE CŪḲAS*." Evidently Prof. Majumdar has in mind the footnote at p. 83 of my *CŪḲAS* i, the only reference to him in this work, if I am not mistaken. This note, which has somehow attracted rather more attention than it merits, aims at stating that even a careful scholar like Majumdar was misled by what I consider to have been some initial mistakes made by the late Kanakasabhai in presenting the data drawn from Tamil works to the non-Tamil world, and I still believe that a perusal of the note will not create any other impression in the reader's mind. In any event, I owe it to myself to say that it was far from my intention to slight or ridicule a colleague in the field of Indian studies for whom I have always had a very high regard. I am sorry that the note should have caused him annoyance.

I shall now turn to the argument on the Campā alphabet. The first point of difference relates to the *reascend* of the lower end of the verticals of *a*, *ā*, *ɛ* and of the medial *u* and *ū*. Prof. Majumdar says that he is unable to understand my argument on this point, and asks if I postulate an imaginary type of southern alphabet earlier than that of Gīrnār and Kanheri. I do nothing of the kind. I even said in a note at p. 194 that the slight curve which develops into the *reascend* was not exclusively South Indian, and added: "There is much waywardness in the adoption of these ornamental excrescences when they first come into vogue. A period of uncertainty precedes the definite adoption or rejection

of the trail concerned', and I reached this conclusion after an examination of many inscriptions discovered since Bühler's *Palaeography* was written. And I also drew attention at p. 195 to certain traits in the Vo-Canh record itself and some others which supported the older view of the South Indian origin, recently reiterated by Vogel. Though Prof. Majumdar uses quotation marks, I must beg leave to say that he has not quoted me properly on this point.

The next point relates to the upper vertical of *br*. Prof. Majumdar suggests that I have mistaken a spot on the estampage due to erosion of the rock in one case, and a serif in another for the bend of the vertical to the left. I say, quite possible; but will only add that in such an argument, I am quite content that Prof. Majumdar concedes that there is some apparent thing, about which he and I may differ.

Prof. Majumdar does not enter into the details of my discussion of the six features which, according to him, are common to the scripts of North India and the Vo-Canh inscription of Campâ, and are absent in South Indian scripts. He says: "I can safely leave it to the judgment of any reader who will take the trouble of comparing the facsimiles of inscriptions referred to therein." But he prepares his reader for this task by prefacing the remark with a sneer and a *tu quoque*. He says: "Prof. Sastri has proved, to his own satisfaction, that these features are either not present in Vo-Canh record or are found in the South Indian inscriptions of an age not much later than the Girnâr and Kanhêri records." I have seldom found that a proof which satisfies me fails to satisfy others; and in this case also, I think that, though Prof. Majumdar has not found satisfaction in what I have said, others may do so. Then he says: "Thus according to Prof. Sastri, the Vo-Canh record is both an 'earlier' and a later 'specimen of the same script'. Comment on this is superfluous." The reader will find that this is exactly what I said of Prof. Majumdar in my review of his paper at p. 197. The temptation to repeat the remark against me has been, unfortunately, too strong for him to observe that my 'inscriptions of an age not much later than the Girnâr and Kanhêri records' are all of them earlier than the Vo-Canh record, and that my argument was that these new inscriptions, unknown to Bergaigne when he formulated his view of the South Indian origin of the Campâ alphabet, go to confirm his views.

On the notched *ja* I find that I have reversed the order of Vogel's sentences in citing them, and this has led Prof. Majumdar to detect a contradiction in Vogel's remarks which is not there. I venture to think that if Prof. Majumdar looks up pp. 224-25 of the *Tāpā inscriptions* he will realise how close is the parallel in the development of this letter in South India and in Campā, and how in fact it is one of the strongest proofs that the Campā alphabet belongs to the South Indian class.

It may be well, before concluding, to define the extent of our difference on the subject under discussion. Prof. Majumdar does not deny the presence of South Indian influences in Campā, nor I that of northern influences. It is all a matter of where the original colonists started from and what the earliest Indian influences traceable among them are, more specifically what the place of the colonad alphabet is in the development of Indian script. When Prof. Majumdar formulated his view of a North Indian origin of this alphabet, it was quite new and contrary to the generally accepted view; and I started examining his views in some detail just to decide if I should accept the new theory or not, and when I saw there was much more to be said for the older view than for the other, I stated the results of my study. I have considered Prof. Majumdar's reply, and I do not see any need as yet to alter my views, which are, after all, not mine but those of a long line of competent scholars who have dealt with the subject for about half a century.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

SUVARNADVIPA—PART I, POLITICAL HISTORY BY DR. R. C. MAJUMDAR, M.A., PH.D., PROFESSOR, DACCA UNIVERSITY. Dacca, 1937, pp. xxiii, 436 and 16.

The exact meaning of the expression 'Suvarnadvīpa' is a matter for some doubt, and after glancing at the different views that have been put forward, Professor Majumdar concludes: "Thus on the whole, we shall not perhaps be far wrong, if we take Suvarṇabhūmi and Suvarṇadvīpa as general designations of Burma, Malay Peninsula, and Malay archipelago" (p. 48). Burma is left out of the reckoning in the rest of the book; but even so, the history narrated in it is not one continuous flowing record, but more or less well-authenticated fragments of a number of separate, but inter-related, histories of different states. The attentive reader will notice many striking analogies between this history of India across the seas and the history of the mainland. "Although Suvarṇadvīpa is a mere geographical expression and a congeries of states, it came to be, on two occasions at least, almost a political entity, first, under the Sailendra kings from the end of the eighth to the beginning of the eleventh century A. D., and, secondly, in the palmy days of Empire of Majapahit," (fourteenth century).

Book I comprising ten chapters (pages 1-148) is devoted to the study of the beginnings of Hindu colonisation in Malayasia. The period is full of controversial problems and Dr. Majumdar endeavours to do justice to the rival points of view held by different scholars, and does not flinch from formulating his own conclusions. He is inclined to date the beginnings of migration across the seas to the prehistoric period when the Dravidian and Aryan settlements in India dislodged the primitive peoples and sent them in search of new homes across the seas (p. 18). It may be observed in passing that this conclusion may seem to set at rest the doubts expressed by the author elsewhere (pp. 6-7) upon the probability of direct voyages between South Indian ports and the Malay Peninsula. He is not convinced by the

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evidence cited in support of the hypothesis of a movement from Indonesia to India (p. 19). He enters on a somewhat elaborate demonstration which seeks to lead to the conclusions that Southern India was the common centre from which migrations took place to Malayasia and Madagascar and that the Mangalore of a Madagascar tradition is no other than the famous town of the same name on the coast of S. Kanara (p. 23). But there are some weak links in this chain of reasoning, mainly philological, and I doubt if the connections perceived by the author among Mājava, Malabar and Malaya are so evident. The differentiae of the pre-Hindu culture of Malayasia are studied in chapter III on the lines followed by Brandes and Koem; the chapter entitled *Suvarṇadvīpa* contains a review of the geographical data from the Purāṇas and other works of Indian literature and the modern discussions of those data calculated to show that from a very remote time the Indians possessed a vague idea of the countries in the Far East across the sea, and that trade was the chief stimulus of the intercourse between India and the Far East (p. 61). In the succeeding chapters the evidence on Hindu settlements in the different parts of the Peninsula and the Archipelago is considered in detail. One is left wondering how a captain from Rangamat (p. 83) came to leave a record in South Indian characters (p. 90) in the Province Wellesley. Dr. Majumdar is generally up to date with his bibliography; it is the more surprising that he should have failed to notice that the Takua Pa Inscription (p. 90) was deciphered and discussed by Hultzsch in *JRAS* and again considered at some length by the present writer in a previous issue of this Journal. On the extent of Hindu influences in Java, Dr. Majumdar is inclined to think that Brahmanical culture was not confined to a handful of colonists settled among a vast native population, but that it was the prevailing religion of the country (p. 104), and that Pūrṇavarman's family was Indian in origin (p. 109). The last chapter (X) in book I is a general review of Hindu colonisation in *Suvarṇadvīpa* up to the end of the seventh century, and here Dr. Majumdar does not have anything to say on the influence of the Pallavas or of South India, as he has reserved for a subsequent volume the discussion of these and other allied questions.

Book II (pp. 149-227) deals with the history of the Śailendra Empire. The history of Śrīvijaya and the relation of [Vol. XI, Part II.]

the Śailendras to that kingdom have been the subject of several discussions in recent years, and Dr. Majumdar has taken an active part in questioning the soundness of older views and formulating new ones. The present writer has not been able to agree with some of the new propositions put forward by the learned author of the book, and this will be evident from some of the notes in it. And Prof. Coedes, who has held the leading place in Śrīvijaya studies since 1918, has also cast a grave doubt on some of the more important conclusions reached by Dr. Majumdar and used by him as the foundation for this part of his narrative. It is not possible or necessary to embark here on a discussion of the various points involved, and it is enough to warn the general reader that parts of the story of the Śailendra empire are still the subject of active discussion and debate. Dr. Majumdar suggests that Rājendra I Coḷa led two expeditions against Kaḍḍaran (p. 173, n), on the assumption that the Sanskrit and Tamil parts of the Truvāṅgaṇḍu plates were composed at the same time, in the sixth year of that monarch's reign. This seems improbable, but the suggestion deserves careful examination.

Book III (pp. 229-362) contains a succinct account of Hindu Javanese history following in the main the great work of Krom on the subject, and the last book (pp. 363-436) traces the downfall of Hindu kingdoms in Suvarṇadvīpa, the final chapter being given to a study of political theory and public administration in Java, as seen from the law books and the inscriptions. These sections of the work deal with passages of history which are much better known, and Dr. Majumdar's narrative is very readable and well documented throughout.

Dr. Majumdar published in 1927 the first volume of his series on *Ancient Indian Colonies in the Far East* and that volume dealt with the History of Campā. We have now before us the first part of the second volume dealing with Suvarṇadvīpa; we learn that the second part devoted to the law, society, art, religion, literature and the economic condition of Suvarṇadvīpa will be published before the end of 1937. A volume on Kāmbhoja, also to be issued in two parts, is promised by the end of 1939, and a last volume containing a general review of Ancient Indian Colonies in the Far East by 1941. Readers of the two volumes of the series already issued will recognise

with pleasure the high level of scholarship and the orderly presentation of difficult and recondite material that mark these books, and will heartily wish Dr. Majumdar success in his comprehensive programme which, when completed, will provide us with a systematic account in English of the history of 'India beyond the Ganges', as the classical geographers used to call it. It is to be hoped that Burma will find its proper place in the final review of the whole subject.

K. A. N. SASTRI.

SIVASVAMIN'S KAPPHINABHYUDAYA, EDITED BY MR. GAURI SHANKAR, M. A., B. LITT. (OXON)

This book, edited by Mr. Gauri Shankar, Government College, Lahore, has been published by the University of the Punjab. This is for the first time edited critically with an introduction in English and Sanskrit and an appendix. The introduction gives very valuable information about the manuscripts from which the work has been published and also about the author, style and literary form of his work and the place of the poet among his contemporaries. The story of the poem is taken from the Avadāna Śataka in the Mañorathapūraṇī which is a commentary on the Anguttara Nikāya. It is a Buddhist legend about King Kapphiṇa. An extract from the Avadāna Śataka about the story of Kapphiṇa is also given in the introduction. The poem of twenty cantos belongs to the Mahakāvya type of Sanskrit literature. In its literary form it conforms to the type of Māgha and it exhibits the influence exerted on the choice of language, thoughts and feelings, by Māgha and Ratnākara, the author of Haravijaya. The number of metres in which the verses are written in the various cantos is great and towards the end we have got Yamakas and Kulakas. The peculiar feature of the work is that Prākṛt is introduced in the 19th canto. The poetry is of the artificial type of the later classical Sanskrit literature. It exhibits the remarkable mastery of the poet over the Sanskrit language and grammar and his powerful and rich vocabulary. The poet is a native of Kashmir and is one among the many literary geniuses that adorned the court of King Avantivarman of Kashmir who lived in the 9th century A. D. There is a reference to him in Kalhaṇa's Rajatarāṅgiṇī where it is stated that the 'poets Ānandavandhana and Ratnākara were contemporaries' [Vol. XI, Part ii.]

aries who became famous during the reign of King Avantivarman of Kashmir. It is remarkable that one who belongs to the school of Kashmir Śaivism should have chosen a Buddhist legend in glorification of the Buddha as a theme for his poem. This shows that in India in those times a spirit of tolerance pervaded the atmosphere in the domain of culture and learning. It is also an indication of the change of attitude on the part of later Hinduism towards the Buddha and his teachings, which was one of appreciation and assimilation. The Punjab University has done well in publishing this work and the Sanskrit world is grateful to Mr. Gauri Shankar for the great industry and scholarship with which he has edited this poem. A brief Sanskrit commentary or English notes would have been very helpful to the reader in understanding this difficult poem.

K. B.

THE BHAGAVATA, CONDENSED IN THE WORDS OF THE ORIGINAL,
BY PANDIT A. M. SRINIVASACHARIAR AND TRANSLATED BY
DR. V. RAGHAVAN, M.A., PH.D., WITH A FOREWORD BY SIR
P. S. SIVASAMI AYYAR, G. A. NATESAN AND CO. RS. 1-4-0.

This condensation of the Bhāgavata has logically succeeded the condensations of the Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata—for these three form "the Great triad wherein lie imbedded all that is noble and inspiring in Hindu religion, philosophy and culture." While in the case of the Mahābhārata a condensation is calculated to present the main narrative in a connected form, the same process applied to the Bhāgavata serves a still more important purpose—that of encouraging the unscholarly type of modern reader to venture into reading it. For in this "triad", the Bhāgavata is rightly considered to be too deep in matter and manner for the average reader and is therefore generally reserved for privileged exposition by Pandits. But though less widely read, it is yet held in greater reverence than the other two. Its superiority is made out by tradition through an interesting account of its genesis. It is said that Vyāsa, after all the writings he had done, still did not enjoy mental peace, but secured it only upon composing the Bhāgavata which he devoted solely to the recounting of the Supreme Lord's labours for the well-being of the created universe, through His several main and subsidiary incarnations. The aim of the Bhāgavata is to emphasise Bhakti as the

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only available method for the attainment of salvation in the Kali age. The Bhāgavata has succeeded in infusing passionate love for God Viṣṇu in several men from age to age and making them saints of great renown. It has its appeal to the emotional nature of man wherein is found, by the wisdom of the sages, to lie the shift-key for a facile transformation of man to a higher plane of life. Faith in the stories of the Lord lifts the individual to an ecstatic state of mind and facilitates communion with the Infinite. The lives of the Bhaktas furnish ample evidence to us of the great power which the Bhāgavata had exercised over their emotional life. From the emotional point of view, all the stories found in it have got a veracity about them which may yet be opposed to historical veracity. Unless man kills the thinking mind, there can be no Vairāgya or Bhakti for him. Bhakti is an emotional experience and the author of the Bhāgavata invites his readers to enter into it, transcending the hampering vacillations and inhibitions of mere intellectualism. For the sceptically inclined, the Bhāgavata has little to teach beyond the Pāñcatantra. It may even fail to convince them except in a superficial manner.

The purpose of the condensation, as pointed out in the foreword, is to give some idea of all the Avatāra described in the Bhāgavata and the narratives do not betray any lacunae; they run on smoothly. The success of the translator's work deserves commendation. It is not an easy task to translate the stanzas of the Bhāgavata into English which in many places abound in characteristic obscurity. Dr. Raghavan overcomes the difficulties by the humility of his approach, by the avoidance of diffuseness and by a strict adherence to simplicity of style. He has indeed done his work in a very neat and attractive manner. His postscript is full of good sense. An Index to Proper Names is added by him at the end as a means of ready reference.

Y. MAHALINGA SASTRI.

ADVAITA AND THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS.¹

BY

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI, M.A. B. SC., BAR-AT-LAW,
Madras University.

I may be pardoned if, at the outset, I give some personal details even at the risk of committing a solecism. I was not born in an advaita tradition; nor did my early philosophic training impart a leaning towards advaita. In so far as I had any pronounced views in the early days, they were fashioned under the influence of James and Schiller; the advaitin's Brahman and the Bradleian Absolute were alike anathema. Even when at a later date knowledge of Absolutism took the place of ignorance and prejudice, my conscientious tutor, Emeritus Professor Joachim was so insistent on putting up the opposite view that my conversion to Absolute Idealism was neither quick nor easy. And not till a detailed study of advaita in recent years did I acquire anything like an intellectual conviction as to that system. I can therefore quite honestly persuade myself that I have not been rushed into this system, which has claimed my final acceptance after a period of over two decades. The acceptance of it has not been due to preconceptions, prejudices, early influences or intellectual indolence. If therefore I seek to say something about the relation of advaita to the concept of progress, it is not because of any impulse to pour old wine into new bottles, or to exhibit ancient conceptions as quite in line with modern tendencies. It has arisen from an attempt to think out the concept of progress in relation to the background of advaita metaphysics. The result may be a poor thing, but it is mine own. And I say this not to disclaim indebtedness to past thinkers, but to explain and excuse the shortcomings of these lectures, the aim of which is to show that non-dualism, far from being in-

1. The Principal Miller Lectures delivered on the 23rd and 24th of February, 1937, under the auspices of the University of Madras.

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consistent with a belief in progress, really calls for such belief. Success in establishing this thesis is beyond my dreams; if I can persuade you that I have made an honest attempt to exhibit a reconciliation I shall be more than satisfied.

I

The prospect of success even for such a moderate ambition seems very gloomy indeed. Reality for the absolutist is beyond time. Neither time nor change is ultimately intelligible. We say every event exists in time; but does time itself exist in time or out of it? Has time a beginning or end? If it has, how is it distinguished from events which have a beginning and end in time? What constitutes its superiority to or distinction from them, whereby we may be justified in treating time as the container and events as contents? Again, that which existed before time began and will exist after time ends, is that also time or is it the timeless? The very use of the words "existed before" and "will exist after" would seem to indicate its temporal character. If so has that a beginning and end? If not, it cannot be temporal. If it has, the beginning of that too must be in time so that we are launched on an infinite regress. If we say that time has its origin in the a-temporal, this is not different from saying that it is a partial and so far forth defective phase or appearance of the timeless; and this is the conclusion we are driving at. Nor does it avail to say that time has neither beginning nor end; for the difficulty arises as to how this can be the substrate or container of events which come into being and are destroyed. To maintain the beginningless as the substrate of events is not far removed from subscribing to the view that time is an appearance of the a-temporal. With a worthy caution we may avoid the use of question-begging epithets and refrain from expressions like "only an appearance"; we may admit that the appearance is of a reality; we seem, however, compelled to conclude that the reality is timeless though it appears as temporal.

If that be the status of the container, the contents cannot fare better. Events are phenomenal; so is the transition from one event to another, change, in other words. Events are the shadows cast in the interior of the cave by puppets carried on the heads of intelligent beings on the farther side of the wall at the entrance to the cave. We do not see this wall, facing away from
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it as we are placed. Much less do we see the puppets or the actions of the beings who carry them. But, noting the sequences among the shadows we formulate the laws of their behaviour. What objectivity can there be for such laws? If we mark tendencies which we call progress or regress, can they claim a place except in our own fancy? Let us abandon the elaborate parable and examine the concept of change. The sequence of any two events is not enough to constitute the phenomenon of change. If we see white and then black, we do not say that white has changed to black, unless it happens to be known that one and the same object is in some way responsible for both the presentations. There must, in other words, be some identical substrate for the change, which is the possessor of the condition before the change as well as of the changed condition. How is this intelligible, that there is identity and yet that there is change in this identity? Are not the two concepts opposed like "light" and "darkness"? We do without a doubt assert identity-in-difference, as when we talk of personal identity persisting through childhood, manhood and old age, or of the identity of a substance in and through its variant forms. But verbal usage cannot guarantee intelligibility or reality any more than when we say that the sun rises or sets. Identity and difference are opposed *prima facie*. Any reconciliation of these has to proceed by distinguishing aspects, parts or phases. In respect of rationality I am identical, whereas in respect of physical configuration and abilities I have changed. Is such a reconciliation satisfactory? Do not mental powers too change from childhood to manhood and old age? If everything that we can know and gauge about a personality undergoes a change through life, what do we mean by his rationality remaining identical? We may camouflage the contradiction by using words like growth and development; but in the end are we not deceiving ourselves when we put side by side sets of qualities like helplessness, confidence and passivity, virility, sophistication and alertness, slackness, confusion and dotage, and yet assert an identity running through them? There is no sameness whether of body or of mind or of anything else that is observable; if an esoteric unity be sought, that surely transcends the phenomenal and for all the good it can do differs not from the Absolute of the Idealist. The identical is that which does not change; and yet change must be of the identical. Solve

this paradox if you can; then we shall admit the reality of change.

The concept of the concrete universal is, for all its fascination, unintelligible. The universal is that which recurs in more than one space-time-configuration, in more than one particular; the particular, on the contrary, is that which is restricted to its own space and time and cannot recur. The identical, in other words, is the recurrent; the non-identical, or the different, is the non-recurrent. The doctrine of the concrete universal would have us believe that the universal is expressed and manifested in every particular, that no particular is barely particular, and that every entity is an identity-in-difference. What precisely does this mean? When I speak of a cow, I am told, I understand not merely the black, brown or white particular before me, but cowness as realised in this particular. Cowness as a bare universal might be recurrent; cowness as realised in the animal of this particular colour, breed, and milking capacity, could that too recur? Obviously not, as that would lead to the absurd conclusion that particulars recur. How then does this view differ from dismissing universals altogether and holding to the sole reality of particulars? Identity-in-difference is but a device for self-deception through insufficient analysis. If gold and its variants are really identical as gold, though different as bracelet and necklet, why is the *śāsterfāmīlās* unhappy in converting gold into ornaments, while those who get the ornaments are happy? Should not all of these experience at the same time indifference, happiness and unhappiness? The divergent experiences of these by different people would be inexplicable: "*prīti-madhyasatā-śokāḥ syur na syūr iti durghaṭam*". And if the rather wild suggestion be made that these experiences are not clearly or absolutely demarcated, that everyone does experience all three, then, neither appetite nor aversion would be intelligible.

When the basic fact of change fares thus, it is ridiculous to claim reality for tendencies noted by us therein. We, as finite creatures, have ideals and purposes. Many of these are common (not universal) to most men and groups of men. In so far as change tends to further these purposes, we speak of progress; otherwise there is talk of regress. The tendency in the facts is only a change; progress or regress is the character ascribed to it in the light of our purposes. To talk of a purpose in things is [Vol. XI, Part III.]

unmeaning; for what is non-conscious and inert cannot have a purpose. Conscious beings have purposes in the plural. It is true as already said that many of them are common to most human beings; but they are not universal in the sense that every human being should have those purposes, in so far as he is human. Self-preservation is a human purpose, but so is self-sacrifice; to seek comfort is a conscious purpose, but so is it to sacrifice comfort; to love one's neighbour is a conscious purpose; so is it to hate him to the point of seeking his extinction; to speak the truth is a conscious purpose; so is it to utter a lie whether for one's own or another's good; even seeking one's own good is not a universal purpose, as another's good is not infrequently sought even to the detriment of one's own. Purposes being thus subjective cannot claim absolute reality; much less can progress be ultimate, since it is but a judgment of tendency in the light of our purposes. It is open to individuals and groups to speak of and to judge progress in relation to their objects and ideals; but there is not any purpose for the universe as a whole. "There is no single purpose in a world which has neither beginning nor end in time, though there is an infinite number of finite purposes." "The theory of a single purpose in the world" says Dr. Inge "seems to me untenable. Such a purpose, being infinite, could never have been conceived, and, if conceived, could never be accomplished. The theory condemns both God and man to the doom of Tantalus".¹ What is above time cannot change; much less can it progress; within the Absolute (if such an expression be not so misunderstood as to import space and time for the Absolute) there may be progress, though it is an open question whether a case for progress even to this extent has been definitely made out. Up to the realisation of the Absolute, time and change are for us real; for we continue till then to look on ourselves as finite cognisers; we have purposes and we are entitled to postulate a relatively real progress in so far as those purposes are steadily fulfilled, though in the last resort both purpose and fulfilment may turn out to be phenomenal.

Are we justified in assuming that progress is at least relatively or empirically real? The very multiplicity of the concepts of progress would seem to negative the assumption. In our country the notion of progress has for the most part been

1. *The Idea of Progress*, W. R. Inge, 1920.

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bound up with the unfolding of a divine plan. Man is not perfect, but he is perfectible, since God has so willed it. The difficulties of such a conception are innumerable. Is there realisation in time for man alone or God too? In the latter case, will not God Himself be subject to change in time and so far imperfect? In the case of a Being limited in time, where is the guarantee that His purpose will be realised? And so long as there is the risk of non-realisation, where is the certitude of human progress? If, on the other hand, the realisation is for man alone, God's plan must be already realised; and man's so-called progress can be but a weak, ineffective and pointless reproduction of the already accomplished. What is the justification for treating this as progress, as the steady and certain achievement of an unaccomplished end? And what is the contribution of man in formulating this end? Surely we do not consider ourselves as having progressed except where our achievements are fulfilments of our own needs, realisations of purposes formulated and consciously striven after by ourselves. In the repetition of an eternally fulfilled divine plan, there is no room for intelligent formulation or free striving. Whence then the talk of progress? So long as man's thoughts are bound up with a creator and his plans, there would seem to be little chance of free development. Hence it is that in the West, as, for example, in the writings of Montesquieu and Voltaire, the concept of progress appears for the most part as incongruous with Providence. But even in the West, Providence has reasserted itself, as, for instance, in the teaching of De Tocqueville.¹

Similar inconsistencies are found even in other aspects of the notion. Is progress indefinite or only continuous? While the early advocates of the doctrine of progress, like the Encyclopaedists, generally held the former view, Hume and Comte would not accept it.² Some held that progress was certain; others, e.g., Fortenelle, Terrasson, d' Holbach, went further and treated it as inevitable and natural, having nothing to do with human free-will.³ In general, the development of the idea of progress coincided with the belief in and the deification of the human reason. Man is perfectible, because he is educable; he can be civilised,

1. See *The Idea of Progress*, J. B. Bury, pp. 21, 22, 151, 316.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 162, 219, 236, 305.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 109, 126, 171.

because he can be made to know; his passions can be brought under control and made hand-maids to reason.¹ In contrast with such a view, held by Saint-Pierre, Voltaire, Comte, Buckle &c., there was at least one exponent of progress, Turgot, who held that the dominance of reason would have arrested progress, and that development has been and will be possible because of human passions and irrationality.² The view will not appear as absurd as it sounds if we remember that it is the tendency of reason to seek adaptation and equilibrium, and that with the attainment of equilibrium there can be neither change nor progress.

Nor is there any greater measure of agreement as to the goal of progress. While those who inspired or were influenced by the French Revolution believed in the natural equality of man's faculties and held equality to be the goal, there were others who could find no room for either equality or personal liberty. For these latter, social harmony, in preference to happiness, was the end; and even where social happiness was held to be the goal, as by Saint Simon, liberty and equality were negatived with little compunction.³ For the Advaitin too, the talk of equality seems to have little meaning. Where plurality is phenomenal, equality can claim no better status; even empirical reality is impossible to grant, for all men are in reality one spirit, while their apparent diversity is due to nescience; of this nescience there seems no justification to assume a difference of quality; if there be no difference of quantity too, men in the plural would appear to be, not equal, but identical; to account for the presentation as diverse, we have to assume inequality in the nescience which limits; men, as they are, are not equal. Nor can equality be the goal; for in self-realisation which is the end there is no plurality.

In the conception of their relation to the past too, the advocates of progress differed. While for Tennyson the past was a fruitful field, for Hugo it was a fetter.⁴ In the influences that were supposed to foster progress, some laid stress on the external,

1. See J. B. Bury, *op. cit.*, pp. 140, 141, 150, 305, 310.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 284, 285, 305, 306; cp. 212, 315, 316, 319.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 327.

others on the internal; while climate and environment were magnified by some, others preferred to look for psychical or moral factors. Even among the latter, while Montesquieu had great faith in social institutions, Godwin considered them pernicious.¹ While in general progress was held to go with the increase of man's confidence in himself, a confidence believed as in Russia to-day to be inconsistent with religion, the doctrine of Providence has come up more than once as an ally of the doctrine of progress; and Bazard far from dispensing with religion wanted a new religion where "God is one, God is all that is, all is God".²

We derive no greater satisfaction if we turn from the ideas of progress to the field of actual achievement. Material progress and scientific advance seem to cry aloud for recognition. It is said that Tennyson composed the line "Let the great world spin for ever down the ringing grooves of change", when he travelled by the first train from Liverpool to Manchester.³ The world has been linked much closer since then by steam and electricity and the internal combustion engine. Man can fly in the air and move under the waters; and the ether is at his command to fetch and carry messages. With all this development there has resulted little of harmony or felicity. Increased skill and knowledge have resulted in feverish armament races; command of new powers has been utilised for the acquisition of greater facilities for destruction; no nation is happy in its own achievements, as it is for most of the time engaged in looking at others' achievements with jealous or envious eyes. What was meant to cure has been turned to kill; and advance, instead of showing the benignant face of Vishnu, wears the irate aspect of Rudra, the destroyer. While the scientific dreamer looks forward to a not distant future when a whole city will come under a single roof "of transparent glass without any visible support"⁴ we read in the papers that the destruction of the Crystal Palace was a piece of official arson to guard against air-raids in a future war.⁵ Civilisation no longer consists in making two blades of grass grow where one grew

1. See J. B. Bury, *op. cit.*, pp. 154, 225.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 288.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 326.

4. *The Frustration of Science*, p. 61.

5. *The Madras Mail*, 1st February, 1937.

before; it has gone to the other extreme of restricting production. "Brazil has been burning coffee, the United States have ploughed up cotton and tobacco, and slaughtered young pigs, and the Irish Free State orders the slaughtering of calves",¹ And all this when "four-fifths of the human race have less to eat than is compatible with health, let alone efficiency."² Enlightenment has taken the shape of education; but it has brought little contentment, having but increased the problems of unemployment and indebtedness.

It may be thought that the problems that have arisen are due not to scientific advance, but to economic greed and inefficiency, that the machinery of distribution has not developed hand in hand with that of production, that with a change in forms of ownership and management the world will benefit by its knowledge better, and that Socialism is the remedy for all the ills brought on the world by industrialisation. "Socialism will want all the science it can get to produce the greatest possible wealth."³ In view of the Russian five-year plan and the measure of success it has had, it is impossible to dismiss this hope lightly. The song of the locomotive is the Soviet saga and the driving axle would seem to convey power to more than one form of advance. Whether, however, Socialism will get firmly established even in Russia and what, even then, its reactions will be in its relation to non-socialist and anti-socialist states, these are problems to which the solution is neither easy nor clear. The moral canker of hatred does not seem to be foreign even to the communist mentality. One has only to look at the mass-trials of conspirators in Russia and to the warm espousals of communist causes outside Russia. Nor is there reason to condone or make light of this hatred on the ground that it is only against "a dissolving enemy, the wicked Imperialist".⁴ There is no reason to be certain that Socialism will at any time have the world as a free field. Even if it does, why assume that the hatred will die of attrition? Will it not turn within and find food even in the Socialist World-State? Assuming that the democratic ideals of

1. Sir Daniel Hall in *The Frustration of Science*, p. 27.

2. Mr. J. D. Bernal in *The Frustration of Science*, p. 66.

3. Prof. P. M. S. Blackett in *The Frustration of Science*, p. 144.

4. *The Shape of Things to Come*, H. G. Wells, p. 153.

liberty and equality go to the wall before the onset of Socialism, is it permissible to believe that they will completely disappear? Are they not rather likely to make their presence felt within the Socialist State causing it serious disturbance? We do not seem to reach a desirable conclusion either way. If there be disturbance, we shall still be very much where we are, with an interne-cine dissension instead of an external one; and civil wars are not more civilised than wars of aggression. If on the contrary there be no disturbance at all it is difficult to avoid the unwelcome thought that all individuality would have been suppressed and human beings converted into Socialist Robots. On the very large assumption that the Socialist State stands for the millennium, economic and political, the world, it would appear, has to undergo a long travail, before attaining that consummation. And there is no certainty that it will be attained. Its bitterest opponent, Fascism, seems to exert at least as strong a fascination over large bodies of people; on the score of present success there seems little possibility of discriminating between the two; and future success is difficult to foretell; both seem to have equal chances on the face of it, since both have succeeded in converting the individual for the most part into an automaton, a cog in the machinery of the State. The Hegelian dialectic, as adapted by Karl Marx, would affect that Fascism is a passing phase, the inevitable antithesis leading to the equally inevitable synthesis. But is Socialism the thesis or the synthesis? The answer is surely bound to vary according to our sympathies and points of view. Even assuming that Socialism is the synthesis, it can be no lasting stage, because of that same dialectic; and when it passes into its opposite, which is absorbed in turn into a higher synthesis, how can we foretell what the complexion of that future State or Society will be? In any case, once you adopt the principle of dialectic change, have you any right, unless you wish to be arbitrary as Hegel was, to cry a halt to the process at any stage and say that with that progress has been achieved? And if there is no finality about the goal, if every stage and every achievement is subject to infinite and indefinite dialectical change, have we the material or the authority to profess a doctrine of progress? It may be that the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations by their very nature called aloud to be flouted, Does that constitute a moral justification for the open defiances

by Germany and Italy? Or are we to seek for the justification in the success of the defiance? Will this not be to adopt the rankest form of the consequence-theory of morality? It is true that for the moment, replete with their successes, both Germany and Italy profess readiness to forward the cause of peace, progress and civilisation. But judged in the light of recent professions and practices, will not a charitable judgment convict them of delusion, if not dishonesty? Is it wise to share the optimism of Browning who

"... .. never doubted.

"Though right were worsted, wrong would triumph"?

A writer in a recent issue of the *Hibbert Journal*, Prof. R. B. Mowat, feels so desperate that the only hope he can entertain for justice is that it is the nature of men to contribute "to make a just world without any certainty that their side will win".¹ Unfortunately for such an attitude of devotion to duty in scorn of consequence, the same writer goes on to say: "On the whole an examination of history seems to show that though injustice often and for long periods prevails, yet gradually the injustices are suppressed, because among all its dross there is a certain nobility in the soul of the common man and woman which responds to the prophet; and no century, or even few generations, have been without their prophet."² An act of faith still seems necessary, though faith is shifted from the cause to the prophet.

Taking the moral development of the world by and large, one does seem to note some kind of progress. There has been at some time or other the change of stress from the external to the internal, from act to attitude, from form to significance; and this is all for the better. But this change took place long centuries ago. It is the difference, say, between the Jewish and the Christian attitude. It is the teaching of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* in emphasising the renunciation not of action, but of the fruit thereof. And yet in these twenty centuries and more, what is the measure of real hold which the teaching has gained among men? Empty forms and symbols are regnant even in the world of to-day. It is still a greater sin to be discovered than to do wrong. Not infrequently our great men are but those who have

1. *The Hibbert Journal*, October 1936, p. 52.

2. *Ibid.*

managed to keep their exteriors untarnished. Sin and superstition denied free expression find safer and more extensive abodes by burrowing underground. If apparently there is less evil in some respects, if there is less of open violence and disregard of the rights of person and property, it is because there is less opportunity. It is not certain that our saints are proof against the open door; and the Devil, Dr. Inge reminds us, has a clever trick of pretending to be dead.

Not is the case for progress any securer in viewing man as a political animal. The vote is the deity of the day and the ballot-box its altar. But has the voter, drilled and herded by caucuses, party leaders and their agents, any real intelligent freedom of choice? Even when there is not corruption, the force of habit, mass suggestion and other equally irrational elements play a far larger part than deliberation and discrimination. Is it possible on a cold analysis to exonerate any party that has been in power or to construe literally the promises of any party that seeks power? The political game continues to be what it was, a gigantic game of bluff; the chances of success are now greater for him who can touch the purses or passions as compared with him who could appeal to respect for tradition and authority. The efflorescence of the political individual is still a hope of the distant future, and, for all that we can see, a vain hope. Whether in melting down church-bells or in hailing the Jew, or in marching to the Coast to manufacture salt, we are still as far away from individuality, as when men were devoted to the Little Father of the people in spite of the knout and Siberia, marched to slaughter and be slaughtered at the command of the Kaiser, or professed unshakeable loyalty to the Burra Sahib who had come to save India in spite of herself.

Even in the field of ideas, one cannot comfortably dogmatise about progress. While the extent of scientific knowledge has increased, its certitude has become much less. Its only definiteness seems to be indefiniteness. Speaking broadly, practice has taken precedence over knowledge, and the pragmatist holds sway. The quantum physicist "studies the art of the book-maker and not of the trainer."¹ We are sure neither of matter nor of mind, though we seem to exercise a better control over the two; but control is not knowledge; it can give us empirical, not abso-

1. Eddington. *The Nature of the Physical World*, Dent, p. 289.
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lute reality. With the scientist's reduction of the causal law to a statistical calculation, the distinction of exact Science from metaphysics practically disappears; and if the metaphysician can discover no evidence of progress the scientist cannot confidently refute him. In philosophy too there has been no consistent or steady advance. For the advaitin, his own non-dualism stands for the high-water mark of philosophy and revelation alike. If we lost all records relating to Indian History from the 5th to the 13th century A.D., and were left only with the three main varieties of Vedānta, an advaitin reconstructing their order of development would, it has been said,¹ place Madhva's first, Rāmānuja's next and Śaṅkara's last; extreme pluralism would appear to him the attitude of naïve common-sense; a stress on identity without being able to give up difference in some form would appear to be the next stage; last would come the realisation of pure identity as the absolute truth. The actual course of history has tended in just the reverse direction. Pluralism comes last instead of first. Can the advaitin be blamed if he sees history as anything but a tale of progress? Not even the dvaitin can easily maintain the contrary; for he sees the forces of evil raising their heads constantly and with increasing force in spite of repeated defeats. Centuries after the Buddha had died, when the influence of Buddhism in India was already on the wane, there arose Śaṅkara, the Buddhist in disguise (so say the Mādhyas) to give a new and longer lease of life to the errors that were disappearing; and though Madhva battled heroically consigning the advaitin to eternal damnation, advaita still flourishes and flaunts its banner.

There seems thus little ground for optimism to whichever field of human achievement we may turn. It is undeniable that man has a spark of heavenly light; but it seems also undeniable in the words of Mephistopheles that he uses this gift solely to be more beastly than other beasts:

"Er nennt's Vernunft und braucht's allein
Nur tierischer als jedes Tier zu sein."

The world is becoming an increasingly difficult place to live in. In the effort to achieve comfort, man has increased complexity. The way of looking without can lead only to endless

1. By Dr. C. Kunhan Raja in a paper read before the Indian Philosophical Congress, Lahore, 1929; see *Proceedings*, p. 252.

bondage and misery. The greedy questing of the extrovert can never bring happiness. It is the duty of the wise to cultivate contentment, to realise that nature in her multiplicity can but distract and delude with an ever receding hope of attainment, and to seek within, there to find everlasting peace.

II

Having developed so far what is called the pessimism of the *advaitin*, let us take a closer look at his system. Does he deny all progress? To belittle past achievement is not to deny the possibility of future achievement. Nor is it a negation of progress to hold that a readjustment is necessary of values and activities. Surely this is the *advaitin's* procedure. He does not deny the reality of happiness or the possibility of achieving it; in the past humanity has not done much to achieve it; that is because its efforts have not been properly directed. With an understanding of the real nature of happiness, that it is not external nor an attribute of the external, but the very constitution of one's self, the development of man is bound to change; progress will then be a reality, no longer a delusion. Granting that much of so-called progress is a delusion, there should be admitted at least as much progress as is implied in realising the delusiveness of the delusion.

The statement of such a position is bound to evoke a host of questions. Is a re-orientation of the kind suggested possible? Even if possible, is it worth while? Are we not asked to condemn what we actually hold to be valuable and turn to the pursuit of something which may be wholly elusive? It is bad enough policy to neglect the here for the hereafter; is it not insane when the pursuit is not even of the hereafter, but of what is not in space or time, and is, curiously enough, said to be ever attained? Scripture may tell us of one or two or half a dozen that have achieved self-realisation. Even on the large assumption that these are not mere tales calculated to ward off depression, what is the certainty that what they have attained is worth while or that the path they have trodden is open to others and will lead them to the same goal? The *lazy* contentment of the beggar in his rags and the idiot in his ignorance, how are these different from the contentment and peace that is the *advaitin's* goal? And what right has the *advaitin* any way to speak of progress after

having denied the reality of time and change? Having shown the illusoriness of the standards of progress advocated by others, what standard can the advaitin apply to demonstrate or to judge progress? It will be the task of what remains over of these lectures to provide some answer to such questions.

III

The advaitin is ever ready to acknowledge facts though he is not prepared to treat all facts as absolutely real. It is a fact that men seek knowledge and happiness; it is also a fact that there is change from a state of ignorance to one of knowledge, from a state of misery to one of happiness, and that though none of these states can claim to be what it is absolutely, there is relative progression from the one to the other. Even the advaitin seeks and hopes to leave his interlocutor wiser than he found him. He cannot at the same time avoid the recognition of numerous paradoxes in the concepts of knowledge and happiness. Neither of these can relate solely to what has been attained; to re-affirm the known is not to know; to remember a past pleasure is not to be happy and sometimes it may be the reverse; "sorrow's crown of sorrow is remembering happier things." Yet knowledge of the wholly unknown is impossible, for the knowing process could not have an inception at all in regard to it. Nor can bliss be some wholly new experience, since there can be no desire or seeking in respect of the absolutely novel. The conception of the partly new and partly old, partly known and partly unknown, is only a verbal device to conceal the difficulty; for our problem persists as to whether knowledge is of the part that is known or of the part that is unknown, and so on. Our experiences of cognition and conation seem to call for the reality of knowledge and bliss; yet our analysis of these processes forces us to declare them unintelligible and non-real. Because of this the advaitin finds himself compelled on the one hand to admit the reality of knowledge and bliss, and, on the other, to treat these neither as objects of experience, nor as modes of relation between subject and object, but as identical with the self of which alone there is indubitable certitude. No one can doubt the self since it is the very self of the doubter; experience can never be sublated, since the sublating too must be experience; hence the self is experience, which we call variously knowledge or bliss; and that self-luminous real is the substrate on which is presented all that is

finite, unintelligible and indeterminable, including both the subjective processes and the objective world. For such a viewpoint, progress is, in a sense, both possible and inevitable. We are not condemned to wander round in ignorance and misery, since knowledge and bliss are real. We may appear to seek interminably; achievement, however, is certain; for, it is of nothing but our own very nature. We retire into ourselves unconsciously when we sleep. To establish firmly and consciously this state of attainment, so that there may be no further disruptions by delusive awareness, that is our ceaseless endeavour. The achievement of this end is certain; for if there were not this certitude there would be no striving at all. The seeking in time postulates the timeless reality; and this latter is both the starting-point and the goal.

But surely, it will be objected, when the all-perfect is timelessly real, how can there be progress towards it? If knowledge cannot relate to the already known nor action to the already accomplished, whence the possibility of progress for the absolutist? The question is common and in a sense legitimate; and advaitins have given different replies, some treating "achievement" as secondary or figurative in sense, while others treat the word as used in the principal sense. What should be noted, however, is that the question is due to a confusion resulting from the deficiencies of language. When we say that the known cannot be the object of knowledge, we speak of that which is temporal, relates to past time as compared with the present. But when we say knowledge is real or is given, we do not mean that it belongs to the past, but that it is a-temporal. While there can be repetitiveness in respect of the past, there can be no such defect in respect of what is not in time. The charge that Absolute Idealism makes our world a meaningless copy of a perfect rounded archetypal Absolute is baseless. Of that which is not either in space or time there cannot be a copy in space and time. There is in experience some amount of copying; but the copy and the archetype, the prototype and the reflection are of the same class. That is why the wise advaitin will not say that Brahman is reflected in *māyā*; the prototype is *Īśvara*, Himself limited by *māyā* though controlling it, while the reflections are *jīvas*, who have but very limited control of *māyā*. *Īśvara* is a knower, as *jīvas* are; but Brahman is knowledge, neither knower nor known. How can the knowing process or

its result be a *copy* of knowledge? That it is a presentation on knowledge as substrate, the advaitin admits, while confessing at the same time his inability to explain the *rationale* of the superimposition; such inexplicability, he would add, is due to the constitution of the appearance, which is indeterminable as real or as unreal. The processes of the finite world are therefore not futile on the ground of being repetitive. But can they be real? They too, the advaitin replies, are indeterminable as wholly real or as wholly unreal; but they are as real as ourselves, considered as finite and striving subjects in contrast with unrealised purposes and desires. Should we realise ourselves as all-perfect, the processes would not be real as such for us, and there could be no talk of progress. We, who seek and strive, however, are far from having realised perfection though this is nothing foreign to our own constitution; and the striving and achievement can claim as much reality as we ourselves. On the principle that the offering is proportionate to the deity, we have no right to demand any greater degree of reality for process or progress. My striving then is a fact and is so far relatively real; I myself am real, being the self of the doubter; and as real I am identical with experience that is perfect and above diversities and discords; the tendency of my striving is towards such perfection and perfection is real; progress therefore is certain. The measure of it will be the measure in which the world of difference is realised to be not real as such, but a super-imposition on the self-luminous consciousness that is the seeker. In other words, there must be a turning from the external to the internal and a transcendence of both contrasted aspects. In so far as there is any part or aspect of the external which still exercises a lure, progress will be unstable; and it will continue to be unstable so long as one stops with the mastery of the external without an analysis of its significance and value, so long as one stops with science and does not turn to metaphysics. Progress goes with increase both in width and depth, in extent and content, in accumulation and interpretation, in acquisition and renunciation, in inclusiveness and harmony. If so far we seem to have achieved little, it is because both as nations and as individuals we have tended to be dominated by one or other aspect, to the comparative neglect of the other.

The Brahman of the advaitin is beyond time and change; it is static; how can this be reconciled with a doctrine of progress?

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The answer has been already indicated; progress is for the being that feels finitude and imperfection; it is for you and me, not for a God held to be perfect; it is the hungry man that needs food, not he who is the picture of satisfaction; to postulate progress for the latter too is to set up yet another ideal and purpose; straight-away there arises the question as to the reality of this purpose, its temporality, its inclusiveness of other purposes, its capacity to develop towards still another ideal and so on; if we are to avoid such endless dissipation we have to admit once and for all that the real is so to speak both the starting point and the goal. For the real there is no progress; but *in* the real there is progress and this is all that we as progressive creatures are concerned with. To call the Absolute static and then feel sore about it, is no more wise than to abuse ourselves and then chafe under it. Static and dynamic are concepts applying to what is in time; in characterising something as static we contrast it with the possibility of itself as dynamic; how can that which is a-temporal be static or dynamic?

If the tender-minded have still a craving for the reality of progress, surely this answer is possible: the seeker for whom there is progress is not radically different from or alien to Brahman; "thou art that"; and in a sense somewhat similar to that in which progress is real for you, it is real for the Absolute too. True, the ascription is figurative in the latter case; but patient analysis will show you that no ascription or predication is anything but figurative; that which is non-figurative is only the final self-realisation, the intuition of the identity that is Brahman.

The Absolute being entirely different from the world of appearance, he who would seek to realise himself as Brahman should negate the world and turn away from it. Progress on the contrary is possible only through living in the world, knowing it, acting in and through it. The path of Brahman-knowledge is *nivṛtti-mārga*, while that of the progressive is *pravṛtti-mārga*. An objection of this nature can find excuse in the confusion not merely of the opponents but also of some adherents of *advaita*. The non-dualist doctrine especially in its later phase has come to be identified with an effete type of asceticism, which affected to despise the world without taking the trouble to know it. Renunciation is the supreme duty; but, for him who has nothing, renunciation is hollow; to ignore the world is not identical with

being ignorant of it; for it is the ignorant mind that despite rigorous self-castigation will be ever prone to the lures of the unknown; the ideal of the advaitin is to know and then to set aside. For it has been said from early days: "adhyāropāpavādābhyām niṣprapañcam prapañcyate";¹ what is transphenomenal is understood by super-imposition and by sublation. No short cut to the goal can be found by eliminating the first step; the result can only be a disastrous short-circuit. It is a dialectic process, whereby the distinctionlessness of ignorance or of indeterminate cognition passes over into a cognition of difference and then transcends itself in the distinctionless intuition that is Brahman. The spirit must go forth and return enriched; to stay at home because of the perils of going forth is for ever to remain impoverished and unable to attain one's own stature. The process is comparable to what Bradley calls the homeopathic work of thought; content and existence, the "what" and the "that" of experience, are given in a relative state of harmony in primitive feeling; but feeling being finite, this harmony is disrupted; thought seeks to transcend the discord by widening it; the reconciliation is effected only when thought transcends itself in the Absolute. To go out seems on the face of it opposed to return; but unless there is a going forth there cannot be a return; for all their apparent opposition, the first is an indispensable preliminary to the second. The error of some advaitins and of all their critics is in holding the worldly life to be essentially inconsistent with and opposed to self-realisation, while in truth it is a phase of that realisation. From the higher stage no doubt the lower will be called untrue or erroneous; that should not make us forget that it is the error which has led to the truth.

Nor is this doctrine a fanciful invention unjustifiably superimposed on advaita. The progressive holds that time is the friend of man.² And for all that Brahman is timeless, time is the friend of the advaitin too. Else why the insistence on the acquisition of eligibility for Vedānta enquiry? One may study the Vedānta not anyhow and at any time, but after the study of the Veda and after the acquisition of the necessary preliminaries

1. The authorship of the saying is not known; but it is quoted by Maṇḍana in the *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 26; it is also found in the *Pāñcikaraṇa* attributed to Śaṅkara, and in his *Gītābhāṣya*.

2. See J. B. Bury, *op. cit.*, pp. 54; 104, 105.

—the discrimination of the fleeting from the permanent, non-attachment to results here or in a hereafter, the qualities of calmness, equanimity, contentment etc., and the desire for release. If every one had these or none could have them, there would be no point in mentioning them as constituting eligibility. It is held on the contrary that those who have it not may acquire it, perhaps in this life, perhaps only in the next. A virtuous life consisting in the efficient performance of the duties of one's station will result in the acquisition of these essentials.¹ When they have been acquired, the subsequent path of inquiry may appear to be more and more a path of abstraction; but a life of action has preceded it; and neither ethics nor metaphysics can formulate an intelligible demand that all rational beings should be active in the same way or for all time. As the metaphysician differs from the scientist and both from the politician or soldier, so does the *mumukṣu* seeking release differ from the man in active life. And as every man is willy-nilly a philosopher so is the man in active life a *mumukṣu* in embryo; when the *pravṛtti-mārga* has reached its limits, it will fulfil itself in the *nivṛtti-mārga*. Those who are aware of the steady march of science on steps made of its own once true but now discarded hypotheses, those who understand that for all the apparent opposition between the Ptolemaic and the Copernican theories the latter came in as the almost inevitable result of ever fresh observations based on the former, will not hesitate to admit that error is the gateway to truth. And this the *advaitin* knows. It is not true that "An uncompromising dualism is assumed between the mundane and the transcendent"² or "that the two worlds have no original relation whatsoever"² or that in the *Vedānta* "truth and practical life are irreconcilable."² One of the greatest of *advaita* writers has shown, on the contrary, that the real, which is consciousness and bliss alike, stands self-revealed, when nescience is transcended (literally, crossed over) by *nescience*. Thus does he interpret the

1. *Maṇḍana* holds that for him who performs without fail the duties of his station, realisation is quicker; the difference between him and others is that between him who has a horse and him who has to cover the whole distance on foot. Both are sure to reach the village they desire to get to; but there will be delay for the latter. An interesting side-light on the *advaitin's* attitude to time! (See the *Brahmariddhi*, p. 36).

2. *The Problem of the Indian Polity*, P. Ramamurti, p. 88.
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Upaniṣadic saying "avidyayā mṛtyum lītvā vidyayā 'mṛtam aśnute". "This may be (asked): how can difference be destroyed by difference itself? Because of its being opposed to difference, it has been said, just as the dust (of the clearing-nut) (is opposed) to dirt (suspended in the water) . . . just as milk digests (other) milk and is itself digested, and just as poison quells other poison and quells itself. As has been said: 'He who knows both vidyā (knowledge) and avidyā (nescience) crosses over death (i.e., difference) by nescience (consisting in the repeated contemplation of the truth) and enjoys immortality which is of the nature of knowledge.' This is what is said: both knowledge and nescience co-exist in the relation of end and means; without nescience there is no dawn of knowledge".¹ The positive character of Brahman and its continuity with the phenomenal, in the sense that its attainment does not require a *volte face* or an act of jumping out of one's skin, are evident from Maṇḍana's repeated insistence on the fact that it is impossible ever to be wholly desireless, that desires cannot be killed or extinguished, and that the seer's aim is to discipline and sublimate desires, not to suppress them. By stages suited to each one's capacity, desires are to be sublimated; from the petty and the fleeting they should be turned to the infinite and everlasting; from nescience they should be turned to knowledge.²

"A hiatus" it is said "is assumed in Hindu Thought between Karma and Jñāna".³ This is apparently true of advaita, whatever may be said of other forms of Hindu Thought. And Śaṅkara, waging ceaseless war against the ritualism of the Mīmāṃsaka, is responsible in no small measure for such a judg-

1. *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 13. "etad uktam bhavati—vidyā-'vidye dve apy upāyo-'peya-bhāvāt sahite; nā 'vidyām antareṇa vidyo-'dayo 'sti." Should the examples of self-transcendence sound unscientific, compare Whitehead: "... a species of microbes which kills the forest, also exterminates itself." *Science and the Modern World*, p. 257.

2. Cp. "Reality and existence are not to be set against each other as metaphysical contraries. Nothing on earth is utterly perfect or utterly without perfection. Those who have the vision of perfection strive continually to increase the perfection and diminish the imperfection." *The World's Unborn Soul*, S. Radhakrishnan, p. 29.

3. P. Ramamurti, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

ment. Knowledge is of what is; it is not arbitrary or dependent on the agent; action relates to what is to be; it proceeds from the agent's volition and may be done, not done or done otherwise.¹ The contrast thus presented is striking, but very unfortunate. A duality of subject and object is involved in knowing as well as acting; neither is possible without a transcendence of the duality. The compulsion of the object cognised is paralleled by the compulsion of the purpose formulated. And if purposes are dependent on education and surroundings, so too are objects cognised. Not everything presented is perceived or perceived correctly. If it is open to man to know in such a way that the process fulfils itself in a supra-relational knowledge, where is the insuperable objection to his acting in such a way that the process fulfils itself in a supra-relational Bliss?² But then, it may be objected, difference is due to nescience and cannot be transcended except by its opposite, viz., knowledge. In saying this, we are victims of a verbal confusion. Approaching Reality as epistemologists we call it knowledge; and the world which, as appearance, so far forth falls short of reality, we call non-knowledge or nescience, as different from knowledge. Reality however is not knowledge or consciousness alone; it is also bliss; since it is one, so that it is not knowledge *and* bliss but the knowledge *that* is bliss, even the world of finite pleasures and pains is said to be characterised by and due to nescience, but in the sense of non-bliss. If reality as knowledge can destroy the world as ignorance (or nescience in the cognitive sense), why should not reality as bliss be capable of destroying the world as non-bliss (or nescience in the conative and emotive sense)?³ There is no rule that the ultimate psychosis, Brahman-intuition, should be purely cognitive; it may well be the ecstasy of the lover or the enthusiasm of the saint. And though Madhusūdana dared claim no more for bhakti than that it gave rise to communion with the conditioned, this understatement has its parallel even among the advocates of intuition

1. Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on *Vedānta Sūtras*, I, i, 4.

2. Compare the description of perfection "as ethical transformation into eternal righteousness"; S. Radhakrishnan, *The Teaching of Buddha*, p. 22.

3. The truth, of course, in either case, is not that Reality destroys, but that Reality-knowledge-bliss stands self-manifest, when there is destruction of ignorance by cognition or of attachment by love or of self-seeking by morality.

as cognitive; for, Vācaspati¹ holds that sākṣātkāra is only of the conditioned. It may be thought that morality cannot culminate in release since what is effected by an act cannot be permanent. But cognition too is an act; its result too should be impermanent. If it be urged that cognition does not effect release but destroys ignorance, whereupon release reveals itself, a similar answer is applicable to the *role* of moral action. While the intellectual pursuit of the Absolute has occupied the foreground of our attention and the emotional pursuit has found an occasional exponent, the pursuit through sublimated morality has been left almost wholly in the shade. It does not, however, follow that the moral life is inconsistent with advaita or that it is possible to realise non-duality without being moral. Though at the outset duality would appear necessary for any action, reflection will show that action itself is a transcendence of the duality;² and what is transcended need not be, indeed cannot be, absolutely real. That the concept of morality taken in itself is unintelligible—this is well known. The moral life is a war against evil; if evil cannot be finally conquered, it is futile; if it is finally conquered, it becomes non-existent; it transcends itself in the a-moral. The best the reflective moralist can do is to formulate the principles and standards of such conduct as will lead to this transcendence.

Nor is the Law of Karma a stumbling block to progress. It is a grotesque travesty to present it as a form of *Lex Talionis*.³ If it is true that every cause has an effect and every effect a cause, there is not the shadow of a justification for exempting the moral realm alone from the operation of the law. It is not the demanding of a tooth for a tooth, but a case of the original act, right or wrong, working itself out. An all-merciful God, if there is one, may forgive the repentant sinner, if there has been genuine repentance. The operation of the law would not have

1. Cp. *Bhamati* (Theosophical Publishing House), p. 78: "na hi śābdajñāna-prakāśyam brahma svayamprakāśam na bhavati, sarvopādhi-vihīnam hi svayam-jyotiḥ iti giyate, na tū 'pahitam api."

2. The unintelligibility (*anupapatti*) of a relation between *draṣṭṛ* and *dṛśya* is not greater than that of a relation between *kartṛ* and *karma*.

3. Cp. P. Ramamurti, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

been suspended with this; rather would its operation have become inexplicable to us; and this is not unintelligible since all the operative conditions cannot be known to a parviscient intelligence. The Law of Karma does not then operate as a relentless and inexorable Fate. It assumes that so long as we view the Universe as a plurality, as containing differences like that of cause and effect, every act must have its consequence. And such a belief, far from countering progress, is indispensable to it. For, if our acts do not have consequences whether in the immediate or the remote future, how can we look forward to or co-operate towards a better scheme of things? When, however, the phenomenal world is no longer apprehended as such, in its diversity, cause and effect are realised as one; the Law of Karma like all other empirical laws is known to be delusive. And to this transcendence in non-duality action may lead, it was said, in the same way as intellection.

The Law of Karma does not make for moral determinism any more than the scientist's profession of the causal law. The Hindu thinker like his Western *confrère* has often sought to establish free-will by exempting moral phenomena from the realm of natural causation. The result in neither system of thought has been satisfactory. The advaitin's solution such as it is stands on a better footing. Man as Spirit is always free; viewing himself as nature, he is always bound. Spirit and nature cannot be placed side by side as independent realms offering conveniences to disappear from the one into the other. Nature is phenomenal; it is the appearance of spirit; and transcending appearance, one transcends necessity as well. One has ridiculed Kant long enough by comparing his doctrine of free-will to telling a prisoner there is freedom outside the prison-bars. But surely there is no sense, is there, in saying there is freedom inside the prison? It is true that freedom outside the prison seems to be of no use to the prisoner as prisoner; but if he is told, as he is by the advaitin, that the prison too exists but in his imagination, it would appear to those of non-dualist persuasion not merely that that is a doctrine of freedom, but indeed the only intelligible doctrine of freedom.

It will be seen that many of the contradictions noted earlier in the idea of progress cannot have any weight for the advaitin. His doctrine is consistent alike with the advocacy of self-reliance
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and Providence. While God is no doubt felt necessary for purposes of devoted contemplation, man has in the last resort to help himself. He must be a light unto himself, a refuge unto himself. He does not work out the purpose of another; in so far as the goal may be said to be pre-ordained it is so ordained by himself as Spirit, not by an alien will however friendly. The confidence in God is at bottom self-confidence; and the realisation of the light is self-realisation; *param jyotiḥ opasāpadya svena rūpeṇābhiniśpadyate*.

Mind like the senses is an appearance; it is higher in the scale and can exercise control over the latter. And while the passions distract and dissipate themselves, mind can co-ordinate them, direct them and secure maximum results from their energy. At bottom, however, director and directed do not belong to different orders of being. It is not that one is Spirit, while the other is nature. Hence the question whether reason is responsible for progress or the passions loses a great part of its interest, from the advaitin's view-point. It is a matter of indifference to him whether the motive-force of progress be said to be controlled passion or dynamic reason; for, both aspects of the progressive force are present in either concept; and the difference between them being one of degree, their reconciliation or co-operation does not appear a problem to the advaitin.

With progress as the achievement of equality the advaitin has little sympathy; for equality, in his metaphysics, can be found neither at the starting-point nor at the goal. But in so far as he believes in a plurality of empirical selves—and many advaitins do, since the consciousness of one's own self as a *jīva* results most vividly and most frequently through the clash with and the distinction from other finite personalities—the advaitin is forced to grant equality of opportunity, in the sense that release is possible and inevitable for all *jīvas*, sooner or later, and that his own release cannot be absolute until that consummation. It is true that not all advaitins subscribe explicitly to this doctrine of universal release. But it is an inevitable corollary from any shade of advaita metaphysics. For him to whom the whole universe inclusive of other *jīvas* is a creation of his own cognition, he alone being the one empirical self to be released, the release of all is synonymous with his own release and is in that

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sense inevitable. But, for those who hold to a plurality of empirical selves, on the release of any one of them, does ajñāna continue to exist or not? If the answer be that there is no more ajñāna there can be no unreleased jīvas either; for the jīva is he who is bound in nescience. If, on the other hand, it be said that there is nescience, but not for the released jīva, what precisely does this mean? Is the released jīva conscious of ajñāna though no longer in its toils? This is to say that he is still māyā-sambaddha as the māyīn; he is no other than Īśvara. If he is not even aware of ajñāna, he cannot be aware of bound souls either; that is to say, he must have arrived at a condition when no more souls appear to him bound. And this cognition is either a delusion, in which case there could have been no release; or it is valid, in which case all souls should have been released. This conclusion is not affected, whatever may be the view of Īśvara, whether He be considered as the prototype or Himself a reflection of Brahman, though the inevitability of an intermediate state of release would appear to lend greater weight to the view of Īśvara as the bomb in which each reflection is merged on the removal of each particular reflecting medium.

Enlightenment or self-realisation is the goal of man. There have been some who thus found themselves in the past, e.g. Śuka, Vāmadeva, etc. Time is the friend of man. Realisation in the future is not merely possible, but inevitable, not for some alone, but for all. Such is the idea of progress for advaita, which, in so far as it may be called a religion, resembles Whitehead's conception of it as "the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real and yet waiting to be realised; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest".¹

1. *Science and the Modern World*, p. 238. The advaitin, however, would substitute "grasp" for "reach"; and he would not admit the hopelessness of the quest except for the confirmed extrovert.

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IV

The field for *adhyāropa* and *apavāda* being infinite, it is matter for little surprise if the tale of achieved progress seems pitiful. Progress may be watched only if the field is narrowed or widened considerably. The physical growth from childhood to manhood is progressive in the majority of cases; economically, morally and in other ways the case for progress will not be equally clear. And if man is compared to the mammoth or the mastodon progress seems certain. There is increased co-ordination and greater economy. Whether man is happier than the mastodon we can neither affirm nor deny; for the happiness of an extinct dumb animal does not allow itself to be estimated. Observation in a field of normal width cannot but be inconclusive. The gain in breadth will often be seen to go with a lack of depth; the widest empire is not the best governed; extensive riches do not make for great happiness; economy of effort is not a value so long as there is no worth while channel of expenditure for what is saved; it is worthless to achieve leisure, when that leisure cannot be put to proper use. All this is true and even trite. But it is no more true that depth and breadth are incongruous than that connotation and denotation vary in inverse ratio. Of content as of connotation there is little definite in the case of larger wholes. What is to be sought is an increase in the definition, not so hopeless as what was assumed to be the task, an increase of the content itself, which might be very difficult if not impossible.

It is not true, except as a brilliant paradox, that ideas have not progressed. The instance cited in the earlier part of these lectures is misleading. Śaṅkara and Mādhva were not the progenitors, but only the most noted expositors of non-dualism and dualism. Each claimed the authority of revelation and there is no doubt that revelation in some measure supplied the basis for either. While thus deriving from a common fountain-head, neither mode of thought can claim definite temporal priority; for we have no authoritative information as to the earliest *dvaitin* or *advaitin* or the chronological relation of the one to the other. For another reason, it would seem futile if not improper to look for progress or regress in the temporal sequence of *dvaita* and *advaita*; our thinkers have always held temporal truth to be relative to eligibility; he whose mind is prepared to appreciate and accept dualism will look on non-dualism either as outworn or as a lapse; the same will apply *mutatis mutandis* to him whose

mind is prepared to receive non-dualism. And though the advaitin holds the realisation of non-dualism to be inevitable for all, that is but the ultimate goal, which is not to be reached except through many back-slidings and recoveries, each such process serving to establish the basic truth more firmly on the *śūnī-ānukūlamana-nāya*. An estimate of progress or the reverse can be profitably made, therefore, only within each system. In this way, novelty is claimed even for the dualist theory, which at first seems to be but naïve common-sense hardly worth the name of philosophy. And though Śaṅkara was called *pracchanna-buddha*, he made significant advances on Buddhist doctrine. Thus, while recognising the world to be phenomenal, he stressed the recognition of the phenomenal substrate without which the phenomenal could not be at all. While he understood and perhaps took over Mādhyamika dialectic, he made the notable contribution of the concept of the indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*), since in the case of contraries rejection of both is possible. Nor has advaita merely marked time since Śaṅkara. If Reality is one, no path can be ultimately fruitless or lead to perdition; at the worst there can be but a loss of time; and in the end, release is the lot of all. These implications of advaita have been made more and more explicit in succeeding centuries. Maṇḍana's view of *prasaṅkhyāna* (deep uninterrupted contemplation) as the instrument of realisation was taken up and developed by Bhāratī-tīrtha, who held that even without intellectual inquiry realisation could be achieved, though with delay, by contemplation of the *nirguṇa*; reference has already been made to Madhusūdana's doctrine of the possibility of realisation through *bhakti*; and the possibility of universal salvation though perhaps implicitly present in many earlier advaita writers, was first set forth *in extenso* by Appayya Dīkṣita. The march of time has thus not been without significance to the development of doctrine; it has helped in various ways both to expand and to consolidate, to extend the scope and deepen the meaning.

Let us turn for a moment to modern political and economic ideas; human relationships, it is well-known, are largely regulated by contract to-day as distinguished from status. And this change must undoubtedly count for progress. There is no intelligible half-way house between the denial of all personalities except oneself (this the *dr̥ṣṭi-ṛjṣṭi-vādin* does) and the full recognition of all personalities other than oneself, with such reservations as may

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be made for inexperience and lack of education. The former view leaves no room for either status or contract; with the recognition of the existence and worth of other personalities, however, the contractual seems the only just basis for human relationships. The change has not been uniform or complete. Marriages in our country are largely non-contractual. And even in those relationships where contracts prevail, unjust contracts are neither unknown nor uncommon. This is in a large measure due to the persistence of status in a different garb. The employer or the capitalist is able to put on undue pressure because there is no equality between the contracting parties; status, that is to say, the inequality of it, still persists. The workers all over the world are striving with a great measure of success to reduce if not abolish this inequality, (which by the obversion of a well-known legal maxim is inequity) by mass organisations and the education of class-consciousness. It is intelligible, however, that the negation of status, i.e., the negation of capitalism, involves also the apparent negation of individual liberty; we may get to the Socialist State where what is called individual liberty is at a minimum and there is no freedom of contract as now understood. The citizen may no longer be a free unit, but a limb of the Socialist organism; status may supervene in a new guise. With all this there will yet be no cause to affirm a regress. What is of moment is neither status nor contract which are empty forms, but the worth of the individual; and in all the phases of the dialectic process, it is this which gains increasing recognition; each apparent negation leads to its own negation in the progress of this central concept. Even Fascism is but the inevitable phase of negation in the dialectic growth.¹ The particular economic and political forms of the society in which men live, these are but phases of what is instrumental to life. Neither the democratic nor the socialist state is a thing of worth in and for itself; for the state itself is but a passing phase. Says Lenin: "... the dictatorship of the proletariat is only a transitional form... The annihilation of the power of the State is the aim all Socialists have had in view, first and foremost among them, Marx. Without the realisation of this aim, true democracy, that is, liberty and equality, is unattainable. It can only be achieved by the Soviet or proletarian democracy; for this system prepares at the very outset for

1. Cp. *The Philosophy of Communism*: J. Macmurray; pp. 86-87.

the *withering away* of any form of State by bringing forward the mass organisations of the working people into constant and absolute participation in State administration."¹ The most revolutionary of political and economic changes seems thus bound up with "progressive disillusionment" with regard to the external.

That our most progressive institutions cause disappointment to us there is no gainsaying. Yet we are not seriously prepared to scrap them. To take the League of Nations for example; the successes to its credit are few and not distinctive, while its failures have been colossal. Yet its bitterest critics would not willingly wreck it. Thus says Mr. Brailsford: "Then does this mean that we must abandon the Geneva League, and with it the ideal of universality? That would be a disaster. With all its limitations in conception and its failures in achievement, it represents an aspiration that is transforming the thinking of a great part of mankind. The nearer it comes to wreckage the more do idealists cling to it. They rallied to it after the Manchuria failure as they had never done before. Even after the Abyssinian defeat they will not abandon it."² That is the real value of the League, that it transforms however slowly the thinking of mankind. The evil man goes on his way heedless of what others say; to a great extent, however, it is because he keeps his ears closed. If public opinion can be brought home to him, if he can be made to realise that what he hears is the criticism not merely of his enemies, but also of some of his friends and of a good many who are normally indifferent, there is bound to result sooner or later an appreciable change in conduct. Even Imperialism cannot hold to its career, when secret treaties and confidential reports are mercilessly exposed. Not even the British Empire can indefinitely continue to "solemnly affirm the independence of the victim and then arrange an eventual 'deal' at his expense."³ It may not be good policy to wash dirty linen in public; but it is surely better than not to wash them at all; and the League by acting as the laundress will help to reveal and eventually to heal many a secret and festering sore. Even such a keen critic as Mr. Brailsford has to admit the following successes: "It has

1. *Bourgeois Democracy and Dictatorship of the Proletariat*; quoted by R. P. Dutt, in *Lenin*, p. 77; italics mine.

2. *Towards a New League*: H. N. Brailsford; p. 60.

3. *Gf. Brailsford, op. cit.*, p. 40.

supervised a big empire in the mandated territories. It made an effort to disarm us all, and brought mankind together to discuss its economic plight at a Conference in London. It has, moreover, a distinguished record of social and humanitarian work. It has succoured prisoners, found homes for refugees, brought hope to populations scourged with malaria, standardised the right to leisure and health of some groups of workers the world over, lifted some stricken countries out of bankruptcy, helped others to organise their transport and social services, penetrated the schools as a teacher of peace, and provided for our social thinking ample material based on exact research..... Every success in international co-operation makes for security. In some of these instances the success was astonishing".¹

The real trouble with the League is not merely that "The 'Haves' dominate it", but that thinking still proceeds on the basis of the "Haves" and the "Have-nots". It is not yet realised that it is a more vital thing to use than to have; the two are not inconsistent; indeed it is necessary in some sense to have before there can be use. What is essential, however, is the use. It is this conception as distinct from that of having, which should inspire and dominate any councils that seek to promote universalism or cosmopolitanism. There is needed a change of "heart" a revision of values instead of mechanisms, a turning away from external organisation to internal reformation. Since God in his inscrutable way has turned our senses outwards, it is the external that attracts, appeals and seems most feasible. Not until such avenues are fully explored and found defective can there be a real reformation. Until that stage the remedy for defective organisation will appear to be but still more organisation. From one view-point, the obvious successes of the League are of less ultimate value than its failures; for, it is these which, exemplifying the inevitable dialectic, will secure a new orientation, through the path of progressive disillusionment.

The growth of the Indian National Congress is another phenomenon of interest exemplifying the dual aspect of progress. From a comparatively small body comprising a few of the intelligentsia, supplicating for the progressive grant of responsible government under the aegis of the British Empire, it has become a huge institution commanding the loyalty of a very large section

1. H. N. Brailsford, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

of the country and eloquently demanding Swaraj). The increase in numerical strength, due in appreciable measure to half-hearted camp followers or disgruntled seceders from other camps, is the least important feature of the change. Self-reliance is the dominant note; and its logical culmination is the demand for independence, a demand which does not ignore the rights and advantages of participation in the British Commonwealth, but insists that the participation should be wholly free and voluntary. So far, there is growth in the nation's stature. What is even more interesting, however, is the new note of analysis that has been introduced by the President Jawaharlal Nehru. Speaking to the people he asks them for whom they want Swaraj. Is it for the magnate or the worker, the plutocrat or the peasant? This is not a quest for the metaphysical self, but a metaphysical quest for the political or economic self for whom the right of self-determination is claimed. Growth in extent has gone with a measure of growth in intent too. It is not improbable that in searching for an answer to the Pandit's question, there may be lack of unanimity, splits, failures, backslidings and what not. This, however, is but inevitable in the dialectic process; and the adherents of the Congress need fear no greater disaster than after the Surat split thirty years ago, but may on the contrary look forward to a subsequent period of greater vitality and utility.

In the contact and reactions of cultures, again, progress may be marked. East and West have grown to tolerate and sometimes to respect each other, even if they have not got to love each other. No longer is it thought that what is alien is not culture at all. The German deification of Nordic culture and the Italian intolerance of Abyssinian barbarism stand almost alone in contrast to the consensus of civilised opinion. Not all the British sympathy for Abyssinia can be set down to hypocrisy or Christianity. "There is the idea of a comprehensive, universal human culture, which is being developed, through worldwide intercourse of varied kinds."¹ And while it was thought till recently that East and West should give of their cultures freely to fuse and form a perfect blend, that the perfect man's life would comprise elements taken from the different cultures and religions, it is now tending to be recognised that "the religious"

1. *Living Religions and Modern Thought*: A. G. Widgery, p. 277.

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(one may say spiritual) 'wealth' of mankind will most probably be increased by scholarly adherents of particular religions remaining faithful to their religions and striving to realise the elements of value in them. The way to comprehensive truth and unity is not likely to be found in the present universal adoption of any one existing religion.¹ Once again we see at work the principles of inclusiveness and harmony.

The historian will find hosts of facts difficult if not impossible to reconcile with this tale of progress. The history of our own country, to say nothing of the innumerable civilisations of the ancient world, would seem to offer striking disproof of the progressive's contentions. For the greatness of India we seem compelled to dig into Vedic and even pre-Vedic times. The consolation for our modern insanitary conditions has to be sought in the wonderful sanitary arrangements of Mohenjo-Daro; and the tale of the so-called ancient republics has to redeem us from the charge of present political incapacity. It is not for me to set up as an apologist of British rule in India. The wonders of modern civilisation which are so frequently cast in our teeth could have come to us without foreign domination. The railway and the telegraph could have come in with foreign contact without necessitating foreign rule. Foreign ideas too if needed could have been assimilated, as by Japan, without political subjection. Our history may well appear one of steady march from freedom to slavery, without any redeeming feature which can be set up by the advocate of progress. But let us forget our own country for the moment and think of the human race as such. Let us suppose that different parts of it, roughly divided as East and West, have developed along different lines aiming at perfection and attaining it in parallel degrees but in different ways. Let us suppose again that a time comes for those cultures to meet, as may happen to two circumnavigators, one going east and the other west. Any one of three things may happen. One of the wayfarers may join with the other and go east or west as the case may be merely retracing the steps, taking over the benefit of the other's experience but casting off the original endowment. This is roughly what has happened with Japan, so far as an outsider can judge. Again, the two travellers may ignore each other and

1. *Living Religions and Modern Thought*; by A. G. Widgery, p. 279.

go on their ways tolerantly giving room each to the other. This India would have done if Europe had also been peaceably minded. It would have been of a piece with her long history of tolerance, her gathering in her skirts a little more closely, letting who will occupy her land¹. She would have exerted no influence on the foreigner except indirectly, and foreign influence would have been as easily shed by her as water off a duck's back. She who gave birth to so many religions and saw them flourish, go forth, or die with indifference would not have let her calm be affected by one more foreign factor. It is permissible to speculate that in such a case humanity would have lost. When there is something to exchange and there is a possibility of doing so, it would be folly to refrain from the exchange. And since one party was indifferent to it, the third course alone would seem to have been possible, consisting in a clash and a dispossession serving as stimuli to waken one to the need for exchange. What humanity needed was not a running in parallel circuits, but a coming together with or without a clash. If the process has been for the moment disastrous to India, the blame for that is to be laid primarily not on the contact, but on her previous enfeebled condition. If she had been stronger, the clash would have created less shock and the conflagration might have been avoided. As it is, it is still permissible for the historian of progress to see more than the historian of India, to look to a synthesis of cultures, consisting not in a barter or blending but in a sympathetic co-operation and exchange of experiences, which, while keeping each traveller on the original way, will yet provide both with a richness of knowledge that would not have been other-

1. Cf. the following description of the Chinese attitude: "Left to ourselves, we should never have sought intercourse with the West. We have no motive to do so; for we desire neither to proselytise nor to trade. We believe, it is true, that our religion is more rational than yours, our morality higher, and our institutions more perfect; but we recognise that what is suited to us may be ill adapted to others. We do not conceive that we have a mission to redeem or to civilise the world, still less that that mission is to be accomplished by the methods of fire and sword; and we are thankful enough if we can solve our own problems, without burdening ourselves with those of other people." (Lowes Dickinson: *Letters from John Chinaman*, p. 10.)

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wise available and whose value cannot be overestimated. India's loss (and we may persuade ourselves it is temporary) may yet be humanity's gain, a gain which might not have been possible otherwise with our tolerance of *paradharmā* combined with our unwillingness to experiment with it, since it imports fear, according to our Scriptures. The experiment had to be forced on us. Let us hope that the democracies of the distant future will be richer, more fruitful and more lasting, resting on the experiences not merely of British Parliamentary institutions but also of such responsible government as existed in ancient India, in whatever form or measure. When this consummation is reached or even remotely approximated to, it will be not because India has given up *svādharmā* but because she has had it enriched with enforced experiments in *paradharmā*; she would have passed through one more *adhyāropa* and *apavāda*.

What was said of India's loss and humanity's gain applies in a measure to the story of dead civilisations. These are not really dead. We may not see any more the glory that was Greece or the grandeur that was Rome; but humanity does not lack the light of Greece or the law of Rome. Achievement in time is infinite. Human capacities are of infinite diversity, varying from clime to clime and age to age. Is it surprising that the finite achievements of progress seem to wander over all the map? What does it matter so long as the main achievement stands, the realisation of man as intelligence, not the massing of marble nor the scribbling on papyrus, paper or palm-leaf? Has not history this lesson to teach us, that man is greater than matter or mind? So long as this lesson is treasured, what matters it that cultures are destroyed or the earth or even the solar system known to us? The intelligence that evolved this world, as a super-imposition on itself, may evolve yet other worlds if there be need. What is destroyed repeatedly is but particularity and finitude; and whether this be destroyed in parts or in the mass, the reality that is yourself can never be destroyed. The possibility of universal decay and the doctrine of entropy have no terrors for the *advaitin*.

The exponent and upholder of the dialectic process must be prepared to see even what he expounds going through the dialectic mill. Not even that theory can be exempt from the movement from thesis to antithesis and thence to synthesis. In

the same way has the advaitin to admit the illusoriness of the doctrine of illusoriness (*mithyātva-mithyātva*). Just as the ultimate negation of the provisional synthesis cannot avail to resuscitate what was negated lower down in reaching that synthesis, the illusoriness of the doctrine of illusoriness cannot avail to re-endow the phenomenal world with reality. The illusory nature of the *apavāda* cannot establish the reality of the *āropita*. When I mistake the rope for a snake and then again for a staff, the staff-delusion sets aside the snake-delusion; but the subsequent removal of the staff-delusion does not reinstate the snake-delusion. Just as knowability applies not merely to things knowable but also to the concept of knowability, even so is it with illusoriness; it applies both to itself and to others. And this is the answer to Bury who, after reviewing the idea of progress from the Middle Ages to the present day, concludes thus: "But if we accept the reasonings on which the dogma of progress is based, must we not carry them to the full conclusion? In escaping from the illusion of finality, is it legitimate to exempt the dogma itself? Must not it, too, submit to its own negation of finality?"¹ True, the idea of progress cannot afford to be non-progressive; but in the process it cannot fail to be progress, i. e., what is not final. Like *pramāṇyatva* for all thinkers and *mithyātva* for the advaitin, the concept of progress applies to itself as much as to the rest of the world. And if the process seems unintelligible, we need only point to the phenomenal and indeterminable character of the world as well as of this concept. That is why for the Absolute there is no progress. It is rather the condition of all progress; and because of the certitude furnished by that condition, the advaitin confidently marches forward to what Entenfin calls "the harmony, ceaselessly progressive, of flesh and spirit, of industry and science, of east and west, of woman and man"². The task seems to be endless; but so is time. *Der Weltgeist hat Zeit genug.*

1. J. B. Bury; *op. cit.*, pp. 351, 352.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 367.

A NOTE ON "DASAŚATASAKALADHARAṆĪTALA"
MENTIONED IN THE TELUGU ACADEMY PLATES
OF VIṢṆUKUṆḌIN MĀDHAVAVARMA.

BY

M. SOMASEKHARA SARMA.

In the Telugu Academy plates¹ of Viṣṇukuṇḍin Mādhavavarman, son of Gōvindhavarman and grandson of Vikramabēndravarmān, Mādhavavarman is described as "*daśaśatasakaladharaṇītalānaraṇatīḥ*". The late Mr. K. V. Lakṣmaṇa Rao, who first edited these plates in the "Journal of the Department of Letters", Calcutta, in 1923, corrected the text of the above passage into "*vanśagata-sakaladharaṇītalānaraṇatīḥ*"² assuming that it was wrongly inscribed by the engraver.

I translated the whole article of Mr. Lakṣmaṇa Rao and published it in the September number of the Telugu journal 'Bhārati' of the year 1930, wherein I added in foot-notes, some more information, which I had gathered on the subject. While I was engaged in the translation of the article, I examined the text carefully and compared it with the original plates, which were then in my possession. I came to the conclusion that the text of the passage, corrected by Mr. Lakṣmaṇa Rao was not faulty and therefore needed no correction. The passage means "the king of the whole of the one thousand country"³ (*daśaśata*: one thousand, and *sakaladharaṇītalā*: whole land or country). Where is this "one thousand country", and what is its significance?

1. Journal of the Department of Letters for 1924, p. 31ff. Jour. Andh. Hist. Res. Soc., Vol. VI, p. 17 ff (July 1931). 'Bhārati' (September, 1930; Feb. 1931).

2. Journal of the Department of Letters for 1924, p. 59, f.n. 6.

3. Mr. R. Subba Rao while editing these Telugu Academy plates of Mādhavavarman in the Journal of the Andh. Hist. Res. Soc., Vol. VI, p. 17 ff, translated the passage thus: "(the mahātāja Mādhavavarman) who subdued the kings of the whole earth of ten thousand villages" (!).

The Viṣṇukundins were successors of the Śālaṅkāyanas in the Vēṅgī country. Though there is divergence of opinion among scholars as to their original home and the direction from which they came to Vēṅgī, certain it is that they ruled over the Vēṅgī country. Their capital was Lendulūr, the present Dendulur, near Ellore in the West Godavari District, from which place Vikramēndravarmān issued his Cikkollā plates.¹ The Ipūr plates² of Mādhavavarman, son of Gōvīndavarman and the Telugu Academy plates of the same king also attest to the fact that the Viṣṇukundins were ruling the Vēṅgī country. The synchronism afforded by the pedigree of the donees, given in the Polunūru grants³ of both the Viṣṇukundin Mādhavavarman and the Cāḷukya Jayasimhavarman I, suggests that the country of Vēṅgī passed from the hands of the former or his son to the latter, and thus affords an indirect proof of the rule of Mādhavavarman over the said country. In these circumstances, it is not unreasonable or unwarranted to identify "the thousand country" with Vēṅgī itself. But will this identification stand the test of epigraphical evidence?

Instances of this kind, wherein districts or provinces are mentioned along with numerical figures, are found in inscriptions, specially of the Canarese country. I allude to some of the Canarese inscriptions of the seventh century mentioning districts or provinces along with their numerical appellations. How much earlier this practice of mentioning administrative divisions with numerical figures commenced in the Canarese country, I cannot say. But as far as the Telugu country is concerned this Viṣṇukundin inscription of the sixth or the early seventh century is the earliest of its kind. Can our identification be strengthened by any other evidence that may prove that Vēṅgī was a "one thousand country?"

The country of Vēṅgī was mentioned by its name in inscriptions only from the time of the Eastern Cāḷukyas, who had regarded it to be their native home. It is in the Satalūr plates⁴ of

1. Ep. Ind., Vol. IV, p. 193 ff.

2. *Ibid.*, Vol. XV II, p. 334 ff.

3. Jour. Andh. Hist. Res. Soc., Vol. VI, p. 17 ff.

Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 73.

Bhārati, Sept. 1930; Feb. 1931.

4. Bhārati, Vol. I, p. 102.

Jour. Andh. Hist. Res. Soc., Vol. V, p. 112, ll. 11-12.

Gunaga Vijayāditya III that Vēṅgī is mentioned, for the first time as "a twelve thousand country". These plates describe Viṣṇuvardhana IV as having ruled over "Vēṅgī of 12,000 *Pramāṇa*" (*Viṣṇuvardhanaḥ pañcatrinśadvargjāyā dvādaśasahasraḥpramāṇa-Vēṅgīmaṇḍalinā amṛtālayat*). A paper on the plates prepared by K. V. Lakṣmaṇa Rao was posthumously published in the 'Bhārati' in 1924. He therein expressed his opinion, as against Fleet, that these numbers refer perhaps to the population of the country or the district and not to villages. In the paper entitled "Prācinrājyaparipālanamu" in Telugu, which I contributed in 1927 to the 'Jayantī', a Telugu bi-monthly (now extinct), I wrote that "grāma" which was used in ancient inscriptions along with numerical figures, is a term denoting extent, and that it should not be taken to mean a grāma or village as we understand it at present. I stated there that it was the unit of measurement of the country just as it was also the unit of administration in ancient times and suggested that it might correspond perhaps to "grāma" as defined in "Śukranīti" ("Bhavēt krōśātmakō grāmō rūpyakarjasaḥsarakāḥ"). Mr. B. V. Krishna Rao also, who re-edited the Satalūru plates mentioned above in 1930 in the "Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society" rejected the theories of Fleet, Lakṣmaṇa Rao and Rice, and stated

"The expression Vēṅgīmaṇḍala 12,000 is inexplicable . . . The expression cannot in any sense mean either the population or the number of villages or revenue-paying units. It might also convey a sense of its extent, expressed in terms of K ōś (two miles), which is a very ancient word, denoting distance; that is to say Vēṅgīmaṇḍala, whose area was twelve thousand square Krōś . . . Though Mañcanakavi mentions Pākanāḍu as consisting 21,000 grāmas, grāma cannot be taken to mean a village but a unit of extent or area.¹"

How then, can we identify "the thousand country" with Vēṅgī of 12,000 extent or *pramāṇa*? The explanation is simple. The numerical figures are not constant and as far as Vēṅgī is concerned² they underwent modifications several times, owing

1. Jour. Andh. His. Res. Soc., Vol. V, pp. 107-108.

2. There is evidence to show that the numerical expressions of other viṣayas or districts also, used to vary in different periods, as for example Velanāḍu, once a '6,000 country' (Ep. Coll., no. 671 of 1920) became a '6,300 country' (Ep. Coll., no. 274 of 1893),

probably to the changing political conditions. If Vēṅgī of the time of Viṣṇuvardhana IV was of 12,000 extent, it became a 15,000 country during the time of Kulōttuṅga I. It is stated in the Pāṭhapuram pillar inscription¹ of Pṛthivīśvara of the Velanāṭi family that, pleased with Cōḷa, son of Goṅka I, Kulōttuṅga I gave him Vēṅgī sixteen thousand. This is attested to by another inscription² from Śrīkākulam, Krishna District of the Velanāṭi chief Goṅka II, son of Cōḷa I to whom the country is said to have been given. In that inscription Goṅka II is styled "Vēṅgī-*viṣaya śōḍaśasahasrāvāṇallabha*" (lord of Vēṅgīviṣaya, 16,000 country). Vēṅgī seems to have been a "fourteen thousand country",³ during the time of Tribhuvanamalla, the Western Cāḷukya ruler of Kalyāṇ. Epigraphical evidence is not lacking to show that it was a "one thousand country" also. An inscription⁴ of Ayyapa, a chief of Vēṅgī, dated Śaka 1159, from Yenamalakuduru, Krishna District, gives out that his great grandfather Goṅka was the king of Vēṅgī, 1,000 (*Vēṅgisahasrakṣmādhīśaḥ*). As a matter of fact even during the time of the Eastern Cāḷukya king, Ammarāja II (Vijayāditya, Vēṅgī was a "one thousand country". At the time of granting the village of Tāṇḍēru, Ammarāja II addresses his order to the "rāṣṭrakūṭapramukhas of Vēṅgī one thousand"⁵ (*Vēṅgisahasrarāṣṭrakūṭapramukhān*). Thus, Vēṅgī in the tenth century has become diminished to a "one thousand country".

That this numerical figure 1,000 refers to the number of 'grāmas' is made evident by two records, one, of the time of Rāja Rāja II, son of Rājendra Cōḷa II alias Kulōttuṅga I, and the other, of a maṇḍalika. Rāja Rāja II is said to have gifted away twelve villages to his "close friend and subordinate chief, Mummaḍi Bhīma of the solar race as "manniyanibaddhamādhī-patyam" in respect of the 1,000 villages comprising Vēṅgī-

Rēnāḍu, a '7,000 country' (Ep. Coll., no. 466 of 1906) became a '70 country' (Ep. Coll., no. 350 of 1905). Mullikināḍu, a '300 country' (Ep. Coll., no. 395 of 1904) became a '4,000 country' (Jour. Tel. Academy, Vol. X, p. 193).

1. Ep. Ind., Vol. IV, p. 32 ff. v. 35.

2. S. I. I., Vol. IV, no. 974.

3. Ep. Coll., no. 319 of 1922.

4. S. I. I., Vol. VI, no. 96.

5. Ep. Ind., Vol. IX, p. 131 ff.

viśaya"¹ (*Vēṅḡḡipura viśaya-grāmasaḥasramanyanibaddhamādhipatyam*). Similarly, an undated inscription² from Dākṣaram states that Kōṇa Pūta acquired "the Vēṅḡḡi one thousand villages" from Kulōttaṅga Cōḍa. Thus, when the term "one thousand" refers unmistakably to "*grāmas*" it is but reasonable to infer that similar other terms, attached to districts or provinces, also refer to *grāmas*.

Telugu literature also furnishes instances of this kind and confirms the above statement. Nanni Cōḍa, a Telugu poet of the 12th century³ and the author of '*Kumārasambhava*' kāvya states in the introduction that he was born to Cōḍaballi, lord of Pākanāḍu, 21,000 (*pākanāḍuṇḍiruvadiyokkarēyīśikadhīḥuḍu*) by his chief queen Śrisalī of the Haihaya family. Similarly, another Telugu poet, Mañcana of about the 14th century,⁴ records in his kāvya '*Kēyūrabāhucaritam*' the fact that Kommana, minister of Velanāṭi Cōḍa, went, at the command of his master, with invincible force and ruled 'Pākanāḍu comprising 21,000 *grāmas*' (*ekavimśatīśahagraṇasāṅkhyōkamaidharanīni-bērcina Pākanāḍu*). While Nanni Cōḍa mentions Pākanāḍu merely with its numerical appellation 21,000, Mañcana makes it clear that the number definitely refers to "*grāmas*."

Instances can be multiplied from inscriptions referring to other districts or provinces, showing that these numerical figures denote only '*grāmas*.' Giripratīci or Koṇḍapaḍumaṭidēśa was 73 *grāmas* (*trisaptatigrāmaṇḍitīm . . . Giripratīcim*).⁵ Similarly "*Vaḍugavaḷimēṛṭu*", the country ruled by the Bāṇas was defined as "*Andhrāt-pāthak paḥcimātō kṛtīḥ*". In Sanskrit it is known as Andhrapatham⁶. Vaḍugavaḷi was a 12,000 country.⁷ In the Muḍiyanūr plates,⁸ the Bāṇa king, Vadhūvaḷlabha Mallidēva Nandivarman was described as "*Andhramaṇḍaladvādala-*

1. Ep. Rep., for 1922, p. 98, para 6.

Cp. no. 3 of 1921-22.

2. S. I. I., Vol. IV, No. 1153.

3. Jour. Tel. Acad., Vol. XIV, p. 20.

4. 'Lives of the Telugu poets' by K. Viresalingam, Vol. I, p. 253.

5. Ep. Ind., Vol. VI, p. 258 ff.

6. Ep. Ind., Vol. III, p. 76, l. 21.

7. S. I. I., Vol. III, pt. 1, p. 90.

8. Ind. Ant., Vol. XV, p. 175.

śrīśaṅgrāmasaupālitasaṣṭhādhalakṣerigayādhipatēh". V. Venkaya remarks about the grant thus: "The . . . record is spurious but there seems to be no objection to admit its evidence on the geographical point"¹. If the above points are taken into consideration three things become clear, namely (i) that even though the record is spurious its evidence on the geographical points seems valid; (ii) that Vaḍugavali is the same as "*kēdālāśāhāṅgrāma*" country of the Andhramaṇḍala; and (iii) that the figures attached to the territorial divisions indicate *grāmas* with or without that term.

Thus, in some instances the district or province is known by its numerical expression only, as in '*Śaṣṭasastodīpa*';² where as in other cases, both the names of the provinces or districts and their respective numerical symbols are also given with or without the suffix *grāma*. Pāṅkoriki Sōmanātha, who lived during the latter half of the twelfth century,³ wrote in Dvipadā metre a Telugu work called '*Paṇḍitarādhyā Caritramu*' the biography of the Śaivaguru Paṇḍitarādhyā. In the '*Purāṇa-prakaraṇa*', i. e. '*Śrīśūlaprakaraṇa*' of the same work, he mentions some of the countries of India, with their respective numbers, while describing the pilgrims who went to Śrīśūla. I may be excused for quoting below, the passage concerned.

Erīṭenta barusa dānēterhici coccon-
Aṅṭarīta viśīrṇamaga śrīśūlayamul-
Erīṭenta barusa dānēterhici kāmīcun-
Aṅṭarīta yunnatambaga Lohgamūrti
Lakṣmīpaga sapādalakṣa Nēpālam-
Īkṣmīpaga sapādalakṣa Saṁjanita(?)
Lakṣmīpaga sapādalakṣa Kēdāram-
Īkṣmīpaga sapādalakṣa Tīrharti
Lakṣmīpaga sapādalakṣa Kāśmīram-
Īkṣmīpaga sapādalakṣa Kāmōja
Lakṣmīpaga sapādalakṣa Koṅkaṇamu
Īkṣmīpaga Śrahaṭṭamila sapṭalakṣa
Kramamomda Sālvādharambadi lakṣa

1. Ep. Ind., Vol. XI, p. 230.

2. '*Kṛṣṇaveṅṇādakṣina śaṣṭasastatantvalabhaḥ*'.

3. "*Bazarapūrāṇamu*"—Introduction by Pandit V. Prabhakara sastri garu, p. 7.

nine-lakh country; other countries are double and treble its extent.

Thus, though "*grāma*" is suggestive of a definite unit of measurement, it is hard to conjecture what it actually represents in terms of measurements of the present day. As already noted, Śukraniti defines a "*grāma*" as a piece of land, the area of which is a Krōś with a yield of 1,000 silver karsas.¹ If we take this definition, the numbers attached to the territorial divisions represent so many Krōś. This is, however, begging the question, since it is not clear what a Krōś is. It is irrational to link it up with the modern Krōś of linear measure, and equate it with an area of, either one square Krōś or one Krōś square in extent.² Even assuming that it refers to one square Krōś, the area of the Telugu country alone, as given by Pāṅkurīkī Sōmanātha would be eighteen lakhs square miles. As a matter of fact, the area of even the whole of the Madras Presidency does not come up to that figure.³ So having in view the area of the various provinces of India, it can be concluded in three ways:

(i) If "*grāma*" is actually equivalent to a Krōś of Śukraniti, then Krōś should represent a much smaller area than it would, if we assume that we can use the term not only for linear measure but also for area. It is, therefore, necessary to interpret the term "*grāma*" in an independent way.

1. Śukraniti, Ch. I.

2. Śukraniti (Sacred books of the Hindus), p. 26. In his English translation of Śukraniti Mr. Benoy Kumar Sarkar adds in foot-notes, in this connection the measure of distances given by Prajāpati and Manu. According to Manu's measurement, which is smaller than that of Prajāpati, 4,000 cubits make one Krōś, each cubit being equivalent to 24 āṅgulas (or, as we understand it now, two feet). Then, 4,000 cubits or one Krōś will be equivalent to 2,666 yards and 2 feet or a little over than a mile and a half. If Mr. Sarkar intends, by mentioning these in this connection, that we should interpret the Krōś to be either 4,000 square cubits or 4,000 cubits square, it is clear that it is as incredulous as equating the Krōś with 2 square miles or 2 miles square. For, even then this method of reckoning gives abnormal figures for the areas of the provinces or districts mentioned above, if the numbers attached to them are taken to be quite true.

3. According to 1931 census the area of the Madras Presidency (British territory) is 1,42,277 sq. miles.

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It may be noted here that there are many instances, in copper-plate grants, of donors expressing the area of the land given by the unit measures of seed necessary to sow it. For example, in the Pasipumbarru grant¹ of Viṣṇuvardhana III, the area of the land granted was expressed as "*pañcadasakhaṇḍikāvrthibijāvāpāraṇāṇakṣētram*" i. e., 'land in which 15 *khaṇḍikās* of seed can be sown'. Again in the Niduparru grant² of the Eastern Cālukya king Jayasimhavallabha I the area of the land is given as "*pañcāśatikhaṇḍikāvrthibijāvāpāraṇāṇakṣētram*" i. e., the extent of land in which fifty *khaṇḍikās* of seed is sown. To quote a third example, the extent of land granted is given as "*dvādaśakhaṇḍikāvrthibijāvāpāraṇāṇakṣētram*".³ In yet another inscription⁴ it is mentioned as "*viṃśatikhaṇḍikāvrthibijāvāpāraṇāṇakṣētram*". Whatever might have been the exact significance of "*khaṇḍikā*" it is clear that the practice of denoting extent or area of the land given away in terms of the unit measures of seed sown in it, was fairly common in ancient times.

There is yet another way in which the extent of land was denoted, and that is in terms of the unit area which could be ploughed with a single plough. For example, in an inscription⁵ of the Kaṭiṅga Gāṅga king Mahārāja Hastivarman, the extent of land given away is expressed as "*adithyadhahalaśyabhūśchēdikṣētrā . . . Samprattā*". Any number of instances of this sort may be quoted from the early South Indian copper-plate grants.

Just like *Khaṇḍikā* and *Hala*, which denoted the unit of measurement of fields or cultivable areas, "*grāma*" perhaps denoted the unit of measurement of a territorial division or country in very ancient times. "*Grāma*" may possibly refer to either an extent of land denoted by the unit of measures of seed sown in it, or an area denoted by *Halas*. It is not necessary to assume that these units of measurement of area were the same throughout the country, since we find that in modern times many of the indigenous units of measurement vary according to the localities.

1. C. P. no. 9 of 1913-14.

2. C. P. no. 7 of 1916-17.

3. C. P. no. 3 of 1914-15.

4. C. P. no. 10 of 1919-20.

5. Ep. Ind., Vol. XVIII, p. 332, l. 10.

(ii) An alternative to the above is to maintain that *grāma* represents some unit of measurement other than a *Kṛōś* of Śukranīti.¹

(iii) It may even be contended that the numbers attached to the provinces or districts must be exaggerated.

1. In his paper on 'Gōlakīmaṭha' (Jour. Bi. Or. Res. Soc., Vol. XIII) Rai Bahadur Hiralal in a foot-note (p. 142) on the 'three lakhs of villages' granted to Sadbhāvaśambhu by the Kaṭacuri king Yuvarājādēva, states that—

"At first sight the figures of '3 lakhs of villages' appear incredible, but looking to the size of villages in the Bastar state, some of which could be bought for a rupee each, a quarter of a century ago, when I toured in that country, the wonder excited would cease to exist. Mr. K. P. Jayaswal informs me that according to '*Abhidhāna Rājendra*' the Kuntlam Jaina dictionary, a '*grāma*' originally signified '*Karaiḥ yadavagamyaṭ*' or that which is the subject of an assessment. It may even be a holding of a few acres of land, which I actually found to be the case in the Wardha district. While checking the Patwari's work, I suddenly entered a field, which the record showed as belonging to a distinct village, and when I asked where the village was, I was informed that it was a deserted village, which consisted of that field alone, in which I was standing."

'*Abhidhāna Rājendra*' was also cited by Dr. Pran Nath, in his monograph "A study of the economic condition of Ancient India". In that monograph he defines *grāma* as an estate which can pay eighteen kinds of government taxes or which is assessed separately for revenue purposes. Prof. K. A. Nilakantha Sastri examined at length, the new interpretation of Dr. Pran Nath, in a paper published in this Journal (Ante, Vol. IV, P. 2-4) and came to the conclusion that the authorities cited by Dr. Pran Nath "failed, on scrutiny, to sustain the burden he seeks to place on them."

[Vol. XI, Part iii.]

IN WHAT SENSE CAN WE CALL THE TEACHINGS OF NĀGĀRJUNA NEGATIVISM ?

BY

DR. PAUL TUXEN.

University, Copenhagen.

I propose to examine the problem of reality as it presents itself in the teachings of the great Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna, who in the last half of the second century founded the Mādhyamika-school of Mahāyāna-Buddhism. We all of us know that there are different kinds of reality. If we are dreaming, our dreaming is of course real enough. But what we experience in our dreams, we do not regard as just as real as what we experience when awake. When we compare the latter with our dreams, we are inclined to deny reality to our dreaming experiences. But also when awake we speak about different degrees of reality. Sometimes we feel deluded by our senses, at other times we do not doubt what they tell us about the external and the internal world. Now there are people who will make us believe that they know of another, higher reality than that of our daily life, and who accordingly do not look at this life as absolutely real. Mystics we call these people, but often there is not anything mysterious about them; on the contrary they very often are lucid intellects. And one of the finest and keenest representatives of this way of thinking is in my opinion just Nāgārjuna. Not all scholars regard him like this. Let us see how he was estimated in India; let us, for instance, ask a critic of the 14th century, Mādhava. His *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* has been a very useful little book to all students of Indian philosophy, before we had access to the works of the philosophers themselves.

It influenced in Europe our comprehension of those schools, whose sources were unknown or unintelligible to us. Now we know very well that Mādhava's point of view was a most partial one; he was an adherent of Śaṅkara's advaita and estimates all systems on the basis of their supposed agreement or non-agreement with the Advaita-Vedānta. Meanest of all philosophers were,

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in his conception, the Cārvākas, the Materialists, but after them came the Buddhists. Mādhava sets up the common division of Buddhist philosophy into four schools of thought, and he states the points of view of these four schools as those of a universal void, of an external void, of the inderability of external objects and of the perceptibility of external objects. That sounds rather difficult, but his view is this: some Buddhists maintain that all is unreal, others that the external world is unreal, others that we are only able to recognise the external world through inference, and others again that we can recognise the external world through sense-perception. Mādhava is astonished that this diversity of views can be founded on the only one teacher, the venerable Buddha, but he compares the situation with that what happens when the sun has set. Then different people understand that it is time to set about their assignations, the adulterer, the thief and the divinity student search for the opportunity of love-making, of theft and of religious duties according to their inclinations. This parallel is perhaps not flattering to the different branches of Buddhist Philosophy, but of course we have not to take it too seriously.

Now all of you know that all Buddhists agree about four statements, viz., that all is momentary, nothing is constant; that all is "pain", there is no possibility of harmony in life; that all is individual, is like itself alone, there are no common properties; and that all is void, nothing is real. These statements are all of them very significant, but they can be explained in different ways; and our understanding of Buddhism just depends on the way in which we explain them. Especially the last one about the unreality of all is open to different explanations; it can be taken as the expression of pure negativism, but there are also other possibilities of understanding it. To Mādhava as to most of the opponents of the Buddhists on the side of Brahmanism the negative interpretation is the only possible, and this negative position he ascribes to the Mādhyamika-school. It is, he says, just as a beggar, who has got admission into a house and gets more and more obtrusive; in the same way the Mādhyamikas are not satisfied, when we have admitted the momentary flux and, granted the illusory character of pleasure, of universality and of reality; they maintain that the doctrine of Buddha terminates in that of a total void, in universal baselessness or nihilism.

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The ultimate principle, then, is a void emancipated from four alternatives, *vai*, reality, unreality, both reality and unreality, and neither reality nor unreality. If real existence were the nature of a water-pot for instance, the activity of the potter would be superfluous, and the same objection will accrue, if non-existence is its nature; in the last case it cannot be produced and in the first case it has of course no need of a maker. So much about reality and unreality; the two remaining alternatives are inadmissible, as self-contradictory. That is to say, the objects are not determined by any one of the four alternatives.

That the good Mādhava believed the Mādhyamika philosophy to be pure negativism is without doubt; that is shown by all his remarks in connection with this part of his work. But in the quotations I have given of his treatment there is something which ought to warn us against accepting his views. All is unreal; yes, so we were told; but the void that we had to look upon as the ultimate principle of the Mādhyamikas was in his own words emancipated from the four alternatives, reality, unreality, both of them and neither of them. This is something quite different from pure nihilism; also in the opinion of Mādhava and the Advaita-Vedānta there is a super-reality beyond reality and unreality. And when Mādhava wants to give a further illustration of the teachings of the Mādhyamikas, he cites a well-known verse: "A religious mendicant, an amorous man and a dog have each of them his own view of a woman's body; to the mendicant it is a carcass, to the lover a mistress and to the dog a prey." This tells us nothing about an ultimate void, only illustrates the relativity of all ideas. And we are not a little surprised when we read on in Mādhava's words "In consequence, then, of these four points of view, when all ideas come to an end, final extinction, which is a void, will result." I am not able to see that this is a necessary consequence of the above considerations; what we heard about the reasonings of the Mādhyamikas much more leads to the doctrine of relativity; and relative, that is just what the word Śūnya means within this chain of reasoning.

When Nāgārjuna founded that school of philosophy which is called the Mādhyamika-school, he had to be prepared for many misunderstandings of his reasoning. His was a mind so keen that many people could not catch the aim of his teachings. And it was not only his enemies who misinterpreted him; also

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his followers very often disagreed in their interpretation of his *kārikās*. I cannot go into this here. That most people both in India and in Europe were inclined to emphasize the negative aspect cannot surprise us, because he himself lays stress on this side, and that for reasons which I shall explain later on. In India another reason asserts itself. There can be no doubt about the fact that the great Śaṅkara is largely indebted to the Mādhyamika-school. And it could not be agreeable to Śaṅkara and his followers, that this fact should be too manifest; it is well-known that other Vedāntins looked upon Śaṅkara and his school as crypto-Buddhists, *pracchannabauddhas*. Therefore Śaṅkara felt obliged to make the distance between his and Nāgārjuna's doctrine as far removed as possible, and he uses in the commentary to the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā-sūtras*, when speaking about the Mādhyamika-school, a language (ad. II, 2, 31) which is much more violent, much more unpolite than it is his custom. As to his argumentation against Nāgārjuna, he maintains that a doctrine which states the unreality of all is in opposition to all means of knowledge and thus does not need any confutation, for the reality of our world cannot be denied without assuming another reality. To this argumentation we may answer, that when Śaṅkara reproaches the Mādhyamikas, that their views are in opposition to all means of knowledge, Śaṅkara himself in quite the same way maintains that the highest truth and reality cannot be realised by our means of knowledge, and moreover when Śaṅkara states that the reality of the world only can be denied if we assume another reality, then that is just what Nāgārjuna also does.

The teachings of Vedānta according to Śaṅkara, and the teachings of Mahāyāna according to Nāgārjuna have not a few ideas in common, but of course the difference is not to be overlooked. The teachings of the Buddhas, says Nāgārjuna, are founded on the idea of two realities, the relative and the absolute; those who cannot understand the difference between these two realities are not able to recognise the profound truth in Buddha's doctrine. Such a distinction is not at all unknown to the Advaita-vāda, but the difference is more outspoken, when we think of the way in which the Vedāntin and the Mādhyamika try to lead their followers to the absolute reality. Here Nāgārjuna mostly prefers the way of negation; he denies all our

ideas and conceptions with the intention of conducting us to that reality which lies beyond those conceptions of ours. To put it in a few words, Nāgārjuna wants us to comprehend that all conceptions are self-contradictory, are senseless, are without reality and therefore quite unfit to tell us anything about that reality which is the only real one.

In his 448 kārīkās, Nāgārjuna examines all fundamental ideas of Brahmanism and Buddhism with the intention of showing their extreme impossibility. He begins with the conception of cause and effect, and it is to him an easy task to show that this conception cannot endure a thoroughgoing inquiry. And after that he in the 27 chapters of his work demonstrates that this also is the case with all other conceptions. What is self-contradictory cannot be real; and so there does not exist anything like sense-perception like the soul (*ātman*), like the Buddha, like Nirvāṇa, etc. You see that the fundamental ideas of Buddhism are shown to be wrong, just in the same degree as the ideas of Brahmanism. Nāgārjuna does not make any difference in favour of his own religion. Because all our conceptions are self-contradictory they cannot tell us anything about reality. To give you an illustration, I shall make use of an instance which the Mādhyamika texts give in different connections. There is not anything astonishing when people disagree as to the colour of the son of a common friend, as to his being dark or fair-haired, but it is impossible to quarrel about the son of a barren woman, if he be dark or blond. This difference is out of the question, because the son of a barren wife can be neither dark nor fair. Those are qualities which in this case are excluded, because both of them are inconceivable. The basis of their reality is lacking, as the son of a barren woman is a logical impossibility and destitute of any kind of existence. Now all our conceptions, all existence, the whole world, are just as senseless as the son of a barren woman, in the opinion of the Mādhyamikas. We can, of course, very well make use of the word *vandhyāputra*; we can try to imagine such a phenomenon and form a reality on the basis of a mere word without meaning; we can draw all the consequences of this absolute nonsense, quarrel about the colour of this un-existing man. And if we do that, then we are acting in quite the same way as we otherwise are acting in this senseless world of ours, this world which is just as unfounded as the son of a barren woman. It would be quite stupid to discuss if this young

man should be eternal or transient, because these two properties, which else exclude each other in this relation are without any sense. And in the same way and for the same reason we have to reject every attempt to declare something about the world.

We all of us will without difficulty admit that the son of a barren woman is something unreal, but are we in the same way obliged to concede that Buddha himself is and always was without existence? Nāgārjuna does not doubt this. In the 22nd chapter of his *Mādhyamika kārikās* he proves that the conception of a Buddha is nonsensical. Who is this Buddha we speak about? he asks; he cannot be identical with the psycho-physical functions which constitute the Ego; he cannot be different from them; they cannot be contained in him; he cannot be contained in them; and finally he cannot be in possession of them. You know that Buddhism does not accept a soul, an eternal personality, but instead of this assumes a set of functions, the skandhas in the material shape (*rūpa*), feelings (*vedanā*), conceptions (*saṃjñā*), dispositions (*saṃskāra*), and sense consciousness (*viññāna*), which makes out the transitory pseudo-units we call individuals. It is therefore necessary to examine the relation of a supposed individual, say the venerable Buddha himself, to this set of functions to these skandhas, as the Buddhists call them.

If Buddha was a real person, he must either be identical with the skandhas or be something different from them. And it will be evident that this relation is impossible, if we look at the matter from a Buddhist point of view. In this connection we can learn much from a former chapter of Nāgārjuna's work, the 10th one. In this chapter he examines the relation between fire and fuel, but as it is mostly the case with Nāgārjuna, he aims at the same time at another goal than that which is his direct one. You know that fire and extinction of fire in Indian literature is a common illustration of life and salvation from life. And in Buddhist literature this same simile is used to elucidate the relation between the individual and the skandhas, which, as I just said, form the basis of the individual. Fire plays the role of the supposed individual, the Ego, fuel of its base, the skandhas. This simile is well fit for the purpose of elucidating the individual and its foundation; fire is namely just as the Ego no permanent substance, but a chain of burning processes. We regard fire as something real, but it manifests itself only in relation to the fuel,

just as the Ego manifests itself only in relation to the skandhas. In the opinion of an ordinary Buddhist the Ego is illusory but its basis, the skandhas, is real. But that is not the point of view of Nāgārjuna and his Mādhyamikas; he regards the basis as just as unreal as that fiction, the Ego, which was founded on the basis. When fire and fuel stand in relation to each other, then they are without absolute reality; what is in possession of absolute reality can of course not be dependent on the relation to something different.

Now we get nearer to our problem. If fire and fuel should be in possession of absolute reality and nevertheless be dependent on each other, then they must either be identical or different. If fire be identical with its fuel, then follows identity between agent and object; and if fire be different from its fuel, then we should see fire produced without fuel. In the first case we should have *kartṛkarmaṇor ekatvam*, something quite impossible; and the same difficulty would be the result, if we asserted the existence of a Buddha, who was identical with his basis, the skandhas. For if we look at Buddha as an individual identical with the skandhas, we give him a position as both agent and object, which will not do. We return to the simile which had to throw light on our problem. If fire was something different from fuel, it could manifest itself without fuel. In this case fire would be an eternal substance, and we should be able neither to kindle it nor to extinguish it. What Nāgārjuna will have us to understand is this. If fire was absolutely different from the fuel, it could not have any relation to it, and, further, if a thing is dependent on another thing, it cannot be absolutely different from it (*yaṁ pratītya ca yaṁ tasmāt tad anyan nopapadyate* XIV,5). Is fire absolutely different from the fuel, then it is burning eternally, is not produced by the fuel, cannot be influenced by any endeavour to kindle or extinguish it, and is without function, without activity, is an agent without action, which is nonsense. We can now apply this reasoning on the conception of Buddha. If Buddha should be absolutely different from the skandhas, he could appear without them, which from a Buddhist point of view is impossible. And if absolutely different from them, he could not be dependent on them; he could never be realised; he would be just as unreal as the son of a barren woman.

Now I think it will be clear, which is the fundamental thought of the Mādhyamika-philosophy, the thought which is

final with regard to the reality or the unreality of things. A Mādhyamika will not allow reality to anything which is dependent on any other thing; a real thing must be quite independent and unconditional. Fire and fuel stand in correlation to each other; they are dependent on each other; they have no sense at all if not in correlation. We cannot imagine fire without fuel, nor fuel (as fuel) without fire. In daily life, of course, fire and fuel are real enough, but absolute reality we cannot grant them. And quite the same is the case, if we try to find out if there ever was a man Buddha. Buddha and the skandhas are correlated, are dependent on each other, are accordingly without absolute reality. The relative reality of Buddha is of the greatest importance to all of us, or rather to all the followers of Buddhism in their relative existence; he is the great teacher, the merciful Saviour, just as long as we are in need of him. In the real sense of the word, he is as in-existent as all other things in the world. We must never forget that an existence, which is dependent on something different, is no real existence; what does not exist in itself cannot be possessed of an existence founded on another thing, whose existence we first have to prove.

But now we ask: if there is not a Buddha, if there are not the twelve Nidānas, if there are not the four Satyas, if there is not a Nirvāṇa, are we then not entitled to regard the teachings of Nāgārjuna as pure Negativism, as Nihilism, just as Śaṅkara and Mādhava did, and just as many other critics of the Mādhyamika-philosophy in India and in Europe have done? I do not think so, and here I quite agree with Professor Schayer of Warsaw. It is quite right that Nāgārjuna has overthrown all these most significant conceptions of Buddhism, but that applies only if we ascribe absolute reality to them; as to their relative importance he is in no doubt. If we, for instance, look at the famous *pratītya-samutpāda*, the so-called chain of cause and effect, we see a chain of different links, where each link is dependent on the former one and conditions the following one. In this way we have *avidyā*, *samskāra*, *vijñāna*, *nāmarūpa* and so on. It goes without saying that here we have a convincing expression of the relativity of existence, and when Nāgārjuna does not accept the *pratītyasamutpāda*, it is only from the point of view that we mistake its meaning and believe it to teach us the coming into existence of the different factors of life. "Nothing will be, nothing has been, nothing has not been, all these conceptions [Vol. XI, Part iii.]

are wrong". Nāgārjuna says, therefore, of this chain conditional and dependent causes and effects cannot tell us of something like an evolution, a development. Just as the different links in this chain are dependent on each other, it is not an absolute reality, but only a relative one. It tells us that all things are correlated and thus unreal. In other schools of Buddhism this *pratītyasamutpāda* is the law which governs the functioning of the elements of existence, and these elements are in themselves real. Not so in the Mādhyamika-philosophy; here the elements are without absolute reality.

Seen from another point of view, these determinations are invalid. If it was possible to express the absolute reality in terms, which are shaped for the use of the relative world, the *pratītyasamutpāda* would be something quite different. Then we could regard it as a designation of that "Monism", (if I may use a word which in itself is quite impossible in this connection) which lies beyond reality and unreality. It was Buddha's teaching, as Nāgārjuna sees it, that the things neither originated without a cause, nor from a cause, nor from many different causes; they do not originate in themselves, nor from something different, nor from both. In this negative way, Buddha denied every possibility of origination and stated the conditional reality of our conventional world. This conditional existence is just the *pratītyasamutpāda*, relativity brought into a formula; for essentially nothing originates. And if we try to get beyond the limits of our knowledge, try to see things beyond the range of senses or other means of right knowledge, then we can take this same chain of causes and effects as an expression of the highest reality. Nāgārjuna begins his work with a fine verse in which he pays homage to his master the venerable Buddha. In this verse he calls Buddha the foremost of all teachers especially because he has taught the *pratītyasamutpāda*, and he characterizes this *pratītyasamutpāda* in terms which perhaps will surprise you. It is that where nothing perishes (*anirodham*), where nothing originates (*anutpādam*), where nothing is transient (*anucchedam*), where nothing is permanent (*aśāśvatam*), where there is no identity (*anekārttham*), where there is no difference (*anānārttham*), where nothing comes (*anāgamam*) and nothing goes (*anirgamam*); it is the blissful reducing to quietness of the whole world-extension (*japaṇcōpaśamanī śivam*). These terms

are indeed surprising in the work of the great dialectician, but they should in my opinion exempt him from being charged with Negativism. We must never forget that his negative dialectics aim at something quite positive.

But I ask now if the charge of negativism is quite without foundation in facts and here I must confess that it is not. Nāgārjuna himself lays stress on this never to give a positive theory. He hopes that this attitude will free him from those assaults which always are ready for any affirmative doctrine. The Mādhyamika lays claim to a point of view, which is a complete refusing of the theories of the opponents without assuming any positive thesis himself. If we contradict a tenet, we are not at all forced to assume the opposite tenet. The refutation of our opponents can be done without caring to establish one's own view. Thanks to this position Nāgārjuna feels sure not to be refuted himself. He has no theory which can be discussed in connection with other discernible theories. He has no doctrine which can be attacked by his adversaries. Neither does he want to convict his antagonists of the excellence of any doctrine. He does not at all want to convict the opponent; he only wants to show that the opponent is unable to prove his position. He is sure having shown that any theory of any antagonist is hopeless nonsense. Rightly he claims not to possess any positive tenet and rightly he lays stress on this attitude, because he in this way avoids being charged with those contradictions, which in his opinion are inevitable in postulating any positive doctrine. Beyond this Nāgārjuna refuses to teach anything.

Of course a Mādhyamika can very well establish these against other theses and discuss their relative value, but he does not accept any of them (*pakṣāntarābhīyupagamābhāvāt* 16,2). And in this way he avoids giving himself away. This Nāgārjuna states quite outspokenly in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī*: If I had tried to prove some positive thesis, then I could have been guilty of errors, but I have not tried to establish some positive thesis, therefore nobody will be able to find errors in my work. If I was occupied with the right knowledge of objects, then I should affirm or deny them on the basis of things, whose examination I had undertaken with the help of sense-perception and other means of right knowledge; but as such objects do not exist, I cannot be attacked on this basis. You see, how confident Nāgārjuna is with regard to the perfection of his position,

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and his pupil, the famous Āryadeva, gives expression to the same opinion, when he says: A philosopher who neither accepts the position that anything is, nor that anything is not, nor that anything both is and is not, his position you cannot refute how long time you even try it. And Candrakīrti, when discussing different theories about cause and effect, also states that this discussion only takes place for the benefit of the opponent to the Mādhyamika-school these theories do not matter, because this school does not possess a position of its own and thus cannot be accused of contradicting its own theories (*svapratijñāyā abhāvāt, tatasca siddhāntavirodhāsambhavaḥ* 23,3).

We sometimes meet with an argument, which maintains that a sceptical school of philosophy not acknowledging any means of knowledge is itself prevented from proving its thesis, just because it does not assume any means of right knowledge. If this argument had any weight, it could of course be used against the Mādhyamika-school. But the position of Nāgārjuna also helps to avoid this disagreeable consequence. In this connection he also states that the relativity (*Sūnyatā*) is no doctrine at all, but only the refutation of all doctrines, and as a matter of fact he ascribes the same attitude to Buddha himself. Those who look at relativity as at a doctrine he declares to be incurable (XIII,8). To refute theories is not in itself something positive (*na ca dṛṣṭikṛtānām nirvṛttimātram bhāvaḥ* 247,4). Those who regard the teachings of Nāgārjuna as a positive doctrine are like people who ask a man to sell them something. The man answers that he has not anything to sell them, but they insist on being given that nothing which he has to sell (*na kenecon nāma paṇyam* 247,6). Candrakīrti rightly asks, how it shall be possible to explain to those people, that in this case there is nothing to be sold. I told you, that in the opinion of our philosophers Buddha had the same view. People who keep to relativity as to a new and arbitrary theory are without hope of recovering. Buddha tells a story illustrating this. A man is ill and the doctor gives him a very strong purgative, which all right dispels all the unhealthy stuff from the patient's body but remains in him without coming out again. What do you think, Buddha asks, will this man be restored to health, Kāśyapa. No, Master, on the contrary his illness will get much worse, when the purgative remains in the body having dispelled all the impure stuff. Quite so, says Buddha, in the same way, the teachings of relativity are as dispelling of all

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theories; but anybody who regards these teachings as a new theory I declare to be incurable (249,2).

Without doubt you are surprised to hear these words of Buddha, words which do not resemble what we are used to look at as real Buddha words. The quotation is from a Mahāyāna text, *Āryaratnakūṭasūtra*, which does not belong to the earliest ones. But the *Mādhyamikas* lay much stress on showing that the teachings of Buddha often are quite different and self-contradictory, and they give as explanation, that he had to comply with the faculty of comprehension of his disciples. Their comprehension was of course not the same, and Buddha made concessions to their different giftedness. Therefore there is never any possibility of controverting the *Mādhyamikas* through quoting the sacred scriptures (*tasmān nāsty āgmatbādho Mādhyamikānām* 359,6). Perhaps you will think that this is too easy a way to escape the difficulties, and perhaps you are right. The Buddhist schools very often distinguish between words of the Master, which have to be understood directly, literally, words which have to be taken in their usual or primary sense (*nītārtha* 43,4), and words of the Master which have to be explained, to be interpreted (*neyārtha*).

We can in every case make the decision, if texts in the scriptures belong to the first or to the second class of words, and so we never get into a difficulty, when we meet with a direct statement of the venerable Buddha, which seems to go against our point of view. Most religions risk to be confronted with words of the founder, which do not at all fit in with the tendencies of the adherents. That is a matter of theology trying to get out of the difficulties in a way as convincing as possible. Very often the theologians are all but fortunate in their endeavours; that also may be the case with the Buddhists even if they are not theologians in the literal sense of the word. But we have only to state the facts.

I hope that now you will understand me, when I say, that Nāgārjuna's teachings are not to be regarded as Negativism. He never forgets that super-reality, which lies beyond the realities and unrealities of our world. But in another sense of the word Nāgārjuna is a Negativist, because he never will allow his teachings to form a positive theory. In this he was a very prudent and cautious man, and may be not quite wrong.

A NOTE ON AMṚTAGAṆA.

BY

MISS C. MINAKSHI, M.A., PH.D.

University of Madras.

In one of the Annual Epigraphical Reports¹ we have the following statement about an interesting body of people known as the 'Amṛtagaṇattār':—"Amṛtagaṇattār and Gaṇapperumakkaḷ are terms not met with in the inscriptions examined so far. Perhaps they have to be connected with Āḷungagaṇattār who were the direct managing members of a village, distinct from the general members of the village assembly."

If we are to accept the above remarks, we have to treat 'Amṛtagaṇa' as a political body; but a closer examination of the inscriptions where the term occurs and an understanding of the meaning of the word 'Amṛta' clearly point out that the body was not connected with the village administration but with the temple and its management.

In interpreting Amṛtagaṇattār certain interesting points may be stressed. Firstly, the earliest references to Amṛtagaṇa are found in the stone inscriptions of Aparājita-vikramavarman; secondly the Tiruvorriyūr inscriptions of this king alone make mention of this body; and thirdly there is no reference to Amṛtagaṇa in any of the early Cōḷa inscriptions (so far discovered) either from Tiruvorriyūr or from any other part of South India.

The above facts lead to the conclusion that 'Amṛtagaṇattār' were a body of people peculiar to Tiruvorriyūr and came into prominence sometime just before the days of Aparājita and either they disappeared in the Cōḷa period or were known by some other name.

The first two inscriptions mentioning Amṛtagaṇa are dated in the 4th year of the Pallava king Aparājita-varman. The object

1. Madras Epigraphy Report, 1912-13, p. 90.

of the one¹ is to record the gift of thirty *kaṇṇiṣ* of gold for a lamp to be burnt in the temple of Mahādēva (Śiva) at Tiruvorriyūr by Amatti alias Kurumba Koḷali, a concubine of Vayiramēghaṇ alias Vāṇakōvaraiyar, the son of Perunaṅgai. The amount was deposited with the assembly of Ādambākkam and the Amṛtagaṇa, who agreed to lend out the money at a permanent rate of three *maṇḍis* per *kaṇṇiṣ*: "Tiruvorriyūrpurattu Ādambākkattu Sabhāiyōmam Amṛtagaṇattōmam ipponṇāl yāṇḍuvarai kaṇṇiṇvāy mūṇṇumaṇḍi" etc. The other inscription² which is also dated in the 4th year of the same king registers the gift of thirty *kaṇṇiṣ* of gold for a lamp to the same temple by Sappakkaṇ alias Pāṇṇadai, a concubine (*bhōgi*) of Vayiramēghaṇ alias Vāṇakōvaraiyar, son of Sāmi Akkaṇ. The amount was again placed under the charge of the Sabhā at Ādambākkam and the Amṛtagaṇa. A third inscription³ dated in the 7th year of Aparājita speaks of the gift of thirty *kaṇṇiṣ* of gold for a lamp by Aparājita's queen (Ivar Dēviyār Mādēvi aḍigal) to Tiruvorriyūr Madādēva. It is the Sabhā of Ādambākkam and the Amṛtagaṇa that received the gold.

In all the above cases the Amṛtagaṇa is mentioned along with the village Sabhā and this may induce us to believe that the former body was also concerned with village administration just as the Āḷuṅgaṇattār, but it may be observed, 'Amṛtagaṇattār' has to be understood differently. 'Amṛtai' means 'Devas', Gods, or immortals. 'Amaradvīja' is a Brahman who lives by attending a temple or idol.⁴ We know that Amara and Amṛta are used synonymously in certain contexts.⁵ If 'Amaradvīja' is a Brahman who lives by superintending a temple, then Amṛtagaṇa surely stands for a group of men who were in charge of temple affairs.

1. Madras Epigraphy Report No. 158 of 1912.

2. Do. No. 161 of 1912.

3. Do. No. 163 of 1912.

Madras Epigraphy Report No. 171 of 1912 is one more record in the same temple which mentions the Amṛtagaṇa. It is a damaged record, the date and the name of the king are lost, and it registers a gift of gold which was received by the assembly of Ādambākkam and the Amṛtagaṇa. On palaeographical basis we may assign this inscription also to Aparājita.

4. Monier Williams. Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 80.

5. Apté. Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 46.

By the time of Aparājita, the Tiruvorriyūr temple seems to have attained great prominence and it is quite natural that such a prosperous institution required the management of an organized committee of people like the Amṛtagaṇattār. Besides, the Sabhā of Ādambākkam¹ could not have looked after the affair of the temple from day to day; and therefore it should have been necessary to entrust the money into the hands of a body designed to transact business on the spot; and the Amṛtagaṇattār seems to have served the purpose.

From the inscriptions noticed above, it is clear that the 'Amṛtagaṇattār' were directly responsible to the Sabhā for the execution of their duties regarding endowments committed to their charge. And further, the close relationship of the village assembly with organized non-political bodies in matters of social administration is also well brought out.



1. Ādambākkam is near St. Thomas Mount.

THE EXTENT AND INFLUENCE OF THE INDUS CIVILIZATION.

BY

P. JOSEPH, B.A.,

In this essay stress is laid only on inscriptional evidence gathered from the little steatite pieces, pottery sherds and copper bits that have been thrown up from the bosom of the earth by the excavator's spade in the Punjab and Sind. The remains excavated at Mohenjo Daro, Harappa and Chanhudaro show naturally that this great civilization flourished in the Indus valley. But we may ask: Was the civilization confined to the Indus basin only?

From the inscriptions we get a fairly good idea of the home, perhaps original,¹ of their authors. Their homeland is called *Sid*,² from which the modern name Sind is derived. Sid is a purely Dravidian word coming from a root meaning "to trickle, to flow", and this word was applied to the river alongside which these ancients built their famous cities; and from the river it has gone to designate the land.³ By this word *Sid*, which has at the present day shrunk in its content to the extent of denoting only the little province of Sind in and around the Indus delta, then was meant a much larger territory, though perhaps not as large as the whole of modern India. Anyway, that Sid included at least Southern India is quite evident from the

1. I say 'perhaps original' because nothing in the inscriptions has so far been discovered to necessitate the theory of a foreign home for these people.

2. Photo, M. D., 606 of 1928-29, No. 7033.

3. It may be interesting to note that the word 'India' itself is derived from 'Sid' through 'Sind' and 'Hind'. Cf. Gnana Prakasar, '*A Study in Etymology*,' *The Hindu Organ*, April 13, 1937, p. 3.

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inscriptions.¹

The majority of the tribes and their cities mentioned in the inscriptions are at present to be found in South India. Names, for instance, like the Paravas, the Minas, the Bilavas, the Kuḍagas, the Nāgas, the Iraḷars, Uḍaiyūr, Velūr and Tirpūr are all well-known in Southern India. Still it is quite possible that owing to pressure of invaders from the north-west in later times the Mahenjo Darians went south in search of pastures new and there founded their new cities while giving them their old names. And yet this is far from the fact: for it is true that the northern Dravidians went south, but only to join their fellowmen already settled there for long.

Some inscriptions refer to the southern country as very big,² while others mention the very big united countries in the south.³ In accordance with the Mahenjo Darian practice of coupling the constellations with their lands and cities, the Fish⁴ and the Jar⁵ are said to be over the southern country. An inscription says that Malayam—probably Malabar—is situated in the south.⁶ There are several references to Velūr famous for its harvests⁷ and on one seal is inscribed that this harvest-famed Velūr was of the South.⁸ Some inscriptions make mention of the southern Paravas.⁹ Others inform us that in the south there were Minas,¹⁰ whose great southern country was under Mina,¹¹ who was their

1. For an elaborate treatment of this topic Cf. *Heras, 'Mohenjo Daro—the People and the Land,' Indian Culture*, III, pp. 714-717. In the present article only a few conclusions are being drawn.

2. Photo, M. D. 457 of 1930-31, No. 3339; Marshall, M.D., No. 104.

3. *Ibid.*, 215 of 1929-30, No. 8422.

4. *Ibid.*, 214 of 1929-30, No. 8104.

5. *Ibid.*, No. 8159.

6. *Ibid.*, 615 of 1928-29, No. 7538.

7. *Ibid.*, H. Neg. No. 4160; *Ibid.*, M.D., 226 of 1920-30, Dk. No. 2127.

8. *Ibid.*, M.D. 218 of 1929-30, No. 8254.

9. Marshall, M.D. No. 237; Photo, M.D. 444 of 1930-31, No. 4052.

10. Photo, M.D., 587 of 1928-29, No. 6624.

11. *Ibid.*, 611 of 1928-29, No. 6901; Marshall, M.D., Nos. 93 and 97.

king with Velūr for capital.¹ These various references to southern places and tribes evidently warrant the inference that the Indus people had dealings with them, political or commercial, specially in view of their excellent seamanship.² But what is of greater importance is that these southerners belonged to the same stock as their northern brethren and enjoyed the benefit of the same civilization too. This fact can be already surmised from all that has gone before; and the following establishes the surmise on firm footing. The Paravas were divided into Sun Paravas³ and the Moon Paravas;⁴ and the southern Paravas were all Moon Paravas.⁵ Moreover, the southern Paravas were a section of the Mīnas,⁶ and had for ruler the Mīna king of the South⁷—the same king of Velūr already pointed out. The kinship hence between the southern Paravas and the Mīnas, who were numerically and politically the most notable of the ancient tribes, and their northern brethren is quite certain.

Perhaps some day some excavator in South India might stumble on a culture similar to that of the Indus valley as a result of intensive digging. This hope is strengthened by the fact of the discovery of pre-historic pictographic writing similar to the Indus writing on old pottery⁸ and in the Nilgiri caves⁹ where the Todas, a very ancient Dravidian tribe, live to-day in a thoroughly decivilized state.

Whereas the Indus civilization extended throughout the greater part of India, its cultural influence was felt far outside.

1. Photo, M.D., 591 of 1928-29, No. 6713; Marshall, M.D., No. 367.

2. Marshall, H., No. 3931.

3. Photo, M.D., 596 of 1928-29, No. 6266.

4. Marshall, M.D., No. 36.

5. The Paravas of Southern India trace their traditional descent from the moon.

6. For a thorough discussion of the inter-relationship of the Paravas and the Mīnas, Cf. Heras, 'The Mīnavan in Mohenjo Daro,' *Journal of Oriental Research*, X, pp. 286-288.

7. Marshall, M.D., No. 8.

8. Bruce Foote, *Government Museum, Madras, Catalogue of the Prehistoric Antiquities*, pl. xxxv; Hunt, *Hyderabad Cairn Burials and their Significance*, pp. 150-152.

9. Brecks, *An Account of the Primitive Tribes and Monuments of Nilagiris*, pl. XLIV-A.

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Several places received the impress of Indus contact, such as Egypt, China, Arabia, Sumer and others, whose scripts can be shown to be connected with, if not to have descended from, the proto-Dravidian script of the Indus Valley,¹ and perhaps the most indebted of all these countries was Sumer. Inscriptional evidence goes a fairly long way to corroborate evidence from the finds in establishing a cultural contact between the Indus and the Sumerian civilizations,² if not a derivation of the latter from the former as an off-shoot.³ Certain manners and customs, both religious and social, were common to Sumer and Mohenjo Daro. The head-dress with which Annu, the Mother Goddess is represented in the Indus seals⁴ is very similar to the Sumerian female headgear.⁵ The nude representation of gods and worshippers is another point of resemblance between the Indus valley⁶ and Sumer.⁷ In some of the Indus seals the moon is called *naman*,⁸ namely 'one who is near', and in Sumer *namur* is the moon-God. But the evidence that clinches the issue of the indebtedness of Sumer to Mohenjo Daro is derived from the development of the

1. Cf. Hunter, 'The Riddle of Mohenjo Daro', *The New Review*, III, pp. 313-315. Heras, *Light on the Mohenjo Daro Riddle*, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 4-6.

2. Cf. Gadd-Smith, 'The New Links between India and Babylonian Civilization', *Illustrated London News*, Oct. 4, 1924, pp. 614-616.

3. In this connection may be noticed the Babylonian tradition preserved by Hierosus, who says that people came from the east led by Oannes and Odakon. The latter name especially is very significant in this, that it has retained its Dravidian form unchanged and means "king of ships".

4. Marshall, M.D., No. 182. Cf. Mackay, *The Indus Civilization*, Pl. I, 1.

5. Woolley, *Ur Excavations, Royal Cemetery*, II, Pl. 128.

6. Marshall, *Mohenjo Daro and the Indus Civilization*, I, Pl. XII, Nos. 17 and 18.

7. Lloyd, *Mesopotamia*, Pl. Xa.

8. Photo. H. Neg., 1954, No. 1. *Ibid.*, M.D., 458 of 1930-31, No. 11862. Cf. Heras, 'Chanhua Daro and its Inscriptions', *St. Xavier's College Magazine*, XXIX, pp. 104-105.

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Sumerian script from the Indus script.¹ For instance, the pictograph used in Sumer for death is certainly derived from the Mohenjo Daro sign for the same; and what is very instructive in this connection is that while the Mohenjo Daro pictograph can be easily explained to bear out the idea of death, the Sumerian sign cannot be, for in the process of derivation and development which in other words means simplification, the original meaning of the pictograph has been lost. The Indus sign shows somebody lying under a funeral monument, while in the Sumerian one the most important element, as far as the idea of death goes, namely, the monument, is missing. In the Indus valley itself the sign in question has gone through three different stages of simplification in minor details.² Then again the signs for eye, god, cloud, acacia and bird³ may be taken as a few other instances among several to go to prove the great indebtedness of the Sumerian script to the Mohenjo Daro. To crown all these evidences there are inscriptions that contain astronomical data that enable us to fix for the Indus civilization an approximate date in hoary antiquity which is not claimed for the Sumerian by its champions.⁴



1. That there is more than apparent connection between the two scripts is acknowledged by several scholars and among them by the late Prof. Langdon, the eminent Oxford Assyriologist, for whose views cf. Marshall, *'Mohenjo Daro and the Indus Civilization'*, II, pp. 454-455.

2. Cf. Heras, *'Mohenjo Daro—The Most Important Archaeological Site in India'*, *Journal of Indian History*, XVI, Pt. 1, pp. 9-10.

3. Heras, *'Sumerian Epigraphy'*, *The New Review*, V, pp. 260-262.

4. Rev. Fr. Heras, S.J. delivered a learned lecture on this topic on March 19, 1936 before the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.

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BY
L. V. RAMASWAMI AYYAR, M.A., B.L.
(*Maharaja's College, Ernakulam.*)

FSY

L. V. RAMASWAMI AIYAR, M.A., B.L.
(Maharaja's College, Ernakulam.)

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These peculiarities (some of which are represented only in isolated instances) are features characteristic of what may be described as the Middle Tamil stage in the evolution of Tamil.

I shall at first indicate with illustrations¹ some of the Old Tamil features and then pass on to deal with the peculiarities referred to above.

1. The editions of Tam. classical works from which illustrations are adduced in this essay are the following:—

Ettuttogai :—Puranānuru (ed. by Mm. Svāmīnātha Aiyar.)

Aingurunūru ()

Paripādal	("	")
-----------	---	---	---	---

Padirrupattu (+	+)
----------------	---	---	---

Aganānūru (ed. by Rājagōpalaiyaṅgār.)

Narṇai (ed. by Nārāyaṇasvāmi Aiyar.)

Kugundogai (ed. by Sauri Perumā) Arāṅgaṇ.)

Kalittogai (ed. by Anantarāma Aiyar.)

Pattuppāṭṭu (ed. by Svāminātha Aiyar.)

Kuṣaḥ (with the commentary of Parimēlaḥaṣa—Śaiva Siddhānta edition.)

Kural (ed. by Pope.)

Nāḷadi (ed. by S. A. Pillai.)

Most of the Old Tam. features given below¹ may be regarded as characteristically Old Tam. in view of two points that could be noted in connection with the works of a later stage:—(i) the colloquial portions of inscriptions (all of which are Middle Tamil) lack these types altogether; and (ii) even in the literary texts (of the Middle Tamil stage) later types and forms often replace the Old Tam. types referred to here. There is warrant to think therefore that such types may have fallen into desuetude altogether or have been on the high road to ruin.

II

Old Tamil features.

1. *Nominal inflections*.—The exclusive use of the fifth case-ending *in*;² the absence of the sixth case termination *nḍai* or

Manimēgalai (ed. by Svāminātha Aiyar.)

Cilappadigāram (" ")

Tolkāppiyam, Eḷuttu (with Naccinārkkīyār's commentary, Saiva Siddhānta Society edition.)

" " (with Ilambūraṇar's commentary, ed. by Namaśśivāya Mudaliyār (Saiva Siddhānta edition.)

" Col. (with the commentary of Teyvaccilaiyār—Karandai edition.)

Vīracōḷiyam (ed. by Dāmōdara Piḷḷai).

Nagḡōl (ed. by Bhavānandam Piḷḷai).

" (with the commentary of Rāmānujakavirāyar).

" (ed. by Svāminātha Aiyar.)

1. The symbols used for transliterating Tam. sounds in this essay are those available in the M. L. J. Press. The values of the following may be noted:—

n—blade-dental nasal.

ṇ—point-alveolar nasal.

r—Tamil *ṛ*.

rr—the long voiceless alveolar plosive of Tam.

l—the continuant *ḷ*.

2. *nigru*, *iṇigru*, *paḷḷaṇigru* [Vīrac., Vēṇṇ., 3] came to be recognized as fifth case post-positions (with definite discoloration of meaning) at a later stage. *Vāṇ avanigruṇ varudum* [Pattupp., 4, l. 28] appears to mark a transitional stage.

nigru in the Kuṛaḷ instance [11] *vāṇigru-ulagam vaḷaṇḡi varudalai* is referred to by the commentator of Vīrac. [Vēṇṇ., 17] as a fifth case-ending. The old commentator of Kuṛaḷ, however, [Vol. XI, Part iii.]

udaiya;¹ the absence² of loose post-positions (popular during a later linguistic stage) like *poruṭṭu*,³ *vēṇḍi*, etc.; the use of the augment *-ay-* for the demonstrative non-rationals *adu*, *idu*.

2. *Demonstratives*.—The use of the intermediate demonstratives in forms like *udu-k-kūṇ* and *u k-kūṇ*; the use of *uḍu* and *idu*, and of *av* in *avum piṇṇum*.

3. *Pronouns*.—(i) The exclusive use of the first person singular *yōḡ*, of the second person singular inflexional base *niy-* as in *niṅṅai* and of the second person plural inflexional base *num-* as in *numakku*.

4. *Verbs*.—(i) The exclusive use of the fully conjugated forms of *al-* and *uḷ-*, while *illai* [cf. Tol. Col., 225] is used for all genders, numbers and persons.

(ii) The transitive-causative bases underlying forms like the following:—

<i>eḷiya</i> [3, 5]	<i>niṇṇi</i> [5, 12]
<i>uḷṇi</i> [5, 29]	<i>ariṇṇēṇ</i> [5, 24]
<i>koḷṇi</i> [3, 31]	

(iii) The total absence of the first person plural personal ending *ōm* in tense-terminations.

interprets it only in its original sense and regards it as equivalent to *niṇṇa*.

Nappūl mentions [299] *-iḷ* (beside *-iḡ*) as a fifth case-ending.

1. The transition from the older use of *udai*, *udaiya* to the association of the sixth case ('possessive') meaning is illustrated by instances like the following:—*avar-udai naṇṇē* [Napp., 306].

2. Postpositions like *uḷ*, *idai*, *micai*, *mēl*, *vayin*, *talai*, *kal*, *kaṇ*, *mudal* are very old ones, occurring as they do in all the Eṭṭutt and Pattupp collections.

3. *poruṭṭu* mentioned by Vīrac. [Vēṇ., 6] belongs to a later stage. The *poruṭṭu* used in Kuṇal 81 [*virundōmbi vēḷṇmai ceydal poruṭṭu*] is a Kuṇippuvaiṇaimuṭṭu. Kuṇal, however, has a few instances of *poruṭṭu* which may be regarded as genuine post-positions.

4. Other forms with the *āydam* in Kalitt. are *eḡḡu*, *poruḷ vēḡḡi*.

5. *av-v-i-yōḡai* [3, 32] shows a somewhat unusual Kuṇṇiyal-igaram.

6. For one instance of *umakku* in Kalitt., see below.

7. The *ōm* belongs altogether to a later stage [cf. Vīrac., Kīriyāp., 6; and Nappūl, 332].

(iv) Past conjunctive participles of the types of *ceyyā*, *ceybu*, and *acai*:—

- | | |
|--------------------------|---|
| (a) <i>cidaiyā</i> | <i>acai</i> [3, 7] |
| <i>tuḍaiyā</i> [1, 15] | <i>cū</i> [4, 1] |
| (b) <i>kūnūn</i> [3, 19] | <i>viyāy</i> [3, 12] |
| (c) <i>ṭuribu</i> [4, 4] | <i>ṭarūy</i> [4, 1], <i>pāy</i> [5, 28] |
| <i>teribu</i> [4, 3] | |
| <i>eḷḷubu</i> [3, 19] | <i>cāy</i> [3, 13] |
| <i>tūbu</i> [5, 28] | (e) <i>ṭōgi</i> , <i>āgi</i> [3, 17] |
| (d) <i>orū</i> [3, 3] | |

(v) Past finites like the following:—

(a) with the augment *-a-* in instances like the following:—

- | | |
|---|-------------------------|
| <i>kaṇḍape</i> [5, 25], <i>moḷindayai</i> [1, 21] | <i>ṭindayru</i> [5, 29] |
| <i>kaṇḍanam</i> [1, 8], <i>moḷindanam</i> [1, 28] | <i>vandayru</i> [1, 25] |
| <i>kuṣṭṭanar</i> [1, 12], <i>vandanar</i> [1, 26] | <i>paḷḷayru</i> [5, 28] |
| <i>ṭurayru</i> [2, 26] | <i>amaindayru</i> |
| <i>kaṇḍayru</i> [2, 26] | <i>uḍaindayru</i> |
| | <i>tūndayru</i> [2, 19] |

(b) With the *idainilai -iy-* kept intact, as in *colliyai-y-ē* [1, 21]

- | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| <i>āgiyru</i> [2, 5] | <i>ṭōiyru</i> [1, 23] |
| <i>viḷaṅgiyru</i> [1, 15] | <i>niḷgiyru</i> [5, 13] |

āgiyru is given a present tense meaning by the old commentator of Kalitt. *Āgiyru* [e.g. in Aīṅ., 17] is translated with the present tense meaning by the old commentator of Aīṅ., while *āiyru* in the same text [236] is given a past finite meaning. In Pur., *āgiyru* [e.g. in 148] is given a past tense meaning by the old commentator of that text. The commentator of Paripāḍal gives a present tense meaning to forms like *āgiyru* [6 L.50] *ceygiyru* [7, L.22] occurring in that text; but it should be noted that Nacc. gives the past tense meaning to forms like *ṭōiyru*, *viḷaṅgiyru*, *niḷgiyru* of Kalitt., i.e., for all forms of this type, except *āgiyru*.

It would appear that the forms¹ are all past formations structurally, though a present tense meaning came sometimes to be associated with some of them.

The commentator Cēḷavaraiyar explains it as *ēṁ-irriṁ cidaivu*. Perhaps the back lip-active vowel was due to the influence of the bilabial *m* following.

1. It was perhaps from forms like these already sometimes given a present tense meaning (though the forms are past in

(vi) First person singular future forms with *-ai*, as in—

<i>valippai</i> [1, 10]	<i>niṟakkutey pōlval</i> [2, 22]
<i>niṟuppal</i> [3, 27]	<i>kōṅṅuval</i> [2, 16]
<i>kāṇbal</i> [5, 5]	<i>niṟuval</i> [3, 31]
	<i>vēṇḍuval</i> (2, 25)

(vii) Third person future finites with the so-called *pa*:—

<i>aṇi-y-ayarba</i> [3, 27]	—masculine plural
<i>naccuṇba-v-ō</i> [1, 7]	— " "
<i>eṭṭai-y-uḷuḷba</i> [2, 12]	—non-rational plural.
<i>laṅṅappa</i> [1, 3]	— " "

(viii) First person future singular with *-gu* or *-kku* (with *kuṟṟiyalugaram*):—

<i>uḍṇuḡ-ō</i> [1, 6]	<i>teṭṭikku</i> [3, 23]
<i>ēṭṭugu</i> [2, 4]	<i>tēṟgu</i> [5, 25]
<i>uṅgu</i> [3, 25]	<i>eṭṭuḡ-ō</i> [4, 11]
	<i>pāḍuḡ-ō</i> [5, 23]

First person plural future forms with *-gum* or *-kkum*:—

kāṅṅum [3, 15], *uṅṅum* [4, 12].

(ix) Future forms¹ of the following varieties:—

structure) that the present tense affix *-g-ir-* was isolated at a later stage and used with regular personal terminations. Such forms are not met with in Kalitt. at all.

cēṟṟiṟa kaṇṇaiy [Parip., 22, 1, 35.]

ōcaṇṇikṇiṟa [Cilapp., 14, 1, 125.]

1. First personal forms like *ōṟṟuḡeṅ* occur numerously in the language of a later stage:—

kaḷaiḡeṅ [Cilapp., 13, 1, 59.]

colluḡeṅ [Tiruvāym., 1, 4.]

ceyḡeṅ [ib., 4, 4.]

uraikkēṅ [ib., 6, 8.]

Future forms like the following in Kalitt. are but rarely represented in Eṭṭutt., but they are frequently met with in the language of a later stage.

- | | |
|----------------------------|--------------------|
| (a) <i>mayal kārḡiṟpāl</i> | <i>laruḡiṟpāy</i> |
| <i>paḍaṟiṟpār</i> | <i>ōṟṟuḡiṟpār</i> |
| <i>kaṟakkirpēṅ</i> | <i>kaḍakkirpār</i> |
| (b) <i>laruḡiṟkum</i> | |

Rare instances in Eṭṭutt. texts are the following:—

piṟiḡipavare [Kur., 22.]

- (a) *paḍugam* [2, 5] *aruḷugam* [3, 30]
 āṟṟugēṇ [5, 23] *ceḷgam* [2, 9]
 (b) *amaṇḡuvāṇ* [1, 29] *koḷḡuvai* [4, 1]
 piṟiḡuvar [1, 12] *kāyḡuvaḷ* [3, 14]
 paṇḡuvar [1, 3] *aiṟuḷḡuvēṇ* [2, 22]
 maḷḡuvam [1, 4] *aruḷḡuvēṇ* [3, 32]
 (c) *kāṇḡaiṟṟāy* [3, 32] is a peculiar formation.

(x) The tense-forms with *-d-* or *-ḡ-* in the first person plural, and in the second person singular and plural, as in the following:—

- | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| <i>āḡudum</i> [3, 17] | <i>oḷḡi</i> [3, 21] |
| <i>vēḷḡum</i> [3, 29] | <i>teruḷi-y-e</i> [1, 6] |
| <i>vāṟudum</i> [3, 35] | <i>iṟaḷḡi</i> |
| <i>iṟuḷḡum</i> [4, 11] | <i>pōḡudi</i> [1, 9] |
| <i>veruḷḡum</i> [3, 22] | <i>pōṟiṟ</i> [1, 8] |
| <i>peṟudum-ō</i> [3, 25] | <i>kaḷḡaḷḡiṟ</i> [1, 6] |
| <i>aṟiḡi</i> [2, 20] | <i>uḡaḷḡiṟ</i> [5, 26] |
| <i>varuḡi</i> [3, 8] | |

(xi) The *viḡai-y-eccam* with *-a* is used to signify the 'effect' of the action of the verb modified, or to denote 'simultaneity' or to initiate slight 'sequentiality'. The force of a previously conceived purpose is not common for this type, though in rare instances like *yāḡ uṟaḷḡa vāṇḡadu* [Pur., 28], *kāṇa vāṇḡu* [Kufund., 212], the construction may conceivably bear such a meaning.

It is interesting to note that this signification of a previously conceived purpose became associated with this construction at a later stage when the Old Tam. "purpose" -participles of the type of *ceyyiya* fell into desuetude. (Cf. Virac., Dhātupp., 7,

piṟiḡipavar [Nar., 391 in a poem attributed to Pālai-pāḡiya peruṇḡaḡuṇḡō.]

The language of a later stage shows this type fairly frequently:—*aṟiḡipār* [Tiruvāym., 8, 3], *veḷḡipāṇ* [ib., 7, 1].

1. The type with *-a* has the force of a "noun infinitive" but rarely in Old Tam., as in the following:—

nigaiḡka vēṇḡa [Puram., 70.]

vaiyakkā-p-paḡ- [ib., 197.]

eṇa-p-paḡ-

comm. which equates this construction to the *tuṃṃ-anta-pratyaya* of Sanskrit).

(xii) Genuine "purpose"-forms of the following types:—

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| (a) <i>kāṇiya</i> [5, 30] | <i>ṇṇiya</i> [3, 20] |
| <i>ayaṇṇiya</i> [5, 3] | <i>uṇiya</i> [4, 5] |
| <i>lēṇiya</i> [3, 8] | <i>kāṇiya</i> [5, 23] |
| <i>toṇiya</i> [3, 25] | <i>kalakkiya</i> [5, 30] |
| <i>aṇiya</i> [3, 19] | (b) <i>varaṇ-ku</i> [3, 18] |
| <i>uṇariya</i> [3, 10] | <i>taraṇ-ku</i> [1, 17] |
| <i>mayakkiya</i> [3, 8] | <i>koṇaṇ-ku</i> [2, 2] |
| <i>toṇiya</i> [3, 25] | (c) <i>toṇiyar</i> [3, 29] |

(xiii) The *-mār* "finite" governing verbs following:—

- | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| <i>aṇimār</i> [4, 6] | <i>kāṇmār</i> [1, 12] |
| <i>āṇmār</i> [3, 27] | <i>eṇmār</i> [3, 19] |
| <i>tarūmār</i> [4, 1] | <i>ṇimār</i> [4, 1] |

(xiv) Optatives like *kō vāṇiyar* [4, 3] and *nī vāṇiya* [3, 31].

The optative *maṇandaikkā* [1, 26] is peculiar.

(v) The "imperative" use of old second person finites like the following:—

- | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| (a) <i>kaṇṇai</i> [4, 5] | <i>vandai</i> [2, 27] |
| <i>kāṇṇai</i> [5, 27] | <i>maṇṇṇṇai</i> [1, 14] |
| <i>kēṇṇai</i> [3, 27] | <i>ṇiṇṇṇai</i> [3, 29] |
| <i>paṇṇ-ṇṇai</i> [3, 21] | |

pāṇṇai [2, 4] is a special formation.

- | | |
|---|----------------------|
| (b) <i>kaṇaimō</i> [5, 16] ¹ | <i>keṇmō</i> [1, 22] |
|---|----------------------|

This type is generally interpreted as a singular imperative, but the instances *ceṇmō*, in *Puṇ.* 333, and *vamṇō* in verse 221 of the same text are plural in meaning.

(c) *ūkkā* in *Kalitt.* 2, 1, is explained by the commentator *Naccinārkkinīyar* as an imperative with *-i*.

Similar imperatives constituted of the base and a short *i* are *kāṇṇi* [5, 30] and *tēṇi* [3, 25]. Cf. *vāṇi* in *Padiṇṇ.* 5.

1. This is usually interpreted as a singular imperative. Cf. *vamṇō nī-y-am* [*Puṇ.*, 180]. But already rarely a plural meaning is also associated with this type, as in *taṇṇiyir ceṇmō* [*Puṇ.*, 333] and *vaigam vamṇō* [*ib.*, 221.]

(xvi) Participial nouns with an old blade-dental *n*;—

<i>turakkunar</i> [1, 13]	<i>koḷunar</i> [4, 9]
<i>naḷunar, aḷunar</i> [1, 22]	<i>niṇaṇṇuṇaḷ</i> [5, 9]
<i>teḷikkunar, kūṇunar</i> [1, 29]	<i>kāṇunar</i> [5, 22]
<i>ṇerunar</i> [3, 26]	

(xvii) Forms like the following, constituted of the past stems followed by the conjugational forms of the help-verb *i*:—

<i>ceṇṇivāy</i>	<i>vandittanar</i>
<i>kēṇṇivāy</i>	<i>nondittāḷ</i>
<i>vand-iḷlāy</i>	

vandīya [= *vava*] is an infinitive "participle".

urṇṇivāy is a negative relative past participle.

vandīga is an optative.

kaṇṇi, kēṇṇi, ceṇṇi; and *kāṇṇimō, ceṇṇimō* are singular imperatives.

kaḷaṇṇimiy, kēṇṇimiy, vāḷaḷimiy are plural imperatives.

uraḷṇṇivāy is a "conditional" form.

aṇṇṇivāy is a negative "conj." participle.

vandittandāy [2, 23] is a finite form containing *i* and *lar-* as expletive help-verbs.

niṇṇiṇṇaḷ [= *niṇṇaḷ*], *aṇṇiṇṇaḷ, iṇṇiṇṇaḷ* are verbal nouns.

(xviii) The use of the first person future finite form with *-gu* with a verb following, as in *kāṇṇu vāḷipṇa* [5, 25].

(xix) Constructions like the following in which finite verbs have the force of *enṇai-y-eccam*;—

<i>naḷṇāy nā vāḷudaliy</i> [3, 5]
<i>vāḷṇāy nā tuṇṇallaliy</i> [3, 5]
<i>vaṇṇuṇṇai vāḷinda</i> [1, 28]
<i>aṇṇiṇṇai vāḷindaḷ</i> [2, 11]

(xx) Negative finites like the following:—

(a) <i>turakkunay-allāy</i> [1, 12]	<i>uṇṇargallāḷ</i> [5, 29]
<i>turakkunay allāy</i> [2, 5]	(c) <i>tuyilalaḷ</i> [2, 9]
<i>tīyēy allēy</i> [3, 25]	<i>nī-y-alēy</i> [5, 20]
<i>veruvuvai-y-allai</i> [1, 12]	(d) <i>iḷḷō-v-ilēy</i>
<i>kāyguvaḷ-allāḷ</i> [3, 14]	<i>iḷḷ-āḷēy</i> [3, 16]
(b) <i>niṇṇukallēy</i> [3, 29]	<i>eyḷalō-v-ilar</i> [5, 20]
<i>amai-y-alēy</i> [5, 11]	<i>cuḷudalō-v-ilar</i> [5, 20]
<i>vāḷalēy</i> [2, 11]	<i>lavay-ilai</i> [2, 20]

<i>arig-alēn</i> [2, 26]	<i>uān-ūan</i> [2, 26]
<i>amaig-alēn</i> [4, 4]	<i>oḡb-ūar</i> [5, 8]
<i>nīḡalam</i> [2, 4]	(c) <i>kollāy-āyṁai</i> , <i>uḡarudiy-</i>
<i>tōy-alam</i> [3, 12]	<i>āy</i> [1, 2]
<i>taruḡallōy</i> [5, 32]	

(xi) Prohibitives¹ with *-al* and *an-miṇ* :—

<i>inūiyal</i> [1, 27]	<i>alamaral</i> [1, 33]
<i>vīḡaval</i> [1, 18]	<i>evam paḡaravṁiṇ</i> [1, 8]
<i>vāral</i> [3, 10]	<i>uḡkḡṁmiṇ</i> [5, 30]
<i>terumaral</i> [1, 26]	<i>ḡiriyavṁiṇ</i> [3, 27]

Negative optatives :—*cellaḡka* [2, 20].

(xii) Older bases and forms like the following in the word-stock :—

(a) <i>ceyḡṁ</i>	<i>kauvai</i>
<i>ḡāḡṁ</i>	<i>ḡulambu</i>
<i>ṁamṁaiyav</i>	<i>nodumalar</i>
<i>ṁamṁiṇ</i>	<i>neruṇai</i>
<i>ṁoyyil</i>	<i>neruḡal</i>
<i>ḡavṁ</i>	<i>avav, ivav, noduvav</i>
<i>alar</i>	<i>āḡḡar</i>
<i>oḡuttal</i>	<i>yāy, āy</i>
(b) <i>ceḡupḡ-</i>	<i>iṇḡ-</i>
<i>ōcc-</i>	<i>micai-</i>
<i>aḡaice-</i>	
(c) <i>ḡō-tar</i> [Middle Tam.	<i>iyai-tar-</i>
<i>ḡōd-</i> ("defec-	<i>ṡiri-tar-</i>
tive verb") and	<i>aḡi-t-tar-</i>
<i>ḡōr-</i>]	<i>miḡu-taḡ-</i>
<i>ḡuḡu-tar-</i>	<i>mi-taḡ-</i>
<i>iḡu-tar-</i>	<i>nō-taḡ-</i>
<i>ceḡu-tar-</i>	<i>ceḡu-taḡ-</i>
<i>iḡu-tar-</i>	<i>iṁ-uḡ-</i>
<i>ṡoḡu-tar-</i>	<i>ōmbaḡu-kk-</i>

1. Negative imperatives of the following type occur fairly numerous in Kalitt :—

<i>nillādi</i>	<i>caḡādi</i>
<i>aḡiyādi</i>	<i>ōvādi</i>
<i>kollādi</i>	

Cf. Kuḡa] *paḡādi* [1210].

(xxiii) It may be noted in this connection that adaptations¹ from Indo-Āryan are not infrequent in Eṭṭuttogai and Pattuppāṭṭu. Kalittōgai has the following:—

<i>aracay</i>	<i>tiru</i>
<i>araicu</i>	<i>tūdu</i>
<i>ari</i>	<i>tēyam</i>
<i>araṇam</i>	<i>tār</i>
<i>araṅḡu</i>	<i>tavam</i>
<i>ānai</i>	<i>tilagam</i>
<i>āgulam</i>	<i>licai</i>
<i>ulagu</i>	<i>teyvam</i>
<i>uruvam</i>	<i>nagar</i>
<i>ōdu</i>	<i>nēmi-y-ōṇ</i>
<i>aiyar</i>	<i>ṇandi</i>
<i>kalul</i>	<i>ṇaruvam</i>
<i>kāmam</i>	<i>ṇēdai</i>
<i>ēmam</i>	<i>ṇayan</i>
<i>ēdu</i>	<i>ṇavalam</i>
<i>ēdam</i>	<i>ṇārppay</i>
<i>kō (-v-mar)</i>	<i>ṇārppayai</i>
<i>kaṇṇipittai</i>	<i>ṇali</i>
<i>kaṇṇai</i>	<i>ṇittu</i>
<i>kaṇṇam</i>	<i>madi-</i>
<i>karumam</i>	<i>maṇḍilam</i>
<i>kuru</i> 'colour'	<i>maṇam</i>
<i>kuru</i> [Skt. <i>guru</i>]	<i>maṭṭu</i>
<i>cāmarai</i>	<i>maṇi</i>
<i>cōyal</i>	<i>mōyam</i>
<i>cir</i>	<i>mā</i>
<i>cirili</i>	<i>māṭṭiram</i>
<i>celṭu</i>	<i>māṭṭirai</i>
<i>cōnda (maram)</i>	<i>mōḍiram</i>
<i>caṇṇagam</i>	<i>yāmam</i>
<i>curam</i>	<i>vaṇṇam</i>
<i>tambalam</i>	<i>vadidai</i>
<i>tāmarai</i>	<i>vaccirallōṇ</i>
<i>tādu</i>	<i>vaduval</i>
<i>tāṇai</i>	

1. Indo-Āryan loans (of different stages) are not unusual in Eṭṭuttogai and Pattuppāṭṭu.

III

Middle Tamil features.

1. The third case-ending *-āṅ* (envisaged in Tol. Col. 97 and 108) is used in some instances, but there are others with *-āḷ* (so common in later stages, and exclusively used in the present-day colloquials):—

<i>ṭṭenarppin-āḷ</i> [1, 24]	<i>ṭṭayalai-y-āḷ</i> [1, 14]
<i>eybadan-āḷ</i> [2, 77]	<i>kanṇin-āḷ</i> [4, 8]
<i>cerukkin-āḷ</i> [3, 4]	<i>kol-yāṅai-k-kōṭṭāḷ</i> [2, 6]
<i>nāṭṭaittāḷ</i> [5, 8]	

It has to be noted that *-āḷ* occurs in some of the members of the Eṭṭuttogai too:—

<i>emṇāḷ</i> [Puṭ., 197]	<i>adaṇḍāḷ</i> [Pari., 4, l. 33]
<i>adaṇḍāḷ</i> [Puṭ., 210]	

āḷ is not mentioned in Tol., but is referred to expressly in Virac. [Vēṇ., 3] and in Nannūḷ, 297.

Colloquial portions of Middle Tam. inscriptions show *āḷ* only; *-āṅ*, therefore, may have fallen into desuetude already in the Middle Tam. period.

These facts, however, need not necessarily mean that *-āṅ* was linguistically anterior to *-āḷ*.

2. *-konḍu* is not used in the oldest known texts as a "crystallized" third case post-position. Yet that it was on the way to being treated thus is illustrated by *adar-konḍ* [5, 22].

Cf. *nacciraṅkonḍu* [Pari. 5, l. 52].

3. The sambōdhana *ellā*¹ [masc. in 4, 10; 2, 28; fem. in 2, 6; 3, 2] seems to have gone out of use in later stages; but *ēḍā* [3, 23] which is the "ancestor" of modern colloquial *ēḍā* occurs.

4. The following features are noteworthy in the use of inflexional augments:—

(i) *ēroḍu* without the "doubling" of *r*, beside the normal inflexional stem *ērṇ-*, occurs in 1, 12.

(ii) *ad-ai* without the augment *-aṅ-* [*naṅg-adai-y-aṇiyinūm* in 5, 8].

Cf. similar forms in the language of a later stage.

1. Paripāḍal has *ellā* and *ellā*, both meaning *ēḍā*, in 8.

(iii) Tol. Eḷuttu. 132, prohibits the use of the augment *-iṅ-* before the fifth case *-iṅ-*; but such forms occur here:—

irav-iṅ-iṅ- [2, 10]

puṇarv-iṅ-iṅ-

ariat-iṅ-iṅ- [5, 24]

ayatt-iṅ-iṅ- [3, 31]

ūṭ-iṅ-iṅ- is a rare instance from Pattuppāṭṭu [1, l. 180].

The practice of using the augment *-iṅ-* before the "case"-termination *-iṅ-* or *-il-* is frequent in the language of a later stage.

5. The use of the demonstratives before relative participles followed by nouns, as in *i-ṇ-irunda cāṅṅir* [5, 22] is not common in Eṭṭuttogai and Pattuppāṭṭu; but such a construction is met with in the following:—

i-c-ciṇṇanda vāṇ cūṇarē [Tiruvāymoli, 5, 10]

i-v-v-iṇṇanda nēṅ-ellakku [S. I. I.]

This construction is common in Malayālam.

6. (i) The second person plural pronoun *nir* [Tol. Col. sūtras 188, 190, mention *nīṇir* only; but Virac. [Vēṇṇ., 9] refers to *nir*] occurs in 1, 4 as an honorific plural.

Kuraḷ has *nir* [1319 and 1320].

In a poem in Nāṇṇigai, attributed to Pālai-pāḍiya perūṅga-ṇūṅō (to whom the Pālai portion of Kalittogai is also ascribed by tradition) there occurs *nir* in verse 48 [*nir emar-iḍai-y-uru-tara-v-oḷilla kūḍē*].

(ii) The Middle Tamil second person plural inflexional *umakku* occurs in one place [5, 22, line 4].

A rare *ummōḍu* is met with in verse 368 of Nāṇṇ.

Tol. Col. [143] envisages only the inflexional base *num-*, and this is the usual form in Eṭṭuttogai and Pattuppāṭṭu.

The inflexional *um-* is mentioned in Virac. [Vēṇṇ., 9, comm.]; and it is very common in the writings of the Āḷvārs and the Śaivites.

7. Tol. Col. 186 and 187, would seem to indicate that *ellām* is not used generally to qualify third personal rational plurals or second personal rational plurals. Kalittogai has, however, instances like the following:—

kaṇḍavir-ellām [5, 23]

peṇḍir-ellām [3, 32]

aiyaṇṇār-ellām [4, 7]
ūvararṅk-ellām [5, 28]
poḍuvarṇ-ellām [4, 1]
vālvārgaṅk-ellām [5, 28]
cāṇṇavarṅk-ellām [5, 22]

The use of *ellām* in connection with plurals of all "persons" is expressly referred to in Naṇṇūl 285, and it is common in Middle Tam. texts.

Tolkāppiyam, however, does not permit this use absolutely. Tol. Col. 186 says:—

ellā ni-eyyum peyarudai-k- kiḷam
paḷvāḷi nudaliya ulaiṭṭō gummi.

But the next sūtra qualifies it by stating:—

*laṇṇ-uḷ-ugulla paṇṇaikk-aiḷad-uyarṇṇai maruṇṇi-
 ākkam-illai.*

Cēṇṇavaraiyar regards *peṇṇi-ellām* as *iḍa-vaḷu-v-amaiḍi* in his commentary on this sūtra, while other commentators would justify this usage as exceptional already in Old Tamil in view of the use of the phrase *ākkam-illai* in Tol. Col. 187.

Instances of this type are rather rare in Eṭṭutt.; Puṇ. has *cāṇṇor-ellām* [63].

8. The use of *-kaḷ* [limited optionally to non-rationals by Tol. Col. 169, 171] for "rational" plurals is met with in the following:—

aracargaḷ [1, 24]
eṇṇōrgaḷ [3, 35]
vālvārgaḷ [5, 28]

Cf. *maṇṇai-y-avarṇaḷ* in Kuṇal [263] and *māṇḍargaḷ* in Nālaḍi [30].

The Middle Tam. grammars expressly refer to the association of *-kaḷ* with "rational" plurals, and such forms are most frequent in Middle Tam. texts. [Cf. Virac., Vēṇṇ., 2 and 9].

9. Causatives with *-vi-*, *-bi-*, *-ppi-*, most rare in the older texts (except in the contexts mentioned below), occur:—

<i>paḍarvill-avaḷ</i> [5, 24]	<i>iṇṇavillal</i> [5, 30]
<i>kaḷipṇikkuv</i> [3, 7]	<i>koḷṇillāy</i> [5, 29-a
<i>maṇṇappillāy</i> [2, 14]	participial noun]

The instances that I could collect from other old texts are the following:—

Tol. Col: *kēṭṭikkum* [267]

Paripāḍal: *cērvittal* [12], *ēṭṭikka* [18], *ēṭṭikkum* [20], *piṇṇappittōr* [3, line 73].

These causatives are not mentioned in Tol., but are expressly referred to in Virac. [Upakārapp., 5], and in Naṅṅūl 138, and are most numerous in Middle Tam. texts.

10. The type of *koṭur-* in *kadanāy koṭuruvēṇ* [5, 44] is rare in Eṭṭ. and Patt., though instances like the following are not lacking:—Parip.:—*koṭuv-* [5, l. 22]

Narr.:—*uṭuv-* [130].

11. *-ittu* as a help-form after past conjunctive participles is mentioned in Virac. [Taddhitapp., 8].

Kalitt. has *piṇṇand-itt-* [4, 1] and *taṇṇ-ittadu* [4, 7]. Cf. *veṇṇiṭṭiyum* [Kura], 231].

viṭ- acts as a *viṇai-viṇai* in *cellō viṭuvēy-ēl* [3, 28]. Cf. *peṇṇaviṭṭay* [Kura], 238].

12. "Purpose"-participles with *-āṇ*, *-bāṇ*, *-ppāṇ* [not mentioned in Tol. and not at all common in the older texts, but expressly referred to in Virac. [Vēṇṇ., 6] and in Naṅṅūl [343] [and largely employed in Middle Tam. texts] occur in the following:—

mānilam iyaṇṇuvāṇ [4, 6]; here the form *iyaṇṇuvāṇ* may be regarded as modifying *sikkuvāṇ* following.

ellaṭ varuvāṇ viṭu [4, 13]; here *varuvāṇ* is definitely a *viṇai-y-eccam*. So also is *kāṇbāṇ* in the following:—*puttiyāyai kāṇbāṇ yāṇṇāṇṇinēṇ* [3, 32].

The instance *koṭvāṇ* in *yār iṇay eṇ kūṇṇal koṭvāṇ* [3, 24] marks a transitional stage.

Paripāḍal has a few instances of this type:—

payaṇ koṭvāṇ [Pari., 10]

purivāṇ [ib., 15, l. 51].

It was Julien Vinson [Manuel de la langue Tamoule, p. 130] that first suggested that this type is derived from the third person singular masculine future forms, employed "impersonally" and "absolutely". There seems to be little doubt that these are third person masculine future finites used as a kind of *viṇai-y-*

eccam [cf. Tol. Col., 457; and Nappūl, 351] governing verbs following, and that the "future" idea inherent in the forms gave rise to the idea of "purpose" when the "finite" nature of the form was lost sight of.

13. *Pōdāra-k-kollum* [1, 32] is interpreted by Nacc. as containing the plural imperative *kollum* which, however, belongs to a type that is most rarely met with in Eṭṭutt. and Pattupp.

Pari. has an instance *vārum* [14].

14. Instances like *naḍakkal-um* [2, 3], *taral-um* [2, 29] are explained by Naccinārkkīyār as "um-m-iṭṭu-vigai-y-eccam".

15. *Porukkal-ān varaitt-aṅṅi* [2, 22] contains the form which is the "ancestor" of the later *ceyyal-ān* type.

16. The most common conditional endings in Eṭṭutt. are *-iṅ* and *āyṅ*; while *-āi*, *-āi*, *-āi*,¹ *-āy(um)* are not frequently met with in these texts.

Kalit. has all of them:—

-āi:—*kāṭṭāi* [4, 7]

kaḍay āyāi [5, 22]

eyṭāl-um [5, 23]

iṭṭāi-āi [1, 24]

āṭṭāi [1, 14]

urāi-y-ār-āi

kāṭṭāy-āi

āṭṭāi

uṇḍāi [2, 2]

-āi:—*tuṇḍāy-āi*

-āy(um):—*niṇṇavar-illāy(um)* [2, 22]

eyṇḍāy-um [5, 23]

Kuṇal has all these:—*kāṇḍāi* [1246], *ceyṇḍāy-āi* [655], *uṇḍāy-āi* [922].

17. *Iṇḍilēy* [5, 29] is a rare instance of a negative finite constituted of the past stem and the conjugated forms of *il*. This type is rare in Eṭṭutt. and Pattupp. Rare instances are

1. *āi* is explained by the Tam. Lexicon as being a contraction of *eyil*, while Vinson has suggested [Manual de la langue Tamoule, p. 134] that *āi* is "perhaps a modification of *āi*" and that both may have been contractions of *dyil*.

myaiṭṭ-ilai [Nāṭṭ., 297]; *aṇṇ-ilēy* [Parip. 8]. The type is common in later stages¹.

18. Genuine "passives" with *-paḍ-* are those in which the verbs are in entire concord with the subjects in gender, number and person. Instances like the following are, however, normal native constructions in which the verb *-paḍ* may be regarded as having the infinitives before them as their "subjects":—

ayb-cya-p-paḍuvadu [5, 16]

paṇalai-y-āḷ uṇa-p-paṭṭu [1, 14]

Even participial nouns involved in the following are native Dravidian constructions:—

lara-p-paṭṭazai [4, 2]

uḷaṇ-uṇa-p-paṭṭōr [1, 22]

Cf. *viyakka-p-paḍūmōr* [Pur., 197]

Only when such forms are employed as regular finites, agreeing in gender, number and person with the subjects, they are genuine passives. Such genuine passives are rare in Eṭṭutt. and Paṭṭupp.; but Kalitt. has *lai-p-paḍukka-p-paṭṭāy nī* in 2, 29 and in 3, 83.

The transition from the normal Dravidian constructions (referred to above) to the stage of genuine passives may have been facilitated by the influence of Sanskrit.

Viracōliyam [Kṛiāp., 11] refers to genuine passives in Tam. (with *-paḍ-* and *peṭ-*)

19. *iḥḍ-ottan* [2, 24; 3, 19; 4, 3; 5, 21] and *iḥḍ-otti* [5, 26] expressing "ceṇal" and "viyappu" appear to have been "popular" forms. *ottan* is colloquial for *oruttan* [*oruvan* alone is common in the oldest texts]; and, further, the association of the non-rational *iḥḍu* with rationals is indicative of the special feelings implied in these forms.

1. Cf. the following:—

aṇṇ-ilai [Cilapp., 13, 1, 136.]

kaṇḍ-ilam [ib., 13, 1, 143.]

This type is common in the language of the Ālvārs and the Śaivites.

Virac., Dhātupp., 10, expressly refers to this type.

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Other forms showing colloquial developments are the following:—

- konarndu* [3, 16];
- attallā* [3, 15] with elision of *-a-*;
- irukkō* [4, 14] with elision of *-a* of *irukka-v-ō*;
- cittai* [3, 19]

IV

The features in Kalitt. showing Middle Tam. peculiarities may be summed up here.

- (1) The lack of augments in *adai* and *ēroḍu*.
- (2) The use of the augment *-iy-* before the case-termination *-iy-*.
- (3) *-kaḷ* for rational plurals.
- (4) The construction *i-v-v-irunda cūyir*.
- (5) The second person plural pronoun *nīr*, and a rare *umakku*.
- (6) The use of *ellām* to qualify third personal rational plurals and second personal rational plurals.
- (7) Causative bases with *-ai*, *-ppi*.
- (8) Causative *koḷu-*.
- (9) *iḍ-* and *viḍ-* as *tuṇai viṇai*.
- (10) The imperative with *-um* in *koḷḷum*.
- (11) "Purpose"-participles with *-āy-*.
- (12) Conditionals with *-āl*, *-ēl*, and concessives with *-āyum*.
- (13) The negative finite *-iḷand-ilaḷ*.
- (14) The genuine passive construction *kai-p-paḍukkap-paḷḷāy ciṇumi nī*.

Paripāḍal, among the Eṭṭutt. texts, shows (7), (8), (10), (11), (12) and (13).

Kuraḷ, attributed by Tam. tradition to the Paṇṇēṇkīḷk-kaṇakku group, shows (3), (5-a), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (12).

V

The Pālai portion of Kalitt. is ascribed by Tamil literary tradition to Pālai pāḍiya peruṅgaḍuṅgū who is also supposed to have written ten poems of the Nārṇmai collection, ten poems of the Kuṇṇuḍogai set, and twelve poems of the Aganāṇūru group.

The second division Kuṇṇikkali is attributed to the great Saṅgam bard Kappilar who is said to have composed one of the

divisions of Pattuppāṭṭu and several poems included in the other units of Eṭṭutogai.

The third division is ascribed to Madurai marudapiḷānāṇār who is also said to have written 12 poems of Naṟṟ., 4 of Kurund., 23 of Agam, and 3 of Puṇam.

Cōḷaṇalluruttirai is regarded as the author of the fourth division or Mullaikkalī. He is supposed to have written one poem included in Puṇam and another in Kurundogai.

Nāvanduvaṇār is said to have written the fifth division (and the *kaḍaruḷ vāṭṭu*). He is supposed to have been the author of four songs included in Paripāḍal, one poem of Agam, one of Naṟṟiṇai, and one included in Tiruvaḷḷuvamālai (which last-mentioned work is probably a comparatively late production).

I closely examined the poems (contained in the other members of the Eṭṭutogai and in Pattuppāṭṭu), said to have been written by these writers; and I find that (except in Paripāḍal) the Middle Tamil linguistic peculiarities listed above are not to be found in them.

VI

In the absence of convincing extra-linguistic evidence, the presence of Middle Tam. peculiarities in Kalitt. cannot be urged to support the proposition that this work was chronologically posterior to some of the other members of Eṭṭutt. and to Pattupp., particularly because several other possible explanations could be suggested to account for these peculiarities.

The suggestion that the compiler Nāvanduvaṇār (who is said to have been a comparatively late writer) may have composed the whole of this work, or may have retouched the language of the work in the process of redaction, is also not *provable* with the sole help of the linguistic materials adduced above.

All that can be safely said now is that Kalitt. shows peculiarities of language that are not met with in the vast majority of the poems constituting the Eṭṭutogai and Pattuppāṭṭu collections. It may also be noted that some among these peculiarities are shown by Kuṟaḷ, also (which is a work assigned to the Padineṇ-kilkkāṇakku group).

THE NUMBER OF RASAS

BY

V. RAGHAVAN, M.A., PH. D.

(Continued and concluded from Vol. XI, Pt. ii, p. 115.)

VII

New Vyabhicārins and Sāttvikas.

We have seen how freely later writers debated the question of adding newer Rasas to those that Bharata gave. But did not writers feel also that there was no finality about Bharata's list of Vyabhicārins and Sāttvikas and their number, thirty-three and eight?

Bharata gave the Bhāvas in three sets as Sthāyins, Vyabhicārins and Sāttvikas. We have already examined and found that all the eight Sthāyins become Vyabhicārins also. Therefore these eight, the Sthāyins, must be added to the thirty-three Vyabhicārins. But when this addition is made, we have to reduce the thirty-three by removing a few which are redundant. Thus when Śoka becomes a Vyabhicārīn, there is no need for Viṣāda; Bhaya in its Vyabhicārīn-grade eliminates Trāsa; Krodha removes Amarṣa. This gives us eight and thirty Vyabhicārins. Further reduction is possible. Among the thirty, we have two Bhāvas, Glāni and Śrama, one of which will suffice. Not only do they look akin at first sight but prove to be identical also when their descriptions are examined. Another case of repetition is Nidrā and Supta; the second is very delicately distinguished from the first. Bharata describes the latter as Nidrābhibhava and Nidrāsamultha. If two are thus removed, we have eight and twenty-eight. Some writers did see the redundancy at least in the case of Nidrā and Supta and, instead of Supta, gave a new Vyabhicārīn called Śauca, as for instance, those whom Sāgarānandin, author of the *Nāṭakalakṣaṇaratnakośa* (edn. Myles Dillon, London, 1937, pp. 83-87), follows.

Why did Bharata classify the Bhāvas into Vyabhicārins and Sāttvikas? Among Bhāvas, there are only two classes, Sthāyins and Vyabhicārins. The Anubhāvas, the twenty

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Alamkāras of damsels, Bhāva, Hāva, etc.,¹ the eight Sāttvikas, Ālāpa etc., given as modes of Vācikābhinaya, the ten Kāma Avasthās²—all these are comprehended in the term Vyabhicārin. Bhoja calls the Sāttvikas, Bāhya vyabhicārins:—

तत्र आम्यन्तरा व्यभिचारिषु चिन्तितुम्व्यावेगवितर्कादयः, बाह्याः
स्वेदरोमाश्चाश्रुवैषण्यदयः ।

Śr. Pra., Ch. xi.

But out of these numberless subsidiary mental states, there are a few which are more major, compared to others; not only are they major, but they are more definitely mental states than others which are physical manifestations. It may be asked if the more major among these accessory mental states are only those given by Bharata and if there are not others. It has been pointed out that this list of Bharata can be reduced on one side; and as a matter of fact, it has been added to also on the other side. Bhoja, in his Śr. Pra., omits Apasmāra and Maraṇa and gives in their place, Irṣyā (which Śiṅgabhūpāla refutes) and Śama which is needed for the Sānta Rasi (Ch. xi). In his S.K.Ā., Bhoja counts among his thirty-three Vyabhicārins Sneha which Śiṅgabhūpāla refutes and, instead of adding Śama as in his Śr. Pra., takes Dhṛti itself, one of the old Vyabhicārins given by Bharata, as the Sthāyin of Sānta. Śiṅgabhūpāla raises the point that there can be more Vyabhicārins, mentions some—Udvega, Sneha, Dambha, Irṣyā—but dismisses these as included in some

1. Rāhula added to this set Maugdhyā, Mada, Bhāvikatva, and Paritāpana according to Abhinava. See J. O. R. Vol. VI, pp. 208-210, my article on 'Writers quoted in the Abhinavabhāratī'. See also Hemacandra, K.Ā., p. 316, where Abhinava's sentence referring to Rāhula's additions is reproduced. See also Padmakṛī's Nāgarasarasva following Rāhula's school, Ch. vii, Śls. 3-4, where Vikṣepa, Mada, Maugdhyā and Tapana are given in addition. (p. 29, Tanusukharam Sarma's edn., Bombay, 1921). While defining Vikṣepa, Padmakṛī quotes a writer named Kapila. Bhoja added Vihṛta, Kṛṣṭa and Keli which Śiṅga criticised. Viśvanātha accepts Rāhula's and Bhoja's additions and has, in addition, three more, Kutāhala, Haṣiṭa and Cakita. (J. O. R. VI, pp. 209-210.)

2. Bhānudatta shows how the ten Madanāvasthās are included in the Vyabhicārins. (Ch. 5, p. 109, Edn. Venkatesvara Steam Press, with Hindi Com.).

of the thirty-three, with reasons which look strained. Bhānudatta proposes Chala:—

“अत्र प्रतिभाति च्छलमधिको व्यभिचारिभाव इति ।”

(Ch. 5.)

and shows its occurrence in Śṛṅgāra, Raudra and Hasya. But it seems to be possible to include it in Bharata's Avahūtā. (*Vide* its description, p. 373, GOS. edn. N.S. I). Rūpa Gosvāmin, in his scheme of Madhura Rasa, accepts at first the traditional thirty-three Vyabhicārins and adds afterwards thirteen more Vyabhicārins generally, as also a few more specially under some individual Rasas (*Vide* Dr. S.K. De, IHQ 1932, p. 663). Dr. De adds that the thirteen additional Vyabhicārins are brought by Rūpa under one or the other of the old thirty-three.

Bharata himself discusses the question of the separate naming and enumeration of the eight Sāttvikas. He says:—as a matter of fact all Bhāvas enacted have to be ‘entered into’; Sattva is ‘entering into’; but still this ‘entering into the state’ is all the more necessary in the case of the eight Sāttvikas. For, a tear has actually to be shed. *See* pp. 379-381 GOS. edn. N. S. I. Bhoja says that in truth all Bhāvas are Sāttvikas, because Sattva means ‘Mind’.

सात्त्विका अपि सर्व एव, मनःप्रभवत्वात् । अनुपहतं हि मनः
सत्त्वमित्युच्यते ।

Sr. Pra., Vol. II, p. 354, Mad. Ms.

Śiṅgabdhūpālā also says:—

सर्वेऽपि सत्त्वमूलत्वाद् भावा यद्यपि सात्त्विकाः ।

तथाप्यभीषां सर्वैकमूलत्वाद् सात्त्विकप्रया ॥

R. A. S. I. 310,

The only writer, now known, to propose a ninth Sāttvika, is Bhānudatta. He proposes Jṛmbhā in his Rasatarāṅgiṇī:—

जृम्भा च नवमः सात्त्विको भाव इति प्रतिभाति । p. 66

Bhānudatta would not base himself on the meaning ‘तन्मयीभवन’ for the word Sattva and justify the separate enumeration of the Sāttvikas. For Sattva so understood would apply to the Vyabhicārins also. So, he interprets Sattva as the ‘body’—Jivāśarīra. Tear, Perspiration etc. are physical states and as such are distinct from the Vyabhicārins which are mental states. The former are

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Bāhya, the latter *Āntara*.¹ (*Rasatarāṅgiṇī*, pp. 57-58 and 7-9). To accord with this, Bhāṇudatta defines a Bhāva not as a *Citta-vṛtti*, but as a 'Kasānukūla vikāra', which is of two kinds, *Ābh-yantara* (*Sthāyin* and *Vyabhiçārin*) and *Bāhya* (*Sāttvika* etc.). But to exclude too palpably physical acts, he gives them a different name *Ceṣṭā* which, he says, is different from *Vikāra*. The difference between the two is that while a *Vikāra* like a tear cannot be made to appear according to man's desire, a *Ceṣṭā* like *Āṅgākṛṣṭi* and *Akṣimardana* are *done* by man of his own will.

"न चाङ्गाकृष्टिनेत्रमर्दनादीनामपि भावत्वापत्तिः । तेषां भावलक्षणा-
भावात् । रसानुकूलो विकारो भाव इति हि तल्लक्षणम् । अङ्गाकृष्ट्यादयो हि
न विकाराः । किन्तु शरीरवेष्टाः । प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमेतत् । अङ्गाकृष्टिरक्षिमर्दनं च
पुरुषैरिच्छया विधीयते परित्यज्यते च । अङ्गा च विकारादेव भवति, तन्निवृत्तौ
निवर्तते चेति ।"

Rasatarāṅgiṇī, p. 69.

VIII

RASA-SYNTHESIS.

Karuna.

The artistic mind has always shown a partiality for pathos. It is said that the sweetest songs are often songs of sorrow. The first *Kāvya* in Sanskrit rose out of the sense of pity. 'रसेषु करुणो रसः' says the well-known anonymous saying. *Ānandavardhana* says that the quality of sweetness which is the melting of the heart is found in the highest degree in *Karuna*.

माधुर्यमार्द्रतां याति यतस्तत्राधिकं मनः ।

Dhva. A. II.

But to point out the beauty and appeal of a *Rasa* is not to do any synthesis. By *Rasa-synthesis* is meant a reducing of all *Rasas* to the nature of one, a formulation of one as *Prakṛti* and the rest as its *Vikṛtis*.

1. Bharata uses *Sattva* as meaning also the opposite of mind, viz., the physical body, and calls *Bhāva*, *Hāva* etc. by the name 'Sāttvikābhinaya'. See Ch. XXIV, 5-7 and 40.

देहात्मकं मयेत्यत्वं सत्त्वाद्भावः समुत्पितः । and सत्त्वोऽभिनयः पूर्वं मया प्रोक्तो दिव्योत्तमाः ।

Abhinava also says "वाङ्मयं वाच्यप्रस्तुतयः", *Abhi. Bhā.*, Ch. 7, p. 343 GOS. edn. I.

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No Ālaṃkārika ever attempted a Karuṇa-synthesis, but Bhavabhūti, in his drama, *Uttararāmacarita*, suggested such a synthesis in Karuṇa. Anandavardhana explains that the Rāmāyaṇa is an epic of Karuṇa:—

रामायणे हि करुणो रसः स्वप्नादिकविना सूत्रितः 'शोकः श्लोकत्व-
मागतः' इत्येवंवादिना । निर्व्यूढश्च स एव सीतात्यन्तविषोगपर्यन्तमेव स्वप्नबन्ध-
मुपरचयता ।

Dhva. Ā., IV, p. 237.

Bhavabhūti gave the same opinion when he said:—

भगवान् भूतार्थवादी प्राचेतसः * * * *
पावनं वचनामृतं करुणादुत्तरसं च किञ्चिदुपनिबद्धम् etc. Act. VII.

Writing a masterpiece dominated by Karuṇa, Bhavabhūti, in a self-conscious mood, says through Śleṣa:—

अहो संविधानकम् —

एको रसः करुण एव निमित्तभेदाद्
भिन्नः पृथक्पृथगिव श्रयते विवर्तान् ।
आवर्तबुद्बुदतरङ्गमयान् विकारान्
अग्नौ यथा सलिलमेव हि तत्समस्तम् ॥

[II. 47.]

"O! what a great play have I written?" he seems to exclaim to himself. By context, the passage refers to Tamasā observing the pathos that was there in everybody, though in different forms.

"एक एव सन्नपि निमित्तभेदाद् सखित्वपतित्वपङ्क्तिव्याधुपाधिभेदाद्
भिन्नः विलक्षण इव पृथक्पृथक् विवर्तान् श्रयते । वासन्तीसीतारामप्रभृतिषु
परस्परविलक्षणावस्थाविशेषान् भजति ।"

Virarāghava's com., p. 99, N. S. Edn.

A general import bearing on our present subject of Rasa-synthesis can also be seen in this verse. Bhavabhūti seems to say that there is only one Rasa, Karuṇa, and that it assumes the different forms called Śṛṅgāra etc., even as the same water assumes the forms of whirl, bubble, etc. Karuṇa is the Prakṛti; the other Rasas are its Vikṛtis. Virarāghava, a commentator, also saw such a meaning in this verse which shows that the interpretation is authenticated by tradition.

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“एक इति । रस्यते स्वाद्यत इति रसः काव्यानुशीलनाभ्यासवश-
विशदीभूतवर्णनीयतन्मयीभवनयोग्यसामाजिकमनोमुकुरभाष्यमानतया निर्भरानन्द-
संविद्रुपः । करुण इष्टजनवियोगजन्यदुःखानिश्चयः । एक एव सन्नपि निमित्त-
भेदात् व्यञ्जकविभावादिविच्छित्तविशेषाद् भिन्नः विलक्षणः । पृथक्पृथक्
विवर्तान् परस्परविलक्षणशृङ्गाराद्यात्मना परिणामान् । “अ्यस्तपरिणामः
स्याद्विवर्तः” इति कपिलः । अयते भजते । * * *

इदमत्र कवेर्मतम्—यद्यपि शृङ्गार एक एव रस इति शृङ्गारप्रकाशकारादिमतम्,
तथापि प्राचुर्याद् रागिबिरागिसाधारण्यात् करुण एक एव रसः । अन्ये तु
तद्विकृतयः इति ।”

Virarāghava's Com., p. 99.

To the Karuṇa-synthesis suggested by Bhavabhūti, this commentator added two arguments, one that Karuṇa is present to the largest extent in life, and the other, that it is found not only in men with mundane desires but in the Yogins also. These however do not make for the Prakṛti-Vikṛti-bhāva in Bhavabhūti's verse and that alone forms the meaning of 'Synthesis'. In English, the word 'Sympathy' meaning 'response to another's feeling of sorrow', has come to be used in an enlarged sense to mean all forms of aesthetic response and attunement of heart, Cittasamvāda; and here is a linguistic argument in favour of a Karuṇa-synthesis. For it seems, the model and the supreme example of a complete attunement of heart, which poetry and drama effects, is certainly the attunement of hearts in Karuṇa.

Śānta.

A regular attempt at synthesis in the field of Rasas by a theorist is however to be seen earliest only in the Abhinavabhāratī of Abhinavagupta. He sponsored the Śānta-synthesis by considering the Śānta as the one fundamental Rasa of which the other Rasas are modifications. He called Śānta the greatest Rasa, first because of its relation to the last and the greatest Puruṣārtha, Mokṣa. Next, poetic delight called Rasa is always of a non-worldly, Alaukika, character, shorn as it is of all mundane associations, a limitless, unbounded and ineffable bliss, and hence is of the form of Śānta.

“तत्र सर्वरसानां शान्तप्राय एवास्वादः, विषयेभ्यो विपरिश्रुत्या— ।”

Abhi. Bhā., VI, p. 340, Gaek. Edn.

Further, the Sthāyin of Śānta, the Ātman, is the very substratum of all mental activities; it is the one basic Citta illumined by this Ātman that takes the form of the Vrttis of Śṛṅgāra etc. Thus it is Sthāyitama; it is the Sthāyin of the Sthāyins, the Prakṛti of which Rati, Hāsa and the rest are Vikṛtis. Says Abhinava—

अत्र सर्वप्रकृतित्वमिधानाय पूर्वमभिधानम् ।

Gaek. Edn., I, p. 340.

And according to some mss. known to Abhinava, the Śānta Rasa section is found at the very beginning, even before the Śṛṅgāra section.

“तथा च चिरन्तनपुस्तकेषु ‘स्थाविभावान् रसत्वमुपनेष्यामः’ इत्यनन्तरम् ‘शान्तो नाम शमस्थाविभावामकः’ इत्यादि लक्षणं पठ्यते ।”

Gaek. Edn., I, p. 340.

The Śānta text found in Bharata, according to some, definitely states this Śānta-synthesis in two verses:—

भावा विकारा स्थायाः शान्तस्तु प्रकृतिर्मतः ।

विकारः प्रकृतेर्जातः पुनस्तत्रैव लीयते ॥

स्वं स्वं निमित्तमासाद्य शान्ताद्भावः प्रवर्तते ।

पुनर्निमित्तपाये च शान्त एवोपलीयते ॥

N. S., VI, pp. 335-6. Gaek. Edn. I.

This has already been indicated in the Śānta Rasa section of this paper.

Śṛṅgāra.

When Abhinava was synthesising the Rasas in Śānta, a similar synthetic spirit was working in Bhoja who merged every Rasa and Bhāva in a new Śṛṅgāra he formulated. He said that at the root of all Bhāvas lay the germ of Ahaṅkāra otherwise called Śṛṅgāra and Abhimāna. It is a Guṇa of the Ātman and is the result of past good acts. By Ahaṅkāra is meant a self-consciousness or the sense of ‘I’ which marks off the cultured from the uncultured. It is that by which not only for himself but for others and other objects also does man have any love. In this sense it is called Ātma-rati. It is this ‘Ego’ or ‘Self-love’ that is the one Rasa. Its manifestations are Rati, Hāsa etc. Thus this basic Śṛṅgāra is different from the first derivative of that name, the Śṛṅgāra developed from Rati. So this Śṛṅgāra-synthesis is not a synthesis in the first of the eight old Rasas of

Bharata and others. This theory finds a brief statement in the 11th chapter of Bhoja's *S. K. Ā.* and an elaborate exposition in his *Śr. Pra.* I have set this forth at great length in my Ph. D. thesis on Bhoja's *Śr. Pra.*, to be published elsewhere, and here I give only a brief account. The *S. K. Ā.* says:—

रसोऽभिमानोऽहङ्कारः शृङ्गार इति गीयते ।

योऽर्थस्तस्यान्वयात् काव्यं कमनीयत्वमश्नुते ॥

विशिष्टादष्टजन्मायं जन्मिनामन्तरात्मनु ।

आत्मसम्बन्धगुणोद्भूतेरेको हेतुः प्रकाशने ॥

Ch. V, Ślk. 1-2, p. 474, N. S. Edn.

(See also Vṛtti on p. 613 where Bhoja quotes Daṇḍin and draws out his own theory from Daṇḍin's verse). The *Śr. Pra.* says:—

आत्मस्थितं गुणविशेषमहङ्कृतस्य शृङ्गारस्मादुरिह जीवितमात्मपरोक्षे ।

तस्यात्मशक्तिरसनीयतया रसत्वं युक्तस्य येन रसिकोऽयमिति प्रवादः ॥

अप्रतिष्ठाकृतया मनसो मुद्रादेः यस्मिन्विदोऽनुभवहेतुरिहामिमानः ।

हेपो रसस्य रसनीयतया आत्मरक्तेः

While Abhinava in his *Sānta*-synthesis took his stand on that ultimate ripple-less state of the Ātman, Bhoja, adopting the Sāṅkhya and a Nyāya phraseology, took his stand on the Ātman with its first shoot of Ahankāra. To Bhoja, even *Sānta* would appear only within the world of Ahankāra; for to him, any Bhāva or Rasa can be experienced only through Ahankāra. *Sānta* as much as *Rati* is the product of Ahankāra.

“ * * * तच्च आत्मनोऽहङ्कारगुणविशेषं ब्रूमः । स शृङ्गारः सोऽभिमानः स रसः । तत एते रख्यातयो जायन्ते । तैश्चार्यं प्रकर्ष-
प्राप्तैः सप्तार्चिरर्चिश्चयैरिव प्रकाशमानः शृङ्गारिणामेव स्वदत इति ।”

Śr. Pra., Mad. Ms., Vol. II, p. 156.

What is called Rasa is an experience of bliss unconditioned by any name. So long as there is the knowledge of the state being *Rati* or *Hāsa* or anything else, the spectator is only in the state of *Bhāvanā* and *Bhāva*; beyond this is the state of *Rasa*. Says Bhoja:—

आभावनोदयमनन्यधिया जनेन

यो भाव्यते मनसि भावनया स भावः ।

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यो भावनायमतीत्य विवर्तमानः

सादृक्कृतौ हृदि परं स्वदते रसोऽसौ ॥

Thus Śṛṅgāra, Hāsyā, Vīra—these are but Bhāva-states in reality. The truth of Rasa is that it is only one and has no more name than Rasa.

Preman.

Side by side with or rather within this Ahaṅkāra-Śṛṅgāra synthesis, Bhoja formulates a synthesis in Preman also. Preman to him is a fundamental love lying at the root of Rati, Sneha, Bhakti, why, at the root of all Bhāvas in much the same manner as Ahaṅkāra itself. If one laughs, it is because he *loves* to laugh; if he fights, he *loves* to do so. Thus all activities go to fulfil a certain love which is innate in man and which explains all his activities; it is this love which makes all his activities a self-fulfilment. Bhoja has three stages of his Rasa, the Pūrvā koṭi, the Madhyamā avasthā and the Uttarā koṭi. In the first, it is the one Ahaṅkāra; in the second, the one Ahaṅkāra has become the forty-nine Bhāvas, each growing to its relative climax through its Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas etc.; on the third all these several Bhāvas become aspects of Preman, or rather ripen into Preman, from which stage again, experience passes into the primary stage of the one Rasa of Ahaṅkāra.

● “प्रेयः प्रियतराङ्गयानमित्यनेन समस्तभावगूर्वाभिषिक्ताया रतेः परप्रकर्षाधिगमाद् भावनाधिति । गमे भावरूपतामुल्लङ्घ्य प्रेमरूपेण परिणतायाः उपादानात् भावान्तराणामपि परप्रकर्षाधिगमे रसरूपेण परिणतिरिति ज्ञापय-
न्नहङ्कारस्य उत्तरां कोटिमुपलक्षयति । सर्वेषामपि हि रत्नादिप्रकर्षाणां रतिप्रियो रणप्रियः परिहासप्रियः अमर्षप्रिय इति प्रेम्ण्येव पर्यवसानं भवति ।”

S. K. A., p. 613.

In the Śr. Pra. he adds: रसं त्विह प्रेमानमेवामनन्ति । Ch. xi, Vol. II, Mad. Ms., pp. 352-3.

This Preman-syntheses finds an advocate in Kavikarṇapūra, the author of the Alaṅkāra-kaustubha where he says:—

● प्रेमरसे सर्वे रसा अन्तर्भवन्तीत्यत्र महीयानेव प्रपञ्चः । ग्रन्थगौ-
रवभयाद् दिङ्मात्रमुक्तम् । ● ● तया च—

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‘उन्मज्जन्ति निमज्जन्ति प्रेम्ण्यखण्डरसत्त्वतः ।

सर्वे रसाश्च भावाश्च तरङ्गा इव वारिधौ ॥’

Pp. 147-8, Vārendra edn.

Rati-Srīgāra.

The Agnipurāṇa took Bhoja's Ahaṅkāra, but instead of saying that Rati and all other Bhāvas emanate from it, said that Rati was the first born of Abhīmāna which was a product of Ahaṅkāra and this Rati modified itself into Hāsa, etc. It further went behind Ahaṅkāra and said that Ahaṅkāra is the first manifestation of Rasa or Camaṅkāra which is the manifestation of the Ānanda, the innate nature of the Supreme Being called Para Brahman.

अक्षरं परमं ब्रह्म सनातनमजं विभु ।

वेदान्तेषु बदन्येकं चैतन्यं ज्योतिरीश्वरम् ॥

आनन्दस्सहजस्तस्य व्यवृते स कदाचन ।

व्यक्तिस्सा तस्य चैतन्यचमकाररसाद्वया ॥

आद्यस्तस्य विकारो यः सोऽहङ्कार इति स्मृतः ।

ततोऽभिमानः तत्रेदं समाप्तं मुच्यते प्रथमम् ॥

अभिमानाद्व्यतिस्सा च परिपोषमुपेक्षुषी ।

व्यभिचार्यादिसामान्यात् शृङ्गार इति गीयते ॥

तद्भेदाः काममितरे हास्याद्या अप्यनेकशः ।

स्वस्वस्यापि विशेषोऽयं (योऽयं) परिपो(षे)यस्त्वलक्षणाः ॥

A. P., Ch. 339, Śls. 1-6.

adbhuta.

Wonder is an invariable element in all enjoyment, mundane or artistic. In art and literature, the element of surprise, extraordinariness, wonder, is present everywhere. The very theme has to be striking; for, when we see an extraordinary situation, do we not describe it as being dramatic? Wonder helps love. Hāsyā is only reversed wonder. The part Adbhuta has in Vira is too plain; Bharata describes Adbhuta as born of Vira. The hold of Adbhuta on the minds of the audience is fully realised by Bharata who says that the dramatist must so work out his story, so weave it, hide some and reveal some, that the audience may get at each step a surprise and a thrill. One of the ends which

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the means to developing the plot called the Sandhyaṅgas serves is the presentation of the story in a wondrous manner — 'आश्चर्यवदभिव्यक्तम्' N. Ś. XXI. Kāśī edn. Sl. 54. There is again the need to intricately complicate the problems of the story and give out a series of revelations in the end, thus carrying away the heart in the end with thrill after thrill. This can be realised, for instance, when the closing scene of the *Mṛcchakaṭika* or the *Mālavikāgnimित्रा* is read. The story has to be, says Bharata, in the form of a cow's tail, bushy at the end, with a crowd of surprises. There must be Adbhuta in the end.

कार्यं गोपुच्छार्थं कर्तव्यं कान्यबन्धमासाद्य ।
ये चोदात्ता भावाः ते सर्वे पृष्ठतः कार्याः ॥
सर्वेषां काव्यानां नानासमावयुक्तियुक्तानाम् ।
निर्वहणे कर्तव्यो निबन्धं हि सोऽद्भुतस्तम्भैः ॥

N. Ś., XX, 46-47.

Similarly, on the side of verbal expression, the *Vācyavācaka*, or the *Vācikābhāṣya* in drama, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin made a synthesis in Adbhuta when they praised *Atiśayokti* as the one great figure of which the rest are but several forms.

श्लेषमादिरुदिता गुणातिशययोगतः ।
सर्वेषातिशयोक्तिस्तु तर्कयेतां यथागमम् ॥
तेषां सर्वेषां वक्रोक्तिरनयार्थो विभाव्यते ।
यत्कोऽस्यां कविना कार्यः कोऽलङ्कारोऽनया विना ॥

Bhāmaha, K. A., II, 84-85.

असावतिशयोक्तिः स्याद् अलङ्कारोत्तमा यथा ।
* * *
अलङ्कारान्तराणामप्येकमाहुः पराणम् ।
वारीशमहितामुक्तिम् इमातिशयाह्वयम् ॥

Daṇḍin, K. A., II, 214-220.

This point has been explained at some length by Ānanda and Abhinava in the *Dhvā. Ā.* and the *Locana*, Ud. III, pp. 206-209. The very strikingness of poetic expression is *Atiśaya* and *Adbhuta*;

* * * * लोकोत्तीर्णेन रूपेण अवस्थानम् * * *
लोकोत्तरेण चैवातिशयः । तेन अतिशयोक्तिः सर्वालङ्कारसामान्यम् ।"

Locana, p. 208.¹

This Adbhuta or element of surprise characterises the climax-condition of all the Rasas. Adbhuta thus permeates a composition, its Alamkāra, Va-tu and Rasa.

The regular theory of a synthesis of Rasas in Adbhuta was however made by an ancestor of the author of the Sāhityadārpaṇa. He was known as Nārāyaṇa. In Ch. 3 of his S. D., Viśvanātha gives this Adbhuta-synthesis in his Vṛtti on verse three, in the name of his ancestor, Nārāyaṇa, and herein quotes a verse and a half to that effect from the writing of one Dharmadatta. This Dharmadatta is cited as reviewing Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra-theory in the Rasasudhānidhi or South Māra Bhāṭṭāraka, available in a manuscript in the Madras Govt. Oriental Mss. Library (R. 3210). P. V. Kane says in his Introduction to the S. D. (p. cxxi) that this Dharmadatta was a contemporary of a subsequent Nārāyaṇa who was Viśvanātha's grandfather and was defeated by this Nārāyaṇa in a debate in the Kalinga court. This Dharmadatta wrote an Alamkāra treatise in which he stated the theory of Adbhuta-synthesis first propounded by the older Nārāyaṇa. The text of this synthesis in the S. D. runs as follows:—

चमत्कारश्चितविस्तररूपः विस्मयापरपर्यायः । तन्प्राणत्वे च अस्म-
त्पितामहसद्वदगोष्ठीगरिष्ठकविपण्डितमुख्यश्रीमन्नारायणपादैरुक्तम् । तदाह
धर्मदत्तः स्वग्रन्थे—

‘रसे सारचमत्कारः सर्वत्राप्यनुभूयते ।

तच्चमत्कारसारत्वे सर्वत्राप्यदुभुतो रसः ॥

तस्माददुभुतमेवाह कृती नारायणो रसम् ।’ इति । S. D. III.

It is accepted that Camatkāra is Rasāsvāda. This Camatkāra is a ‘flip’ of the mind which is in essence a wonder. The ‘Lokottaratva’ of all Rasāsvāda, accepted on all hands, again

I. Under Adbhuta Rasa, Bhāṇudatta says in his Rasatarāṅgiṇi—

‘अत्युक्ति भ्रमोक्ति चित्रोक्ति विरोधाभासप्रभृतयोऽदुभुता एव ।’

Under Citrokti mentioned here, he brings all expressions turning on Lakṣaṇā. ‘लाक्षणिकमस्ति चित्रोक्तिरेव ।’

points to Adbhuta. Bhānudatta accepts that in Śṛṅgāra and other cases there is an element of Adbhuta as Aṅga; where it is Aṅgin, the Rasa becomes Adbhuta proper.

शृङ्गारादौ चमत्कारदर्शनाद्यत्र मनोविकृतिरङ्गतया भासते तत्र
शृङ्गारादय एव रसाः । प्राधान्येन यत्र भासते तत्राद्भुत एव रसः ।

Rasataranginī, ch. I.

Prabhākara, author of the Rasapradīpa (p. 40. edn. Princess of Wales Sarasvatī Bhavan Texts), refutes this Adbhuta-synthesis:

“—इति नारायणेन अद्भुत एव रस इत्यभिहितम् । धर्मदत्तादिभिश्च
तदेवानुसृतम् । तत्र साधु । वैलक्षण्यस्य अनुभवसिद्धत्वात् । प्रकृतिभेदाच्च ।
नापि व्यभिचारिणु स्यान्नि एव रस्यादिषु विस्मयानुगमः । शोकादिषु
तथाननुगमात् ।” etc.

Prabhākara goes at length and says in the end that he has refuted this theory of ‘Adbhuta in all Rasas’ in his earlier Alarṅkāra work, the Alarṅkāratāsyā, also, which is not available to us now.

On the practical side, Śaktibhadra’s Āścaryacūḍāmaṇi illustrates the dominating Rasa of Adbhuta, and this has been explained in detail by my Professor, Mm. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, in his Introduction (pp. 12-15) to the Bālaṃanōramā edn. of this play. The now lost Kṛtyārāvaṇa also seems to be a play which specialised in Adbhuta. Towards the end of the 17th century, young Mahādeva wrote his Adbhutadarpaṇa, where his Rāma is made to say:—

यत्सलममितः स्तब्धैः इन्द्रिवैरिन्द्रजालवत् ।

अद्भुतैकरसावृत्तिः अन्तर्मील्यतीव माम् ॥

Kāvya-mālā. 55. IV, 8.

Rasa only one.

It may be granted that an element of wonder enters many Rasas, but it is absent at least in Karuṇa as Prabhākara effectively points out. Though Rasāsvāda is Cittasārvāda and is called Camatkāra, the Cittasārvāda is not, in all cases, of the form of an ‘enlargement’, Vistāra. There is Vikṣobha as in Bibhatsa, and there is Droti as in Śṛṅgāra and Karaṇa. This Droti of Śṛṅgāra and Karaṇa is totally absent in Raudra, Bibhatsa, Bhayānaka and Adbhuta, and in this way the Karaṇa-synthesis is defective. Abhinava’s Śānta and Bhoja’s Ahaṅkāra-Śṛṅgāra, going to the

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very substratum of the emotions may be conceded some validity; so also in the synthesis in Preman, Vira meaning Preman for Utsāha, and so on.

But though it might be difficult to prove and accept that all the Rasas are but forms of some one of them, it has been recognised by all writers that Rasa as such, the ineffable bliss, is one, Rasa is Rasa. It has no other name. It is one. It is like the Brahman or the Sphoṭa. The names Śṛṅgāra, Vira etc. and the consequent plurality and difference are ultimately unreal; or they are at best *like* parts of a whole. Hence it is that Bharata also, says Abhinava, uses the singular—

न हि रसाद् ऋते कश्चिदर्थः प्रवर्तते ।

N. Ś. V, pp. 273-4.

“—तत एव निर्विग्रहस्वसंवेदनात्मकविश्रान्तिलक्षणेन रसना-परपर्वणेन व्यापारेण गृह्यमाणत्वाद् रसशब्देनाभिधीयते । तेन रस एव नाट्यम्, यस्य व्युत्पत्तिः फलमित्युच्यते । तथा च 'रसादृते' (६-३३) इत्यत्र एकवचनोपपत्तिः । ततश्च मुख्यभूतान्महारासात् स्फोटदृशीव असंख्यवादिना वा, अनिताभिधानदृशीव उभयव्यक्त्यानि सत्त्वानि वा, अभिव्यक्तित्वदृशीव तत्समुदायिरूपाणि वा, रसान्तराणि भगवामिनिवेशदृष्टानि रूप्यन्ते (?) ।”

GOS. Edn. Abhi. Bhā. I, p. 261.

Again, commenting on the Sūtra न हि रसादृते etc., Abhinava says that though names are given to it differently according to its evoking conditions, Rasa is fundamentally one, and hence it is that Bharata refers to it in the singular number.

पूर्वत्र बहुवचनमत्र चैकवचनं प्रयुज्जानस्यायमाशयः । एक एव तावत्परमार्थतो रसः सूत्रस्थानत्वेन रूपके प्रतिभाति । तस्यैव पुनर्भागदृशा विभागः ।

Abhi. Bhā., I, p. 273.

Abhinava says that therefore Rasa and Nāṭya mean the same thing.¹ In experience also we find that our relish is one undefined state of the form of a repose of the mind, Viśrānti. Bhaṭṭa Narasimha, a later commentator on Bhoja's S. K. Ā., in his ex-

1. Cf. his Locana. p. 149. प्रीत्यात्मा च रसः, तदेव नाट्यम्, etc. Cf. also Abhinava's borrower Śārṅgadeva: नाट्यशब्दो रसे मुख्यः । VII, 17. Sañ. Ratnākara.

position of Bhoja's Rasa theory, points out that Rasa as relish, Svāda, is one.

“अष्टावेव स्थायिन इति कुतः ? तावतामेव स्वादात्मकत्वादिति चेत्, किमेतेष्वनुस्यूत एकः स्वादात्मा ? तर्ह्यनक्षरमिदमुक्तम्—एतेषां कूटस्य एक एव स्वादात्मा ; एते च तद्विशेषा इति—”

“अत्रे (अतः) सर्वेषां कूटस्या(स्य) एक एव स्वादात्मा ।”

Mad. Ms., R. 2409, p. 150.

Kavikārpapūra Gosvāmin states the point more elaborately and clearly. He considers a certain blissful state of the mind, which is a quality (Guṇa) of the mind established in the Sattva-guṇa and completely devoid of any touch of either Rajas or Tamas, as the one eternal Sthāyin and the one eternal Rasa. This Sthāyin called Ānanda or ‘Āsvādānkurakanda’ is separately and diversely named according to the different causal conditions, the Vibhāvas. The difference between this writer and Abhinava and others is that he expressly postulates a Sthāyin also for this one Rasa which they do not in so many words, though their position implies this one Sthāyin also.

“आस्वादाङ्कुरकन्दोऽस्ति धर्मः कश्चन चेतसः ।

रजस्तमोभ्यां हीनस्य शुद्धसत्त्वतया सतः ॥

स स्थायी कथ्यते विद्वैः—विभावस्य पृथक्तया ।

पृथग्विधत्वं यात्येष सामाजिकतया सताम् ॥ SL 63.

सामाजिकतया सतां सामाजिकानाम् एक एव कश्चिदास्वादाङ्कुरकन्दो मनसः कोऽपि धर्मविशेषः स्थायी । स तु विभावस्य उक्तप्रकारद्विविधस्य भेदेरेव भिद्यते । Alaṅ. Kau. V. Chap.

Commentary: “एक एवेति—ननु स्थायिभावरूपधर्मस्य एकत्वे कथमेकस्य स्थायिनः वीररसे उत्साहत्वम्, करुणरसे शोकत्वम्, अद्भुतरसे विस्मयत्वं भवति, परस्परविरुद्धानामेतेषाम् उत्साहत्वादीनाम् एकस्मिन् स्थायिरूप-धर्मे वृत्तिवाभावादित्याह—स त्विति । स एकोऽपि धर्मः उक्तप्रकारद्विविधस्य विभावस्य भेदेरेव भिन्नो भवति इत्यर्थः । यथैक एव स्फटिकः जपाकुसुमादि-नानापदार्थानां सङ्गात् कदाचिद्रक्तः, कदाचित् पीतः कदाचिच्छ्यामः, इत्यादिविविधाकारो भवति, तथा एक एव स्थायिरूपो धर्मः वीररसादिपोषकानां

नानाविधविभावानां सङ्गात् कदाचिदुत्साहरूपः, कदाचिद्विस्मयरूपः,
कदाचित् शोकरूपः इत्यादिविविधाकारो भवतीति भावः ।”

In the same chapter, Kavikarnapūra Gosvāmin again states this in clearer language:—

बहिरन्तःकरणयोर्व्यापारान्तरोधकम् ।

स्वकारणादिसंश्लेषे चमत्कारि मुख्यं रसः ॥

अयं तु उत्तमप्रवृत्तीनाम् अनुकार्याणाम् स्वतस्सिद्ध एव । काव्यादी तु
सामाजिकानामेव । तेषां सर्वरसाभिव्यक्तिशाली एक एव पूर्वोक्तः कश्चन
आस्वादकन्दः चेतोधर्मविशेषः स्थायी । तत्र युक्तिः दर्शयिष्यते—

रसस्य आनन्दधर्मत्वात् ऐक्यम्, भाव एव हि ।

उपाधिभेदान्नानात्वम्, रत्नादय उपाधयः ॥

रत्नादयः स्थायिनः यथा नानाविधशरावसखिलतारतम्येऽपि तरणिविम्ब-
प्रतिविम्ब एक एव, तथा उपाधिगत एव भेदः, नानन्दगतो रसस्य ।”

Com. “आनन्दधर्मत्वात् चरमानन्दरूपत्वात् ऐक्यमेकविधत्वम् । यथा
सितोपलयाः पाकान्तरे नास्ति तथा रसस्यापि ।”

A NOTE ON THE DATE OF ŚAṆKARA.

BY

K. A. NILAKANTHA SASTRI,

University of Madras.

My object in this short note is not to discuss at any length the difficult subject of the date of the great founder of the Advaita system as we know it, but just to draw the attention of scholars interested in it to a striking epigraphical datum that seems to have a bearing on it. It occurs in *Inscriptions du Cambodge*, Volume I, recently published by G. Coedes, the Director of the French School of the Far East at Hanoi. At pages 36-46 of this work we have a very interesting inscription recording the the foundation perhaps of a Śiva temple by a certain Śivasoma. The date of the inscription is given in the Khmer part which follows the 48 Sanskrit verses constituting the first part of the record. It is unfortunate that the last figure in the Śaka date is illegible while the first two figures in it are clearly 8 and 0, so that the date of the inscription lies between 878 and 887 A. D.

Now Śivasoma was the preceptor of King Indravarman who reigned between 877 and 889 A. D.¹ This is clear from the reference to him and to his pupil in the inscription of Sdok Kak Thom, where soon after the mention of Indravarman and his hotar Vāmaśiva, we read:²—

Śivasomasya tad-rājaguror Vāmaśivāhvayaḥ |
Antevāsyātmavidyaṅgha iva mūrttau bahirgataḥ ||
Śivasomas sa tenāntevāsinā saha dharmyadhīḥ |
Kṛtvā Śivāśramam tatra śaivam liṅgam atīṣṭhipat ||

1. BEFEO, XV, No. 2, p. 183.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

Whether the āśrama referred to here is the same as the foundation of the new inscription under reference we cannot say. But attention must be drawn to the fact that Śivasoma's pupil is described as Ātmavidyā incarnate. Now in the new inscription of Śivasoma we find that he claims to be the pupil of Śaṅkara. The relevant verses are Nos. 39 and 40 in the inscription, and they read as follows:—

Yenādhītāni śāstrāṇi bhagavacchaṅkarābhavāt |
 Niśśeṣasūrimūrdhālī-mālāliḍhāṅghripañkajāt || 39 ||
 Sarvavidyāikanilayo vedavid viprasambhavaḥ |
 Sāsako yasya bhagavān rudro rudra ivāparaḥ || 40 ||

In his short introduction to the inscription Prof. Coedes remarks: "Śivasoma had Bhagavat Rudra for his master (40) and had 'learned the śāstras from the mouth of Bhagavat Śaṅkara (39)'. It is not impossible that this is a reference to the celebrated Śaṅkarācārya whose activity in India falls at the beginning of the ninth century." If this is a correct view of these verses, as I am inclined to think it is, there follow the most interesting results: *firstly* that Śaṅkara counted among his pupils a scholar from Kāmbhōja across the seas, for Śivasoma was the grandson of the maternal uncle of King Jayavarman II (802-869 A. D.)¹, and *secondly* that the intercommunication between India and the colonies of the East was so brisk and active as to justify the view commonly stated by the contemporary Arab geographers that the peninsula and the archipelago that lay to the south of China formed parts of India.

1. V. 30 of Śivasoma's inscription.

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A NOTE
ON
THE SCIENTIFIC STATUS OF LINGUISTICS.

BY

C. R. SANKARAN, M.A.,

Diploma in French and German.

Linguistic study remained for a time true to its philosophical and literary origin. However, language, the fundamental of human activities, is also the simplest. Whoever observes, or records forms of speech, is sure to find facts that invite the kind of grouping and presentation which we call science. Alphabetic writing, for instance, implies phonemic structure. Incidentally, I must point out that the Macro-phoneme is a fiction, defined for the purpose of describing conveniently the phonological relation among the elements of a language it forms. The phoneme is a negative relational, differential abstraction: it is, in short, of a unit of that sort of relation which de Saussure describes. (*Cours de Linguistic Générale* 1922-1966.) [See Twaddell, *Definition of Phoneme*, *Lang. Monograph*, 16.]

At the end of the 18th Century, Sanskrit grammar taught Europeans to see the structure of words. In an epoch when the scientific method was revolutionising, at great speed, all the conditions of life, this method was bound, no matter how indirectly, to affect even the student of language. Slowly and not without dispute, and misunderstanding, the linguist adopted the essential habits of the scientific method. The result was so favourable as to carry linguistics far ahead of the other human sciences. The methods developed by the linguists of the 19th Century are still to-day the working methods of every competent linguist. They have been refined and supplemented, but not replaced, by larger acquisitions, notably the phonemic principle and the mapping of the dialect differences. Under these methods the phenomena of linguistic change, which baffled the scholars of the 17th and 18th Centuries, can be compactly recorded and classified, and even subjected, within methodically defined limits, to inference and prediction. Like all scientific methods, they are justified only by their performance.

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Absolute predictability in science demands, among other things, exact measurement which is common to all the sciences. But while measurement appears to be a purely objective process and therefore capable of absolute exactitude, the actual fact is that errors in measurement are inevitable in all the sciences through illusions of sense, through changes in the physiological condition of sense organs in each individual, and through individual differences in groups of individuals. Again in any case of measurement, apart from possible defects in the measuring instrument, which may be considered as purely objective, variations are introduced, through the various methods of handling the instrument, the psychological condition of the experimenter and changing conditions of the environment. [See *Experimental Phonetics*, Parmenter, Trevino and Bevans "A technique for Radiographing the organs of speech during articulation," *Zeitschrift für expl. Phonetik* I, 63, 84. See also, a technique for the experimental investigation of the associative interference in artificial linguistic material, by Erwin Allen Esper, *Lang.*, Monograph published by the Linguistic Society of America, November, 1925, No. I, and No. XI. The relation between linguistic structure and associative interference in artificial linguistic material, by Dael Lee Wolfe, March, 1932. For further details see E. H. Struvevat *Analogical creation and contamination as illustrated by lapses*, *J. A. O. S.* Vol. LVII, No. 2, June, 1937. Refer also to *Sapir's Totality*, and No. 17 *Indication* by W. E. Collinson, edited by Alice V. Morris, April to June, 1937.]

As a result of the inevitable variation in statistical results accruing from variable measurements, the experimenter in each of the physical sciences resorts to the 'mean' as a measure of approximation to accuracy. Absolute accuracy in physical science is a goal seldom, if ever, attained. So long as the physical sciences still labour under the handicap of subjective factors, I am of opinion that it is too much to expect linguistics to yield hypotheses and results free from all subjective taint.

In addition to exact measurement absolute predictability demands a mechanistic conception. (See L. Bloomfield, *Linguistics as a science*, *Studies in philology*, Vol. XXVII, No. 4, October 1930. *Language or idea?* *Language*, Vol. XII, No. 2 April-June, 1936.)

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We will do well to ponder now on another trend in physical science, the theory of indeterminism, which is fast displacing the older view—the mechanistic theory so popularly espoused—that was so completely accepted as axiomatic. A modern physicist writes "Determinism has faded out of theoretical physics. Some are credulous and can't believe it has been eliminated. Some think it is only a domestic change in physics. Some imagine it is a justification of miracles. Some expect determinism to fade in again." (Eddington, *The decline of determinism*, Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institute, 1932, P. 141ff.)

A parallel to this in linguistics is the postulate of "the invariability of phonetic law" "*Ausnahmslosigkeit der Lautgesetze*" which goes to Leskien, *Declination in Slavisch/Litauischen und Germanischen* 1876, Einl. P. XXVII. It was taken up with enthusiasm as a guiding principle, by most of the younger generation of scholars, though also rejected by some. For the discussion down to 1900, cf. the Bibliography, in Wechsler, *Gibt es Lautgesetz*. In 1901, Wheeler (TAPA 32, 6) made the following observation, "Few herald it in the abstract, few disregard it in the concrete." For recent discussion, cf. E. Hermann, *Lautgesetz und Analogie*, 1931, with the review by L. Bloomfield in *Language*, VIII, 220 ff. This postulate is now replaced by the postulate "phonemes change", i.e. that sound change goes on regardless of meaning and therefore is subject to phonetic conditions only. The postulate of sound-change without exceptions will probably always remain a mere assumption, since the other types of linguistic change (analogic change, borrowing) are bound to affect all our data. As an assumption, however, the postulate yields, as a matter of mere routine, predictions which otherwise would be impossible. "In other words, the statement that *Phonemes change* (sound changes have no exceptions) is a tested hypothesis: in so far as one may speak of such a thing, it is proved truth." As Oertel observes (*Lectures on the Study of Language*, 260), "Phonetic law" rests its claim to recognition *not upon a causal explanation but upon its relative universality*. That is to say, because a certain sound change can be observed in a large mass of cases it is elevated to the rank of a phonetic law. Compare also his contention (261) that law is used in grammar with a peculiar and a special signification. It stands for formulae by which a large mass of phonetic correspondences are summed up.

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Ten years ago practically every physicist of repute was, or thought he was, a determinist. He thought he had discovered strictly causal law. But Eddington is among those who are reconciled to indeterminism. For him indeterminism is as useful for predictions as determinism. To quote again, "prediction refers to the average behaviour of the vast number of particles. With fewer particles prediction becomes more of a gamble. Backing an electron to do anything is as uncertain as backing a horse."

If a consistent set of assumptions which allow of sporadic sound change should be devised, we can 'explain' any and all changes of linguistic forms; but then we must abandon all results that were gained by an implicit or explicit use of the present assumption of sound change. We should have to give up, to take the classical instance of the sound change discovered by Verner, for nothing is more common than the voicing of intervocalic spirants, and changes of this type occur progressively in various Germanic dialects. Had Verner countenanced the possibility of a change which passed sporadically from form to form, he could never have found the correlation of pre-Germanic spirant-voicing with the place of the P.I.E. accent. This example gets an added, if extraneous, interest from the fact that Verner, to all appearances, had not explicitly formulated the assumption of regular sound change.

One can invalidate a set of assumptions only by presenting an alternative set which fits more inclusively or more snugly over the data of observation. One can invalidate single assumptions by showing that they are inconsistent with the rest of the set, and one can add single assumptions, by way of replacement or otherwise, provided that these new assumptions are consistent with the assumptions which one proposes to retain. Facts of observation which are not covered by our assumptions are kept in the foreground as an unexplained residuum. Indeed, this setting off of problems is one of the advantages of scientific procedure; as the discrepant facts accumulate, they may reveal a common characteristic which either betrays their true place with our assumptions or leads to a revision of the assumptions themselves. Above all, any change in the assumptions necessitates a complete weeding out of earlier conclusions that depend upon the rejected assumptions, and reworkings of all data embodied in those conclusions. This reworking, if the change in the assumptions is

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justified, will lead to a more inclusive classification of the data, or to a classification that fits more accurately and simply into the total result of science. We do not know why a given change occurs when and where it does. In this linguistics is no better off than the other branches of human study." We are forced to embody every descriptive or historical fact in separate little assumption. Finally, we can co-ordinate our basic assumptions about linguistic change with our knowledge of non-linguistic processes only in the matter of linguistic borrowing, which is obviously a phase of cultural borrowing in general.

What is of special significance is that attempts are being made now to bring linguistics more into line with the exact sciences, in articles like "the quantitative classification of Indo-European languages" by A. I. Koeber and C. D. Chertien, published in *Language*, Vol. XIII, No. 2, April-June, 1937, and in the works of Zipf, the founder of dynamic philology. His thesis is that the key to explanation of all synchronic and diachronic language phenomena has been found in a statistically established tendency to maintain equilibrium between size and frequency.

1. Relatively frequent use of linguistic unit causes it to be reduced in one or more of its various kinds of magnitude, accent, complexity of articulation, extent in time, number of components etc., while relative infrequency of use occasions corresponding enlargement.

2. This law of Abbreviation has been established by statistical study.

3. This law serves as the basis of a new science of language.

4. Current techniques of linguistic science thereby become partly obsolete, partly ancillary. The statistician avoids the popular concept 'cause and effect' (cf. my paper—*Teleology and Linguistics*) and prefers to work with the concept 'functional interrelation' as it is used in mathematical and natural science, where the word 'function' has a technical meaning. When the statistician is confronted with two variable quantities in a complex of phenomena, he sets himself to observing whether certain values of variable A are associated (in his observation) with the probabilities or possibilities (both *a posteriori*) that variable B will have certain of its possible values. The two are said to stand

in 'functional interrelation' when every possible choice of a value of A is found associated with a restriction of the possible or probable values of B.

Two particular cases will be of interest. (i) Each variable is said to be a single valued 'function' of the other when the restriction is always to a single value of B so that a choice among the values of A implies a choice of certain values of B. (ii) The two variables are said to stand in 'statistical correlation' when it is a restriction of the probable values of B, so that the probabilities that B has certain of its possible values are different from what they were before the choice was made. There is a full range of possibilities in strictness of correlation. "Evidently a single valued function is that limit case of correlation which could be called 'perfect': it is indeed that case which is marked with the statement 'correlation equals one' and the correlation (η) used here is so defined that it can be calculated from numerical data."

In a lengthy review of Zipf's *Psycho-biology of language*, Martin Joos criticises the doctrine of relative frequency. (*Language*, Vol. XII, 1936.) Zipf replies to this criticism in *Language*, Vol. XIII, No. 1, January—March, 1932. Joos was well within his rights, as Zipf himself admits, in doubting that any causal relation can be perfectly established for the familiar reason that 'the chain of causality' between any two events consists of an infinity of nexus points, all of which cannot be conceivably disclosed to empirical analysis. One has no right to say for instance that pulling a trigger *causes* the firing of a shell, because one cannot account for the infinity of moments presumedly involved in the total phenomenon of detonation. But Zipf points out that nothing is gained by arguing this matter of causation further and over-doing it. He has the support of Professor M. H. Stone, Associate Professor of Mathematics at Harvard, who opines that Joos's indictment of the general procedure followed by Zipf is in reality an indictment of all current scientific thought. Those of you who have read L. Bloomfield's recent book '*Language*', may recollect that on page 389 he says "the causes of sound change are unknown". If we choose to condemn Zipf's work because he speaks of causation, then we have to admit that L. Bloomfield was using *causes* in the unenlightened sense of the exact sciences. But remember that Zipf does not imply even for a moment that

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correlation is the same as causal relation. Yet in some cases a correlation may lead to the discovery of a causal connection for reasons which should be obvious to any one familiar with the elements of statistics. D. C. Jones in his "A first course in statistics" 18 (London 1922) says "when we have two or more factors tabulated together we may be sometimes led to discover a connection of some kind, possibly causal, between them and a search for such a connection, or *correlation* as it is called, represents one very useful purpose to which tabulations may be put."

In scientific linguistics, the fact that its conclusions never extend beyond probability scarcely calls for a reversion to the vagaries of popular conceptions. What is of paramount need is the recognition that relative meagreness of data and tentativeness of conclusions should serve to prevent hasty generalizations. As Dunlap in his "Mysticism, Freudianism, and scientific psychology" (St. Louis Mosby, 1920, p. 41) says, "Science offers only working hypotheses of increasing exactness of application. It does not pretend to absolute or final certitude."

"Confusion in the methods of linguistics originates in other than linguistic circles. The cheaper sort of philosophers and literary men are always devising half-baked theories which pretend to solve all problems by means of grandiose but undefined catchwords. Some of these people, having looked into linguistic books and found them difficult and void of popular psychologic terms, direct their noise especially at the linguist demanding that he conform henceforth to their theories. They affect a rackish up-to-dateness of phrase which is to show their possession of their important 'new' idea and casts a suspicion of idiocy upon any one who has not yet adopted it. Now, the linguist enjoys less academic prestige and has less of popular audience; he is methodically associated by his divorcement from the common-sense notions which prevail not only in most other branches of human study, but in the linguist's own non-professional outlook; in his science he is perplexed by a host of unsolved problems; and above all, he is imperfectly grounded in the presuppositions of the scientific method which he has learned to use. It is no wonder that he allows himself to be swept off his feet. To be sure, he cannot change his actual technique but at least he supplements his work with inconsistent

semi-popular theorisings with Polemics against the linguistic assumptions that do not fit into the new context, and with theoretical amendments which he does not state definitely enough to test their effect. Science is materialistic and mechanical. Her truths are born as working assumptions and, if one scans them closely, never outgrow this estate. Some of her followers nevertheless see in her the only hope of mankind".

L. Bloomfield (*Lang.*, Vol. VIII, p. 226.)



ERROR, DOUBT AND DREAM COGNITION IN DVAITA VEDĀNTA.

BY

P. NAGARAJA RAO, M.A.,

*Some time Research Scholar in the Philosophy Dept.
of the Madras University.*

I.

The soundness of any theory of knowledge is judged by the way in which it treats the problem of error, the most knotty of all the problems of epistemology. Different schools of Indian philosophy have advanced different theories of error, and their polemics against one another 'exhibit their respective powers of psychological analysis and metaphysical acumen'. Their treatment of the problem is coloured by their metaphysical presuppositions. Madhva also is no exception. The radical Realist that he is, he wants to give a complete objective basis to the content of error after the model of the Nyāya school. With certain modifications Madhva accepts the Nyāya theory of error, and calls it by a different name, 'Abhinava-anyathākhyāti' the new anyathākhyāti.

Before we attempt to explain the different theories of error, we have to meet the arguments of those that deny the existence of error. Prabhākara holds and champions the opinion that there is no erroneous cognition at all.¹

He examines critically the term Anyathākhyāti (apprehension as other or different) and points out its untenability. If the term 'anyathākhyāti' be interpreted as 'anyākāreṇa pariṇāta-vastu-viśayaka-jñānam' (the cognition of an object that has transformed itself into a different form from other than its own), then valid cognitions like 'that is a pot' would become cases of anyathākhyāti, because the cognised pot is a pariṇāma, i.e., a modification of clay. Hence the definition of 'anyathākhyāti' is over-pervasive in respect of valid knowledge.

1. *Pramāṇapaddhati*, Chap. I, sec. 12, p. 68.

Granting, for argument's sake, that a modification is possible, still the difficulties do not disappear. Is the modification caused, or eternal? If it be eternal, in the stock example of the shell and the silver, the delusion will be there for ever. If it be said to be caused, what exactly is the cause? It cannot be the defect of the sense (Karaṇadoṣa), because the sense organ and the modification are in two different loci, and so there can be no cause-effect relation between them. Further the subsuming cognition does not take the form 'the silver cognised is a modification of the shell'; but it only takes the form 'the cognised object is not silver'. On these grounds this interpretation of the term is ruled out.

Anyathākhyāti can be interpreted in another way, 'anyākāra-viṣaya-jñānam, i.e., vastv-avytti-dharma-viṣayaka-jñānam', i.e., the knowledge of that 'attribute which is not found in the object cognised'. Is the 'attribute' cognised real, or unreal? If it be real, we would have no perception of the object, but in our experience we do perceive the object. This second interpretation too proves to be untenable.

If 'anyathākhyāti' be interpreted as 'anyākāravaiśiṣṭa-jñānam', i.e., 'vastv-asadrūpajñānam', i.e., the cognition which is entirely dissimilar to the object, then all cases of cognition would become cases of anyathākhyāti, because in no cognition is the form of cognition the same as that of the object cognised. The objects are external, and knowledge and its forms are internal. So this interpretation too proves to be of no avail.¹

Prabhākara's analysis of delusion is as follows: What is called a delusive cognition is made up of two elements, a perception and a recollection.² It is not a single unit of knowledge but a composite of two cognitions. When we perceive nacre as silver, we perceive only the qualities common to nacre and silver, i.e., brightness and the like. The qualities common to nacre and silver revive the idea of silver in our mind by association. What passes for error is the non-discrimination of these two cognitions, namely perception and memory. This happens so because the fact of memory being memory is lost sight of. It is this non-discrimination of difference (bhedāgraha) which is responsible for

1. *Nyāyasūtra* of Jayatīrtha, pp. 41-4.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

the empirical usage leading to the appositional designation in language and the identification of the two in practice. This fact of 'non-discrimination' leads to error in conduct and usage.

Madhva criticises the Prābhākara position as follows: The assumption that what is called error is a composite of two jñānas has no warrant for it. There is no pramāṇa to that effect. When we discover error, we do not recognise that there were two jñānas. The subsuming cognition which takes only the form 'what I took to be silver is no silver', goes to disprove Prabhākara's position. Further, do the two apprehensions, the perceived and the remembered ones, appear in consciousness or not? If they do not, they do not exist; if they do, then non-perception of difference between them is impossible.¹ 'The theory fails to account for the fact that as long as error lasts there is the actual presentation to consciousness and not mere memory image'. It is difficult to account for the obscuration of memory which breeds illusion of a direct presentation.² The knowledge of the given element shell, for which the person has no desire, will lead to counter-activity; the knowledge of the remembered silver to activity; and the non-apprehension of the distinction between the two should result in non-activity. It is difficult to understand how unconsciousness can prompt one to activity.

Let us state and criticise the 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' theory of error which Rāmānuja calls 'the satkhyāti'.³ Its scientific value consists in its aim which is to show that jñāna including delusion never deviates from reality. If all knowledge be equally valid, it may be asked, how the distinction between truth and error is to be effected. Rāmānuja is of opinion that 'knowledge is always of the given, but need not be of the whole of what is given'. Error is not 'incomplete knowledge', because it is not completeness of knowledge that differentiates truth from error. For knowledge to be true, it should, in addition to correspondence with external reality, be serviceable in life.³ When the mirage water and shell-silver are described as false, what we understand is not that water and silver respectively are not present there, for in that case we could not become conscious of them at all, but that they are not such as can be put to practical use. A geologist may correctly adjudge a

1. See Pandit, N. S., Vol. XII, p. 109.

2. *Indian Philosophy*, by Sir S. Radhakrishnan, Vol. II, p. 398.

3. *Yatindra-mata-dīpikā*, p. 3.

bit of ore as gold; but it does not mean that bangles can be made out of the metal. The subsuming cognition does not negate the object (artha), but it negates only activity (pravṛtti).¹ The discovery of error, in Prahhākara's view also, affects 'only the reactive side of consciousness, not its receptive side.'²

Madhva criticises Rāmānuja's theory as follows: "The assumption that all objects have the characteristics of all other objects in them has no warrant in our experience." If there be the element of 'silverness' in the nacre, the perception of the silver is no error at all. If it be contended that partial knowledge is error, then our knowledge of Brahman obtained through the Vedas would become erroneous, because we have cognition only of a few attributes which form a fraction of the infinite attributes of the Brahman. Further, when we perceive silver in the nacre is it the perception of a little quantity of silver in it? It cannot be so. If this were so, we could pick up any object, because it has also got a small quantity of silver in it. The failure to cognise the predominant element as the predominant element, i.e., the apprehension of a little quantity of silver to be the predominant quality, is nothing more than 'anyathākhyāti'.³

Ātmakhyāti (apprehension of the self as external):⁴ The Yogācāra school of Buddhism holds this view. They say that there are no external objects corresponding to the cognitions we have. An error is not produced by any external object in contact with a sense organ, but is the projection of a subjective idea into the world, i.e., a 'subjective hallucination'.⁵ The idea of 'silver' is produced by the residual impression of the silver cognition.

Madhva criticises the Yogācāra position as follows: If everything be an idea, the cognition, the cogniser, and the cognised would become mere ideas. Then the cognition must take the form 'I am silver', and not the form 'this is silver'. Further,

1. Rāmānuja's commentator says that the subsuming cognition negates 'jñāna-phala-bhūta-pravṛttibādhyatvam. (S. B. Com., p. 185.)

2. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, by Prof. Hiriyanna, p. 395.

3. *Nyāyasūdhā*, p. 49.

4. For a full statement of the *Ātmakhyāti* refer to Vid-yāranya's *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha* (translation), Indian Thought Series, Vol. I, p. 85.

5. *Indian Psychology: Perception*, by Sinha, p. 287.

this view is open to all those objections which are levelled against the denial of an external world of reality. Besides this, to mistake the purely subjective idea to be objective silver is again a case of *anyathākhyāti*.¹

Asat-khyāti (apprehension of the unreal).² The Mādhyamika school of Buddhism holds this view. This school of thought is quite revolutionary in its view. They doubt the validity of knowledge as a whole. They refute the common belief that we get into touch with reality through knowledge. They say (1) that this reality is riddled with all sorts of self-discrepancies, and (2) that critical reflection shows its hollowness. We cannot describe what passes for a real thing as either existent or non-existent. For example, if a jar always existed, it is difficult to see why it needs to be made, and the efficiency of the maker becomes superfluous. If, on the other hand, we assume that it was at one time non-existent and then came into existence, we shall be predicating existence and non-existence of the same object, whose nature, for that reason, becomes unintelligible. The only escape from such a difficulty is to regard objects as having no intrinsic character (*nissvabhāva*), a position which is diametrically opposed to Naturalism (*svabhāva-vāda*). According to this school, in the illusory cognition of silver there is a cognition of silver as real, though there is no silver at all. Error is something non-existent cognised as existent. The wrong cognition of silver, according to this school, gives the knowledge of silver that does not exist. What is apprehended by the cognition is silver, which at that particular time and particular place has no existence. So it is non-existent.

They say that there is nothing inherently impossible in the cognition having the capability of causing the apprehension of things non-existent as well as existent; it is not necessary for this that there should be some potency in the thing itself; it is sufficient if the cognition is equipped with such a potency and the cognition is not a non-entity. The conclusion is that it is this capability of causing non-existent things in apprehension that distinguishes the valid from the invalid cognition. Madhva criti-

1. *Nyāyārūḍhā*, p. 54. Madhva's criticism of the 'Ātmakhyāti' is the same as that of the Nyāya school. Refer to Jha's *Sadhana Lectures on Nyāya*, Indian Thought, p. 393.

2. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, by Hiriyanna, pp. 207-8.

cises the above view as follows.¹ 'The sublating cognition does not negate nacre. So there is the reality of the nacre which is cognised through perception. The Mādhyamika position denies this, and so is opposed to experience. There is neither the possibility nor the place for the concept of error in the above school because nothing has existence. If non-existence is mistaken for existence, it is a case of *anyathākhyāti*.'

Anirvacanīyākhyāti: Error, according to Advaita, is illegitimate transference (*adhyāsa*); wherever there is *adhyāsa*, there is confusion between two orders of experience. The causes of delusive cognition, namely, defective sense and previous experience, are not by themselves sufficient to produce the delusive cognition. According to the Advaitins, when nacre is seen as silver, what happens is this: over the real substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) i.e., nacre or, more correctly, nacre-delimited spirit (*śukty-avacchinna-caitanya*), the beginningless positive Nescience (*anādi-bhāvarūpa*) causes the silver there. This Nescience operates in a double way. It conceals the fact of nacre and shows up silver in its place. 'To see silver where there is only nacre, a necessary condition is the concealment of shell.' 'Suppression precedes substitution.' The two aspects of Nescience are respectively called '*āvaraṇa*' and '*vikṣepa*'. The Nescience has for its '*āśraya*' the person that mistakes nacre for silver, and nacre as its *viṣaya*. When the sense of sight comes into relation with the nacre in a general way, the Nescience is partly dissolved by the modification of the '*antaḥkaraṇa*' which takes the form 'this' (*idamākāravṛtti*). This Nescience however continues to veil the 'nacreity' of what is seen as 'this' (*idam*). The two factors, namely, the prepossessions of the knower's mind and similarity between the object seen as 'this' and 'silver', make it undergo a transformation, with the result that silver too comes into existence along with the cognitive modification of Nescience. The silver that has come into existence is neither real (*sat*) nor unreal (*asat*), nor both real and unreal (*sadasat*). It is not real, because the sublating cognition contradicts it, nor can it be unreal because there is the immediate cognition of silver and the consequent effort on the part of the person under delusion to pick it up. Nor can it be both real and unreal, because such a supposition would involve both the above difficulties, and they cannot inhere in one. So it is said to be

1. *Nyāyasūtra*, p. 55.

relatively real, and is said to be indeterminable, i.e., 'anirvacaniya.' 'It is also said to be 'pralībhāsika' in the sense that it is co-terminus with its presentation in cognition.' Error, according to the Advaitins, is a 'cognitive complex' of two factors: (1) *vṛtti* of *antahkaraṇa* and (2) *vṛtti* of Nescience. The Advaitins favour the 'anyathākhyāti' view with reference to delusions conditioned by an adjunct (*śopādhikabhāva*), e.g., the cognition of a crystal as red when a rose is in its vicinity.

Madhva criticises the above view as follows:¹ 'The doctrine of anirvacaniya has no warrant for it. It is an unintelligible concept. A thing is either real or unreal, and there is no middle ground.'

The very assumption of the Advaitins of an indeterminable existence for the object of delusive cognition implies that one thing appears to consciousness as real.² This is no other than the 'anyathākhyāti' view which they seek to refute. If the indeterminate silver were apprehended as indeterminate, the cognition would be no delusion at all, but it is not so, because it is contradicted by the subsuming cognition.

If we admit that an indeterminate object is produced at the time of the delusive cognition, what is exactly its cause? In the delusive cognition of silver, what exactly is the indeterminable silver which is the object of delusion? The cognition of silver cannot originate the indeterminable silver, for there cannot be the cognition of silver. The answer that a beginningless Nescience is the cause of silver does not stand to reason, because it involves the fallacy of infinite regress or reciprocal dependence.

The Nyāya theory of error is known as 'anyathākhyāti'. It is apprehension as other or different. According to the modern Nyāya school, it is the apprehension of certain attributes of an object other than or different from its true setting. Error, according to them, creeps in where we relate two or more objects given in our cognitions. The contents of our knowledge as a complex may be false, but the several things we cognise are true. Error

1. *Nyāyasūdhā*, pp. 55-7.

2. The Advaitin does not admit that what appears to consciousness is 'real'. He simply says that it is indeterminable. So the above criticism does not apply to Advaita. The only reality that he admits is Brahman. The rest are relatively real.

creeps in during the synthetic activity of the mind. In the shell-silver example, when the shell is seen as silver, the erroneous cognition that arises takes the form 'this is silver' (*idam rajatam*). Here the 'this' stands for the shell lying in front of the knower, and it is first seen as a white piece, and not as nacre, the distinctive feature of nacre being missed through some defect in sight. The visual perception of shell arises in the ordinary way, i.e., the normal sense relation of contact between the sense and the object seen. The 'silverness' which belongs to the real silver is elsewhere; for example, it is in the shop (*āpaṇastha*). This 'silverness' which is elsewhere is presented here as the attribute of the shell seen as 'idam'. Neither the real 'rajatam' nor the real 'rajatatva' is connected with the sense of sight through normal sense relation. Without some sense relation perception is unaccountable. So the Naiyāyikas hold that the real silver and silverness come to be connected with the sense of sight by an extra normal sense relation (*alaukikasannikarṣa*).

It is called *jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti*, i.e., a sense contact consisting in cognition. The Nyāya school maintains that in a delusive cognition not only the subject but also the predicative element is of an 'alaukika' type where the impressions of the former experiences serve as means of representing things to our mind. The argument appears specious, but all that is meant is that even the content of error has a complete objective basis.

Madhva criticises the 'anyathākhyāti' view, but accepts it with some modifications. The extra normal relation of the Nyāya school, is it real or unreal? If it be real, the cognition of silver in the shell is no case of delusion at all. All the three elements of the cognition are real, i.e., the object, the attribute and the relation. If it be declared unreal, the Nyāya school has to accept the cognition of *asat*, i.e., non-existence, a position fundamentally opposed to their realism.

Abhinava-anyathākhyāti (the novel theory of anyathākhyāti): All the schools of thought are agreed as to the erroneous nature of the cognition of shell as silver. But there is difference of opinion as regards the nature of the three constituent factors in that cognition, namely, the substrate, the attribute and the relation. Madhva subscribes to the anyathākhyāti view. He interprets the term as follows: 'anyathā anyātmanā viśayīkurvat jñānam anyathākhyātiḥ', i.e., 'the cognition which apprehends one as of

the nature of another.' The apprehension of 'asat' as 'sat' and of 'sat' as 'asat' is error.¹ Absolute non-existence is the non-existence that is present in all the three aspects of time.² It is the counter-correlate of that non-existence which is found in all the aspects of time (*traikālikābhāvapratiyogi*). Madhva accepts cognition (*pratīti*) for 'asat'. This is refuted by all other schools. He tries to put forth a case for it. Those who deny 'pratīti' for 'asat' in a way are obliged to accept it. It is as follows: when the Advaitin or any other opponent declares that a particular object is not 'asat', such differentiation (*vilakṣaṇajñāna*) implies the *pratīti* of 'asat'.³ Without the cognition of the counter-correlate we cannot have the cognition of non-existence. To know that a particular thing is different from 'asat' is to know 'asat'. This fact can be put in the form of an inference. The disputants have cognition of 'asat' because they have the cognition of the difference from 'asat'. He who has the knowledge of the difference of an object from another has the knowledge of the object from which the difference is cognised.

Further when we talk of the 'horns of a hare', do the words 'horns of a hare' convey any meaning or not? If they do not have meaning, words prove to be meaningless. Further, we cannot predicate non-existence of them⁴, because such a predication implies that we have cognition of these words. If the words convey some meaning, then it amounts to the acceptance of the cognition of 'asat'. Madhva makes a statement in his *Anuvyākhyāna* to the effect that his position regarding the *pratīti* of 'asat' is irrefutable.⁵

The causes for the delusion are two: (1) sense defect, i.e., being too distant, (2) similarity, i.e., the defect of object. Each by itself cannot account for delusion. Madhva's theory is not so thoroughgoing as that of the Nyāya school. It resembles the *asatkhyātivādin's* position.

1. 'Asataḥ sattva-pratītiḥ, sato asattva pratītir ityanyathā-pratīter eva bhrāntitvāt.' *Nyāyasūdhā*, p. 47.

2. Madhva's *Tattvasamkhyāna*, Vol. III, p. 5.

3. The Advaitins mean by the word 'pratīti' only immediate cognition. They deny such cognition in the case of *asat*. They admit mediate cognition of it.

4. In the expression 'horns of a hare' each word by itself has meaning, but their juxtaposition is unintelligible.

5. *Anuvyākhyāna*, v. 28, p. 2.

Doubt

Jayatīrtha defines 'doubt' as 'uncertain knowledge' (anavadhāraṇajñāna). The word 'uncertain' (anavadhāraṇa) is used in order to avoid over-pervasion in respect of valid knowledge and error. The word 'knowledge' (jñāna) is used in order to avoid the same defect in respect of inert objects like pot or cloth.¹

Doubt arises, according to the Nyāya school, in the absence of the determining factor as qualified by one or more of the following: (1) 'Properties common to many objects' (sādhāraṇadharmā), (2) 'Unique quality' (asādhāraṇa dharmā), (3) 'conflicting testimony' (vipratipatti), (4) cognition (upalabdhi), and (5) non-cognition (anupalabdhi).

Doubt arises only when we fail to cognise the unique attribute (asādhāraṇadharmā) characterising the object. 'Doubtful cognition' (samśaya-jñāna) has for its content a single object (ekavastuviśayaka) and two or more alternative attributes as characterising the object (anekakoṭiprakāra-jñāna). Let us analyse 'doubt'. In an act of cognition we notice the attribute 'tallness' as characterising an object in front of us (purovartinīṣṭha-dharma). The attribute 'tallness' is a 'sādhāraṇadharmā' in a restricted sense. It means the attribute which reminds us of two alternatives, upasthāpakadharmā or smāraka. The cognition of this attribute 'tallness' gives rise to the cognition of two alternatives, a person or a post. In order to give rise to the cognition of these two alternatives, the attribute has to be present in both (koṭidvaya-sāmānādhikaraṇavṛtti). As soon as we cognise the two alternatives, we look for the respective determining factors characterising both, namely, 'head and hands', 'crookedness and cavities'. We don't find them. Then doubt arises in this form; 'Is it a person or a post?'

The absence of the decisive factor as qualified by the asādhāraṇadharmā of sound, the unique quality of ākāśa, gives rise to the doubt whether sound is eternal or non-eternal.

The dispute as regards the nature of the senses, between the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṅkhyas, one declaring them elemental and the other non-elemental, gives rise to doubt in the absence of the decisive factor.

1. *Pramāṇapaddhati*, Chap. I, Sec. viii, p. 49; Sec. ix, p. 55.

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When a well is sunk water appears. The percipient in the absence of the determining factor queries 'whether the water was always there and was revealed to his perception by the act of digging, or whether water was brought into existence in a place where it was not present before.'

A person comes to know that a demon dwells in a certain tree; the person sees no demon about. This fact of non-cognition in the absence of the determining factor gives rise to the following doubt: 'Is the demon capable of remaining invisible in the tree, or did it never inhabit the tree?' Some are of opinion that the sources of doubt are the three first mentioned, the last two being comprehended in 'sādhāraṇadharmā'.¹ We have cognition (*upalabdhi*) of objects like pot, cloth etc., in darkness, but only with the aid of a lamp. Similarly we have cognition of their past non-existence, only after their manufacture. As we have this 'upalabdhi' in existent as well as in non-existent objects, it becomes a 'sādhāraṇadharmā'.

We have no cognition (*anupalabdhi*) of existent objects like *Īśvara*, Time, etc. We have no cognition of non-existent objects like the horns of a hare, a barren woman's son, etc. As non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*) is present in both the existent and non-existent objects, it becomes a *sādhāraṇadharmā*.

Jayātīrtha reduces the remaining three sources of doubt to a single head, namely 'sādhāraṇadharmā'.²

Let us examine in detail the case of *asādhāraṇadharmā*. It does not give rise to doubt directly like *sādhāraṇadharmā*, because it has not the capacity to remind us of two alternatives. The "unique quality of *ākāśa* is not able to give rise to the cognition of two alternatives, because it is present only in *ākāśa*. But this '*ākāśaviśeṣagūṇatvam*' is not found in eternal objects like *Īśvara*, Time or Space, nor is it present in non-eternal objects like pot or cloth. Thus we come to cognise the two modes, namely, 'being not present in eternal things' and 'being not present in non-eternal beings'. *Ākāśa-viśeṣagūṇatvam* qualified by the two attributes gives rise to doubt. According to Jayātīrtha this is a case of doubt arising as a result of 'two *sādhāraṇadharma*s', (1) not being in eternal things (*nityāvṛtīti*),

1. *Pramāṇapaddhati*, Chap. I, Sec. x, p. 58.

2. *Ibid.*

(2) not being in non-eternal things (*anityāvṛttitva*). Let us examine in what sense the two above-mentioned attributes are *sādhāraṇadharma*s. The term '*sādhāraṇadharma*' is interpreted as that attribute which is present in one alternative, and also in the substrate of doubt. Wherever doubt arises as a result of two *sādhāraṇadharma*s, the attributes are present in one of the alternatives and the substrate is doubt. *Sādhāraṇa* means presence in more than one, and this plurality is made up in the case of two *sādhāraṇadharma*s by the substrate of doubt and the alternatives in each case; where doubt is due to the *sādhāraṇadharma* in the Nyāya sense of the term, the attribute is found in more than one alternative.

The use of the word *sādhāraṇadharma* in such a loose sense is not strict logic. Further the mode of operation when the *sādhāraṇadharma* is present in both the alternatives is quite different from the mode of operation when the two *sādhāraṇadharma*s function together. In one case a single attribute calls to cognition both the alternatives, and in the other case, each attribute calls to cognition one alternative only. They together give rise to the cognition of both the alternatives.

The attribute '*anityāvṛttitva*' is present in non-eternal objects like pot, and in the substrate of doubt, *i.e.*, sound. The attribute '*anityāvṛttitva*' is present in eternal objects like *Īśvara* and Time and also in the substrate of doubt. The attribute '*nitya-avṛttitva*' gives rise to the alternative, Is sound non-eternal? The other attribute '*anitya-avṛttitva*' gives rise to the alternative, Is sound eternal? These two attributes in the absence of a determining factor give rise to the doubt, Is sound non-eternal or eternal?

'*Vipratipatti*' is also a case of two *sādhāraṇadharma*s.¹ In the example referred to, the *sādhāraṇadharma*s are (1) being an element, and (2) being a non-element. The attribute 'being an element' is present in the substrate of doubt, and in one of the alternatives, *i.e.*, elemental objects like pot. The attribute 'being a non-element' is present in the substrate of doubt and in one of the alternatives, namely non-elemental things like *Īśvara* and Time. These two attributes in the absence of a determining factor give rise to the doubt 'are our senses elemental or non-elemental?'

1. *Pramāṇapaddhati*, Chap. I, Sec. xiii, p. 75.

[Vol. XI, Part iv.]

The criticism levelled against the difference in the modes of the operations of doubt holds good in the case of Vipratipatti also.

The Nyāya school of thought enumerates two other types of indefinite knowledge besides doubt: (1) surmise (ūha), (2) anadhyavasāya.

In surmise (ūha) the mind has no distinct consciousness of the two alternatives as in doubt. It is conscious only of the one alternative. The other alternative is suppressed, e.g., we hear some sound in the verandah of our house, and surmise that it proceeds from some human being.

Jayatirtha is of opinion that 'surmise' is a case of doubt, since one among the number of alternatives is weighed against the rest.

Anadhyavasāya is a type of indefinite knowledge where all the alternatives are unmanifested. For example, a certain person enters a garden and asks for the name of a particular tree. Anadhyavasāya is also a case of doubt, as a number of alternatives are suggested.

If we assume that the enquirer remembers the names of all the trees excepting the one before him, which happens to be the jack fruit tree, the assumption reduces itself to a case where he needs only to be reminded of the name of the tree. So both the types of indefinite knowledge are cases of doubt.¹

Dream

There are some passages in the Upaniṣads, (e.g., Bṛhad-āraṇyaka, 4, 3, 10, Kāthaka, 5, 8, and Aitareya, 3, 2, 4, 17) which declare that our world of experience is on the same level as dream experience and dream cognition. From this it follows that if dreams and dream objects prove to be unreal, our world of experience also proves to be unreal. One important tenet of Madhva's pluralistic metaphysics is the absolute and eternal reality of the world of facts. The epistemological status of dream cognition is significant to the realistic outlook of Madhva's metaphysics. This fact makes Madhva discuss the problem in detail and refute the views of other schools.²

1. *Pramāṇapaddhati*, Chap. I, Sec. xiii, p. 75.

2. *Allahabad University Studies*, Vol. V, 'Dream Theories in Indian Thought' by Umeśa Miśra, pp. 273-280.

The Nyāya school of thought is of opinion that dream cognition is a distinct type of cognition different from recollection, doubt, and indefinite knowledge. Udayana refutes the view that dream cognition is a type of recollection on the ground that dream cognition does not take the form 'I remember'. Further, we cognise in dreams some objects for the first time, and such cognitions rule out the hypothesis that dream cognition is a type of recollection, because recollection is only of the experienced.¹ The Vaiśeṣika school is also of the opinion that dream cognitions constitute a distinct type different from recollection. The theory that dream cognition is distinct from recollection can be called the 'presentative theory of dreams' as contrasted with the 'representative theory'. Dream cognitions are definite, *i.e.*, determinate, and we experience the fact of thatness (*idamtvam*) which is a special characteristic of perception. The mind in dream cognition does not oscillate between alternative possibilities, as in doubt. Dream cognition is presentative, *i.e.*, perceptual in character.

The Mīmāṃsakas and the Sāṅkhyas subscribe to the representative theory of dreams. Kumārika holds that dream cognitions are produced by the revival of the past and the subconscious impressions. This revival is effected through the agency of *adṛṣṭa*. The experience of dream objects as existing here and now is accounted for by the perversion of the mind in sleep.²

Prabhākara is also an advocate of the representative theory of dreams. He explains the presentative nature of dream objects as arising out of the obscuration of the representative character of memory (*smṛtipramoṣa*). The memory element, *i.e.*, 'the thatness' is forgotten, so the objects appear as a direct and immediate presentation.³

The Advaitins are of opinion that dream objects are presentative in their nature, but they differ from the Nyāya school regarding the metaphysical implications of dream objects and dream cognition. There is no cognition for the Advaitin which does not involve a subject and an object. The double implica-

1. *Nyāyakurumāṇjālī* of Udayana, pp. 146-7 (quoted by Sinha).

2. *Sāstradīpikā* of Pārthasārathi Miśra (quoted by Sinha).

3. *Indian Psychology: Perception*, Sinha, pp. 809-10.

tion is always there. Where there is no object, there is no knowledge, e.g., the round square and the barren woman's son. We have only a verbal cognition of it. In 'dream cognition' also, we are forced to 'presume' the existence of an objective counterpart, otherwise we shall be face to face with the contradiction of the well-tested fact, namely that there is no cognition without an object. The dream objects are said to be apparently real (*prātibhāsika*). The difference between the apparently real and the empirically real consists (not in the presence or absence of an object outside of and corresponding to the cognition), but in the difference of the characteristics of the object. The apparently real objects are common only to a few, while the empirically real objects are common to all. Further the apparently real object lasts as long as its cognition lasts, 'neither for a longer time nor for a shorter time.' The empirical knowledge is more enduring. The dream objects belong to the apparently real type.¹

Madhva regards 'dream knowledge' as valid, because it satisfies the criterion of validity formulated by him, namely, 'strict correspondence with external reality' (*yathāvastūhājñeya-viśayikāritva*). Dreams are not only valid, but real. The criteria that determine the reality of any object according to Madhva are two: (1) existence, i.e., any object that existed for a time is real, it need not be imperishable, (2) it should be non-contradictory. For Madhva a thing need not be eternal to be real. The unreal objects are those that are never in existence.

Existence in Space and Time is the criterion of the real for Madhva.² Space and Time exist in themselves according to Madhva. Time exists in Time in a relation of non-difference. Space and Time are their own loci. Relation obtains only between two different relata, according to the Advaitin. Madhva holds that relation does obtain between two non-different things also. He explains the relation on the basis of the category, *viśeṣa* (a special category) in his system which effects differentiation between two identities.

Another cardinal test of the real is that it should have efficiency, i.e., productive of effect (*arthakriyākāritva*). We judge

1. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, Hiriyanna, pp. 349-51.

2. All the arguments of the Advaitin against the conception of the existent as the real hold good in the case of Madhva also.

the reality of a thing from its effect. The mirage water is not real because it does not quench the thirst. This is otherwise known as the pragmatic test. This test applies to delusive cognitions also.

Madhva after formulating his criterion of validity and reality sums up the case for the opposition which contends that dream objects are unreal on the following grounds:¹ (1) Dream objects are unreal because of the absence of the material and efficient causes. In the absence of these two causes nothing can be produced. (2) The spatial dimensions of our head are very limited, and so they cannot accommodate huge objects like the real elephant and real mountain. From this it follows that dream objects are unreal. (3) We have 'real cognition' only when all the senses work. They are the instruments of cognition. In dream experience none of the senses function. From this it follows that dream objects and dream cognitions are unreal. (4) Dream cognition and dream objects are sublated by our waking experience.

Madhva answers the arguments of the opposition in detail. The 'material cause' out of which dream objects arise is the impression (*vāsanā*). The impressions of all our experiences, even of the past lives, are deposited in the *manas*, and not in the *Ātman*. This *manas* exists always; till release it has the three-fold attribute of *prakṛti*, namely, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The 'manas' of the released is not tainted by the three-fold characteristics of *prakṛti*. It is this bundle of impressions stored in the *manas* that is responsible for the cycle of births and deaths. This bundle of impressions stored in the *manas* constitutes the material cause of dream objects.

The efficient cause of dreams is God. The authority for this assumption is the *Vedānta Sūtra*. Bādarāyaṇa says 'God creates dream objects in dream state, Śruti says so'.² The dream objects are destroyed by God as soon as the dreams come to an end.

The Nyāya school contends that dream objects are unreal, because the materials out of which they are made are not visible.

1. Such an assertion on the part of Madhva is hardly logical. It is meaningless to hold that a thing exists in itself in a relation of identity.

2. *Vedānta Sūtra*, III, ii, 1.

Impressions of which dream objects are made are considered by Madhva to be supersensible like the atoms of the Nyāya school. The atoms, though themselves invisible, still constitute the material cause of the binary (dvyaṇuka) and the triad (tryaṇuka).

Another possible objection against regarding 'the impressions' as the material cause of dream objects is that the impressions are only of experienced objects. In dream we cognise objects which have not been experienced by us in our waking life, and those objects could not have been produced out of impressions. In order to avoid such difficulties Madhva posits that the accumulated impressions of all our past lives are deposited in the manas, and it is possible that the objects might have been experienced in our past life though not in the present one.

The Advaitins contend that dream objects are relatively real, but they are not ultimately real, like the self. So the Advaitins relegate the dream objects to the apparently real existences (prātibhāsika-sattā). Madhva criticises the doctrine of the three-fold reality (sattātvaividhya) of the Advaitin as follows:¹

Division presupposes an object that is capable of being divided (vibhājanīyavastu). We must have known some generic attribute characterising it. This attribute is called 'vibhājakadharmā', i.e., the basis of division. The Advaitin does not accept any other sattā than the three, namely (1) pāramārthika-sattā, (2) vyāvahārika-sattā and (3) prātibhāsika-sattā. As there is no such common sattā, there is no common attribute in all the three sattās that make division possible. If he were to contend that pāramārthika-sattā is the common attribute, the other two prove to be different. Thus they do not become divisions of sattā. Hence the division is vitiated.² Further, at the time of cognition we do not cognise objects as characterised by any of the three sattās.

1. Madhva's *Anuśaṅkhyāna*, Chap. v, 22, p. 158.

2. Though in essence it is identical with sattā which is said to be three-fold, it must be remembered that not all the Advaitins admit the three-foldness of sattā. According to some, Brahman is the sole reality which appears defined as it were both in empirical life and dream, etc. The practical efficiency of these is not due to their possession of different kinds of reality, but to the sole reality manifested in them, however defectively.

Madhva points out that perception and inference bear testimony to the fact that dream objects are real. We have a reflective cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) of dream experience. *Anuvyavasāya* is a type of perception. As we have perception of dream objects, we cannot say that they are unreal. Inferences that prove the reality of dream objects take the following form: (1) Dream objects are real, because they are originated by *manas*, like *jñāna*, (2) Dream objects are real, because they are the loci of superimpositions like Brahman. (3) Dream objects are real, because they are created by *Īśvara*, like the word.

Madhva concludes that dream objects are real, and that dream cognitions are valid. The element of unreality in dream experience is the understanding of the objects in dreams as constituting objects of external world. The elephant which I see in dream as such is not unreal, but the idea that the dream elephant is the elephant seen in the external world is unreal. The dream objects in dream cognition are all real except for the element of externality which is superimposed and accounts for sublation. So what is contradicted in dream experience is the *āropita-bāhyatva* (the superimposed). What is sublated in dream cognition is one of the attributes of the objects, i.e., the superimposed externality. What is sublated in a delusive cognition is the substrate itself.

ON UDGĪTHA'S COMMENTARY ON RV. X, 15, 12.

BY

A. VENKATASUBBIAH.

On pp. 206-217 of Vol. X of this *Journal*, I have had occasion to cite some passages from Uvāṭa's commentary on the VS and Skandasvāmin's commentary on the RV, whose wordings are so similar as to show conclusively that one of these authors has borrowed his explanations from the other. I now reproduce below Udgītha's commentary¹ on RV. 10, 15, 12 whose wording is so similar to that of Uvāṭa on VS. 19, 66, as to point to a like conclusion. As before, I shall, for the sake of contrast, add the commentaries of Sāyana and Blatta-Bhāskara also.

RV. 10, 15, 12 reads as follows:—

त्वमग्र ईक्षितो जातवेदो
वाद्द्व्यानि सुरभीणि कृवी ।
प्रादाः पितृभ्यः स्वधया ते अक्ष-
न्नदि त्वं देव प्रयता हवीषि ॥

This verse is the same as TS. 2, 6, 12, 5 and VS. 19, 66 also, except that the latter verse has the reading कव्यवाहन instead of जातवेदः in pāda a, and the former has कृत्वा instead of कृवी in b.

Uvāṭa on VS. 19, 66: यस्त्वं हे अग्ने ईक्षितः अध्येषितः सन् कव्य-
वाहन अवाद् 'वह प्राणे' इत्यस्यैतदूपम् । ऊदवानसि । द्व्यानि
हवीषि । सुरभीणि सुगन्धीनि । कृवी कृत्वा । कृत्वा हवीषि । प्रादाः प्रदत्तवा-
नसि पितृभ्यः स्वधया पितृमन्त्रेण । ते च पितरः । अक्षन् अत्तवन्तो भक्षित-
वन्तः । अदि भक्षय त्वं हे देव । प्रयता प्रयतानि शुचीनि हवीषि ॥

Udgītha on RV. 10, 15, 12: हे अग्ने जातवेदः उत्पन्नसर्वविषय-
वस्तुज्ञान । त्वमस्माभिरीक्षितः स्तुतः । अवाद् ऊदवानसि पितॄन् प्रति प्रापित-
वानसि । द्व्यानि हवीषि । सुरभीणि सुगन्धीनि । कृवी कृत्वा । प्र अदाः
प्रदत्तवाञ्छसि । पितृभ्यः ते च पितरस्त्वया प्रयतानि । स्वधया अग्नेन
हेतुना अन्नमेतदस्माकमित्यभिप्रायेण अक्षन् अत्तवन्तो भक्षितवन्तः । अयेदानीं
श्रुतोपकारः सन् अदि भक्षय त्वं हे देव । प्रयता प्रयतानि शुचीनि हवीषि ॥

Sāyana on *ibid*: हे जातवेदः । जातं सर्वं जगद्वेत्तीति जातवेदाः ।

1. The text of Udgītha's commentary is reproduced from the Lahore edition of Viśvabandhu Śāstri (printed in 1935), and that of Uvāṭa's commentary from the Nirṇayasāgara edition of 1912.

तयाविध हे अग्ने ईळितोऽस्मानिः स्तुतस्त्वं हव्यान्वस्मदीयानि हवींषि सुरभीणि सुगन्धीनि कृत्वा कृत्वा अवाट् । वहनं कृतवानसि । कृत्वा च पितृभ्यः प्रादाः । ते च पितरः स्वधया स्वधाकारेण दत्ते हविरक्षन् । अदन्तु । हे देव त्वमपि प्रयता प्रयत्नसम्पादितानि हवींषि अद्धि भक्षय ॥

Bhaṭṭa-Bhāskara on TS. 2, 6, 12, 5: हे अग्ने जातवेदः जातानां वेदितः प्रजावेदितः त्वं ईळितः स्तुतः अवाट् हव्यानि । वहंस्छान्दसो लुङ् । ततश्च तानि सुरभीणि कृत्वा पितृभ्यः प्रादाः प्रदेहि स्वधया अन्नेन सहैव । ततस्ते पितरः तानि प्रयत्नानि शुद्धानि हवींषि अक्षन् अदन्तु । अदे-
स्छान्दसो 'लुङ् सनोर्धसूङ्' इति प्रस्तादेशः । 'मन्त्रे घसः' इति च्लेर्लुक्, 'घसिमसोर्इळि च' इत्युपधाजोपः । देव, त्वमपि तानि हवींषि अद्धि भक्षय सततमस्मानुपकारिणः कुर्विति भावः ॥

It can readily be seen that the wording of Udgītha's explanation is almost identical with that of Uvaṭa and that this identity is not fortuitous but due to conscious borrowing. The edition of Udgītha's commentary, referred to above, contains the explanation of 29 hymns only (nos. 6-34) of the tenth *Maṇḍala*; and it is not improbable that his commentary on the remaining hymns of that *Maṇḍala* and on other *Maṇḍalas* contains other examples of similar identity of wording with the explanations of Uvaṭa. Further, it is not unlikely that a good critical edition, based on sufficient Ms. material, of the published commentary itself, would show some more examples of identity of wording with the explanations of Uvaṭa. For instance, the unintelligible expression *svābodhikāram* in Udgītha's explanation of *prajānan* in 10, 16, 9 is, without doubt, a corruption of *svam adbhikāram*; compare Uvaṭa's explanation *prajānan svam adbhikāram* in his commentary on VS. 35, 19. Note also how similar Udgītha's commentary on 10, 16, 9ab and 10, 14, 6 is to that of Uvaṭa on VS. 35, 19 and 19, 50, and how dissimilar to that of Sāyaṇa (on RV. 10, 16, 9ab and 10, 14, 6) and Bhaṭṭa-Bhāskara (on TS. 2, 6, 12, 6).

The published edition of Udgītha's commentary contains neither an introduction at the beginning nor a *prabasti* at the end; and we cannot know therefore what Udgītha has said of himself and of his work. The RV. commentator Veṅkaṭa-mādhava however has, as pointed out already (see Vol. X, p. 221 *ante*), stated that Udgītha collaborated with Skandasvāmin in the writing of the RV. commentary. It would follow hence that the two authors were contemporaries; and since it has also been shown earlier (see Vol. X, p. 218 *ante*) that Skandasvāmin borrowed the explanation of some RV mantras from Uvaṭa, it would also follow that Udgītha too has done the same. That is to say, it would follow that Udgītha's explanation of 10, 15, 12 is borrowed from the commentary of Uvaṭa.

[Vol. XI, Part iv.]

ĀDITYA CŌLA'S I KANṆANŪR
(BĀLA) SUBRAHMANYA TEMPLE—9th Century A.D.

BY

S. R. BALASUBRAHMANYAN, M.A., L.T.,

Chulambaram

AND

K. VENKATARANGA RAJU,

Pudukotah.

Long ago V. A. Smith laid down the safe dictum that style is conveniently considered a function of time and place, and that works of art including architecture should be classified with regard to their age and geographical position. The traditional boundary between the Cōla and Pāṇḍya countries was the southern Veḷḷār running through the modern State of Pudukotah. The temple of Kanṇagūr, the subject of this paper, is situated in the region south of this river and is, strictly speaking, in the Pāṇḍya country; but there is epigraphical evidence that it is a Cōla structure raised in the days of Āditya Cōla I. His reign marked the beginning of a period of imperial expansion. The extent of the Cōla country under him included not only the traditional limits of the kingdom but also the Koṅgu country and the Toṇḍaimaṇḍalam and we have to infer that Āditya I extended his sway over a part of the Pāṇḍya country by at least a few miles south of this traditional boundary, and thus he might have prepared the way for the conquest of Madura under his successor, Maduraiṅḱa Parakēsari-Varmān alias Parāntaka I, the conqueror of Madura. It is well known that, according to the Anbil plates, Āditya I has to his credit the building of rows of tall stone temples from the Sahyādri mountains to the sea, as monuments of his success. We have no evidence that this temple was built by him, but we know for certain that it was constructed in his days. It is one of the few temples in South India dedicated exclusively to the worship of Subrahmanya, equipped with all the features of a Śiva temple.

[Vol. XI, Part iv.]

Kaṇṇaṇūr is a village situated in the Tirumeyyam Taluk of the Pudukotah State, about 23 miles south-west of the capital of the State. There are two temples close to each other on the eastern slope of the bund of the big tank of this village. The one close to the bund is the Bālasubrahmanya temple, the other is a Viṣṇu temple referred to in one of its inscriptions as "Viru-
darājabhayaṅkara Viṇṇakara Emperumāṇ".

The temple of Bālasubrahmanya is a structure built entirely of well-dressed and close-fitting granite blocks without the use of mortar, as we find in a number of later Pallava and early Cōḷa temples. It consists of a Garbhagrha, an Antarāḷa, a closed Mukhamantapa together with a Prākāra enclosing the entire structure. Except the two jamb stones of the Prākāra gateway, the rest of the walls has disappeared.

All the nine published inscriptions of this place are found on the walls of the Mukhamantapa and all of them are Pāṇḍyan. The earliest of them belongs to the third year of Māgavarman Sundara Pāṇḍya (acc. 1216 A. D.). The temple is undergoing renovation at present and on closer inspection we were able to discover two new inscriptions on the east wall of the temple on both sides of the door way of the Antarāḷa which was the limit of the original structure of Aditya, as in the case of the Tirukkaṭṭalai temple. The Mukhamantapa must have been a later addition, made perhaps during, or sometime before, the days of Māgavarman Sundara Pāṇḍya with whom begins the second wave of imperial expansion of the Pāṇḍyas. The two newly discovered inscriptions are unfortunately built in and it is not possible to get a full estampage of the inscriptions, but enough of them has been exposed to view to enable us to learn that it was in Tuṟumā Nāḍu included in Kāṇa Nāḍu and the deity enshrined is Subrahmanya or perhaps Bālasubrahmanya as it was known in later times. But the most valuable part of the information gleaned from the limited exposed portion is that, according to the inscription on its *proper right*, the *ūrārs* made a grant of land to Subrahmanya of this *ūr* in Tuṟumānāḍu in the reign (regnal year is built in) of Kōvi (rāja) Kēsaripaṇmar, and the inscription on its *proper left* (king's name and regnal year built in) refers to a gift of lamps (*tirunandāvilakku*) to God Subrahmanya by the *ūrōm*. The paleographical features of the ins-



Kaumanūr Subrahmanya Temple Vimāna.



Kaimanur Temple—General View including Mukhamantapa.

scription, the style of architecture and the details of decoration clearly indicate that the Rājakēśari Varman referred to in the newly discovered inscription is none other than Āditya Cōla I whose accession is placed about 871 A. D.

The whole temple measures nearly forty-nine feet east to west. The Garbhagrha is a square, each side measuring externally 12 ft. 6 in. It has a gateway and in front is the Antarāḷa or vestibule with another entrance facing east. Between this main original structure and the Mukhamantapa is a gateway on the southern side. The Mukhamantapa is supported by a double row of four pillars provided with curved bracket capitals. Its gateway is on the south side and in front of it is a portico supported by four pillars with capitals and brackets similar to those found on the pillars of the Mukhamantapa. In its eastern wall just opposite the Garbhagrha is a lattice window to let in light.

The Garbhagrha is enclosed by a thick wall interspersed with pilasters, ornamented with elegant scroll work, and provided with Kalaśam, Kumbham and Palagai resembling the pilasters of the Tirukkattappai temple. The corbels have an angular profile as in the case of Vijayālayacōḷivaram at Nārttāmalai and those of Kāliyāpatti and Tiruppūr. Above the corbels and below the cornice, we have a row of Bhūtagaṇas as in Vijayālayacōḷivaram. Over this is a thick single arched cornice also decorated with beautiful scroll work as in Kāliyāpatti. All these features are confined to the original part of the structure, the pilasters and the cornice of the Mukhamantapa betraying clear traces of a later age. Further up, there runs a row of standing yājis.

The Vimāna over the central shrine rises on a circular basement. In the Grīvā portion there are four niches on the four cardinal points having on the top Kūḍūs decorated with elegant scroll work and surmounted with Sīṃhalalāṭams (lion faces). An idol seems to have been placed in each of these niches. Idols are now found only in two of them, eastern and northern. One of these idols is kept inside the temple. A broken piece of another belonging to the western niche is lying on the ground. All of them are so weather-beaten that they cannot be identified.


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KANNANUR TEMPLE
GENERAL PLAN



Kannanur Temple—General Plan.



Inscription (newly discovered) on the proper left—a part.



Inscription (newly discovered) on the proper right of the old temple—a part.

The presiding deity of the place standing by the side of a peacock at present is a new idol, but the original image of the temple which is broken is now placed in the Maṇḍapa. The idol, a standing figure cut in half relief (*citra-ardha*), measures 3 ft. 6 in. in height, 1 ft. 6 in. across the shoulders and 6 in. in thickness. It has four arms with a Śakti of an archaic character and an Akṣamālā in the upper right and left hands respectively; the lower right hand is in Abhaya pose, and the lower left rests on the hip. It wears two Akṣamālās running cross-wise across the chest¹. It has a Kāraṇḍa Makuṭa. It wears Vṛtta Kuṇḍalams in its ears, and has a Kaṭibandha and Udarabandha.

Each of the three niches of the outer walls of the Garbhagrha must have been once filled with idols, but there is only one figure in the southern niche; those in the other niches are missing. It is the figure of Jñāna Dakṣiṇāmūrti. It is represented seated under a tree and has a Jāṭamakuṭa and has four arms. The front right hand is in Cini-mudrā pose, and the front left hand is placed on the thigh. We are not able to see clearly the object in the back right hand; it may be an Akṣamālā. It holds a Sarpa in the back left hand and the left leg hangs down pressing on the Apsamāra-puruṣa, and the right is placed over the left thigh. The image surely is as old as the main structure.

The pillars of the Antarāḷa have given way; plants and trees have struck deep roots and the stones have been dislodged from their original position. Thanks to the enlightened policy of the present Administrator of the State, the Darbar has ordered the renovation of this ancient monument and it is being repaired on scientific lines.

The worship of Subrahmanya in the name of Muruga was prevalent in the Tamil country from the earliest time. As pointed out already, the *Tirumurugāruppadai* deals with the various centres and the mode of worship of Muruga and his greatness.

he observes that "in Southern India a deity accompanied by a peacock or carrying the emblems which distinguish Subrahmanya in modern art is never found in Pallava or Cōla temples." (p. 46, *Iconography of Southern India*, English edition, Translated by Mr. A. C. Martin.) This observation needs modification.

1. See plate XXXI, Subrahmanya at Mavalipuram (7th century) which has a similar chest cross-band.

The cult was very much in vogue in this part of India, and even now there are large sections of his votaries of a deeply devoted character. It is interesting to note that it was about 874 A. D. that the Pāṇḍya King Varaguna Mahārāja made a grant of 1,400 kāsus to the temple of Subrahmanya Bhaṭṭāra, the deity in the central shrine of Tiruccendūr in the Tinnevely district, and this endowment was entrusted to three of his officers who in turn lent out this amount among sixteen different *ūrs*, *nagarams* and *sabhās* on condition that, from the interest thereof, certain specified services and requirements of the temple were to be met.¹ Like the Tirukkattāḷai temple which we have dealt with in this Journal,² this is another temple of the days of Āditya Cōla I.

As a structure made entirely of stone belonging to the 9th Century A. D., as a temple dedicated to the exclusive worship of Subrahmanya with features similar to those of Śiva temples, and for its peculiar bell-shaped Śikhara, the Kappanūr temple is unique in many respects, and is a rare monument redounding to the credit of Āditya Cōla I who was himself a great builder but who above all by his example inspired those that were religiously and charitably inclined to construct such works of art as the Subrahmanya temple of Kappanūr.

APPENDIX.

Inscription on the proper right.

1. Svasti śrī Kōvī.....
2. Kēsari paṇmar.....
3. Āvadu iurumānāṭṭu...
4.nilan ti.....
5. n iurur Subrahm.....

Inscription on the proper left.

1.Āvadu Kāpanāṭṭu
2.brahmanya Dēvarkku
3.ḍu ūrōm kuḍutta
4.jūr tuḍavaiyi
5.vāyilirāṇḍu
6.tirunandāvilakku.

1. E. I. XIXI, Part iii, pp. 101-116.

2. J. O. R., Vol. X, Part iii, pp. 231-9. See also *Cōlas*, I, (p. 139) by Prof. K. A. Nilakanṭha Śāstriyar.

श्रीः
॥ कालिदासीयं हास्यम्* ॥

BY

R. S. VENKATARAMA SASTRI, M. A.
Professor, Sanskrit College, Mysore.

दृक्कानादैस्सकलजगतां मोहमुन्मूल्य, दृश्यान्
भावान् भिन्नानपि समतया भासयन् स्वात्मभासा ।
आखण्ड्यात्स्वं रसमनुभवन् प्राप्तभेदप्रमोषः
गायन् स्वैरं दहरकुहरे नर्तको नानटीति ॥

अद्यानास्तमेवमभिप्रेयते प्रतीचीसाहित्यरसिकैर्गोर्वाणवाणीप्रणयिभिः
—यत् संस्कृतसाहित्यप्रपञ्चे न तादृशो हास्यपरिपोषः यः, भिनोति
ध्वनिरसिकान्, सान्तर्दोषास्तान् कुरुते स्फुरितकपोलोदरान् । विदूषका-
दिनाटकपात्राणि प्रदशनानि च हास्यवैवातिवेलं निवेशितानि, तथापि तानि
प्राकृतानामेवाद्दृष्टासप्रयोजकानि, न तु रसिकतल्लज्जाद्दृष्टकानि । न हि
प्राकृताद्दृष्टासप्रयोजकं किञ्चिद्भास्यं रसयति । किं तर्हि ? तदाभासीकुरुते
केवलम्—इति ॥

तदेतदपेशलमिव प्रतिभाति कृतगोर्वाणवाणीपरिश्रमस्य प्रतीची-
साहित्यप्रणयिनः, यतोऽत्रापि विद्योतते रुचिरं हास्यपोषः ध्वनिकान्तमप्या-
वर्जितस्वान्तं कुर्वन् । परश्शतं च सन्निवेशः शक्यं प्रदर्शयितुम्, देववाचा-
प्रपञ्चो हास्यपोषे न कस्मादप्यधरीभवति, न वा कस्यापि पृष्ठं सेवत
इत्येदर्थम् ॥

यथोक्ताशयस्तावत् “भिक् प्रदशनम्” इत्यनेन विदूषकद्वारेण च
हास्यरसद्वेषिणं तत्रभवन्तं भवमूर्तिं मत्वा, ‘भवमूर्तिर्नैव हासं कुरुतेऽसावु-
दुम्बरः’ इत्याशयानस्य स्यात् प्रातापि । मालतीमाधवे नन्दनचित्रम्,

* A paper read on the occasion of the celebration of the
Kalidasa Day by the Sanskrit Academy, Madras, in October,
1937.

उत्तररामचरिते तत्रभवतो वाल्मीकेराश्रमे वट्टनामखण्डितशैशवचित्रं च विना हास्यं किमन्यत् स्यात्? यदेतद्विदूषकहानं भवभूते: “विक् प्रहसनम्” इति च, हास्याभासविषयं तदिति ध्येयम् ॥

इदानीं पुनः कालिदासस्यैव यत्किञ्चिदंशस्य वक्तुमुचितमिति, तदीयमेव हास्यमुपन्यसितुकामोऽयं जनो यथाप्रतिमानं स्थालीपुलाक-
कमेण, नितरां सम्मानितोऽद्योपन्यासदानेन ऐषमः श्रीकालिदासमह-
महनीये दिने, संस्कृतजीवातुमूतान् संस्कृतसेवासमितिप्रधानाध्यक्षपादा-
नाचार्यवर्यान् पादपातैर्नत्वा, शारदसुधाकरसमुज्ज्वलयशःपटलान्
Rt. Hon. शास्त्रिमहोदयान् स्मारंस्मारं सविनयं तेभ्यो नमोवाकं
प्रशास्य, सहृदयेभ्यश्च सामाजिकेभ्यः सादरं कार्तरज्यमाविष्कृत्योत्तरं
प्रवर्तते ॥

मादेशो हि महाकविः नानारसं भिन्नरुचिं जनं दर्शदर्शमसक्तः
सान्तर्दासं दृष्टित्वा सुखमनुभोमयीति । न हि निस्सङ्गस्य रसान्तरेष्वपि
हास्यशरीं पश्यतो विवामार्थं विशिष्य हास्यरसापेक्षा । हास्यं च प्राधान्येन
यथाश्रीयेत, जातुचित् प्रहसनतुल्यं प्रायशः आभासीभवेदपि । रसान्तर-
पोषकविधं ध्वनने परं पेशलं भवत्येव । कविसार्वभौमस्य सुशिक्षिता सा
ध्वनिपरिपाटी प्रथितैव रसिकानाम्, यस्यामिदानीमध्यक्षयामो हास्यम् ॥

वरीवर्ति हि कश्चिदालङ्कारिकप्रभेदो वक्तोक्तिमेव कविताजीव-
नाडीति मन्यमानः । न हि काव्यजीवितमियं वक्तोक्तिरर्थालङ्कारेषु प्रसिद्धा
श्लेषकाकुभ्यामपरायप्रकल्पनारूपा । किं तर्हि ? भुजङ्गभङ्गिभाषितस्वरूपा ।
विवक्षितमर्थं सारत्येन हि श्रोतृचित्तमारोपयन्ति वक्तारः प्रेक्षावन्तः ।
दुरूहोऽपि विषयो यदि हास्यरसोद्भावमुल्लिख्येत् कृतार्था भवेयुर्वक्तारः,
यदर्थमतिवेलमाद्रियते वक्तोक्तिर्महाकाविना । न हि दृश्यन्ते महाकवि-
वाचावल्यामस्मदनुल्लिखिता अर्थविशेषा अनालपिता वा वाचामोचाः ।
कथं तर्हि कविवाण्यामनितरसाधारणी सुधाधोरणी ?

सुग्धेन्दोरिव वक्तृत्वं कौटिल्यं कुन्तलेष्विव ।

भुजङ्गभङ्गिर्वाग्देव्या वैचित्र्यं तन्तनीत्यहो ! ॥

वक्रोक्तिवल्ल्याश्च हास्यमुपग्रायते । अत एव च हास्यं तस्या जीवितमपि ।
 रसहितैकजागृविः कविः वक्रोक्तिसमाश्रयणेन हि रसपोषायालं भवतीति
 वक्रोक्तिरसिकाः । न हि विना हास्यं वक्रोक्तिरपि जीवन्ती, येन तदेव
 वक्रोक्तिजीवितम् । न चेदं विभावानुभावादिसमाश्रयो हास्यरसः केवलम् ।
 अपि तु सहृदयगोष्ठीसंपर्कचातुर्यनिदानम्, सर्वविरोधसमीकारकम्, सहवास-
 कलाप्रावीण्यावहम्, अशब्दाभिधेयम् । वक्रोक्तिगर्भितत्वेन यत्सत्त्वं साहित्य-
 पये निर्वेदभीशोकजुगुप्सितान्यपि रसयति । यत्कार्यं च कपोलोदरस्फुरण-
 मन्तर्हासश्च । ईदृशमेव हास्यं प्रायशः कालिदासीयं प्रशस्तम् । विरुद्धयोः
 सामानाधिकरण्यदर्शनेन योऽयमनिर्वचनीयतानुभवः तत्रेदं ध्वनति विशेषतः ।
 विमृश्यन्तां तावदध्वन्याचार्योदाहृतानि पद्यानि । यथा—

भूरेणुदिग्धान्नवपारिजात-

मालारजोवासितपाहुमध्याः ।

गाढं शिवामिः परिरम्यमाणान्

सुराङ्गनाञ्जिष्टभुवान्तरालाः ॥

सशोणितैः कव्यभुजां स्फुरद्भिः

पक्षैः खगानामुपवीज्यमानान् ।

संवीजिताब्धन्दनवारिसेकैः

मुगन्धिभिः कल्पलतादुकूलैः ॥

विमानपर्यङ्गतले निषण्णाः

कुतूहलाविष्टतया तदानीम् ।

निर्दिश्यमानालैलनाङ्गुलीभि-

वीराः स्वदेहान् पतितानपश्यन् ॥

अत्र ये वीराः परासवस्संयुगे, त एव वीरस्वर्गमवाप्स्य नाकिनीसहचरा
 भूत्वा युद्धरङ्गे भूरेणुदिग्धान् शोणितपिच्छिलान् शृङ्गोत्कर्तितान्
 स्वकबन्धानेव अमरललनाङ्गुलीनिर्दिष्टान् पश्यन्तीति चित्रणे, शृङ्गारिणो वीरा
 जुगुप्सितानात्मीयान् कबन्धानेवापश्यन्निति हासध्वनिः । पश्यतात्र हास्य-
 मेव शृङ्गारजुगुप्सयोर्विरोधं सरसं श्लिषोति । 'वीराः' इति प्रथमान्त-

विशेष्यप्रतीतस्य वीररसस्य अत्र विरोधपरिहारकत्वमिष्यते लोचनकृद्धिः । तदपि आन्तरालिकहासच्चनेरेवेति अनुभूतिरत्र प्रमाणम् । पार्यन्तिकी हि वीरप्रतीतिः ॥

विरुद्धयोः सामानाधिकरण्यदर्शनं च 'Perception of incongruities' इति व्यपदिश्यते प्रतीचीसरण्याम् । तादृशस्थलेषु विरोधपरिहारकं हास्यमावश्यकमिति दर्शितं दिङ्मात्रम् । विरुद्धयोः सामानाधिकरण्येनानिर्वचनीयताप्रयुक्तमेव हास्यं कुमारसम्भवे प्रबन्ध-व्यङ्ग्यतयापि प्रतीयते । तथा हि—

निर्ममश्च स्थाणुः हैमवतमाश्रमं निर्ममे । केनापि कामेन तपस्यन्
पितुराज्ञया शुश्रूषमाणां गिरिजां सर्वोवयवानवद्यामनुमेने, यद्यपि तरुणी-
सन्निकर्षः समाधिभङ्गायैव न हि प्राकृतजनीना चित्तविक्रिया महत्सु
संभावयितुं न्याय्या । “विकारहेतौ सति विक्रियन्ते येषां न चेतांसि त एव
धीराः” । धीराग्रणीः कपालीति खलुक्त्वा खलु । स्तान्नाम ! सोऽयं धीर-
धीरेयो भूभङ्गदुष्प्रेक्ष्यमुखो वीरासनासीनो रतिरमणवाणगोचरस्सन् “उमा-
मुखे बिम्बफलाधरोष्ठे व्यापारयामास विलोचनानि” । सर्वोऽपि लोचने
एव व्यापारयेत् । धीरः पुनरयं विलोचनानि ! लोचनव्यापारानन्तरं
वशित्वाभिमानेनेन्द्रियश्लोभं निगृह्य पलवत्, “हेतुं स्वचेतोविकृतेर्दिदृक्षु-
र्दिशामुपान्तेषु ससर्ज दृष्टिम्” । स्वचेतोविकृतेर्हेतुः स्वचित्तजन्मैव । स च
स्वस्मिन्नेव वर्तते । तदिदृक्षुरयं विरूपाक्षो दिशामुपान्तेषु दृष्टिं ससर्ज ! न
ददर्श । स्पृष्ट्वा दृष्टिम्, मदनं बाह्यं भस्मसात्कृत्य — योऽयं धीरः पूर्वं गिरिजा-
सन्निकर्षमनुमेने—सोऽयम् “स्त्रीसन्निकर्षं परिहर्तुमिच्छन्नन्तर्दधे भूतपति-
स्समूतः” । अन्तर्धायापि पार्वतीप्रमुष्टचेताः सप्तर्षिमण्डलं सस्मार । दृष्ट्वा
सारुन्धतीकं तत् स्मरशासनस्य ववृधे भूयान् दारार्यमादरः ।

पशुपतिरपि तान्यद्धानि कृच्छ्र-

दगमयदद्रिसुतासमागमोत्कः ।

कमपरमवशं न विप्रकुर्वु-

र्विभुमपि तं यदमी स्पृशन्ति भावाः ! ॥

‘द्वितीयाद्भि भयं भवति ।’ द्वितीयं तृतीयमुत्पादयति, तृतीयं तुरीयम्, तच्च पञ्चममित्येवं हन्त भोः ! अलं द्वितीयाग्रहणेनेति तस्माद्विभ्यतोऽपि गिरिजाजानि पश्यन्तु ! एवं हास्यं कुमारसंभवे प्रबन्धव्यङ्ग्यमित्यत्र न कापि संशीतिः । अत्र शृङ्गारस्य रौद्रशान्तयोश्च विरोधं हासध्वनिरेव परिहरतीत्यत्र को वा सचेतास्सन्देहि ? विना कविसार्वभौममन्यः परममाहेश्वरो मन्मथदाहेन रुद्रस्य रुद्रत्वम्, तपसा ईश्वरस्य योगेश्वरत्वम्, पार्वतीपरिणयेन स्थाणोः स्थिरभक्तियोगसौलभ्यमेव केवलं निर्हास्यं नीरसमवर्णयिष्यत् । अहो महाकवेर्हास्यशिक्षाचातुरी !

विद्यते च हासध्वनिर्मदनेन्द्रसंभाषणे कालिदासीये । प्रयोजनापेक्षी खल्विन्द्रः कुसुमेष्टुं मनसा जगामेति कवेराश्रयः, यदनुगुणं संभाषणमपि चित्रीयते । कामश्च स्वस्मिन् महेन्द्रस्यानिष्कारणवात्सल्यं ध्वनयितुकामः संवृताभिप्रायस्सन् देवराजं भुजङ्गमङ्गि वभाषे ।

आज्ञापय ज्ञातविशेष ! पुंसां
लोकेषु यत्ते करणीयमस्ति ।
अनुग्रहं संस्मरणप्रवृत्त-
मिच्छामि संवर्धितुमाज्ञया ते ॥

केनाम्यस्या पदकाङ्क्षिणा ते
नितान्तदीर्घैर्बनिता तपोभिः ।
यावद्भवत्याहितसायकस्य
मत्कामुकस्यास्य निदेशवर्ती ॥

असम्मतः कस्तव मुक्तिमार्गं
पुनर्भवक्लेशभयात् प्रपन्नः ।
बद्धाश्विरं तिष्ठतु सुन्दरीणा-
मारेचितभूचतुरैः कटाक्षैः ॥

अध्यापितस्योशनसापि नीतिं
प्रयुक्तरागप्रणिधिर्द्विषस्ते ।
कस्यार्थधर्मौ वद पीडयामि
सिन्धोस्तटावोष इव प्रवृद्धः ॥

कामेकपत्नीव्रतदुःस्वशीलां
 लोलं मनश्चास्तया प्रविष्टाम् ।
 नितम्बिनीमिच्छसि मुक्तलज्जां
 कण्ठे स्वयंग्राहनिषक्तबाहुम् ॥

अत्र, पुंसां ज्ञातविशेष ! इति साकृतम् इन्द्रं संबोध्य लोलमनसः शचीपते-
 भोगैकप्रावण्यम्, वित्तमतस्य तस्य चित्तवृत्तिं च साकृतैर्विशेषणैरुत्तरं
 ध्वनयति । आत्मम्भरिः खलु देवराजो द्वेष्टि तपस्विनः, विघटयति मुमुक्षून्,
 पीडयत्यर्थधर्मौ, दृष्टाच्च कामयते साध्वीः । इन्त ! किमिव हि स न
 कुर्यात् !—इति मदनहृदयम् । इन्द्रस्तु निर्ज्ञातमदनाभिसन्धिः
 प्रत्यवधीत्—

सर्वं सखे त्वय्युपपन्नमेत-
 दुभे ममास्ते कुलिशं मवांश्च ।
 वज्रं तपोर्वीर्यमहत्सु कुण्डं
 त्वं सर्वतोगामि च साधकं च ॥

अयि रतिरसिक ! मम तावत् कार्यसाधके अस्त्रे द्वे एव, कुलिशम्, मवांश्च ।
 तत्र हि कुलिशं इधीचित्रिकसम्भूतमिति तपोर्वीर्यमहद्वज्रं प्रवर्तते । त्वं तु
 वर्जयित्वा न किञ्चिदपि न केवलं सर्वतोगामि, अपि तु साधकं चेति
 मदनदर्पं मनक्ति एकेनैव घातेन । सहृदयाः ! मङ्गयात्र प्रमूणां
 प्रयोजनापेक्षितया सव्याजमत एव लोलं गौरवम्, मदनस्य दुर्निग्रहत्वं च
 हास्योद्भावमुल्लिखितं न वेति स्वानुभूतिं पृच्छत । अत्र परं सम्भाषणा
 अभिप्रायवती, यतो हासध्वनिः । अभिप्रायवतीषु सर्वत्र व्यङ्ग्यविशिष्ट-
 वाच्याद्वास्यं ध्वनति ॥

शकुन्तलेऽन्ततः शकुन्तलाप्रत्याख्यानदन्दद्यमानान्तःकरणो दुष्यन्तो
 विदूषकं साकृतं पृच्छति—“सखे ! सर्वम् इदानीं स्मरामि
 शकुन्तलायाः प्रथमवृत्तान्तम् । कथितवानस्मि भवते च । स भवान्
 प्रत्याख्यानवेलायां मत्समीपमुपगतो नासीत् । पूर्वमपि न त्वया
 कदाचिदपि संकीर्तितं तत्रभवत्या नाम । कदाचिदहमिव विस्मृतवानसि
 त्वम् ?”—इति । विदूषकस्तु कटुककुटिलं ब्रवीति—“न विस्मरामि ।

किन्तु सर्वं कथयित्वावसाने पुनः परिहासविजल्प एष न भूतार्थं
इत्याख्यातम् । मयापि मृत्विण्डबुद्धिना तथैव गृहीतम् । अथवा बलवती
भवितव्यता"—इति । अत्र हि विदूषकस्य दन्तोदरता हासं ध्वनयत्येव ॥

अत एव च उभयथाघटमानार्थतानुविद्धं भाषणमपि हास्यमङ्कुरयति ।
“Pun is the bane of all literature” इति प्रतीचीरसिकवादः
संस्कृतसाहित्ये नैवाङ्गस्यं भजते । विरोधशब्दार्थेष्टेपादि अन्तर्हासं
जनयतीत्यत्र सुबन्धुबाणवाणीधोरणीप्रणयिन एव प्रमाणम् । महाकवि-
आस्माकं भाषान्तरेषु अप्रतिनिबन्धनीयं यथा तथा करोति तत्
“सउन्दलावण्यं पेक्ख” इत्यत्र । सर्वोऽपि नामसाजात्येन वञ्चितो
भवतीति स्लिष्टमेतत् ॥

चाटुवञ्चनायां वञ्चितोऽपि कदाचिदसति स्वयम्, परान् तटस्थान्
हासयति ध्रुवम् । इन्दुमतीप्रत्याशया स्वयंवरमण्डपे साकृतं समुत्पन्नविविध-
शृङ्गारचेष्टा राजन्या निष्फळारम्भा अन्ततो वञ्चितास्तटस्थान् हासयन्ति-
तराम् । महाकविरत्र शृङ्गारं हास्यान्तरं कुरुते ॥

अननुरूपयोर्मेलनेन हास्यव्यनिर्विरोधमूलमेव । इममेव प्रभेदं
‘Bathos’ इति व्यपदिशन्ति प्रतीचीसाहित्यरसिकाः ।

मध्येमहदुल्लेखं लब्धवतारस्तनोति हास्यरसम् ।

पुरतः पूर्णेन्दोः सा खद्योताली प्रहासाय ॥

प्रभूताहारी तुन्दिलो विदूषको विपणिक्न्दुरिव धमधमायमानमुदरं परा-
मृश्य त्वरमाणभोजनकामो महतां चिकित्सकानां वचनमुदाहरति मालविका-
प्राप्तिरूपकार्यान्तरग्रस्ततया इतिकर्तव्यतामूके राज्ञि, “समुचितभोजनवेलाति-
क्रमेण हि चिकित्सका दोषमुदाहरन्ति” इति ॥ किञ्च, मालविकाया
नाट्यकलाविशुद्धिं दर्शयितुं पण्डितकौशिकीप्रभृतयः कलाविमर्शका
विगलितवेद्यान्तरं भवन्ति ॥

अङ्गैरन्तर्निहितवचनैः सूचितः सम्यग्गर्थः

पादन्यासो लयमनुगतस्तन्मयत्वं रसेषु ।

शास्त्रायोनिर्मदुरभिनयस्तद्विकल्पानुवृत्तौ

भावो भावं नुदति विषयाद्रागबन्धः स एव ॥

इति कलावती कौशिकी हर्षगद्गदिकामनुभवति ।

वामं सन्धिस्तिमितवलये न्यस्य हस्ते नितम्बं

कृत्वा श्यामाविटपिसदृशं स्रस्तमुक्तं द्वितीयम् ।

पादाङ्गुष्ठालुलितकुसुमं कुट्टिमे पातिताश्वं

नृत्तादस्याः स्थितमतितरां कान्तमृन्वायतार्धम् ॥

इत्यग्निमित्रो नर्तकीसौन्दर्यं श्लाघते । स्थिते चैवं विदूषकः “यथोपदेश-
दर्शने प्रथमं ग्राह्यस्य पूजा कर्तव्या । सा ननु वो विस्मृता”
—इति क्रमभेदं कञ्चिदुच्यति । बहो ! प्रयोगाम्बन्तरः प्रश्नः इति
सर्वे प्रहासिताः । मालविकापि स्मितं करोति । तथैव च शाकुन्तले
शकुन्तलाविरहदुःखदूयमानहृदयो दुःस्थन्तः उत्कण्ठाविनोदाय कान्तां
भावगम्यं चित्रगतां कृत्वा कलाविमर्शकरण्या—

कार्या सैकतलीनहंसमिधुना खोतोवहा मालिनी

पादास्तामभितो निषण्णहरिणा मौरीगुरोः पावनाः ।

शास्त्रालम्बितवल्कलस्य च तरोर्निर्मातुमिच्छाम्यधः

शृङ्गे कृष्णमृगस्य वामनयनं कण्ठयनानां मृगीम् ॥

इति चित्रसौष्ठवमनितरसाधारणमुल्लिखति । विदूषकः पुनः “यथाहं
प्रेक्षे पर्यितव्यमनेन चित्रफलकं लम्बकूर्वाणां तापसानां कदम्बैः” इति ॥
एतादृशचित्रणे अननुरूपयोः संयोजनप्रयुक्तमौचितीभङ्गं हासध्वनिरेव
तिरयति, पुष्पाति च शोभाम् । न ह्यौचितीभङ्गसदृशं रसभङ्गकं किञ्चि-
द्वर्तते । अत्र पुनः सत्यपि तस्मिन् रसपोषानुभवो हास्यध्वनिनिबन्धन
इति दिक् ॥

सुतरामसम्भव्यपि अवयातयम् अतद्विधं मनसि कृत्वा चरन्ति भूयांस
इति, तादृशचित्रेण हास्यानुभवः प्रकारान्तरम् । महान्तोऽपि प्रकृतिसंबन्धात्
प्रमाद्यन्ति । कैव कया प्राकृतप्राणिनिकायप्रवाहपतितान् प्रति । प्राकृता

आययातप्यं स्वैरमज्ञातमूलान् सम्प्रदायान् प्रवर्तयन्ते । प्रवर्तितांश्च तानन्ध-
परम्परानयेन धीमन्तोऽपि गृह्णन्तीति, ध्युत्यन्नचित्तानामपि पश्चादिभिरा-
विशेष्यं दृष्ट्वा हसन्त्यन्तस्तद्व्याः । तदेतन्महाकविर्दिङ्मात्रं प्रदर्शयति—
प्रयागाभिषेकेण विनापि तत्त्वज्ञानं प्रयागे तनुत्वज्ञां शरीरबन्धो नास्ति—
इति संप्रदायपरामर्शेन—

समुद्रपत्न्योर्जलमन्निपाते *

पूतात्मनामत्र किलाभिषेकात् ।

तत्त्वावबोधेन विनापि भूय-

स्तनुत्वज्ञां नास्ति शरीरबन्धः ॥

अत्र किलेत्यलीके । अशरीरत्वरूपमोक्षं प्रति तत्त्वावबोध एवास्त्वसा-
कारणं भवति । इतरत् सर्वं ज्ञानमुत्पाद्य प्रणालिकपेवेति श्रीभगवत्पूज्यपादा-
द्यौपनिषदतल्लजानां तर्कितो राद्धान्तः । सति चैवं प्रयागाभिषेकोऽपि
ज्ञानमुत्पाद्य मोक्षकारणं भवतीति न्याय्यम् । अमीषां पुनर्विनापि
तत्त्वावबोधेन प्रयागाभिषेकात् तनुत्वज्ञां शरीरबन्धो नास्ति किल ! अहो
आययातप्यम् ! कल्पनारासिक्यम् ! इति किलशब्देन हासध्वनिः ॥

एतावता कविसार्वभौमस्य व्यङ्ग्यपथे लसन्ती हास्यचातुरी दिङ्मात्रं
प्रदर्शिता । यत्र पुनर्हास्यं व्यङ्ग्यपथमपैति तत्र नाटकरचनासंप्रदायोऽनु-
सन्धेयः । कथावस्तुगाहन्येन निर्भरमत एव भङ्गुरं सामाजिकमनो वर्तिष्य-
माणगहनकथावताराय किञ्चिदिव सारत्येन सारयितुं नर्भालापादिभिः
विभावानुभावादिभिश्च हास्यं विशदयन्ति कवय इति नाटकरचनासंप्रदाय-
विदां सुगममेव । अयं शाकुन्तले पञ्चमषष्ठाङ्कमध्ये प्रवेशके धीवरोऽपि
नागरिकेण श्यालेन रक्षिभ्यां च चोरब्रान्त्या पश्चाद्दृष्टं सन्ताड्यमानः
स्वस्य निर्दुष्टतां समर्तियविषुः पशुमारणकर्मदारुणेनाप्यनुकम्पामृदुना
श्रोत्रियेणात्मानं तोलयित्वा मत्स्योपजीवितां महीकरोति । स्यालः पुनः
'विशुद्ध इदानीमाजीवः'—इति विपरीतलक्षणया विस्रगन्धिनं तं गोघातीति
धृत्करोति । अत्रेदमवधेयम् । सर्वोऽप्यात्मनीनमुत्कृष्टं मन्यते, अनात्मनीनं
निन्दति । “कमेलकं निन्दति कोमलेन्दुः, कमेलकः कण्टकलम्पटस्तम्”
इति सोऽयं नैसर्गिको हास्यांशः प्रपञ्चस्य भूयसा हासयत्यस्मान् ॥

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विडम्बनं च विडम्बनामावहतीति हास्योद्भावे प्रकारान्तरम् । गिरिजायाः पारमेशं भावं स्थूणाखननन्यायेन द्रवयितुकामो नैष्ठिकसुन्दरो नैर्गुण्यं कपालिनः छिष्टमुल्लिखति । यथा च लोके प्राकृतोऽतत्त्वदर्शी सङ्कुचितमतिः कृपणो द्रेष्टि महात्मनां चरितम्, तथायमपि महेश्वरतत्त्वानभिज्ञ इव प्रलपति । अत्र प्रत्यक्षं हास्यं यन्नाति महाकविः परममहेश्वरः । शिवद्वेषिणं यथातथं विडम्बयति वटुरिति चटुलं विस्मेरमस्मन्मनो हसति । वस्तुतश्च वटुरयं वृषराजकेतन इति आत्मानमेव निन्दाकर्माचकारेति च अस्माननुपदं हासयतितराम् ॥

अधोक्तं निगमयामः । हास्ये द्वैविध्यं शक्यं द्रष्टुम् । सौष्टव्येण स्थौल्येन च । तत्र सूक्ष्मं हास्यमन्तर्द्विजानयीति । कपोलोदरं विकासयति । विरोधं समीकरोति । सहृदयगोष्ठासम्पर्कचातुर्यमावहति । सहवासकलाप्रावीण्यमाधत्ते । व्यङ्ग्यमर्यादां नपैति । एतद्धि वक्रोक्तिजीवितं रसान्तरेष्वप्यन्तर्यामितया वर्धति ॥

स्थूलं पुनर्हास्यं विभावानुभावादिभिः स्फुटयते । कवयो नाटकादिषु कथाभारभङ्गुरं सामाजिकमनः सारयितुं नर्मालापकदम्बकैर्विषमविभक्तगात्रैः विदूषकादिभिर्भूनेत्रतात्वादिचाकचकथं पुस्फोरविषन्ति । यच्च व्यङ्ग्यपथं प्रायशोऽपैति । प्रहसनादिषु च प्रधान्यं भजते । अट्टहासं च प्रयोजयति ॥

तदेतद्द्वयमपि कालिदासग्रन्थरेखे चित्रप्रदर्शं यथाप्रतिभानं समर्पितयिषितमिदानीम् । इदं त्ववधेयम् ; नैव कविसार्वभौमो हास्यस्य प्राधान्यमाधित्सते, यदनुसरणं तत्रभवन्तं भवभूतिम् “चिक् प्रहसनम्” इत्यवीवदत् । कुमारसंभवे परं प्रबन्धव्यङ्ग्यतया हास्यं जाञ्जलीति इति समर्थितमधस्तात् । न हि सर्वत्र हास्यशरीं पश्यतो रसान्तरणि हास्यान्तराणि अध्यक्ष्यतो महाकवेर्हास्यस्य पार्थक्यमावश्यकम्, यतः समरससुकुमारभारतीहास एव श्रीकालिदास इति गुरुचरणस्मरणमेव शरणम् ॥

REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

THE NATAKALAKṢANARATNAKOSA OF SAGARASANDHIN—EDITED BY MYLES DILLON, LECTURER IN COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY AND SANSKRIT, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN.—Volume I, Text (Oxford University Press, London: Humphrey Milford, 1937, 15 sh.)

This work has been rightly dedicated by the Editor to the memory of that eminent Oriental Scholar, Professor Sylvain Levi who has the credit of having discovered this treatise during his visit to Nepal in 1922. The author of this work is not well known in Sanskrit literature. The work belongs to the type of Prakaraṇas giving a brief description of the elements of Sanskrit Dramaturgy. The Editor finds it difficult to put forward a definite theory of the date of the author. He has done his work well. The Sanskrit printing in bold types is very pleasing to the eye and the Editor deserves our warm congratulations.

A second volume with translation, introduction and notes is promised, and we await it with great interest. We hope therein Mr. Dillon will deal with the place of this work in Sanskrit dramatic literature. The Editor has done well in giving references on the right hand side of the pages to the various dramas from which quotations have been made by the author, as we find the author sometimes omits to give the names of the dramatic works. It is noteworthy that there are frequent quotations from the Rāghava-Abhyudaya. It is not known who the author of this drama is. Probably it is, as the Editor surmises, a lost work of Viśākhadatta the author of the Mudrā-Rākṣasa.

It is very refreshing to note that the National University of Ireland should have given a liberal grant for the publication of a Sanskrit work like this. We hope that, when in India sometimes, our University authorities hesitate to vote moneys for Sanskrit publications and opinions are even expressed that such grants are a waste of public money, this example of foreign Universities will prove a healthy corrective.

We are sure that this edition will prove a very useful manual on the Indian Drama to the students of the Sanskrit Rhetoric.

K. B.

[Vol. XI, Part iv.]

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A SHORT HISTORY OF PŪRVAMĪMĀMSĀ

PART I

[Literature]

BY

T. R. CHINTAMANI, M.A., Ph.D.,

Senior Lecturer in Sanskrit, University of Madras.



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1938

CHAPTER I

PREDECESSORS OF JAIMINI

The earliest and most systematic account of the doctrines of Vedic exegesis, technically called *Mīmāṃsā*, is to be found in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras* of Jaimini, extending over sixteen *adhyāyas*. The last four *adhyāyas* are technically known as *Saṅkarsakāṇḍa*, and they form a supplement as it were to the other twelve *adhyāyas*. The *Sūtras* of Jaimini form the basis of the further development of this system of philosophy. The *Sūtras* of Jaimini himself are based upon a number of other collections current in his days.

The history of this system of philosophic thought in the pre-Jaimini days is practically sealed to us. Not often do we find some faint glimpses of this system. The word *MIMĀṂSĀ* means 'desire to discuss' and since the *Śāstra* is full of discussions, the *Śāstra* itself came to be known as *Mīmāṃsā*. In the *Manusmṛiti* for the first time we find in the oft-quoted verse,

अङ्गानि वेदाश्चत्वारो मीमांसा न्यायविस्तरः

Mīmāṃsā referred to as a definite *Śāstra*. Again from an entirely unexpected quarter we find *Mīmāṃsā* recognised as a *Śāstra*. In the *Bodhāyana Dharma Sūtra* we find

धर्मेणाधिगतो येषां वेदः सपरिवृद्धयः ।

विद्यास्तदनुमानज्ञाः श्रुतिप्रत्यक्षहेतवः ॥ 1, i, 6.

and

चातुर्विधं विकल्पी च.....1, i, 8.

In commenting on the former, Govindasvāmin tells us

श्रुतिप्रत्यक्षहेतवः.....अनेन मीमांसकाः कीर्तिताः.....

p. 3. (Mysore edition.)

and on the latter,

विकल्पी मीमांसकः p. 4. (Mysore edition.)

On the authority of Govindasvāmin, we can postulate that even in the days of *Bodhāyana*, the class of *Śāstra*jñas known as

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
Mīmāṃsakas did exist. Excepting references like these, we have no definite and reliable information regarding the system in pre-historic period.

The origin and development of this system of thought is narrated to us, as recorded in orthodox tradition, by Parameśvara, the author of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtrārthasaṅgraha* in the following words:—

लोकानुग्रहायै परमकारुणिको भगवान् वादरायणः समस्तेषु स्वशिष्येषु
अतिशयेन क्लेशविद्यासम्बुधानामानामाश्रयभूतमृषिर्वयं जैमिनिमाहूय अन्वशिष्यत्
वत्स जैमिने.....त्वं खलु अशेषविद्यायमानमानसोऽपि
विशेषतः सङ्ख्यशास्त्रान्यासप्तसामवेदगततत्त्वज्ञानावाक्यार्थगततत्त्वाविष्करण.....
अधिकारी । अतः तामिमां च पूर्वमीमांसां समस्तश्रोत्रियजनानुग्रहार्यमन्त्रेण
शब्दं प्रवर्तमानं सूत्ररूपेण संददर्भे [संक्षेपे] ॥

अपरस्तु गुरुपूर्वकमात्मकः । स चैवं श्रूयते—ब्रह्मा महेश्वरो वा मीमांसां
प्रजापतये प्रोवाच । प्रजापतिः इन्द्राय, आदित्याय, वृहस्पतये, मनवे च । मनुः
वसिष्ठाय ; वसिष्ठः पराशराय ; पराशरः कृष्णद्वैपायनाय ; कृष्णद्वैपायनो
जैमिनये । जैमिनिः कलियुगादौ अत्ररथानप्रयुक्तोऽवाम्नासाकुलीकृतं त्रयीमार्गं
अमलीकर्तुम् इमं न्यायकल्पपं ग्रन्थे निबुधुग्मे इति ॥

Thus, according to one tradition, Vyāsa asked Jaimini to take the initiative in composing the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*. According to the other, they were handed down from teacher to student in the following order:—



Jaimini refers to the works of his predecessors in a number of places in his Sūtras. Bādarāyaṇa, Bādari, Āśmarathya, Ātreya, Kārṣṇājini, Aitiāyana, Lāvukāyana and Kāmukāyana are the authors mentioned by Jaimini by name, in the twelve adhyāyas which form the Pūrvamīmāṃsā system proper. It was said at the outset that the Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa comprising the last four adhyāyas of Jaimini's Sūtras also forms part of the system and in that portion of the work, the following names occur:—Bādarāyaṇa, Kārṣṇājini, Ālekhana, Auḍulomi and Āśmarathya. These names except those of Ālekhana and Auḍulomi appear in the previous portion also.

In certain places the name of Jaimini too appears along with those of others, but whether he is identical with the author of the Sūtras that we have at present has been the subject of controversy for long and we shall also revert to it later. Let us now proceed to see what information we can gather regarding these predecessors of Jaimini.

BĀDARĀYAṆA:

Bādarāyaṇa, the Mīmāṃsaka, has been referred to in the following places:—

1. औपत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन संबन्धः तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशोऽप्यतिरेकस्यार्थेऽनुपलब्धे तत्प्रमाणं बादरायणस्यानुपेक्षत्वात् ॥ I, i, 5.
2. अन्ते तु बादरायणः तेषां प्रधानशब्दत्वात् ॥ V, ii, 19.
3. जातिं तु बादरायणोऽविशेषात् तस्मात् स्वयं प्रतीयेत जात्यर्थस्याविशिष्टत्वात् ॥ VI, i, 8.
4. विधिं तु बादरायणः ॥ X, viii, 44.
5. विधिवत्प्रकरणाविभागे प्रयोगं बादरायणः ॥ XI, i, 64.
6. “विप्रतिषिद्धौ वैकल्याणयोगात् काण्डहिनोः” इति बादरायणः ॥
p. 152, Saṅkarṣabhāṣya.

BĀDARI:

To Bādari the following references are to be seen:

1. द्रव्यगुणसंस्कारेषु बादरिः ॥ III, i, 3.
2. निमित्तार्थेन बादरिः तस्मात् सर्वाधिकारं स्यात् ॥ VI, i, 27.

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3. कालम्यासेऽपि वादरिः कर्मभेदात् ॥ VIII, iii, 6.
4. वर्णे तु वादरिः यथाद्रव्यं द्रव्यव्यतिरेकात् ॥ IX, i, 33.

ĀSMARATHYA:

Āsmarathya has been made mention of thus:

1. अनिरुतेऽम्युदिते प्राकृतीभ्यो निरूपेत् इत्यास्मरथ्यः तण्डुलभूतेष्वप-
नयात् ॥ VI, v, 16.
2. “प्रकृतितः” इत्यास्मरथ्यः ॥ Sāṅkarsābhāṣya, p. 201.

ĀTTREYA:

Āttreya has been mentioned as follows:

1. फलमात्रेयो निर्देशादश्रुतो ह्यनुमानं स्यात् ॥ IV, iii, 18.
2. मुख्यमानन्तर्यमात्रेयः तेन तुल्यश्रुतित्वात् अशब्दत्वात् प्राकृतानां
व्यवायः स्यात् ॥ V, ii, 18.
3. निर्देशाद्वा त्रयाणां स्यात् अग्न्याधेये ह्यसंबन्धः कतुषु नास्मरणश्रुतिः
इत्यात्रेयः ॥ VI, i, 26.

KĀRṢṆĀJINĪ:

Kārṣṇājini has been alluded to thus:

1. कृती फलार्थवादमङ्गवत् कार्णाजिनिः ॥ IV, iii, 17.
2. स कुलकल्पः स्यात् इति कार्णाजिनिः एकस्मिन्संभवात् ॥ VI, vii, 35.

AITIŚĀYANA:

Aitiśāyana has been referred to thus:

1. सर्वेषां वैकमन्त्र्यम् ऐतिशायनस्य भक्षियानत्वात् सवनाधिकारो हि ॥
III, iii, 43.
2. स्याद्वास्य संयोगवत् फलेन संबन्धः तस्मात् कर्मैतिशायनः ॥ III, iv, 30.
3. छिन्नविशेषनिर्देशात् पुंयुक्तमैतिशायनः ॥ VI, i, 6.

LĀVUKĀYANA:

Lāvukāyana has been mentioned thus:

1. विप्रतिषेधाच्च गुण्यन्तरः स्यात् इति लवुकायनः ॥ VI, vii, 37.

KĀMUKĀYANA:

The Sūtras which give us information regarding Kāmukāyana are:

1. तथा चान्वार्यदर्शनं कामुकायनः ॥ XI, i, 57.
2. सङ्गदिग्धां कामुकायनः परिमाणविरोधात् ॥ XI, i, 62.

AUDULOMI:

Audulomi is mentioned thus:

1. “न यवानामाप्रयणं विद्यते” इत्यौदुलोमिः Saṅkarṣabhāṣya, p. 134.

ALEKHANA:

Alekhana is referred to as follows:

1. “यथाधिकारमनुवृत्तात्” इत्यालेखनः Saṅkarṣabhāṣya, p. 200.

Thus ten persons have been mentioned by name by Jaimini. We have to consider whether all these ten were authors of works on Pūrvamīmāṃsā and have been referred to as such, or whether they were only some individuals who expressed certain views which were, at times, identical with those of Jaimini and at others, different from those of his. Taking one by one:—

BĀDARĀYAṆA:

He seems to have been an author of some work on Pūrvamīmāṃsā. We are familiar with Bādarāyaṇa as the author of the extant Brahmasūtras. Now certain views are attributed to Bādarāyaṇa by Jaimini and they are not to be met with in the Brahmasūtras. The natural conclusion is, as it ought to be, that such views should have been embodied by the author in an altogether different work. Another conclusion which is also possible is that the one Bādarāyaṇa is different from the other. Let us proceed to consider their identity or otherwise.

In an article entitled “Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa”, published in Volume L of the Indian Antiquary, (pages 167-174), Professor K. A. Nilakantha Sastri, M.A., remarks:—“It will be shown in the sequel that the Bādarāyaṇa referred to in the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras could not possibly be the author of the Vedānta Sūtras.” And in

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the sequel he disposes of the several Sūtras where the views of the Bādarāyaṇa of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras happen to have no bearing on the philosophy of the Vedas. One Sūtra alone is doubtful, according to him, and that is:—

औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्येन संबन्धः तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशः अन्यतिरेक-
श्रार्येऽनुपलब्धे तत्प्रमाणं बादरायणस्यानपेक्षत्वात् ।

and in this connection he remarks:

“ It might therefore appear at first sight that at least the Bādarāyaṇa referred to here must be the same as the author of the Vedānta Sūtras, who also maintains the eternity and infallibility of the Veda. But closer scrutiny shows that here again we are dealing with one of the most vital points of difference between Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā. In the view of the former the Veda's eternity is innate and absolute and not dependent on any god or deity, personal or otherwise; the Vedāntist view is that the eternity of the Veda is only a relative quality and dependent on Īvara. Hence we find that the reason assigned by the Mīmāṃsist for his position is अन्येष्वस्य while the reasons assigned by Bādarāyaṇa in Vedānta Sūtra I-iii-28 are अतः प्रमत्वात् and it is to be particularly noticed that Śaṅkara repeats parts of the Sūtra of Jaimini औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्येन संबन्धः in the pūrvapakṣa. In his comments on the Vedānta Sūtra just referred to, Śaṅkara must surely have noticed that a Bādarāyaṇa is referred to as taking Jaimini's view in the औत्पत्तिक Sūtra and if he believed for a moment that it was his own Sūtrakāra that was so mentioned, it is not in the least likely that he would have treated the very Sūtra of Jaimini as the pūrvapakṣa view to be refuted by him. On the contrary we should find Śaṅkara attempting somehow a reconciliation between the contrary of Bādarāyaṇa the one mentioned by Jaimini and the other stated in the Vedānta Sūtra. To my mind therefore, this fact taken along with the others.....is conclusive proof that the Bādarāyaṇa referred to by Jaimini is anterior to him and is a Mīmāṃsist, different from the author of the Vedānta Sūtras ”.

These statements need careful consideration. According to Mr. Nilakantha Sastri, the Vedāntins hold that the authority of the Veda is only *सापेक्षत्वलक्षण* which is not the case. In fact, one of the strongest points of the Vedānta system is that the infallibility of the Vedas is maintained at any cost. Śaṅkara in a number of places states that the system of the Vedānta is based upon the principle of the *अनपेक्षत्वलक्षणप्रामाण्य* of the Veda. Mr. Nilakantha Sastri refers to the Sūtra

शब्द इति चेन्न, अतः प्रभवात् प्रत्यक्षानुमानाम्याम् ॥ I, iii, 28

to support his statement that according to Bādarāyaṇa and his followers वेदप्रामाण्य is *सापेक्ष*. Now the Sūtra referred to above has been interpreted by Śrī Śaṅkara as follows:—

अतः प्रभवात् अत एव हि वेदिकात् शब्दात् देवादिकं जगत् प्रभवति ।

Thus we see that the meaning of the Sūtra does in no way leave us in doubt regarding the Vedāntist conception of Vedaprāmāṇya. The words अतः प्रभवात् do not refer to the Vedas taking their origin from Īśvara, as supposed by him. The explanation that he has in view has not been offered by any commentator. Without any necessity whatever, the commentator, Śaṅkara, states in the bhāṣya on the next Sūtra अत एव च नित्यत्वम् thus:

स्वतन्त्रस्य कर्तुरस्मरणादिभिः स्थिते वेदस्य निश्चले देवादित्यक्तिप्रभवा-
भ्युपगमेन तस्य विरोधमाशङ्क्य अतः प्रभवात् इति परिहृत्य इदानीं तदेव
वेदनित्यत्वं स्थितं दृढयति ।

and quotes in support of his position the famous verse

पुण्येऽन्तर्हितान् वेदान् सेतिहासान् पार्श्वयः ।

लेभिरे तपसा पूर्वमनुज्ञाताः स्वयमुवा ॥

That Śaṅkara refers to parts of the Sūtra औत्पत्तिश्च ॥ etc. in his pūrvapakṣa in I, iii, 28 cannot lead us to any other conclusion. A careful perusal of the Pūrvapakṣa Bhāṣya will show that what

has been raised as *pūrvapakṣa* on the basis of the Sūtra औत्पत्तिकस्तु has been accepted in the Siddhānta. It is only such *Pūrvapakṣa* views as are not accepted by the Siddhāntin that can lead one to a different conclusion.

The fact that Śaṅkara accepts the difficulties raised shows that he was aware that the *pūrvapakṣa* view belonged to Bādarāyaṇa, identical with the author of the text on which he was commenting.

The position of Śaṅkara is clear. Bādarāyaṇa, according to Śaṅkara, regarded the infallibility of the Veda as अनपेक्षस्वरक्षण. To seek to distinguish between the theories of Vedaprāmāṇya of Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini is therefore impossible. Hence it comes to this, that in the Sūtra औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्वायेन संबन्धः etc. the Bādarāyaṇa referred to might well have been the author of the *Brahmasūtras*.¹

With regard to the other references to Bādarāyaṇa in the Sūtras of Jaimini, it has to be pointed out that it may not turn out to be an unreasonable conjecture that Bādarāyaṇa may have been the author of a set of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* Sūtras. It is likely that in places where Bādarāyaṇa is referred to, there are actual reminiscences of the very words employed by him in his work, which is obviously lost to us at this distance of time.

If we argue that the Bādarāyaṇa referred to by Jaimini is the same as the author of the *Brahmasūtras*, a pertinent question may be raised as to how Bādarāyaṇa quotes Jaimini. One can easily get out of the difficulty by saying that the two Jaiminis are different; but that is simply trying to evade the question. Like Bādarāyaṇa, who must have written on both the systems of thought, Jaimini too should have written on both the systems. Here we have a more definite proof, for even so late a writer as Sureśvara records the fact that Jaimini wrote on the Uttara-

1. For an expression of a similar view see pages 28-34 of the "Introduction to *Pūrvamīmāṃsā*" by Pasupatinath Sastri.

mimāṃsā also. In the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, Suresvara remarks in one place:—¹

यदपि जैमिनौयं वचनमुद्घाटयति तदपि तद्विवक्षापरिज्ञानादेवोद्भाष्यते ;
कारणं किम् ? यतो जैमिनेरयमभिप्रायः, आश्रायः सर्व एव क्रियार्थः, इति ।
यदि ह्ययमभिप्रायोऽभिविध्यत् “अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा” “जन्माद्यस्य यतः”
इत्येवमादि ब्रह्मवस्तुरूपमाश्रयायाम्यप्रकाशानपरं गम्भीरन्याससंगृह्यं सर्ववेदान्तार्थ-
मीमांसनं श्रीमच्छरीरकं नासूत्रयिष्यत्, असूत्रयच्च । तस्मात् जैमिनेरेवाय-
मभिप्रायो यथैव विधिवाक्यानां, स्तार्थमात्रे प्रामाण्यमेवमैकात्म्यवाक्यानामपि,
अनभिगतवस्तुपरिच्छेदसाम्यादिति ।

From this extract it may be easily inferred that the first two, probably the first four, *Sūtras* of *Bādarāyaṇa* should have been common to both *Jaimini* and *Bādarāyaṇa*. The references to *Jaimini* in the *Brahmasūtras* relate to points of Vedāntic interest and of *Mimāṃsā* interest also. धर्म जैमिनिरत एव undoubtedly refers to the *Mimāṃsā* predilections of *Jaimini*. It is, therefore, very probable that each had occasion to look into the work of the other and each probably modified his work after looking into that of the other.

BĀDARI:

Bādari is another writer quoted by both *Bādarāyaṇa* and *Jaimini*. The name *Bādari* seems to imply the possibility of some sort of relationship between him and *Bādarāyaṇa*. In all likelihood he may have been the son of one *Badara* and an ancestor of *Bādarāyaṇa*, and consequently slightly older than *Bādarāyaṇa*. Objections similar to those that have been raised regarding the identity of the *Bādarāyaṇa* of the *Pūrva* and *Uttaramimāṃsā*s may be raised in the case of the identity of the *Bādari* of the two systems, but they again stand on slippery ground. References to *Bādari* show that he too must have

1. See page 52 of the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, second edition—
Edited by Prof. Hiriyanna, B. S. S. Both Col. Jacob and Prof.
Hiriyanna have drawn attention to this fact.

written on both the systems. We are here concerned with the Pūrvamīmāṃsā system alone.¹

ĀŚMARATHYA:

One may see from the name itself, that he is the son of one Āśmaratha. This is perhaps the only information that we have of him. Āśmarathya is quoted by both Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa. Jaimini's references as usual relate to points of Mīmāṃsā interest and Bādarāyaṇa's references naturally have bearing on the theories of Vedānta. From the remarks of Śrī Saṅkarācārya and later commentators it is obvious that he belonged to that school of Vedāntic thought which came to be styled, in the terminology of later Vedāntins, as *bhedābheda*. It may be of some interest to note that several Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhāṭṭa school, beginning from Kumārilaśvāmin, have held the philosophical doctrine, *Bhedābheda*. Kumārilaśvāmin has devoted a considerable portion of his work to the elucidation of the doctrine, *Bhedābheda*. The only Sūtra in which reference is made to Āśmarathya in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras seems to be a direct quotation from the lost work of Āśmarathya.²

ĀTTREYA:

To Āttreya again there are both Vedāntic and Mīmāṃsīc references. The references in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras are clear and they all indicate the views of Āttreya on Mīmāṃsā. One reference in the Brahmasūtras is not clear. It may have particular reference either to Vedānta or Mīmāṃsā. One of the Sūtras ascribed to Āttreya in Jaimini's work seems to be a direct quotation from the lost work of Āttreya. The reference is to the Sūtra

1. It is worthy of note that in the Kātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra reference is made to a Bādari in the following Sūtra: अनुवादः पूर्वस्येति वात्स्यवादी ॥ IV-96. Perhaps he is the same Bādari.

2. An Āśmarathya is frequently referred to in Śrauta Sūtra literature, very often as differing from Ālekhaṇa. The Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra and the Āśvalāyana sūtra make mention of Āśmarathya. Here again it is likely that this Āśmarathya is the same as the one referred to by Jaimini.

निर्देशाद्वा त्रयाणां स्यादग्न्याधेये ह्यसंबन्धः कतुषु ब्राह्मणश्रुतिः इत्यात्रेयः ।

VI, i, 26

Jaimini completely agrees with Ātreya in certain places, as for instance in the *rātrisatrādhikarṇa* where he quotes Ātreya in support of his conclusions.

We know of an Ātreya, who is referred to in Dharmaśāstra literature as an authority on Smṛtis. To him is ascribed a Smṛti¹, but it is no longer available. Perhaps the author referred to by Jaimini is the same as the Smṛti writer, Ātreya. Another Ātreya is known to us through a single reference in the Śrauta Sūtra of Bodhāyana.² It is not known if all or any of these Ātreyas were identical.

KĀRṢṆĀJINI:

This name seems to be somewhat tell-tale. The deerskin was probably inseparably associated with him so that he came in to be known by that name. This author too is referred to both in the Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta Sūtras. The citation in the Vedānta Sūtras has particular reference to a passage in the Upaniṣads and its interpretation, and has nothing to do with Mīmāṃsā. Similarly, the references in the Mīmāṃsāsūtras have nothing to do with Vedānta. The references therein relate to ritualistic details. Therefore, there is not much difficulty in assuming that Kārṣṇājini may have written on both the systems.

1. सीदते बहुभूत्याय श्रोत्रियायाहिताग्ने ।

अतिथिप्रियाय दान्ताय देवा धेनुर्गुहान्विता ॥

अकुलीनाय मूर्त्वाय तुम्भाय पित्रुनाय च ।

हव्यकल्पज्वेताय गौर्न देवा कपचन ॥

Caturvargacintāmaṇi, I, 451.

चतुर्भुजो गजमुखो मूषकस्यञ्च तुण्डिलः ।

विषाणं चाक्षत्त्रं च परशुं मानुजद्वयम् ॥

Caturvargacintāmaṇi, I, 622.

These verses are ascribed to Ātreya.

2. आत्रेयस्य संबन्ध इति, XXI, 21.

12 HISTORY OF PŪRVAMĪMĀNSĀ LITERATURE

A Kārṣṇājini appears as the author of a lost treatise on Dharmaśāstra. Numerous extracts occur from Kārṣṇājini's work in many Nibandhas on Dharmaśāstra.¹ Whether that Kārṣṇājini is identical with the Vedāntin Kārṣṇājini is a matter to be investigated. Very probably they are.

In Śrauta literature again, we come across the views of a Kārṣṇājini. For instance, in the Kātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra, we find:—

कुलसत्रमिति कार्ष्णाजिनिः I. 144.

AUDULOMI:

Audulomi's also is a familiar name. He has been mentioned thrice by Bādarāyaṇa in the Brahmasūtras. But in the 12 adhyāyas of Pūrvamīmāṃsā we do not find his name mentioned. In only one place in the Saṅkarṣa is his name referred to as stated already. More of Audulomi we do not know.

ĀLEKHANA:

Ālekhana is an author of importance, who is mentioned neither in the Brahmasūtras nor in the 12 adhyāyas of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. We come across his name only in the Saṅkarṣa-kāṇḍa portion of Pūrvamīmāṃsā in the Sūtra referred to already. It is of some importance to note that Ālekhana is referred to in the Śrauta literature and very often he is referred to as holding an opinion that is antagonistic to that of Āśmarathya. Āśmarathya and Ālekhana are seen to be holding antagonistic views in the Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra and also Āśvalāyana Śrauta Sūtra.²

1. See Parāśaramādhaviya: BSS. Vol. I, Part I and II.

I-i. 108: 267: 352: 353: 392:

I-ii. 131: 246: 321: 322: 392:

325: 330: 417: 451: 452:

454: 461: 468:

See Page 127. Nandapaṇḍita, Dattaka Mīmāṃsa; Page 29, Dattakacandrikā.

In the commentary on the Dattakacandrikā the work of Kārṣṇājini is referred to as a Sūtra.

2. For a complete list of references to Ālekhana and Āśmarathya, please see appendix I.

AITISĀYANA, KĀMUKĀYANA AND LĀVUKĀYANA:

These are not found referred to in the Vedāntasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. Jaimini alone has something to say about them and one cannot conclude from this whether they wrote on both the systems or on one only. It should be left to future research to find out the contributions of these persons.

KĀŚAKṚTSNA:

Among the predecessors of Jaimini, mention must be made of two important writers, who, though not mentioned by Jaimini, have yet to be regarded as writers on Mimāṃsā. Kāśakṛtsna figures in the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa but not in the Mimāṃsāsūtras of Jaimini. On the other hand there is a tradition alluded to by Vedānta Deśika that Kāśakṛtsna was the author of the last four chapters of Mimāṃsā known as Saṅkarśakāṇḍa.

In the Mahābhāṣya¹ of Patañjali we find under the Sūtra अनुसर्जनात् IV-4-14 the statement काशकृत्स्नी मीमांसा. It is not unlikely that Patañjali refers to the work of Kāśakṛtsna on Mimāṃsā i.e., Pūrva and Uttara Mimāṃsā. Kāśakṛtsna was a predecessor of Bādarāyaṇa and Pāṇini and it is but therefore proper that he should be referred to in this connection.

In the Śrauta Sūtra of Kātyāyana we find the following reference: वयस्त्वं काशकृत्स्निः IV-95.

Is this person the same as Kāśakṛtsna or a relation of his?

ĀPIŚALI:

In the same place in the Mahābhāṣya we find the statement आपिशली मीमांसा. Āpiśali is not found referred to either by Bādarāyaṇa or by Jaimini, but it is not improbable, in the light of the remarks of Patañjali, that Āpiśali, like Kāśakṛtsna, wrote on Mimāṃsā—Pūrva and Uttara. Āpiśali, we know, preceded Pāṇini.

1. See the chapter on Saṅkarśakāṇḍa.

2. Keilhorn, Vol. II, p. 206.

14 HISTORY OF PŪRVAMIMĀNSĀ LITERATURE

JAIMINI:

Among the writers referred to by Jaimini, it has been said, the name of Jaimini also occurs. Except in one instance, the references are to his own views. But in one place, i.e., in the Sūtra.

कर्मभेदं तु जैमिनिः प्रयोगवचनैकत्वात् सर्वेषां उपदेशः स्यात् इति ।

VI, iii, 4.

the opinion of Jaimini happens to be the pūrvapakṣa. Śabarasvāmin, who always refers to the author of Pūrvamīmāṃsā sūtras as Ācārya Jaimini, takes particular care to omit the word आचार्य in this connection. He says: इति जैमिनिः मन्वते स्म and इति जैमिनिः आह स्म in the Bhāṣya on VI-iii-1 and VI-iii-4. According to Śabarasvāmin's bhāṣya on this Sūtra, the view of Jaimini is treated as pūrvapakṣa. It is clear from this that the Jaimini referred to in the pūrvapakṣa should have been a writer different from the author of the extant Mīmāṃsāsūtras.¹

1. This point has been dealt with by Mr. K. A. Nilakantha Sastri in Vol. L of the Indian Antiquary.

CHAPTER II

JAIMINI

Jaimini shares the fate of most of our eminent old Indian worthies. We do not know who Jaiminī himself was. We know of a Jaimini in whose name a Brāhmaṇa of the Sāmaveda has come down to us at present; we know of another who is the author of a Śrauta and a Gṛhya Sūtra of the Sāmaveda. There is another Jaimini referred to in the Āśvalāyana¹, Śāṅkhayana, Kauṣītaka and other Gṛhya Sūtras.

It is interesting to note that apart from Jaimini, a Sūtra and bhāṣya are mentioned in this extract. Perhaps there were bhāṣyas also written prior to the days of Āśvalāyana; which bhāṣya is referred to here, we do not know. But it is likely that the bhāṣya referred to is a bhāṣya on some Sūtra. There is then, Mimāṃsā sūtra whose author is another Jaimini; finally we have the Jaimini referred to in the Sūtras of Jaimini himself. Apart from these Jaiminis there are a few more, like the author of the famous astrological and astronomical Sūtras; there is also a Bhārata ascribed to a Jaimini. How many more Jaiminis may be discovered in course of time we cannot say at present. The point to be investigated is the identity of the author of the Mimāṃsāsūtras and the Jaimini quoted therein. The authors of the Gṛhya and the Śrautasūtras may have been identical. In the extract cited on pages 1 and 2 *ante* from the Mimāṃsāsūtrārthasaṅgraha of Parameśvara, we find that according to Parameśvara, the Jaimini of the Sāmaveda was identical with the author of the Pūrvamimāṃsāsūtras.

The name of Jaimini occurs in the Pūrvamimāṃsā in a number of places, and except in one of the instances, the Jaimini

1 Āśvalāyana mentions Jaimini thus:—

प्राचीनाधीती नुमन्नुजेमिनिवेशम्यापनयैलक्ष्मभाष्यमहाभारतधर्माचार्यः... सर्वे
वृष्यन् ॥ III-iii-5.

